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Abstract
The statutory residency rules were introduced in 1930, while some of the statutory 
source rules have their genesis in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), others in 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth) and still others in the 1890s State and New 
Zealand tax Acts. Similarly the common law principles in respect of residency and 
source were established in the late 1890’s. The fact the law has ancient origins in itself 
is not the issue, rather it is the ability of that law to engage in a 21bt century world where 
trade in services outstrips trade in goods and the communications revolution has 
removed the need for traditional physical linkages to jurisdiction.
Concerns about the ability of the law to deal with the Internet lead the ATO, in its 1997 
Report on Taxation and the Internet to call for the current source, residency, and 
permanent establishment rules to be substantially revised. Similarly, the 1999 broad 
inquiry into Australia’s business tax regime by the Review of Business Taxation 
recommended reform of the source “rules”, while the 2003 Board of Taxation report (in 
respect Treasury’s Review of International Taxation Arrangements) recommended 
reform of the company residency test.
These calls for change have been initiated without a contemporary, comprehensive 
review of the rules against tax policy objectives. This thesis undertakes that study.
The thesis argues that the law of residency and determination of source under 
Australia’s income tax law (the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)) is inadequate in 
its practical application when judged against four tax policy objectives; equity, 
efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance. It establishes that the 
residency rules (applicable to individuals, companies and trusts) and that the 
determinations of source income do not meet those objectives (particularly in respect of 
simplicity and the prevention of avoidance).
The thesis also argues that there is scope to modify the law, within the jurisdictional 
framework, so that it more closely meets the tax policy objectives. A comparative study 
of residency and source in other jurisdictions is undertaken to explore the potential 
alternatives for reform.
vii
Although the thesis identifies limited areas where change, consistent with the tax policy 
objectives and within the jurisdictional boundaries, is achievable, it concludes that 
significant change is not possible without reconsidering Australia’s jurisdictional claim.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The primary objective of this thesis is to examine and assess the adequacy of residency 
and source (the so-called the “rules of attachment”) used in determining sufficient 
connection under the Australian income tax law. This examination is to be undertaken 
against the tax policy objectives of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of 
tax avoidance. 1 2 A second objective, having evaluated and defined the adequacy of these 
rules, is to examine the avenues for reform that more closely satisfy the objectives just 
noted.
This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis by illustrating the importance of 
residency and source in the Australian income tax law. It does this against a contextual 
summary of the historical transition in Australia from a territorial (source) based system 
of taxation to a worldwide (residency) based system of taxation in the context of 
Colonial, State and Commonwealth income tax law. Having clearly articulated the thesis 
and the reasons that justify testing of the thesis, the Chapter also lays out the approach to 
be adopted in exploring the thesis.
I. Background
While in theory public international law does not impose any limitations on a 
government's power to tax, it is widely accepted that a government’s power is 
effectively limited to those taxpayers who have a “sufficient connection" to the 
jurisdiction.3 Sufficient connection can be established in five ways:4
1 The appropriateness to the tax policy objectives selected is argued in Chapter 2.
2 See the United States Supreme Court decision in McCullock v Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 429 
(1819) and Martin Norr, ‘Jurisdiction to Tax and International Income’ [1962] Tax Law Review 43.
3 Similarly, the Commonwealth, Royal Commission on Taxation, Reports (1932-34) (the 1932 Royal 
Commission), 65 noted that “[e]very state has an unrestricted right to adopt its own methods of 
taxation within the sphere of its jurisdiction. The obligation or duty to pay taxes may be determined 
by reference to various tests, as, for example, political allegiance, temporary residence, domicile or 
origin.” Other attachment rules used to justify the right to tax include sovereignty, 
benefit/entitlement, faculty, economic allegiance and realistic doctrines -  see Niv Tadmore, Tax 
Treaties and Electronic Commerce (SJD Thesis, Deakin University School of Law, 2003), 15-40.
4 Edwin R A Seligman, Essays in Taxation (3rd ed, 1900), 108.
• political allegiance (ie citizenship) of the taxpayer (the oldest principle);'
• temporary residence of the taxpayer;6
• residency or domicile of the taxpayer (the world-wide principle of taxation) ; 7
• taxation based on where the property is located or where the income is sourced
o
(the territorial principle of taxation); and
• the economic interest or economic allegiance of the taxpayer, ie taxed according 
to an individual's economic interests under each jurisdiction.9
Of these five possible badges of sufficient connection, Australia adopts two, 10 the 
source of the receipt (the territorial principle of taxation) and the residency or domicile 
of the taxpayer (the world-wide principle of taxation). Both source and residency are 
based strongly upon geographical attachment (ie either by the taxpayer being located 
within the jurisdiction or by a transaction being conducted within the jurisdiction).
However, despite the importance of each principle, both principles remain vague and ill- 
defined. For example, in law there is no single concept of "residence" . 11 The term 
residence can have a different meaning in different contexts (eg its meaning in 
jurisdictional matters will vary from its meaning in an income tax context). Even in the 
revenue context, the term's meaning can vary.
Despite the variety of definitions, a good starting point adopted by the courts for 
obtaining a general sense of the term is the dictionary meanings of the word (ie "reside"
5 Ibid. However, Seligman rejects this test as "[i]n the modem age of the international migration of 
persons as well as capital, political allegiance no longer forms an adequate test of individual fiscal 
obligation. It is fast breaking down in practice, and it is clearly insufficient in theory" (at 109).
6 Ibid. Although Seligman (at 109) rejects this test as not having any logical basis (ie the " . . .  
relations between him and the government are too slight"), the operation of this approach can be 
seen in indirect taxes like Goods and Services Taxes (GSTs) and Value Added Taxes (VATs), and 
in accommodation or entertainment levies.
7 Ibid. This later basis of taxation is based on the concept that personalty (property) of the income 
follows the owner (mobilia personam sequuntur). The principle is sometimes expressed as mobilia 
inherent ossibus domini (at 112).
8 Ibid. The doctrine of situs, ie taxed where the property is located or where the income is sourced 
(the territorial principle of taxation).
9 1932 Royal Commission, above n 3, 65 and Klaus Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs source of income -  
A review and revaluation of arguments (Part I)’ (1988) 8-9 Intertax 216, 219.
10 1932 Royal Commission, Ibid.
11 Peter E Nygh, Conflicts o f  Laws in Australia (3rd ed, 1976) 145. See also R Sappideen, ‘The 
residence of natural persons’ (1979) 8 Australian Tax Review 139.
12 See, eg, Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (the 1936 Act) s 23AA (the term “ordinarily 
resident” is used), cf Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) (the term “resident taxpayer” is used).
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means . . to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have one's settled or
1 Tusual abode, to live, in or at a particular place").
There are also three general usages of the term “source” in taxation law. The principal 
usage of the word “source” is the concept of “territorial” source; being the place the 
income arises. The two other uses of the term “source” are in the context of the taxing 
of income as it arises (ie taxing income “at its source”), and to describe the “character” 
of the receipt (ie the classification of receipts according to the nature of the activity that 
gave rise to the receipt, for example “income from business”). Although the 
“characterisation” of income is an important issue, the focus of this work will be on 
territorial source.14
A. Importance of sufficient connection
Despite being ill-defined the sufficient connection principles of source and residency are 
the so-called "fundamental building blocks" of the Australian taxation system.1'̂  Under 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (1997 Act) a finding of residency is the primary 
way income is tied to the Australian16 tax system. Residents are assessed on their
13 Applegate v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1979) 9 ATR 899, 905; 79 ATC 4307, 4313, per 
Northrop J relying on the Shorter English Oxford Dictionary. The Macquarie Concise Dictionary 
(3 rd ed, 1998), 987 defines resides in similar terms - “to dwell permanently or for a considerable 
time; have one’s abode for a time". Justice Wilcox in Hafza v Director-General o f  Social Security 
(1985) 6 FCR 444, 449 stated ”[t]here is a plethora of decisions arising in various contexts . . . 
relating to the legal concept of residence. As a general concept residence includes two elements, 
physical presence in a particular place and intention to treat that place as home at least for the time 
being not necessarily forever."
14 Characterisation is important in a number of areas including income/capital determinations and in 
determining the nature of a receipt (such as a royalty) for the purpose of Australia’s bilateral 
agreements for the avoidance of double tax and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income (DTA’s), which are located as Schedules to the International Tax Agreements Act 
1953 (Cth). The importance of this issue is recognised by the Australian Taxation Office (Taxation 
and the Internet: Second Report (1999) para 5.2.9) and by the OECD (which created a dedicated 
Technical Advisory Group on Treaty Characterisation of E-Commerce Payments). For further 
discussion see Chapter 5 Part II A of the thesis.
15 See eg Robin H Woellner, et al, Australian Taxation Law (13th ed, 2003), 1348.
16 The definition of “Australia” in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act was repealed in 1960. The operative 
definition is found in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and applies to all Commonwealth Acts, 
unless a contrary intention appears. Under s 17(a) "Australia" or "the Commonwealth" means the 
Commonwealth of Australia and, when used in a geographical sense, does not include an external 
Territory. The following subsections further refine the definition:
17(p) "Territory of the Commonwealth" or "Territory under the authority of the Commonwealth" 
includes any Territory administered by the Commonwealth under a Trusteeship Agreement; 
(pa) "Territory" or ""Territory of Australia" means a Territory referred to in s 122 of the 
Constitution, and includes a Territory administered by the Commonwealth under a 
Trusteeship Agreement; . . .
(pd) "External Territory" means a Territory, not being an internal Territory, for the government of 
which as a Territory provision is made by any Act;
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17 1 8 *ordinary and statutory income from all sources under the 1997 Act. A finding that a 
taxpayer is not a resident of Australia (a non-resident)19 will limit the income subject to 
tax in Australia to the ordinary20 and statutory21 income from Australian sources. A 
determination of residency is also crucial for corporate group consolidation,22 the 
taxation of income from trusts,23 entitlement to oral binding rulings,24 entitlement to tax 
offsets (rebates) and the taxation and regulation of superannuation. Source is
(pe) "Internal Territory" means the Australian Capital Territory, the Jervis Bay Territory or the 
Northern Territory.
The definition of "Australia" is extended to the Territories for the purposes of s 23AA of the 1936 
Act. The scope of the 1936 Act is further extended beyond the "Australia" definition by two other 
sections. These extensions include certain sea installations (vessels and oil rigs) and offshore areas 
(including the external territories of Ashmore and Cartier Islands, the Coral Sea Islands and Heard 
and McDonald Islands and Petroleum Act adjacent areas) (s 6AA), and, to limited extent, to 
Territories of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Christmas Island and Norfolk Island (s 7A).
17 s 6-5 (2) [Assessable ordinary income - residents] If you are an Australian resident, your assessable 
income includes the *ordinary income you *derived directly or indirectly from all sources, whether 
in or out of Australia, during the income year.
18 s 6-10 (4) [Assessable statutory income - residents] If you are an Australian resident, your 
assessable income includes your *statutory income from all sources, whether in or out of Australia.
19 The definition of a "non-resident" in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act, unlike the resident definitions was not 
initially incorporated into the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (the 1997 Act). The 
definition continues to be operative for the 1936 Act. However, the definition was subsequently 
placed in s 995-1 of the 1997 Act by A New Tax System (Pay As You Go) Act 1999 (Cth) under the 
guise of a new definition of "foreign resident" (ie, a person who is not a resident of Australia for the 
purposes of the 1936 Act) to facilitate the PAYG provisions relating to dividends, interest and 
royalties received in Australia. The term “foreign resident” is also used in the Taxation 
Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 12-315 and 12-317 and was also used in Board of Taxation, 
Commonwealth, Tax Value Method Demonstration Legislation Prototype 4 (2002) s 995-1. A 
specific non-residency definition (ie "non-resident life assurance policy") was introduced by New 
Business Tax System (Miscellaneous) Act (No 2) 2000 (Cth) to define the exempt income of 
insurance companies.
20 s 6-5 (3) [Assessable ordinary income - non-residents] If you are not an Australian resident, your 
assessable income includes:
(a) the *ordinary income you *derived directly or indirectly from all * Australian sources 
during the income year; and
(b) other *ordinary income that a provision includes in your assessable income for the income 
year on some basis other than having an * Australian source.
21 s 6-10 (5) [Assessable statutory income - non-residents] If you are not an Australian resident, your 
assessable income includes:
(a) your ^statutory income from all * Australian sources; and
(b) other *statutory income that a provision includes in your assessable income on some basis 
other than having an * Australian source.
22 The residency of an entity is crucial for an entity’s inclusion in a consolidated group -  see, eg, 1997 
Act ss 700-5(2) (general), 703-1 and 703-15 (companies), 703-25 (trusts), and 719-10 to 719-20 
(multiple entry consolidated (MEC) groups).
23 The categorisation as a resident or a non-resident trust estate is important for the purposes of 
applying ss 99 and 99A of the 1936 Act, in that if it is a resident trust estate all net income 
regardless of its source will be subject to tax in Australia if it is income to which no beneficiary is 
presently entitled. In contrast, if it is a non-resident trust estate, it is only that part of the income to 
which no beneficiary is presently entitled that also has an Australian source that will be subject to 
tax in Australia. Also, beneficiaries in non-resident trusts (see definition in s 95(3) of the 1936 Act) 
are subjected to the foreign income fund measures (FIF) and transferor trust measures.
24 Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 360-140(l)(a) of Schedule 1: the Commissioner is not 
permitted to provide an oral binding ruling on a matter of law if during the inquiry period the 
Commissioner is not satisfied that the person making the request was an Australian resident.
25 See, eg, baby bonus in 1936 Act ss 61-355, 61-360. Entitlement to a tax rebate (a baby bonus) upon 
birth or adoption of your “first” child (a “child event”) required the parent to be a resident. The
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crucial in determining whether income is tax exempt,2X determining timing of 
assessment, whether losses will be quarantined and availability of tax credits.
Specifically, for international transactions a finding of Australian residency or 
determining an Australian source for income of a non-resident will render that taxpayer 
subject to Australian tax. For example, under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
(1936 Act), where an Australian resident derives income sourced outside Australia the 
foreign tax credit system allows both direct and indirect (or underlying) credits in 
respect of foreign tax paid, as well as a series of exemptions. Exemptions in respect of 
the foreign source income of residents also exist where the Government has sought to 
fill skill shortages by encouraging foreign experts to come to Australia for limited 
periods. There is also a system for allowing deductions for current and carried forward 
foreign losses.34 Further, where residents have interests in offshore companies they then 
may be subject to the Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) or Foreign Income Fund (FIF) 
measures. Similarly, interests in trusts may subject them to the transferor trust measures 
and the FIF measures. There are also special rules for companies engaged in offshore 
banking and those that establish regional headquarters in Australia.35
scheme for new parents was terminated from 1 July 2004, but current participants continue to 
receive their entitlement until 30 June 2009.
26 Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 360-140( 1 )(a).
27 See, eg, Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1996 (Cth) s 27.
28 See, eg, the 1936 Act s 23(r) (via the operation of ss 6-20 and 11-15 of the 1997 Act), which
excludes from the scope of the 1997 Act the foreign source income of non-resident taxpayers, 
except where a provision of the 1997 Act expressly includes assessable income on a basis other 
than source. See also, eg, the 1936 Act s 23 AG, which applies foreign service income of residents.
29 See the transferor trust (1936 Act Division 6AAA of Part III), CFC (1936 Act Part X) and the FIF 
measures (1936 Act Part XI).
30 See foreign tax loss measures (1997 Act Division 36 and 1936 Act ss 79D, 79DA, and 160AFD).
31 See the foreign tax credit system, Division 18 of Part III of the 1936 Act.
32 See generally 1936 Act, Division 18. These exemptions apply where the foreign income received 
has previously been subject to Australian tax (eg ss 1936 Act ss 23AI and 23AK) or where it is 
administratively easier to exclude the income. An example of the latter is s 23 AG of the 1936 Act, 
which provides an exemption from tax for salary and wage income where a resident has been 
engaged in continuous foreign service for at least 91 days.
33 See, eg, 1936 Act s 517 (exemption from the FIF rules for individuals who enter Australia on a 
temporary entry permit, where the visa is for four or fewer years’ duration) and 1997 Act s 104- 
165(1) (exemption from capital gains tax, provided the individual was an Australian resident for 
less than 5 years of the last 10 years and the asset disposed of was either owned by taxpayer before 
becoming a resident or it was acquired after becoming a resident because of someone's death).
There were proposals made by Review of Business Taxation, Commonwealth, A Tax System 
Redesigned (1999) to extend these limited exemptions but following two failed attempts to 
introduce the proposed changes (Taxation Laws Amendment (No 4) Bill 2002 (Cth) (introduced on 
30 May 2002) and Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 7) 2002 (Cth) (introduced on 23 October 
2002)) due to the opposition parties in the Senate opposing the bills passage, the Government has 
abandoned the reform proposals -  Treasurer, ‘Taxation of temporary residents’ (Press Release No 
105, 8 December 2003).
34 See, eg, 1936 Act ss 79D, 79DA, 79E and 160AFD.
35 1936 Act Div9A.
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Non-residents are also subject to a range of special rules. Non-residents have a zero tax- 
free threshold36 and are excluded from personal tax offsets.37 However, interest, 
dividend and royalty income derived by non-Australian residents is subject to 
withholding taxes at rates lower than that applicable to residents.38 Under the rewritten 
rules contained in Div 820 of the 1997 Act (formerly Div 16F of the 1936 Act) non­
residents with investments in Australia and residents with outbound investments may be 
subject to thin capitalisation rules (which impose limits on debt/equity ratios on both 
forms of investment). Division 13 of the 1936 Act may also apply to set aside or vary 
transactions that have the effect of shifting profits (transfer pricing arrangements).
The above discussion illustrates that Australia's ability to regulate international tax 
matters is reliant on the law relating to the fundamental building blocks of residency and 
source. The adequacy of that regulation must be questioned if it is proved that in 
essence the concepts of residency and source are vague and ill-defined.
B. History of residency and source
The reasons for the lack of clarity of these rules of attachment may be explained by the 
fact that the rules have not always operated in tandem in Australia. Although a world 
wide basis (extra territorial) of taxation was adopted in Australia's first colonial income 
tax law,40 the income tax systems introduced by the Commonwealth of Australia and the 
other Australian States/Colonies were founded on source rather than residency.41 This
36 Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) ss 12, 15, 18 and Schedules 7, 10 to 12.
37 Concessional rebates -  see, eg, 1936 Act s 159H(1).
38 1936 Act Divs 11A and 13A.
39 Roger Hamilton, Robert Deutsch and John Raneri, Australian International Taxation (October 
2002), para 2.10. It follows that understanding of the principles of residency and source is 
necessary for anyone who practices income tax - Justice D Graham Hill, ‘Contemporary tax 
practice’ (Paper presented at the 14th Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, 
Auckland, 18 January 2002) 4.
40 Introduced in Tasmania in 1880 by the Real and Personal Estates Duty Act 1880 (Tas).
41 James Gilbert, The Tax Systems o f Australasia (1943) 39, and in Commonwealth, Royal 
Commission on Taxation, Reports (1920-24) (the 1920 Royal Commission) Jolly stated at 138A 
that “. . . in the taxing Acts of the Commonwealth and the States of Australia, as in other important 
parts of the British Dominions, the scope of the income tax has always been confined to incomes 
derived from a source within the geographical area controlled by the taxing authority.” However, 
these observations are not correct, as Tasmania adopted a worldwide basis for taxing income. The 
Real and Personal Estates Duty Act 1880 (Tas) s III imposed a tax on “all dividends declared, or 
ascertained, or becoming due from any Company carrying on business in Tasmania”. This 
residency approach was continued in Tasmania's first general income tax Act, the Income Tax Act 
1894 (Tas) s 14 which imposed a " . . .  tax on all Income arising, accruing, received in, or derived 
from Tasmania", and continued in all subsequent Acts (eg Income Tax Act 1902 (Tas) s 14, and 
Land and Income Taxation Act 1910 (Tas) s 27). In all of these Acts relief from any potential 
double taxation was provided for by permitting any taxpayer residing in Tasmania in receipt of
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occurred despite the English income tax legislation from its origins in 1799 adopted a 
residency basis for taxation42 and the majority of the colonies/dominions of the British 
Empire (including Canada, New Zealand and India) followed suit by adopting a 
residency or a domicile basis of taxation. However, the Australian Colonies were not 
alone as a number of other colonies/dominions adopted a source basis.43
This dominance of source as the primary method for determining liability for income tax 
in Australia44 came to an end in 1930 when the Commonwealth4' and some states46 
introduced the residency basis of taxation. This change had its genesis in the 
recommendations of the 1920 Royal Commission on Taxation,47 and was accepted by 
the Commonwealth Parliament in 1927. By the introduction of uniform income tax 
legislation between 1936 and 1937,40 income tax levied in Australia moved from this 
territorial (source) principle of taxation to a worldwide principle of taxation based upon 
the residency of a taxpayer. However, uniformity in the definition of residency between
foreign source income, to deduct from the income tax payable in Tasmania any income tax paid in 
respect of that foreign income derived in England or elsewhere (eg 1894 Act s 29, 1902 Act s 52 
and 1910 Act s 114).
42 Income Tax Act 1799 (UK) - see Denis Sheridan, ‘Residence in the United Kingdom: Observations 
on the Inland Revenue Consultative Document’ (1989) 29 European Taxation 17, 18.
For a more detailed history of the development of taxation laws see James Coffield, A Popular 
History o f Taxation from Ancient to Modern Times (1970); B E V Sabine, A History o f Income Tax 
(1966); and B E V Sabine, A Short History o f Taxation (1980). From an Australian prospective see 
Peter Harris, Metamorphosis o f the Australasian Income Tax: 1866 to 1922 Research Study No 37, 
Australian Tax Research Foundation (2002); Julie Smith, Taxing Popularity: The Story o f Taxation 
in Australia (1993); Ian vanden Driesen and Richard Fayle, ‘History of Income Tax in Australia’ in 
Richard Krever (ed), Australian Taxation: Principles and Practice (1987) 27-36; and Stephen 
Mills, Taxation in Australia (1925).
43 For example, the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Basutoland. 
Although countries such as Singapore continue to tax on a source basis, other traditionally source 
taxing countries are converting to a residency basis (eg South Africa changed from 1 January 
2001).
44 1920 Royal Commission, above n 41, Appendix No 6. Norman Rydge in The Law o f Income Tax 
in New South Wales (1921) 41 and Federal Income Tax Law (1921) 60 noted, relying on 
Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) v Kirk (1900) AC 588; 21 NSWLR 154, that it is immaterial 
whether a person resides in New South Wales or in Australia as residency is not relevant 
determining tax liability.
45 A definition of “resident”, similar to the current “resident” definition in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act, was 
introduced via s 2(i) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1930 (Cth).
46 Although the source basis of taxation continued for all States (except for Tasmania), residency 
based taxation was adopted in respect of specific categories of income. For example, a residency 
basis of taxation of dividends was introduced in South Australia via s 4 of the Taxation Act 1931 
(SA), and ex-Australian income was partially taxed in New South Wales (income from non­
investment trade or business) and Western Australia (export income).
47 1920 Royal Commission, above n 41, 108.
48 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 July 1930, 4845 (Dr Earle 
Page).
49 1936 Act (Cth); Income Tax (Management) Act 1936 (NSW); Income Tax (Assessment) Act 1936 
(Vic); Income Tax Assessment Act o f 1936 (Qld); Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (SA); Land 
and Income Taxation Act 1910 (Tas) as amended by Land and Income Taxation Act 1935 (Tas); 
and Income Tax Assessment Act 1937 (WA).
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States and the Commonwealth () was only ensured in 1942 with the Commonwealth 
passing four Acts, which centralised the levying of income taxation in the hands of the 
Commonwealth.^1 Since 1939, when the so-called "superannuation" test was introduced, 
the definition o f "resident" in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act (which is the definition adopted for 
the 1997 Act via s 995-1) has not been substantially amended.
Over the period statutory source deeming rules have been introduced on an ad hoc basis 
not governed by any general principles. Except for the royalty source deeming rules,53 
which were introduced in 1968 and 1986, the genesis of many of these rules is the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 (1922 Act), and in some cases, the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1915 (1915 Act) and earlier State Acts.54
50 For example, in respect of residency of individuals New South Wales, in the Income Tax 
(Management) Act 1936 (NSW) s 5(a), adopted the “resident person” definition used in the Income 
Tax (Management) Act 1928 (NSW) s 3. Section 5(a) defines “resident” to mean “a person, other 
than a company, whose usual or principal place of abode is in his State and includes any such 
person who is a public officer of the Commonwealth or of this State and who is absent from this 
State in the performance of his duty, and the wife of such public officer absent from this State with 
him.” Tasmania, in the Land and Income Taxation Act 1910 (Tas) s 2(1) adopted only the 
“resides” test. Similarly, Queensland reserved the additional power for the Commissioner to deem 
a company to be resident (Income Tax Assessment Act o f 1936 (Qld) s 4) while Tasmania deemed 
company residence to be “. . . the place where the company has - 1. Either its head office or its chief 
place of business: or II. Its chief place of manufacture or production within the Commonwealth” 
(Land and Income Taxation Act 1910 (Tas) s 2(1)).
51 The four Acts which centralised income taxation in the Commonwealth were the States Grants 
(Income Tax Reimbursement) Act 1942 (Cth) which provided for payments to the states, Income 
Tax (War-time Arrangements) Act 1942 (Cth) which provided for the transfer of state officers to 
the Commonwealth, Income Tax Assessment Act 1942 (Cth) which gave payment of 
Commonwealth income tax priority over all other taxes, and Income Tax Act 1942 (Cth) which 
imposed new tax rates for the year. With the validity of these laws upheld by the High Court in 
State o f South Australia v Commonwealth ('First Uniform Tax Case) (1942) 65 CLR 373, the 
States suspended the operation of their income tax legislation -  see Income Tax Suspension Act 
1942 (NSW) ss 2 to 7; Financial Arrangements and Development Aid Act 1942 (Qld) ss 3 to 6; 
Income Tax Suspension Act 1942 (SA) ss 5 and 6; Land and Income Tax Act (No 2) 1942 (Tas) s 
3(1); Income Tax (War-time Collections) Act 1942 (Vic) ss 2 and 3; and Income and 
Entertainments Tax (War-time Suspension) Act 1942 (WA) ss 2 and 3. The operation of the tax 
laws in Western Australia was suspended indefinitely by the Income and Entertainments Tax (War­
time Suspension) Act 1953 (WA) s 3.
52 Section 6(a)(iii) was added by the Income Tax Assessment Act 1939 (Cth). The subsequent changes 
to the definition only reflect changes to the Commonwealth's superannuation scheme named in s 
6(a)(iii).
53 These rules deem an Australian source for certain royalty payments (s 6C of 1936 Act inserted by 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1968 (Cth)) and certain natural resource payments (s 6CA of 1936 Act 
inserted by Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 4) 1986 (Cth)).
54 For example the ship charterer source rules were introduced into New South Wales in 1895 by s 24 
of The Land and Income Taxation Assessment Act 1895 (NSW) and in Victoria in 1896 by s 18 of 
the Income Tax Act 1896 (Vic).
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II. Justification
There are two primary reasons for undertaking this study: the lack of formal review of 
the laws dealing with residency and source despite great changes in the tax landscape 
and the Australian economy, and a specific gap in the government and academic 
literature.
A. A lack of formal review
First, although a determination of residency and/or source is a crucial part of any tax 
system, the development of these legal concepts lies principally in the 19th and early 
20th century common law and in statutory developments in the mid 1890’s through to 
the 1930s. The residency rules were adopted at a time when “. . . there were virtually no 
Australian taxpayers who received an income from investments or business abroad,” and 
as a result Australia did not have a single bilateral tax treaty from the prevention of 
double taxation and tax avoidance (so-called Double Tax Agreements (DTAs)).55
Despite developments in Australia's economy since 1930 and subsequent Royal 
Commissions and Inquiries over the last sixty years into the Australian tax system there 
has been no fundamental change to laws dealing with residency and source. The Asprey 
Committee in 1975 found, based upon considerations of equity and efficiency, that there 
was “a case for extending the exercise of jurisdiction to tax on the basis of residence so 
that all foreign income is subject to Australian tax and credit, so far as administratively 
feasible.”56 Despite that recommendation no reform eventuated.
Since the 1980’s Australia has been further thrust into the international market place. 
There was wide recognition that the Australian taxation system did not possess a 
cohesive legislative framework to deal effectively with the demands of both Australian 
businesses in the international market place and with foreign businesses operating in
55 Edwin RA Seligman, Double Taxation and International Fiscal Cooperation (1928), 47. 
Australia’s first DTA was signed with the United Kingdom on 29 October 1946 and incorporated 
into the Third Schedule of 1936 Act by Income Tax Assessment Act 1947 (Cth). With the signing of 
a second DTA with the United States on 14 May 1953, both DTAs were placed in the schedules to 
the Income Tax (International Agreements) Act 1953 (Cth).
56 Taxation Review Committee, Commonwealth, Full Report (1975) 260 (Asprey Report). The 
Committee (in Chapter 17A) recommended the adoption of specified statutory source rules dealing 
with income from personal service, income from business, and interest, dividend and royalty 
income.
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Australia.57 The level of weakness in the tax system is illustrated by the fact that as late
• • • •as 1985 much foreign source income was either not taxed or taxed lightly. In addition,
the liberalisation of exchange controls in 1983 created opportunities for tax avoidance
and tax minimisation by the use of tax havens.59
In light of these concerns, many aspects of the taxation of international transactions have 
been subjected to change since 1985. This process started in 1986 with the introduction 
of a foreign tax credit system.60 In the following years the tax law has been further 
amended to introduce the foreign source income (FSI) measures,61 the FIF measures,62 
revised withholding tax collection procedures in respect of royalties paid to non­
residents63 and new rules in respect of the taxation of offshore banking units (OBUs).64 
As well as these amendments to the 1936 Act, Australia entered into, or renegotiated, 
many of its comprehensive bilateral tax agreements. However, these reforms were aimed 
at addressing specific weaknesses in the existing rules (such as bringing forward the 
timing for recognition of offshore income (FSI and FIF measures) or providing 
incentives for foreign investors (eg OBUs)), not at revising fundamental rules like 
residency and source.
The failure to address fundamental reform has continued despite a number of recent 
Government initiated reviews of aspects of the tax system. The 1999 broad inquiry into 
Australia’s business tax regime by the Review of Business Taxation failed to address the
57 For example see the Office of the Economic Planning Advisory Council, Commonwealth, An 
Overview o f Submissions Received on Taxation Reform (1985)) and its findings - Commonwealth, 
Reform o f the Australian Tax System: Draft White Paper (1985). The Draft White Paper set out the 
Government’s reform agenda including measures aimed at reforming the international tax regime. 
In July 1985 the Hawke Government held a Tax Summit (recommendations of which were 
summarised in Commonwealth, A Guide to Tax Reform (1985)). As a result of the Summit the then 
Treasurer, Paul Keating (in his 19 September 1985 Reform o f the Australian Taxation System: 
Statement by the Treasurer (1985)) announced a number of major reforms including the 
introduction of a foreign tax credit system.
58 Allen Boxer, ‘Tax Reform Revisited’ (1985) 2 Australian Tax Forum 363, 373 and Richard Fayle, 
‘Controlling Abusive Tax Shelters’ (1985) 2 Australian Tax Forum 53, 64.
59 The then tax clearance procedures under Part IV of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) did 
not permit the issue of a tax clearance where tax havens were the destination of the funds. Section 
39B of the Banking Act 1959 (Cth) did not allow the Reserve Bank to permit specified funds 
transfers without such a certificate. By removing these procedures funds could flow into tax havens. 
See generally John Azzi, ‘Historical development of Australia's international tax rules’ (1994) 19 
Melbourne University Law Review 793, 803 and ibid Fayle (1985) 64.
60 Above n 31.
61 Above n 29.
62 Ibid.
63 Amending the definition in s 6 and Division 4 of Part IV of the 1936 Act introduced by the 
Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 5) 1992 (Cth).
64 Division 9A of Part III of the 1936 Act introduced by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 4) 
1992 (Cth).
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area of residency and only made a number of superficial recommendations to reform the 
existing source “rules”.65 The Government on 11 November 1999 accepted the source 
rule recommendations in principle,66 subject to further development through 
consultation. Changes to the residency definition were also mooted in other proposed 
reform measures.67
On 22 August 2002 the Treasury in a consultative paper titled Review of International
z: o # m
Taxation Arrangements (the Consultation paper) also considered options for reforming 
the company residency test,69 the treatment of dual residents and the taxation of 
expatriates. However, it did not pick up on the Review of Business Taxation 
recommendation in respect of reforming the statutory source rule. Despite the Board of 
Taxation in International Taxation: A Report to the Treasurer recommending the 
adoption of “incorporation” as the sole test for corporate residency, the Government
65 A Tax System Redesigned, above n 33, Recommendation 23.2(c), 684. Recommendations were 
also made in respect of the taxation of non-residents and double tax agreements - 
Recommendations 22.17 to 22.24 and 23.1 to 23.3. Anne O’Connell, ‘The race for tax base: 
Allocation of taxing rights between source and residence jurisdictions in Australia’ (2001) 24 Tax 
Notes International 1003, 1005 n 23 and Hamilton, above n 39, para 2.300 claim that in 1985 the 
Government indicated source rules were being developed. However, the reference upon which they 
rely in Paul Keating, Commonwealth, Reform o f the Australian Taxation System: Statement by the 
Treasurer (1985) 66 seems to be limited to source in the context of availability of a foreign tax 
credit rather than the distillation of the existing territorial source rules into statutory source rules.
66 Treasurer, ‘The New Business Tax System: Stage 2 Response’ (Press Release No 74, 11 November 
1999) Attachment N.
67 In Explanatory Materials, Exposure Draft: New Business Tax System (Entity Taxation) Bill 2000 
(Cth) para 1.40 the Government indicated that modifications of the residency test for non-fixed 
trusts were being developed. Similarly, the Board of Taxation had flagged further changes to the 
residency definition under the then proposed Tax Value Method (TVM) (see Board of Taxation, 
Commonwealth, Tax Value Method Demonstration Legislation Prototype 4 (2002) ss 4-15 and 
995-1). TVM was designed to replace Australia’s current traditional income tax system (ie based 
upon the income/capital dichotomy) with a new income calculation method where taxable income 
or loss is calculated as the sum of net income (being the difference between receipts and payments 
(excluding private flows) plus the change in the tax value of assets over the period less the change 
in the tax value of liabilities) and tax law adjustments (ie the exceptions to the rules where 
government policy requires a different treatment (eg capital gains discount, gifts, R & D etc)). Both 
proposals have subsequently been abandoned.
68 Treasury, Commonwealth, Review o f International Taxation Arrangements: Consultation Paper 
(2002) (the Consultation Paper). The Consultation paper arose from the Government’ 15 October 
2001 election policy (John Howard, Commonwealth of Australia, Securing Australia's Prosperity - 
The Coalitions Economic Policy (2001)) announcing a review of Australia’s international tax 
system and the 2 May 2002 statement by the Treasurer clarified the Review’s terms of reference 
(see Treasurer, ‘Review of International Tax Arrangements’ (Press Release No 21, 2 May 2002)). 
See generally Michael Dirkis, ‘Reviewing an International Tax Review’ (2002) 6 Tax Specialist 68.
69 The Consultation Paper (Ibid) after examining the incorporation test, proposed consideration of 
options to clarify the test of company residency so that exercising central management and control 
alone does not constitute the carrying on of a business (Option 3.12).
70 Board of Taxation, Commonwealth, International Taxation: A Report to the Treasurer (2003) 109 
(Recommendation 3.12).
1 1
deferred consideration of changes pending the release of a draft ruling by the Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) to clarify the operation of those tests.71
Finally, the law of residency and, to a lessor extent, source, is confined by geographic 
jurisdictional boundaries (it is based upon physical (geographic) or territorial (domain of 
nations over land and sea) nexus with Australia).72 When these physical limitations are 
combined with the subjective nature of the source and residency concepts, scope exists 
for manipulation of a person's residency status, a business's residency status, or the 
geographic source of income, in order to reduce the incidence of Australian income tax.
Concerns about this manipulation have been heightened by the developments in mass 
communications technology and the spread of the Internet. As the Internet has no
I'Xjurisdictional boundaries it is argued that it is possible for some taxpayers to operate 
via the Internet in a particular country without actually being physically present in the 
country.74 The ATO in its 1997 report on taxation and the Internet found that the 
application of the existing jurisdictional rules would be eroded in the Internet
• -7Cenvironment. In particular, the Report found that a reason why the application of the 
residency rules was in serious doubt was that the rules were designed for an era in which 
electronic commerce did not exist.76
Other jurisdictions, faced with similar challenges, have subjected their sufficient 
connection rules to review. Although the laws governing sufficient connection in those 
jurisdictions vary from those operating in Australia, many of the problems faced are 
similar. As a result of the reviews in the United States (1984), New Zealand (1988), the 
United Kingdom (1993) and Ireland (1994) changes were made to the fundamental rules
71 Treasurer, ‘Review of International Tax Arrangements’ (Press Release No 32, 13 May 2003).
72 Although Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Tax and the Internet: Discussion Report 
(1997) (ATO’s first Internet Report), 100 claims that both residency and source are tied by 
geographic jurisdictional boundaries, source is not purely a matter of geography as the source of 
income depends upon how it is produced, where it is produced and who pays it - see Robert Couzin 
in Corporate Residence and International Taxation (2002), 6.
73 Ibid 46.
74 Alan Tyree et al, Computer Money Consulting Pty Ltd 's INNET 97/2 Report on Electronic 
Commerce Banking and Finance Issues (1997) at URL: 
http://www.ato.gov.au/content/Businesses/Downloads/cmc.rft Part 2 as at 31 December 2002. The 
report has subsequently been removed from ATO site. Other examples have been cited of the 
telecommuting knowledge workers (lawyers and consultants) and physicians remotely diagnosing 
patients on the Internet -  see Dale Pinto, ‘The Nation State: Will it survive globalisation?’ (2000) 3 
Journal o f Australian Taxation 136, 140 and 147.
75 Finding 18, ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 72, 100 and Pinto, above n 74, 148.
76 ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 72, 35.
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governing residency and source.77 Given the recognition internationally for change and
no
on going reviews in other jurisdictions (eg the United Kingdom ) the lack of formal 
review in Australia is more difficult to justify.
In conclusion, given the fundamental importance of residency and source, it is surprising 
that except for the scant review given by the 1999 Review of Business Taxation and a 
narrow review of the corporate residency in the 2003 Review o f International Taxation 
Arrangements, little attention has been given to their broad operation into the 21st 
century where globalisation of world trade and commerce and emergence of electronic 
commerce seem to undermine their physical jurisdictional basis.
B. A gap in the government and academic literature
The second reason for undertaking this study is that there is a gap in the literature. As 
mentioned above although there was governmental debate from the late 1880’s until the 
1930s on whether Australia should be taxed on a residency basis,' this analysis did not 
involve a systematic analysis of what particular transactions should be in Australia’s tax 
net, except to generally exclude foreign source dividends and other income taxed in 
other jurisdictions. Thus, except for the Asprey committee and the 1999 Review of 
Business Taxation none of the other tax reform committees and inquiries have 
considered the adequacy of the law governing residency and source. Inquiries conducted 
in other jurisdictions have also reviewed aspects of the law relating to residency and 
source. However, in the main, they too have limited their studies to analysing the 
particular methods for jurisdictional claim adopted in their jurisdiction or avenues for 
reform.81
77 The scope of these Reviews is discussed in Chapter 2, n 188. Although changes have occurred in a 
number of other countries, including South Africa, Israel, and Norway, it is not proposed to 
examine those processes in detail. For details of changes in South Africa, Israel, and Norway - see 
Ernest Mazansky, ‘South Africa and its worldwide tax regime: Have we (almost come full circle?’ 
(2004) 58 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 151,152-3, Michael Bricker and Dror 
Levy, ‘Israel publishes tax reform proposal’ (2000) 20 Tax Notes International 2695 and Sverre 
Hveding and Finn Backer-Grondahl, ‘The concept of residence for tax purposes in Norway’ (2002) 
56 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 427 respectively.
78 HM Treasury and Inland Revenue Reviewing the Residence and Domicile Rules as they Affect the 
Taxation o f Individuals: A Background Paper (2003).
79 Harris, above n 42.
80 The Inquiries and Reviews are listed in Chapter 2, n 1, 3-12, 14.
81 See, eg, Denzil Davies, Booth: Residence, Domicile and UK Taxation (1995), A Farnsworth, The 
Residence and Domicil o f Corporations (1939), Garth A Harris, New Zealand's International 
Taxation (1990) and Paul R Me Daniel, ‘The Steven L Cantor International Tax Symposium: 
Article: The US tax treatment of foreign source income earned in developing countries: A policy 
analysis’ (2003) 35 George Washington International Law Review 265. More expansive studies
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Various authors have examined the aspects of the residency and source law. The work 
undertaken by legal writers varies from the description of the law to legal analysis of 
select aspects of the law (ranging from reviewing the problems for expatriates and DTAs 
to specific case law and legislative analysis). ‘ Both economists and lawyers have also 
focused upon the broader structural approaches to taxing international transactions.84 
This includes:
o r
• commonality in approaches;
• the sustainability of either residency or source as basis of taxation;86
• dual residency and double taxation; and
00
• the impact of specific developments such as global trading, electronic 
commerce89 and tax induced migration of high wealth individuals.90
include: Jinyan Li, ‘E-commerce policy in Australia, Canada and the United States’ (2000) 6 
University o f New South Wales Law Journal 40, and Couzin, above n 72.
82 See, eg, Geoffrey Lehmann and Cynthia Coleman, Taxation in Australia (5th ed, 1998), Mills, 
above n 42, Woellner above n 15 and Jeffrey Waincymer, Australian Income Tax: Principles and 
Policy (2nd ed, 1993).
83 See, eg, expatriates (Alice Abreu, ‘The difference between expatriates and Mrs Gregory - 
citizenship can matter’ [1995] Tax Notes International 1613)), DTAs (Tom W Magney, 
Australia’s Double Tax Agreements: A Critical Appraisal o f Key Issues (1994)), case law analysis 
(Alan Gotterson, ‘The limit to Applegate’ (1983) Nov The Chartered Accountant in Australia 17), 
and legislative analysis (Company residency tests (Peter J Gillies, ‘Understanding company 
residence: Central management and control’ (1989) 1(4) CCH Journal o f  Australian Taxation 52).
84 See, eg, Brian J Arnold and Michael J McIntyre, International Tax Primer (1995), and Hugh Ault, 
Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis (1997).
85 See, eg, Arnold, Ibid.
86 See, eg, Vogel I, above n 9, Klaus Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs source of income - A review and 
revaluation of arguments (Part II)’ (1988) 10 Intertax 310, Klaus Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs source of 
income - A review and revaluation of arguments (Part III)’ (1988) 11 Intertax 393, Jinyan Li, 
‘Rethinking Canada’s source rules in the age of electronic commerce: Part 1’ (1999) 47 Canadian 
Tax Journal 1077, Dale Pinto, E-Commerce and Source-Based Income Taxation (2003) and Kerrie 
Sadiq, ‘Jurisdiction to tax and the case for threshold reform’ (Paper presented at the 16th 
Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Adelaide, 30 January 2004), Kerrie Sadiq, 
Interjurisdictional Allocation o f Multinational Banking Income: Aligning Taxation Principles with 
Economic Activity (Phd Thesis, Deakin University School of Law, 2003) and supremacy of 
residence -  John K Sweet, ‘Formulating international tax laws in the age of electronic commerce: 
The possible ascendancy of residence-based taxation in an era of eroding traditional income tax 
principles’ (1998) 146 University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 1949 and United States, Staff of the 
Joint Committee on Taxation, Background Materials on Business Tax Issues (2002) at 
www.haise.gov/jct/x-23-02.pdf accessed on 30 January 2004.
87 See, eg, League of Nations (Bruins et al), Report on Double Taxation (1923) Doc EFS 73 F 19 
cited in Seligman (1928), above n 55, 115, Kees van Raad, ‘International: Dual residence’ (1988) 
28 European Taxation 241, Sir Josiah Stamp The Fundamental Principles o f  Taxation (1936), 
130-42, Seligman (1928), above n 55, 114-142, and Klaus Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation 
Conventions (3rd ed, 1997).
88 See, eg, Robert A Green, ‘The future of source-based taxation of the Income of multinational 
enterprise’ (1993) 79 Cornell Law Review 18, Charles E McLure, ‘Globalization, tax rules and 
national sovereignty’ (2001) 55 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 328, Charles 
Plambeck, ‘The taxation Implications of global trading’ (1990) 48 Tax Notes 1143 and Sadiq, 
above n 86, and Vito Tanzi, ‘Globalization, technological development, and the work of fiscal 
termites’ (2001) 26 Brooklyn Journal o f International Law 1261.
89 See, eg, Bjom Westberg, Cross Border Taxation o f E-commerce (2002), Paul McNab,
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In summary, despite several Australian governmental reports, commissioned studies and 
academic writing there has been no detailed, holistic, legal critical review addressing the 
practical adequacy of the current Australian law of residency and source against the 
generally accepted objectives of a “good” tax system (ie equity, efficiency and 
simplicity) . 91 This thesis seeks to fill that gap in the literature.
III. Thesis
The main thesis of this work is:
The law of residency and determination of source, as applying in the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (the 1997 Act), is inadequate as the law fails in its practical 
application to satisfy the "essential objectives ” o f equity, efficiency, simplicity and the 
prevention o f tax avoidance.
The sub-thesis of this work is:
The domestic law of residency and source can be modified within the jurisdictional 
framework to more closely meet these “essential objectives”.
‘International reaction to electronic commerce developments’ (1998) 27 Australian Tax Review 
219, Pinto, above n 74, Dale Pinto, E-Commerce and Source-Based Income Taxation (2003), 
Nilesh Shah, et al ‘Taxing the internet gold rush’ (2000) 11 (3) International Tax Review 13, 
Tadmore, above n 3, and Melissa De Zwart, ‘Electronic commerce: Promises, problems and 
proposals’ (2000) 6 University o f New South Wales Law Journal 305. For a summary of the OECD 
consideration of electronic commerce see OECD, Taxation and Electronic Commerce: 
Implementing the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions (2001).
90 See, eg, Jagdish N Bhagwati and John Douglas Wilson (eds), Income Taxation and International 
Mobility (1989), Charles Bruce, ‘Permanent Tax Exile - The plight of former US citizens?’ (1996) 
50 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 205, Sanford Goldberg et al, ‘Taxation caused 
by or after a change in residence (Part 1)’ (2000) 21 Tax Notes International 643, Juhani Kesti, 
‘Sweden: Tax treatment of cross-border employment income’ (1995) 35 European Taxation 409, 
OECD, International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies (1987), L Pan (ed), 
Chinese Overseas (1999) cited in Nolan Sharkey, ‘An examination of the individual residency 
rules: Policy, practical operation and foreign comparisons’ (1999) unpublished, ATAX research 
paper, 3, and Martin Sullivan, ‘Democrats revisit expatriate tax: With neutrality and justice for 
all?’ (1999) 19 Tax Notes International 1705.
91 However, Michael J Graetz in Foundations o f International Income Taxation (2003) has sought to 
explore the theoretical principles as they underpin international income tax (principally from a 
United States view).
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IV. Approach adopted
The approach adopted in respect of the main thesis is to evaluate the law of residency 
and source against the objectives of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of 
tax avoidance. This process includes an examination of the current scope of residency 
and source rules, the tax policy underlying the rules (or the lack thereof) and the 
practical problems with their implementation and the legal limitations on the scope of 
the rules agreed through international agreements (eg double tax agreements). This 
involves looking at the practical adequacy of the law from the perspective of all users of 
the tax system, but in particular tax administrators, tax advisors and taxpayers.
The approach adopted in respect of the sub-thesis will involve comparison of the 
approaches adopted domestically in other jurisdictions, including the United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Germany and evaluating any reform 
models developed against the objectives of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the 
prevention of tax avoidance.
V. The structure
The structure to be adopted in the thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 defines the scope of the objectives of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the 
prevention of tax avoidance and justifies why these are the most appropriate 
measurement criteria for this legal review of residency and source.
Chapter 3 deals with the residency tests for individuals, and Chapter 4 with the residency 
tests for companies and trusts. Despite the existence of residency definitions related to 
superannuation funds in the tax laws these residency tests will not be evaluated as they
92 At a broad level the tax system has of a number of key stakeholders being:
law makers (the parliament), Treasury, Office of Parliamentary Council (OPC), and Office of 
Legislative Drafting (OLD);
the tax administrator (ATO) and tax system monitoring bodies (Board of Taxation, Inspector 
General of Taxation and the Australian National Audit Office (ANOA));
• judiciary;
tax professionals (ranging from compliance focused return preparers (bookkeepers and tax 
agents) to tax advisors (tax agents, tax accountants and tax specialist lawyers (solicitors and 
barristers)); and
users (academics, students and taxpayers (ranging from tax professions (such as corporate tax 
managers) to individuals who self prepare)).
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fall outside the scope of the thesis.93 Similarly, although the residency rules relating to 
“limited corporate partnerships” will be discussed in Chapter 4 (as these partnerships are 
treated as companies),94 again partnerships96 are also not generally reviewed as they fall 
outside the scope of the thesis.96
Finally, chapter 5 deals with the three broad categories of territorial source law 
(personal, property and business income).
93 A “resident superannuation fund” is defined in the 1936 Act s 6E. The related definitions of a 
“resident approved deposit fund” and a “resident regulated superannuation fund” are defined in 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, (Cth) (SISA) ss 20A and 10, respectively. The 
reasons for not reviewing superannuation funds are twofold. First, these definitions rely on the 
“central management and control” concept, which will be extensively evaluated in the context of 
company and trust residency rules. Secondly, as retirement policies are country specific, they drive 
the unique residency definitions used. For example, in Australia the definition of “resident 
superannuation fund” in the 1936 Act s 6E, seeks to ensure that the taxation concessions applying 
to Australian superannuation funds were only available to Australian resident funds whose 
membership were also mainly Australian residents (a complying superannuation fund). However, in 
the United States the “qualified retirement plan” concession is focused upon there being an 
American employer not on the residency status of the employee except where an amount paid by a 
foreign affiliate of an American employer (Internal Revenue Code o f 1986 (US) IRC § 401(a)). 
Therefore, jurisdiction comparisons offer no assistance in evaluating reform options for the purpose 
of the sub-thesis.
94 1936 Act ss 94K and 94J.
95 As a partnership is not a taxable entity under s 9-1 of the 1997 Act there is no specific definition of 
partnership residency. A partnership is defined in 1997 Act s 995-1 as "an association of persons 
carrying on business as partners or in receipt of ordinary income or statutory income jointly, but 
does not include a company".
The tax liability is determined at the partner level. To calculate the partners share, however, the 
1936 Act treats the partnership as a resident entity. Section 90 defines “net income”, “exempt 
income” and “partnership loss” in terms of a resident taxpayer (eg the income or loss of a 
partnership is determined as if the partnership is a resident taxpayer). Then, ss 92(1), (2) and (3) in 
determining the assessable income, loss and exempt income of a partner use the partner’s residency 
status. Given that the tax liability is determined at the partner level, any issues of residency of 
partners will be covered in the analysis of the law relating to the residency of individuals, 
companies and trusts in Chapters 3 and 4.
Similarly, the specific definitions of “Australian partnership” in ss 337 and 472 of the 1936 Act 
(which were inserted to ensure foreign income was taxable on an accrual basis where it arose from 
a partnership, which contained at least one Australian resident corporate partner) rely on specific 
company residency rules. An “Australian partnership” is defined for the purposes of Part X of 1936 
Act by s 337 (as being an Australian partnership at a particular time if at least one of the partners is 
an Australian entity at that time) and for the purposes of Part XI of the 1936 Act under s 472 (as an 
Australian Partnership if at least one of the partners is an Australian entity (defined in s 471 as an 
“Australian partnership”, “Australian trust” or “Part XI Australian resident”) at that time). In terms 
of the sub-thesis, as partnerships are treated as either transparent or as taxable entities, 
jurisdictional comparisons offer no assistance in evaluating reform options for the purpose of the 
sub-thesis.
96 For discussion of partnerships see generally Kees van Raad and Rijkele Betten (eds), The 
International Guide to Partnerships (7 November 2003). However, there are double tax issues that 
arise from the taxation of transparent entities resident in one state as a taxable entity in another (see 
Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International: International Tax Problems o f Partnerships, Vol LXXXa 
(1995)). The OECD commentary has been updated to deal with these problems in light of 
recommendations in the OECD report, The Application o f the OECD Model Convention to 
Partnerships (20 January 1999). Also see John Avery Jones et al, ‘Characterization of other states’ 
partnerships for income tax’ (2002) 56 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 288.
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The structure adopted in Chapters 3 to 5 for evaluating each area of law is broadly 
similar. Each Chapter starts by defining the scope of the test in Australia’s income tax 
law, before evaluating the practical application of each category of law against the 
objectives of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance. This 
examination includes consideration of problems arising from the developments in 
electronic commerce and, through comparative studies of the approaches adopted in 
other jurisdictions, explores alternatives for reform in light of the problems discovered.
In Chapter 6, the thesis and sub-thesis are evaluated in light of the evidence gathered and 
a summary of the findings made. Future areas of development will also be explored.
Finally, as tax law and policy are changing constantly it is important to state that the 
thesis has been written against the laws and policy announcements in existence as at 30 
April 2004. However, in order to ensure currency, key selected developments in the law 
and policy that have occurred up to 31 October 2004 have been incorporated into the 
thesis.
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Chapter 2
Methodology
I. Purpose of this Chapter
As stated in Chapter 1, the main thesis of this work is that the law of residency and 
source, as applying in the 1997 Act, is inadequate as the law fails in its practical 
application to satisfy the "essential objectives” of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the 
prevention of tax avoidance. This leads on to consider the sub-thesis that the domestic 
law of residency and source can be modified within the jurisdictional framework to more 
closely meet these “essential objectives”. The thesis is concerned with evaluation of the 
operation of the law, that is, it is a legal analysis of the main thesis and the sub-thesis. In 
order to be consistent with that approach it is important that the objectives used to test 
the effectiveness of the law will result in illustrative examples that demonstrate the 
success or failure of the current law and to judge any reform proposals.
The purpose of this Chapter is to justify why, in the context of this thesis, the four 
objectives identified from the myriad of possible tax policy objectives are the most 
appropriate tests for evaluating the thesis. This involves first setting out a range of 
possible tax policy objectives, drawing from major and minor Australian inquiries and 
reviews, major tax reform reviews conducted in other jurisdictions, independently 
commissioned studies and academic writing, which could be used to evaluate the 
adequacy of the law of residency and source.
A series of common tax policy objectives emerges from that analysis. First, there is wide 
spread use in evaluating the effectiveness of existing laws and the proposed tax reforms 
of the three tax policy objectives of equity, simplicity and efficiency. Second, underlying 
a number of most recent reform reviews, the policy objective of reducing tax avoidance 
is also commonly used. The scope of these four tax policy objectives is examined in 
detail in order to define each term and set out the process for measuring the extent to 
which the law of residency and source complies with the objectives. Given the legal 
focus of this study the evaluative process is qualitative in nature rather than quantitative 
or empirical.
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In order to reinforce the appropriateness in the context of this thesis of the four selected 
objectives, other key tax policy objectives will be reviewed in order to illustrate why 
they were less appropriate in the context of this thesis than those selected.
Finally, a discussion of the weighting to be given to each tax policy objective is 
undertaken. This is necessary as a number of the objectives, if pursued in isolation can 
counter the pursuit of other objectives.
II. Background
As mentioned above, the first step is to explore a range of possible tax policy objectives, 
which could be used to evaluate the adequacy of the law of residency and source. In 
Australia, during the first sixty years of the Commonwealth's income tax regime, official 
independent tax reform inquiries were launched every decade or so (with the exception 
of the 1940's due to World War II and its aftermath). From the 1980’s the tax reform 
process shifted to the bureaucracy (the Treasury, ATO and Board of Taxation), with 
independent inquiries used, if at all, to review bureaucratic generated tax reform 
proposals rather than proposals generated through receipt of evidence from the 
community. Political influences have in many cases been instrumental in the creation of 
these reviews. The major reform events“ over the last 80 years have been:
■5
• First Royal Commission' on Taxation (24 September 1920 to 15 December 
1924);1 234
• Second Royal Commission on Taxation (6 October 1932 to 28 November 
1934);5
• Commonwealth Parliamentary Committee on Taxation (February 1950 to 
March 1954);6
1 For example the Howard Governments' election proposals for a revamp of the Australian tax system 
(Peter Costello, Commonwealth of Australia, Tax Reform, Not a New Tax, A New Tax System (13 
August 1998) (ANTS)), although conceived in Treasury, led to the creation of the Review of 
Business Taxation.
2 For an overview of these reform events see Michael Dirkis, ‘Observations on the Development of 
Australia's Income Tax Policy and Income Tax Law’ (2002) 56 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 522.
3 A Royal Commission is an independent inquiry mechanism (usually with evidentiary compulsive 
powers) used for a wide variety of purposes in Australia.
4 Commonwealth, Royal Commission on Taxation, Reports (1920-24) (the 1920 Royal
Commission). There were four reports.
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• Commonwealth Committee on Taxation (3 December 1959 to June 1961 );7
• Taxation Review Committee (14 August 1972 to 31 January 1975);8
• Reform o f the Australian Tax System, Draft White Paper (1985);9
• Review of Business Taxation (14 August 1998 to 30 July 1999);10 and
• Review of International Taxation Arrangements (22 August 2002 to 28 
February 2003).11
These major Australian inquiries and other more limited Australian reviews,12 major tax 
reform reviews conducted in other jurisdictions,13 independently commissioned studies14 
and academic writing1'̂  have used various tax policy objectives as a basis for evaluating
5 Commonwealth, Royal Commission on Taxation, Reports (1933-34) (the 1932 Royal 
Commission). There were four reports.
6 Commonwealth Committee on Taxation, Reports (1951-53) (Spooner Committee).
7 Commonwealth Committee on Taxation Report (1961) (Ligertwood Committee).
8 Taxation Review Committee, Commonwealth, Full Report (\915) (Asprey Report).
9 Commonwealth, Reform of the Australia Tax System: Draft White Paper (1985).
10 Review of Business Taxation, Commonwealth, A Tax System Redesigned (1999).
11 The Treasury, Commonwealth, Review o f International Taxation Arrangements: Consultation 
Paper (2002); Commonwealth, The Board of Taxation, Commonwealth, International Taxation: A 
Report to the Treasurer (2003) and Treasurer, ‘Review of International Taxation Arrangements’ 
(Press Release 13 May 2003).
12 See, eg, reports released by the Treasurer (John Dawkins, Commonwealth, Taxation o f Financial 
Arrangements: A Consultative Document (1993) and Peter Costello, Commonwealth, Proposed 
Changes to the Taxation of Foreign Source Income: An Information Paper (1996) (1996 FSI 
Paper) and those released by the Australian Taxation Office (Australian Taxation Office, 
Commonwealth, Tax and the Internet: Discussion Report (1997) (ATO’s first Internet Report) and 
Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Taxation and the Internet: Second Report (1999) 
(ATO’s second Internet Report)).
13 See, eg, Canada, Report o f the Royal Commission on Taxation (1966) (the Carter Commission); 
Ireland, Commission on Taxation, First Report (1982), Second Report (1983), Third Report {1984) 
(O’Brien Commission) and New Zealand, Taxation Review Committee Taxation in New Zealand, 
Report (1967) (Ross Report). Examples from the United Kingdom includes United Kingdom, 
Report o f the Royal Commission on the Income Tax Cmd 615 (1920) -  in particular Report of the 
Sub-Committee on Double Taxation, Evidence Appendix 1, 168; United Kingdom, Report o f the 
Income Tax Codification Committee Cmd 5131 (1936); United Kingdom, First Report o f the Royal 
Commission on the Taxation o f Profits and Income Cmd 8761 (1953); United Kingdom, Final 
Report o f the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income Cmd 9474 (1955) and 
United Kingdom, HM Treasury and Inland Revenue Reviewing the Residence and Domicile Rules 
as they Affect the Taxation o f Individuals: A Background Paper (2003). Also see League of 
Nations (Bruins et al), Report on Double Taxation (1923) Doc EFS 73 F 19 cited in Edwin 
Seligman Double Taxation and International Fiscal Cooperation (1928), 122.
14 See, eg, RI Downing, et al, Taxation in Australia — An Agenda for Reform (1964) (Researchers 
were appointed by the Social Science Research Council of Australia to develop proposals to 
improve equity of the Australian tax system); John Hewson and Tim Fisher, Fightback! Taxation 
and Expenditure Reforms for Jobs and Growth (1992) (Liberal and National Parties); and Paul 
Drum (ed), CPA Australia’s, Tax Reform: The Road Ahead (2002).
15 Graeme S Cooper, ‘Income Tax Law and Contributive Justice: Some thoughts on defining and 
expressing a consistent theory of tax justice and its limitations’ (1986) 3 Australian Tax Forum 
297; David Goldberg, ‘Acceptability, morality and balance in taxation’ [2000] British Tax Review 
106; Ann Harding, ‘Tax reform, equity and social security’ (1985) 2 Australian Tax Forum 223; 
Howard Pender The Joy o f Tax (1997), 10 and 22-27 and Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations (1776) - version used Edwin Cannan (ed) (1904), reprinted 
(1961).
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the effectiveness of existing tax laws and of potential reforms.16 Despite the myriad of 
tax policy objectives used in these reports and studies, a number of key common tax 
policy objectives can be identified. These key objectives of tax policy include questions 
such as:
• is the tax law consistent with Adam Smith's four principles of taxation:17 
equality, certainty (extended to cover concepts such as clarity, consistency and 
stability18), convenience and economy;
• is it consistent with the policy reasons for its introduction;
• is it consistent with the Government's fiscal strategy;
• does it maximise economic efficiency;
• does it maximise the opportunities for broader microeconomic reform to 
contribute to an internationally competitive economy;19
• does it recognize the challenges of (international) tax competition;
• does it conform with neutrality benchmarks of capital export neutrality, capital 
import neutrality, and national neutrality;
• does it provide a secure source of revenue;
• does it improve simplicity and transparency;
• is it administratively efficient;
• does it reduce compliance and administrative costs;
• is it feasible (ie can be legislated and implemented); and
• does it prevent tax avoidance (ie create integrity in the system20)?
A common thread in the reviews and studies conducted from Adam Smith in 177621 to 
the Board of Taxation’s 2003 report on the Review of International Taxation 
Arrangements is the use of the three traditional “good tax policy objectives” of equity,
16 See, eg, the Carter Commission n 13, Volume 1, 3, in discussing the relative importance of equity 
in its consideration of the objectives of a tax system noted that “[a] tax system can be judged from 
different points of view. Is the system fair? Does it contribute as much as possible to the growth 
and stability of the economy? Are the rights and liberties of the individual protected? Does it help 
to strengthen the federation?”
17 Smith, above n 15, 350-2.
18 1996 FSI Paper, above n 12, 19.
19 Ibid.
20 As a result of the 1999 Review of Business Taxation the use of the term “anti-avoidance” has been 
replaced by the word “integrity” (eg New Business Tax System (Integrity Measures) Act 2000 
(Cth)).
21 Smith, above n 15.
22 Board of Taxation, above n i l .
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simplicity and efficiency in evaluating the effectiveness of existing laws and the 
proposed tax reforms. Academic commentators broadly accept these three tax policy 
objectives as the traditionally accepted criteria for evaluating tax systems. Also 
underlying a number of most recent reform reviews has been concerns about the impact 
of tax avoidance and designing solutions to counter avoidance opportunities.
III. Reviewing the appropriateness of equity, simplicity, efficiency and
the prevention of tax avoidance
Given the widespread use of equity, simplicity, efficiency and the prevention of tax 
avoidance in the various reviews, these four tax policy objectives are the logical choice 
to use in evaluating the two hypotheses. However, as wide spread use does not of itself 
necessarily mean that the objectives are appropriate in this context, it is important to 
review the scope of the equity, simplicity, efficiency and the prevention of tax avoidance 
objectives to ascertain the appropriateness of each.
A. Equity
The first policy objective is equity. The term in the tax law context has been used 
interchangeably in various reports with the terms fairness24 and equality.25 Equity is
23 See, eg, Geoffrey Lehmann and Cynthia Coleman, Taxation in Australia (5th ed, 1998), 65, Robin 
H Woellner et al Australian Taxation Law (13th ed, 2003), 26-37, Jeffrey Waincymer Australian 
Income Tax: Principles and Policy (2nd ed, 1993), 24-39, and Rodney Fisher ‘Ralph Review: 
reform by name but not nature?’ (2003) 7 Tax Specialist 61, 62. However, not all commentators 
agree that the objectives of simplicity, efficiency and equity are good predictors of the tax system. 
For example, Michael J Graetz, Foundations o f International Income Taxation (2003), 5, in 
agreeing they are appropriate in domestic taxation, notes that in the international context there is “a 
remarkable lack of consensus”, while others, such as Simon Blount 'The Art of Taxation' (2001) 16 
Australian Tax Forum 345, 355, goes further arguing that the better predictors are the objectives of 
elasticity, complexity and invisibility. Further, Graeme Cooper, Richard Krever and Richard Vann, 
Income Taxation: Commentary and Materials (4th ed, 2002), 3, note that although the three tax 
policy objectives have dominated bureaucratic thinking since the 1970s, tax policy analysis in 
public finance literature has been based upon the use of welfare economics (ie optimal taxation).
24 The OECD uses fairness as one of its broad principles of taxation rather than equity, which is 
included under the neutrality principle. Fairness is defined as "taxation should produce the right 
amount of tax at the right time, and the potential for evasion and avoidance should be minimised. 
OECD Taxation and Electronic Commerce: Implementing the Ottawa Taxation Framework 
Conditions (2001), 10.
25 However, New Zealand’s Ross Report, above n 13, 15 warns that equity is not the same as equality. 
“While . . .  the tax system should operate to reduce inequalities in distribution and wealth, this 
desire for equality should not be pressed to the point where it could have serious repercussions on 
personal savings and such incentives to economic activity, as effort, investment, enterprise, and the 
willingness to take risks.” Also see Klaus Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs Source of Income - A Review and 
Revaluation of Arguments (Part III)’ (1988) 11 Intertax 393, 395-6. Also, “equity” in this context
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generally accepted as an essential quality of any tax or tax system. The Canadian 
Carter Commission best expressed the importance of equity in the tax system as follows:
[t]he first and most essential purpose of taxation is to share the burden of the 
state fairly among all individuals and families. Unless the allocation of the 
burden is generally accepted as fair, the social and political fabric of a 
country is weakened and can be destroyed. History has many examples of 
the severe consequences of unfair taxation. Should the burden be thought to 
be shared inequitably, taxpayers will seek means to evade their taxes. When 
honesty is dismissed as stupidity, self-assessment by taxpayers would be 
impossible and the cost o f enforcement high. We are convinced that
9*7
scrupulous fairness in taxation must override all other objectives . . . .
Despite the importance of the concept, the word “equity” can have many meanings in the 
taxation context. Therefore, it is important to define what equity is for the purpose of 
the thesis. Implicit in defining equity is the need to specify the process for identifying 
the level of equity/inequity contained within the rules relating to residency and source.
1 Defining equity
The definition of equity adopted in a number of Australian inquiries is the two 
dimensional definition of horizontal and vertical equity.29 Horizontal equity requires that 
“[individuals in similar circumstances should be taxed similarly”,30 while vertical
is not equity in the sense of legal equitable principles -  see Robert Couzin, Corporate Residence 
and International Taxation (2002), 27.
26 See, eg, 1985 Draft White paper, above n 9, 14, stated that “An equitable tax system is critical, not 
only to the attainment of economic and social objectives, but also to the maintenance of a basic 
respect for the tax system from which a high degree of voluntary compliance derives.” Similarly the 
New Zealand Report o f the Task Force on Tax Reform (1982) (the Me Caw Report), 68 notes that 
“[i]f a paramount consideration has been adopted, it is for fairness, or equity -  on the ground that 
no system which is unfair and is perceived to be unfair will have the acceptability and relative 
permanence which are required of a good tax system”. Also see 1920 Royal Commission on 
Taxation, above n 4, 3 and the Asprey Report, above n 8, 12. Equity is also seen as a crucial 
objective of good tax administration - Inspector-General of Taxation, Commonwealth, Issues paper 
Number 2: Policy Framework for Review Selection (2003), 1 and 3 at URL: http://www.igt. gov.au 
as at 31 December 2003.
27 Carter Commission, above n 13, 4 and Review of Business Taxation, Commonwealth, A Strong 
Foundation (1999), 63.
28 Asprey Report, above n 8, 12 noted that ". . . . in tax matters as in law and ethics, it is an ideal 
exceedingly difficult to define and still harder to measure". Also see Vogel III, above n 25, 393 
who views equity (which embodies the concepts of equality and integrity) as a moral and legal 
concept which cannot be defined, only explained or paraphased.
29 A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 63 described two other forms of equity - administrative equity 
(administrative procedures that do not inappropriately advantage some and disadvantage others) 
and transitional equity (the fairness of transitional arrangements associated with changes to tax 
legislation).
30 This definition has wide spread acceptance eg Board of Taxation, above n i l ,  32; the 1985 Draft 
White Paper, above n 9, 14; and the McCaw Report, above n 26, 68. In A Strong Foundation,
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equity requires that the . . tax burdens should depend upon ability to pay . . the 
greater burden falling on those more able to pay” .31
As these definitions focus upon equity as it relates to taxpayers they have often been 
classified as “individual” or “inter-individual” equity as opposed to “inter-nation 
equity”, which focuses on ensuring that each country linked in a cross border transaction 
receives an equitable share of tax revenue arising from that transaction (ie an equitable 
distribution of the competence to tax).32 Equity in the context of inter-nation equity 
depends upon tax rates in the source country and the allocation of the tax base between 
the source and residency country.33 Thus “individual” equity is primarily a domestic tax 
policy objective, while “inter-nation” equity is an international tax policy issue.
Thus, both “individual” equity and “inter-nation” equity would be potential tools for 
evaluating the effectiveness of the rules relating to residency and source. However, as 
the focus of the thesis is on the effectiveness of Australia’s domestic rules as they 
operate within Australia’s jurisdictional claim, the focus of the following discussion will 
be on “individual” equity, rather than “inter-nation” equity.34
above n 27, 63 and 75 it is suggested that horizontal equity can be achieved through ensuring all 
forms of income (wages, rent, capital gains, etc) are taxed equally
31 This definition has wide spread acceptance eg Board of Taxation, above n 11, 32; the 1985 Draft 
White Paper, above n 9, 14, and the McCaw Report, above n 26, 68. This latter concept has its 
origins in Adam Smith original maxim that “[t]he subjects of every state ought to contribute 
towards the support of the Government, as nearly as possible, is, in proportion to the revenue which 
they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state (Smith, above n 15, 350). The Asprey 
Report, above n 8, 12 notes that the concept is consistent with the taxation of non-residents on the 
derivation of Australia source income. In A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 63 it is suggested that 
vertical equity can be achieved through personal taxes and welfare systems and ensuring that 
business income is ultimately taxed in the hands of individuals through the personal tax system.
32 Nancy H Kaufman, ‘Fairness and the taxation of international income’ (1998) 29 Law and Policy 
in International Business 145, 153-4 and Vogel III, above n 25, 394-5. The concept was first 
identified by Peggy B Musgrave (Peggy Brewyer Richman (now Musgrave), Taxation o f Foreign 
Investment Income - An Economic Analysis (1963)).
33 For further discussion see Kaufman, ibid, Peggy B Musgrave, ‘The treatment of international 
capital income’ in Head, John G (ed) Taxation Issues o f the 1980s Conference Series No 1, 
Australian Tax Research Foundation (1983), 279, Peggy B Musgrave, ‘Sovereignty, entitlement, 
and cooperation in international taxation’ (2001) 26 Brooklyn Journal o f International Law 1335, 
and Dale Pinto, E-Commerce and Source-Based Income Taxation (2003), 35.
34 Michael J Graetz ‘Taxing international income: Inadequate principles, outdated concepts, and 
unsatisfactory policies’ (2001) 26 Brooklyn Journal o f International Law 1357, 1399 argues that 
with equity “[a]s with efficiency, a national rather than world-wide perspectives seem appropriate.”
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2 Identifying equity
Despite general acceptance of the two part definition of “individual equity”, and a view 
that equity can be measured in isolation in the context of the income tax,35 there are a 
number of difficulties in identifying the level of equity/inequity.
A problem in measuring horizontal equity is that it is very difficult to identify when
. . .  . T/r
people are in similar economic circumstances. It gives rise to questions of whether the 
inquiry should be based upon taxpayers' incomes and/or their wealth, their level of 
commitments (ie the assessable amount) or whether the economic circumstances of 
associates (eg their family and associated entities) should be considered or just the 
individual’s income (ie the taxing unit). Other problems include determining when 
ability to pay should be taken into account (ie the timing of the assessment)39 and 
determining the appropriate rate at which taxes should increase with ability to pay.40 
Even the question of capacity to pay is difficult as the horizontal equity concept assumes 
that people with the same capacity to pay tax are located at the same point on the scale, 
where as this may not be the case.41
The measurement of vertical equity has similar problems. The problem with the ability 
to pay concept is, while a higher ability-to-pay should imply a higher tax liability, the 
relationship may in fact:
. . .  be proportional, progressive or regressive, or some mixture of these and 
objective considerations have to be blended with important value 
judgements about the redistributional goals of the community before a 
conclusion on the shape of this relationship can be reached.42
35 Asprey Report, above n 8, 258.
36 See, eg, Asprey Report, above n 8, 13, Woellner, above n 23,28.
37 Waincymer, above n 23, 32.
38 The 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 14. The Asprey Report, above n 8, 13 notes that personal 
factors such as health and size of family are felt to be relevant differentials between taxpayers, 
while personal factors such as sex, race and religion are irrelevant. Also see the Cater Commission, 
above n 13.
39 Waincymer, above n 23, 32-33 argues that it is difficult to determine ability to pay at any point as 
income is rarely earned evenly over a lifetime.
40 1985 Draft White paper, above n 9, 14.
41 McCaw Report, above n 26, 68.
42 Ibid.
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Thus, the determination of vertical equity and the resultant distributional issues is based 
upon value judgments (often founded on ethics or aesthetics)43 and therefore, has been 
difficult to pursue.44
It is also clear that measuring vertical equity can only be assessed in relation to the tax 
system as a whole43 as deviations from a comprehensive tax base generally accrue to the 
benefit of high income individuals.46 This explains the focus of recent reform processes 
on changes to the comprehensive tax base.47 It is argued that “[i]f certain types of 
income are omitted from the tax base, or if particular expenditures are treated 
preferentially, then taxpayers with similar taxpaying capacities will not be taxed 
equally.” Thus, as the focus of the thesis is on specific aspects of the income tax 
system within Australia’s jurisdictional claim, then global measurement has little 
relevance to that process.
The challenges in measuring the level of equity/inequity may make it difficult to use the 
two part definition in its pure form. These difficulties are reinforced by concerns that 
pursuit of theoretical equity is an unattainable goal that can only lead to a tax Act that is 
too scientific and that the attempt will involve a sacrifice of simplicity and convenience 
out of all proportion to the value of the results achieved.49 There is also a clash between 
economic efficiency and vertical redistribution.30
43 Henry C Simons, Personal Income Tax (1938) cited in John G Head ‘Tax Refom: A quasi­
constitutional perspective’ in Graeme Cooper (ed) Tax Avoidance and the Rule o f Law (1997), 155, 
157.
44 Ibid Head citing WJ Blum and H Kalvem Jr, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation (1953). 
Also Downing, above n 14, 47 warns that rapid and substantial movements to income equality 
through steeply progressive income tax rates would have serous effects.
45 McCaw Report, above n 26, 68. This is a different focus to Adam Smith, above n 15, 350, who in 
acknowledging that the various heads of revenue (taxes on rent, profit and wages) will fall 
unequally upon different taxpayers, focused on “. . . inequity which is occasioned by a particular 
tax falling unequally even upon that particular private revenue which is affected by it.”
46 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 14.
47 See, eg, ANTS, above n 1, which included recommendations to alter indirect tax base, including 
included recommendations to introduce a goods and services tax (GST) and A Tax System 
Redesigned, above n 10, recommendations 4.1 to 4.24 proposing the Tax Value Method (TVM), 
which was intended to replace Australia’s current traditional measurement of income.
48 Ibid.
49 1932 Royal Commission, above n 5, 6. Evidence was presented before the Commission that “[e]ven 
if theoretical equity were possible, it would be dearly bought if it could not be obtained without the 
complexities of the present system, which create great difficulty in administration and irate 
taxpayers, with the result the whole Act comes to be condemned as unintelligible and oppressive.”
50 See generally JE Meade et al, The Structure and Reform o f Direct Taxation (1978), 7-23 and AM 
Okun Efficiency and Equity: The Big Tradeoff (1975) cited in Yuri Grbich, Adrian Bradbrook and 
Kevin Pose, Revenue Law: Cases and Materials (1990), 40-42.
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Further, it is generally recognized that necessity causes many arbitrary elements in the 
taxation system, such as the scale of progression, exemptions and deductions. It is also 
accepted that taxes are usually a “poor instrument for achieving social (equity) 
objectives.” 51 Thus, although it may be an idle “. . . hope that a system based upon such 
a foundation can be theoretically equitable in all its parts”,52 a good tax system is one 
that minimizes the various clashes between equity and other policy objectives.
In summary, what is clear from the literature is that the appropriate measurement of 
equity depends upon social, political and economic judgments of the persons seeking to 
measure it. Thus, from the above it is clear there are a number of fundamental 
difficulties in qualitatively measuring equity. However, it is possible to identify where 
there is a failure to achieve equity or where the system in operation results in inequitable 
outcomes.
3 The use of equity within the thesis
Despite these problems, all the reports and authors see equity as a crucial tax policy 
objective of a good tax system. It is also clear that taxation based upon world wide 
income (residency) of individuals is important in achieving the individual equity policy 
objective54 and that a comprehensive income tax is also a important for achieving 
horizontal equity.55 Therefore, the question is not should equity be used, rather how it 
can be used within the thesis to evaluate the effectiveness of the law relating to 
residency and source.
Given the lack of an accepted measurement process, the equity of the legal rules relating 
to residency and source will be evaluated in the thesis qualitatively by identifying when 
the law does not, in certain circumstances, give rise to either horizontal or vertical 
equity. Thus, the thesis will highlight where individuals in similar circumstances are not
51 1996 FSI Paper, above n 12, 19.
52 1932 Royal Commission, above n 5, 6.
53 However, some authors are starting to question, whether vertical equity, if still a legitimate 
economic policy aim, remains an existing policy objective of taxation in the US in light of the anti­
taxation political trend over the last 10 years -  see, eg, Thomas F Field, ‘A report from Rip Van 
Winkle’ in Ranjana Madhusudhan (ed), National Tax Association: Proceedings o f  95'h Annual 
Conference (2002), 85.
54 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 84.
55 Simons, above n 43, 158.
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being taxed similarly or where the tax burdens do not fall upon those with the greatest 
ability to pay.
Similarly when focusing on reform of the legal rules relating to residency and source, 
reform recommendations will also be measured qualitatively by illustrating where the 
proposed reforms result in changes that ensure that individuals in similar circumstances 
will be taxed similarly or where the tax burdens fall upon those with the greatest ability 
to pay.
B. Efficiency
The second policy objective is efficiency. The efficient use of the nation’s resources is a 
long standing policy objective of public policy, including tax policy,56 as:
[w]ith a more efficient tax system, resources will be more likely to move 
into activities where they will generate the largest economic gains to the 
nation, rather than activities where they will simply yield the largest tax gain 
to investors.57
As efficiency is aimed at ensuring the optimum allocation and use of resources, it is 
inevitably linked to other tax policy objectives such as ensuring consistency with 
national or governmental economic objectives (fiscal strategies), ensuring economic
CO
growth and providing for an international competitive economy. It is based upon the 
presumption that, except for certain public goods and services, the private market will 
ensure reasonable, efficient allocation of resources.59
1 Defining efficiency
Efficiency, in the tax context, has been historically defined in terms of economic 
efficiency (ie minimising the distortion of economic activity such as patterns of 
investment or saving) and in terms of administrative efficiency (ie minimising the 
compliance and administrative costs arising from the structural design or the costs of
56 Asprey Report, above n 8, 16.
57 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 14.
58 As with other policy objectives, many reports merge the various tax policy objectives -  eg Ross 
Report, above n 13, 15.
59 John G Head, ‘Capital gains taxation - An economist's perspective’ (1984) 1 Australian Tax Forum 
148, 150 and Klaus Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs Source of Income - A Review and Revaluation of 
Arguments (Part II)’ (1988) 10 Intertax 310.
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collection) .60 This dual aspect has meant that the term has been traditionally used 
interchangeably in various reports with the terms “convenience” and “economy” .61
The Board of Taxation has defined economic efficiency as:
. . .  in raising revenue, the business tax system should interfere as little as 
possible with the best use of existing national resources, with the efficient 
allocation of risk, and with long term economic growth.62
Thus, an efficient tax is one that does not unduly distort the market.
As efficiency involves the reduction of distortions to a minimum,63 the concept of tax 
neutrality is now commonly used interchangeably with efficiency in various reports64 
and by many commentators.66 The use of the term “neutrality” rather than “efficiency” is 
to ensure that the focus of the review is on improving the economic efficiency of the 
national or global economy and to ensure the international competitiveness of locally 
based businesses by minimising the tax distortions that affect individuals’ and business’ 
choices. Thus, as economic neutrality benchmarks are used in analysing the optimal 
taxation treatment domestically and internationally,66 it is necessary to define efficiency 
and neutrality within those contexts for the purpose of this thesis.
Before looking at the subset of efficiency/neutrality tax policy objectives (benchmarks), 
it is important to distinguish the concept of “revenue” neutrality, which has been used as 
a tax policy objective in some reform reviews.67 However, the focus of “revenue”
60 See, eg, 1996 FSI Paper, above n 12, 19, which focused only on administrative efficiency.
61 1920 Royal Commission, above n 4, 125F and 131. The “convenience” concept has its origins in 
Smith’s third maxim, which requires that “[e]very tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the 
manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it (Smith, above n 15, 
351). Flexibility is also seen as an attribute of efficiency -  Ross Report, above n 13,15
62 Board of Taxation, above n 11,31.
63 Head, above n 59, 150.
64 Asprey Report, above n 8, 16, ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 12, 10, Board of Taxation, 
above n 11, 31; 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 31, and Inspector-General, above n 26, 1. In fact the 
OECD includes equity under the neutrality principle, rather than treating it as a separate principle 
of taxation - OECD, above n 24, 10.
65 See, eg, John Azzi ‘Policy considerations in the taxation of foreign source income’ (1993) 47 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 547, 548, Waincymer, above n 23, 27 and Drum, 
above n 14, 11. However, Klaus Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs Source of Income - A Review and 
Revaluation of Arguments (Part I)’ (1988) 8-9 Intertax 216 suggests the reverse stating that 
efficiency of capital allocation is the underlying basic criterion of neutrality.
66 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 91 notes its use in analysing the optimal taxation treatment of 
inbound, outbound and conduit income.
67 A Tax System Redesigned, above n 10, v, vii and 18. The revenue neutrality policy objective had 
been earlier stated in A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 6, and Review of Business Taxation,
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neutrality is not on removing distortions, rather, it is on ensuring that the reform 
proposals do not increase or decrease the current levels of tax revenues (ie are revenue 
neutral) . 68
(a) Domestic efficiency/neutrality
The Review of Business Taxation noted that there were two neutrality principles that 
bore centrally upon efficiency in the domestic context: investment neutrality and risk 
neutrality.69 Investment neutrality requires no taxing differentials in respect of the type 
of investment, the type of entity, entity financing alternatives, the type of income 
distribution, and distributions relative to retention. Implicit in investment neutrality is 
that business engaged in electronic commerce should be subject to equivalent 
arrangements as businesses engaged in physical commerce.70 Risk neutrality means that 
the tax system should ensure that it minimises distortions to the pattern of
71undiversifiable risk bearing by investors.
Historically, a further subset was administrative efficiency, which is focused upon 
removal or reduction in the transaction costs associated with compliance and revenue 
costs.72 However, minimisation of transaction and compliance costs is also a function of
Commonwealth, A Platform for Consultation: Discussion Paper 2 Building on a Strong 
Foundation (1999), 6.
68 A Platform for Consultation, ibid.
69 A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 69. These elements have been further categorised as investment 
neutrality (if investment incentives are required for social or economic measures, they should be 
explicit, efficiently targeted, transparent and costed), entity neutrality (choice of business entity 
should be neutral), financing neutrality (neutrality in choice of transaction funding), payout 
neutrality (neutrality between dividends, retained profits and share buy-backs), income source 
neutrality (neutral in its treatment of different income, expenditure sources and asset and liability 
types), and neutral in its impact in financial innovation -  Drum, above n 14, 12
70 United States, Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Policy, Selected Tax Policy Implications
o f Global Electronic Commerce (1996), 19, para 6.2 at URL:
http:/Avww.fedworld.gov/tel/internet.txt located on 31 December 2003, OECD, above n 24, 10, 
ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 12, 96 and ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 12, 8. Also 
see Bjorn Westberg Cross-border Taxation o f E-commerce (2002), 57-65.
71 A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 75.
72 Waincymer, above n 23, 27 and 1985 Draft White paper, above n 9, 15. This collection aspect has 
its origins in Adam Smith’s final maxim that u[e]very tax ought to be so contrived as both to 
takeout and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it 
brings into the public treasury of the state. A tax may either takeout or keep out of the pockets of 
the people a great deal more than it brings into the public treasury, in the following four ways. First, 
the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater part 
of the produce of the tax . . .  Secondly, it may obstruct the industry of the people . . . Thirdly, by 
the forfeitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individual individuals incur who attempt 
unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit 
which the community might have received from the employment of their capital . . . Fourthly, by 
subjecting the people to frequent visits and the odious examination of the taxgathers, it may expose 
them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression” (Smith, above n 15, 350-52).
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the simplicity tax policy objective and often, as is in this thesis, simplicity is seen as a 
separate and primary objective rather than as “a facet of economic efficiency” .73 
Similarly, although the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion can give rise to a lack of 
neutrality, it has been decided to deal with the prevention of tax avoidance as a separate 
evaluative criterion in the thesis (see the discussion in Part III D).
(b) International efficiency/neutrality
In the international context, the neutrality objectives commonly used are capital export 
neutrality, capital import neutrality and national neutrality.74 All three neutrality 
objectives exist in the international tax rules of most jurisdictions.75
(i) Capital export neutrality
The term capital export neutrality (CEN) aims for neutrality in international investment 
decisions by ensuring that regardless where income is earned (domestically or overseas), 
residents are taxed on that income at the same effective tax rate79 ensuring equal pre-tax 
rates of return on investments between countries. It is argued that CEN is achieved 
solely by taxation based upon country of residence. ‘ Therefore, tax measures aimed at 
achieving CEN seek to offset the effects of source country taxation through tax credits 
for foreign tax paid by residents through domestic foreign tax credit regimes and/or 
under tax treaty obligations to provide credits for foreign tax.79
(ii) Capital import neutrality
The term capital import neutrality (CIN) aims for neutrality in international savings 
decisions by ensuring that regardless of where capital is invested (domestically or
on
overseas) the income derived, is taxed at the same rate, so that the effective after-tax
73 Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1410.
74 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 8. Richard L Doemberg, International Taxation in a Nutshell (5th 
ed, 2001.
75 See, eg, Australia (2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 93) and the United State (Doemberg, ibid, 6).
76 Board of Taxation, above n 11,31 and 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 92.
77 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 92.
78 Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1364-5.
79 2002 Consultation Paper, above n 11, 93. The broad focus of the CFC and FIF measures is aimed 
at ensuring CEN -  see Paul J Keating, Commonwealth, Taxation o f Foreign Source Income: A 
Consultative Document (1988), 5.
80 Board of Taxation, above n 11, 32.
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rate of return on an investment in any particular country is the same for all investors 
regardless of investors’ place of residence.81 It is argued that CIN is achieved by giving 
primacy to tax to the source country.82 Therefore, tax measures aimed at achieving CIN 
include “the income tax exemption for non-portfolio dividends (or branch income) an 
Australian company receives from a listed country, the non-taxation of active business
O T
income retained offshore” and recommendations in the Consultation paper for a
84reduction in the level of company tax on direct investment offshore.
(Hi) National neutrality
o c
The term national neutrality aims for neutrality in investment decisions of residents by 
ensuring equality between the pre-tax (gross) return on domestic investments and the 
post-foreign tax return on foreign investments. This occurs where foreign investment 
income of a resident investor is taxed (without deferral) at the same domestic tax rate as 
domestic income and with foreign tax treated as a deductible expense. An Australian 
tax measure consistent with national neutrality is the denial of franking credits for
o o
foreign tax paid by Australian companies and their offshore subsidiaries.
2 Identifying efficiency/neutrality
The efficiency of the tax system can be measured from both domestic and international 
views, focusing upon neutrality objectives.
81 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 92.
82 Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1365.
83 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 93. Other measures aimed at ensuring CIN include the exemption 
for foreign active income under the CFC and FIF measures.
84 Ibid, 8. The Consultation Paper claims that the reduction in the company tax rate will improve the 
competitiveness of Australian companies operating overseas and raising capital internationally. 
Further, for individual investors and funds, the options are based on balancing capital export and 
national neutrality benchmarks.
85 Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1380 notes that this concept was also developed by Peggy Musgrave.
86 2002 Consultation Paper, above n 11, 92.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid, 93.
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(a) Measuring domestic neutrality
The efficiency of the tax system domestically can be determined by a number of aspects, 
being the level of taxation,89 the method of collection90 or the form that the system 
takes.91 Crucial in any evaluation is the degree to which the income tax base is 
comprehensive, as substantial domestic neutrality in relation to business financial and 
investment decisions can only be achieved through a comprehensive income tax.93 
However, given the focus of the thesis on the effectiveness of particular tax provisions, 
many of these measurement approaches are not relevant because they relate to overall 
tax system performance at the macro level.
(b) Measuring international neutrality
Although domestic neutrality is a vital tax policy objective, problems arise due to:
. . . interactions between the tax systems of the domestic country, the country 
of the source of the income or residence of the investor, and third countries 
(in relation to conduit cases) .94
Efficiency will also be compromised even where the same level of income tax is 
imposed in Australia and in another jurisdiction, if profitability differential arises from 
an international tax difference, such as an excise. Thus, in order to evaluate the 
efficiency of the system, it must be measured as a whole, including the impact of foreign 
taxes on the system.95
89 The 1985 Draft White paper, above n 9, 15 notes that the “. . . deleterious effects on efficiency are 
more difficult to avoid as the total level of taxation increases. This is one reason why the 
Government is committed to pursuing tax reform without increasing the overall tax burden.”
90 As mentioned above, in this thesis administrative efficiency will be dealt with under simplicity. 
However, for completeness, administrative efficiency is measured by the size of the excess burden, 
which is the cost imposed by the system over and above the revenue actually collected 
(Waincymer, above n 23, 27).
91 Board of Taxation, above n 11, 31. The 1985 Draft White paper, above n 9, 15 notes that “. . . 
[a]ny tax will tend to discourage the activity on which it is imposed.”
92 The 1985 Draft White paper, above n 9, 15 notes that “. . . that the more comprehensive the tax 
system is the less distortion there will be of the relative rewards of different types of work, of the 
relative attractions of work and leisure, of the relative returns from different types of investment, 
and of the relative prices of goods and services. That is to say, efficiency, like equity, is generally 
enhanced by the adoption of a comprehensive tax base.”
93 Simons, above n 43, 158 and A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 75.
94 2002 Consltuative Paper n 11, 92.
95 Asprey Report, above n 8, 258 and Meade, above n 49.
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The three international neutrality objectives (CEN, CIN and National neutrality) provide 
a useful conceptual framework for measuring efficiency/neutrality. However, as the 
three objectives do adopt conflicting policy directions,96 it is important in discussing 
measurement to briefly summarise the strengths and weaknesses of the three objectives. 
The purpose of this examination is not to ultimately determine which of the three 
objectives has primacy on their merits, rather it is to illustrate the difficulties involved in 
using these three international tax policy objectives in a thesis focused on qualitative 
analysis within the context of Australia’s jurisdictional claim.
CEN is often proposed as the dominant theory as it maximises global welfare and is 
consistent with the “horizontal and vertical equity benchmarks for individual taxpayers 
under a progressive tax system.” ' However, CEN is not universally supported, nor 
perfect, as the economic modeling underlying the adoption of CEN is based upon 
unrealistic assumptions associated with perfect competition such as the residence of 
taxpayers is fixed, demand for capital is also fixed and the company tax payable in a 
country is independent of the economic infrastructure provided by that country. The 
models also ignore the dynamic benefits exposure to overseas markets may bring to 
domestic business.99
The other two international tax policy objectives have similar strengths and weaknesses. 
CIN is seen as more practical being based upon considerations of international 
competitiveness rather than economic theory. 100 Further, it has been argued that 
deviation from CIN may in fact favour high marginal cost producers ahead of low cost 
producers. 101 However, CIN is seen as an impossible goal in light of the differences in
1 O'?national tax structures, rates and benefits.
In light of the above, the choice between CEN and CIN can be determined
1 OTempirically. CEN is favoured as:
96 Ibid, 91-2 and Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1365.
97 2002 Consultation Paper, ibid, 92 and Vogel II, above n 59, 311.
98 Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1366, Philip Anderson, ‘Economic policy considerations in the taxation 
of foreign source income’ (1988) 5 Australian Tax Forum 395, 408, and 2002 Consultation Paper n 
11,92.
99 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 92.
100 Pinto, above n 33, 26.
101 Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1366-7.
102 Pinto, above n 33, 24 (relying on Peggy Musgrave) and Vogel II, above n 59, 311.
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• the cost of distortions associated with the location of investment (CEN) exceeds 
those associated with the allocation of savings (CIN); and,
• savings (based upon the relative elasticity between saving and investment) are 
less responsive to changes in taxation than investment. 104
National neutrality also has weaknesses. It is argued that national neutrality can 
discourage foreign investment as deductions can offer far less relief from double tax 
than foreign tax credits. The other concern is if it is adopted by all nations, it would 
result in a reduction in worldwide economic output. 105
In summary, the measurement of international neutrality is clouded by the fact that there 
is little consensus in favour of the primacy of any one of the international neutrality 
policy objectives, 106 and compounded by the fact that it is impossible to achieve all three 
international neutrality policy objectives simultaneously. 107 Even if it is possible to 
adopt a particular policy objective, solutions may be difficult to secure, as it is not within 
Australia’s jurisdiction to control efficiency at a global level. 108 As a result the question 
about what is the theoretical optimal international tax arrangement is left open and 
remains the subject of much debate. 109
(c) Summary
From the above discussion it is clear that evaluation of efficiency/neutrality is usually 
undertaken at the macro level based on economic models. 110 As the focus of the thesis is 
on specific aspects of the income tax system within the context of Australia’s 
jurisdictional claim, then global measurement using economic modeling has little 
relevance to that process.
103 Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1366.
104 Ibid.
105 Graetz (2003), above n 23, 29.
106 This lack of consensus is due in part to compliance and administrative considerations, but is mainly 
due to all nations, including Australia, having a national interest in protecting their share of taxing 
rights - see 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 91-2 and Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1371.
107 Ibid.
108 Asprey Report, ibid. Klaus Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (3rd ed, 1997), 
14 notes that the best possible efficiency in the international context in allocation is obtained 
through the state of residency taxing on a world wide basis and granting a credit for the tax levied 
in the state of source (capital export neutrality). If taxation is restricted to state of source on the 
territorial principle, capital import neutrality is achieved by economic inefficiency.
109 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 91-2 and Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1365.
110 Vogel I, above n 65.
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3 The use o f  efficiency (neutrality) within the thesis
Despite the difficulty in getting a clear consensus on the preferred neutrality objective,
the difficulties in quantitative measurement of efficiency/neutrality, and the fact that
complete neutrality is unattainable,111 what is clear is that efficiency/neutrality is a
crucial tax policy objective. In fact the Asprey Committee argued that neutrality should
be the general aim when considering efficiency, and that departures should be made only
112where other measures will not give rise to an efficient result.
Therefore, as the thesis is focused on the legal rules relating to residency and source as 
opposed to the operation of the system as a whole, any lack of efficiency (neutrality) 
identified in the legal rules will be evaluated qualitatively. This will be done by 
identifying when the law in certain circumstances gives rise to distortions such as a 
taxpayer being taxed differently due to the market in which the taxpayer operates (eg 
physical or electronic). A lack of neutrality may also be demonstrated where income is 
taxed differently depending upon its characterisation or its source. This evaluation will 
not consider distortions due to the nature o f business structure adopted. However, 
although the impact of tax avoidance and evasion will be evaluated under the prevention 
of tax avoidance evaluative criterion, in respect of neutrality, distortions caused by tax 
avoidance will be briefly noted.
C. Simplicity
The third objective criterion is simplicity.113 The test, in the tax law context,114 has been 
used widely in various reports11' and in some circumstances, interchangeably with the
111 Ross Report, above n 13, 15 notes not only is complete neutrality unattainable it is also not justified 
where all other economic objectives are sought to be satisfied.
112 The Asprey Report, above n 8, 16 argues that some discriminatory taxes that discourage output to 
encourage societal good (eg health) are in fact an “efficiency tax”.
113 There are a myriad of papers on this topic which Cooper has classified into three themes: “. . . 
extolling the virtues of simplicity in taxation as self-evident, describing the cost of the scourge of 
complexity, and suggesting remedies to the problem of complexity of varying degrees of 
sophistication” -  see Graeme S Cooper, ‘Themes and issues in tax simplification’ (1993) 10 
Australian Tax Forum 417, 419.
114 There is also the concept of “economic simplicity”, which “emphasises the interaction between the 
tax law and the economy (as characterised by the population of taxpayer)” and is based upon the 
operating cost of the tax -  see Binh Tran-Nam, ‘Tax Reform and Tax Simplicity: A New and 
‘Simpler’ Tax System?’ (2000) 6 University o f New South Wales Law Journal Forum 6, 7.
115 Examples of reports focused principally on simplicity include New South Wales, Taxation 
Investigation Committee Report (1937) and the 1936 UK Income Tax Codification Committee, 
above n 13 (which was charged with preparing a draft Income Tax Bill which aimed at making the 
law more “intelligible to the taxpayer . . . promote uniformity and simplicity”).
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term certainty, 116 which in turn embodies concepts such as clarity, consistency117 and
1 1 o
stability. The importance of simplicity is that in its absence tax laws are complex 
(uncertain) 11 <; and poorly designed which in turn:
• imposes high compliance costs on the community; 120
• imposes high administrative costs on the tax authorities; 121
• results in socially unproductive and costly tax litigation; 122
• are counterproductive to the economic development of the country, in 
particular by jeopardizing economic neutrality; 124
116 Certainty is Adam Smith’s second maxim, ie that “[t]he tax which each individual is bound to pay 
ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to 
be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person . . . The 
uncertainty of taxation only encourages the insolence and favours the corruption of an order of men 
who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt.” - Smith above n 15, 
350-1. Also see the 1920 Royal Commission, above n4, 125F.
117 Tran-Nam above n 114, 6, sees clarity, consistency and certainty as some of the essential 
requirements for legal simplicity. Also see A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 64 and ANTS, above 
n 1, 105-27.
118 Although this is advocated by Lord Howe of Aberavon, ‘Simplicity and stability: the politics of tax 
policy' [2001] British Tax Review 113, 123, Cedric Sandford and John Hasseldine, The 
Compliance Costs o f  Business Taxes in New Zealand (1992), 119 and Inspector-General, above n 
26, 1, there is not universal acceptance of stability being an essential criteria for simplicity -  see 
Cooper (1993), above n 113, 460.
119 A recent example of the expansive drafting style is the new debt equity rules - New Business Tax 
System (Debt and Equity) Act 2001 (Cth). It is argued that in a self assessing environment such 
expansive drafting does not make sense as it produces “imprecise, fluid and elastic provisions” 
which lack clear policy direction and creates uncertainty for taxpayers - see Ian Stanley, ‘The debt 
equity rules: Debt interests’ (Paper presented at NSW Division of the Taxation Institute of 
Australia Seminar, Sydney, 16 August 2001), 1.
120 These costs take two forms. First, from September 1985, when it was first announced that 
traditional taxation administration arrangements were to be replaced with self assessment, a large 
compliance burden was shifted from the tax administrator to the taxpayer. For a history of its 
piecemeal introduction from 1 July 1986 onwards, a discussion of the failure of the system to fully 
address the power imbalance created through ensuring accessible and binding information and 
recommendations for reform see Michael Dirkis and Michael Payne-Mulcahy, ‘Time for a change: 
Self assessment 14 years on’ (2002) 36 Taxation in Australia 417.
Second, this community cost can be increased through incompetent advisers. Complex income tax 
laws, which make it impossible to form a defendable view in respect of the law, discourage 
thorough tax advisers, as they are unable to justify their fees for such uncertain outcomes. As a 
result, less thorough advisers can charge less for their equally uncertain advice (the so called 
Gresham’s Law) -  see and HH Monroe, ‘Fiscal Statutes: A Drafting Disaster’ [1979] British Tax 
Review 265, 268; Committee on Tax Policy of the New York State Bar Association’s Tax Section, 
‘A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax’ (1972) 27 Tax Law Review 325, 327; Mark Burton 
and Michael Dirkis, ‘Defining Legislative Complexity: A case study - the Tax Law Improvement 
Project’ (1995) 14 University o f  Tasmania Law Review 198, 205; and Margaret McKerchar, The 
Impact o f Complexity upon Tax Compliance: A Study o f Australian Personal Taxpayers Research 
Study No 39, Australian Tax Research Foundation (2003).
121 As complexities continue to rise, so do complex boundaries for the ATO to police and the total cost 
of the tax system (ie, the sum of compliance costs and administrative costs borne primarily by the 
ATO) — Chris Evans, et al, A Report into Taxpayer Costs o f Compliance (1997), 86 and Cedric 
Sandford, ‘International Comparisons of Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation’ (1994) 
11 Australian Tax Forum 291, 301.
122 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 15.
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• acts against public involvement in policy development; and
• generates disrespect for the rule of law.126
It is further claimed that a simpler tax system results in lower administrative costs (with 
fewer resources being devoted to socially unproductive activities such as tax planning 
and tax litigation) and gives rise to many economic benefits.
1 Defining simplicity
The simplicity principle of tax policy design is that “tax rules should be clear and simple 
to understand, so that taxpayers know where they stand” (ie a good tax system should 
be as simple as possible). Thus, it is argued that where possible, tax reform measures 
capable of ready comprehension and application should be preferred over more complex 
alternatives in order to increase the certainty of what is or is not taxable, and to increase 
the clarity of the tax system.1 Jl In other words, a reform should only be adopted if it can 
be legislated and can be implemented (ie the reform is feasible).
However, despite the self-evident nature of the concept, the myriad of writings on the 
topic present what appears to be an unending array of definitions of what constitutes
125
123 See, eg, Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Plain English and the Law (1987), 59; Ed, 
‘Counting the costs’ (1991) 26 Taxation in Australia 248; and Brian Nolan and Tom Reid, ‘Re­
writing the Tax Act’ (1994) 22 Federal Law Review 448, 450
124 Complexity can create a lack of economic neutrality by favouring projects with more predictable 
tax outcomes - Burton, above n 120, 204.
125 Certainty about tax laws allows for a widespread, informed debate on taxation policy issues, which 
is essential to the functioning of democracy - see C Havighurst and R Hobbet, ‘Foreword’ (1969) 
34 Law and Contemporary Problems 671 cited in Burton, above n 120, 206.
126 It is argued that if taxpayers lose faith with the tax law as a body of rules, voluntary compliance 
will suffer and the government in introducing measures, which protect the revenue, will incur 
greater cost - see Ross Parsons, ‘Income tax - An Institution in Decay?’ (1986) 3 Australian Tax 
Forum 233. Adam Broke, ‘Simplification of tax or I wouldn’t start from here’ [2000] British Tax 
Review 18 sees four causes of complexity: diversity, volume, drafting and language.
127 Law Reform Commission of Victoria, above n 123, 62 and 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 14.
128 Cooper (1993) suggests “. . . there is little empirical work that can verify the grand, but largely
unsupported claims for the benefits of simplification” (above n 113 at 420 and also at 426-432).
129 OECD, above n 24, 10. The definition adopted by the Board of Taxation (“. . . a tax system should 
be transparent, easily understood, and keep administrative and compliance costs to a minimum”) 
stretches the definition to include the administrative efficiency objective - Board of Taxation, 
above n 11, 32.
130 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 15. It is argued that it is self-evident. Lord Howe, above n 117,
113 in citing Alice G Abreu, ‘Untangling tax reform’ (1996) 33 San Diego Law Review 1355, notes 
“‘If taxes had existed in the Garden of Eden, the serpent wouldn’t have needed an apple; the
promise of a simpler tax system alone would have seduced Eve.’ She said it all, didn’t she? Tax
simplification is a hugely seductive subject.”
131 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 15 and ANTS, above n 1, 17-18 and 129-152.
132 1996 FSI Paper, above n 12, 19.
39
simplicity. Cooper, having reviewed the literature, suggests that the many and varied 
concepts discussed by writers can be distilled down to seven concepts that are embodied 
in the notion of simplicity. These concepts are:
123
• predictability (ease of understanding) of a rule’s intended (and actual) scope;
• proportionality (complexity proportional to the policy);
• consistency (avoids arbitrary distinctions);
• low compliance burdens;
• easy administration;
• co-ordination with other tax rules; or
• clear expression.134
Although other writers have distilled what appear to be different concepts underlying 
simplicity, these differences are generally based upon subtle differences in classification 
and expression.135
2 Identifying simplicity
When attempting to measure simplicity the focus of measurement has been on the level
of complexity,136 rather than attempting to measure simplicity.137 It is generally accepted
• . . .  . . .  1 that income tax is in varying degrees intrinsically complex. However, as there have
133 See, eg, Asprey, above n 8, 15 which defines a tax simple if the official cost of administration and 
taxpayer compliance costs are low (ie both are the ancient cannon of certainty).
134 Cooper (1993), above n 113, 424.
135 For example: predictability, enforceability, difficulty and manipulability -  Joel Slemrod 
‘Complexity, compliance costs and tax evasion’ in JA Roth and JT Scholtz, Taxpayer Compliance: 
Social Science Perspectives (1986) 156 cited in Tran-Nam, above n 114, 6. Similarly, Westberg 
(above n 70, 65-71 and 73-74) identifies predictability and proportionality as underlying certainty 
and administrative ease and ease of compliance costs as underlying simplicity.
136 Complexity, as with simplicity, has been defined in a number of ways including the cost of 
compliance arising from the lack of certainty eg New York State Bar Association, above n 120, 
327.
137 Cooper (1993) above n 113, 425 argues that there is no measure of simplicity.
138 1936 UK Codification Committee, above n 13, 17 noted “[t]he impossibility of producing a simple
code of income tax law must be obvious to anyone who reflects for a moment . . . The countless 
complications of modem life must inevitably reflect in the complexity of the code which has to 
cope with them”. This was cited with approval by the Commissioner of Taxation - see the 
Commissioner of Taxation, Commonwealth, Eighteenth Report (1936), 14. Also see Stanley S 
Surrey, ‘Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax 
Detail’ (1969) 34 Law and Contemporary Problems 673, 680; 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 
15, Michael Carmody, ‘Issues Confronting Australia’s tax system’ (Paper presented in Financial 
Review Leaders Lunch, Sydney, 29 July 2002), 14 (copy located at:
http://www.ato.gov.au/content.asp?doc=/content/Corporate/sp200207.htm accessed 31 December 
2003) and Gary Banks (Chair, Productivity Commission), ‘The good, the bad and the ugly:
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been continual complaints in reports and in the literature about the complexity of the tax 
system since its inception, 139 it is difficult to gauge from that research what is a valid 
means of measuring complexity so an accepted level of complexity can be determined 
(ie, the ability to determine when is a measure is not too complex) . 140
There are a number of methods adopted to measure complexity. One methodology is to 
measure the complexity of taxation law by the readability of the legislation141 with the 
solution seen in simplification by improving readability through “plain English” 
drafting. 142 However, this solution has been substantially criticised as mere readability 
does not ensure understanding to such a level that enables the provision to be applied in 
all circumstances. Further, no matter how clearly expressed, a complex rule remains 
complex143 and a simple provision, which contains an administrative discretion couched 
in general terms, may mask huge complexity. 144
economic perspectives on regulation in Australia’ (Paper presented at the Conference of 
Economists, Business Symposium, Canberra, 2 October 2003), 3.
139 1932 Royal Commission, above n 5, 6
140 GSR Wheatcroft, ‘The Present State of the Tax Statute Law’ [1968] British Tax Review 377; 
Robert Couzin, ‘The Process of Simplification’ (1984) 32 Canadian Tax Journal 487; John Clark, 
‘Statutory Drafting’ [1980] British Tax Review 326; and Charles E McLure, ‘The Budget Process 
and Tax Simplification/ Complication’ (1989) 45 Tax Law Review 25.
In fact, whilst the objective of the now defunct Tax Law Improvement Project was to reduce the 
complexity of the Act, nowhere in the Commonwealth, Joint Committee of Public Accounts An 
Assessment o f Tax - A Report on an Inquiry into the Australian Taxation Office, Report No 326
(1993) , which was the genesis of the project, or the various publications associated with the project 
(in particular George Gear, Commonwealth, Tax Law Improvement Project: The Broad Framework
(1994) Information paper No 1 and George Gear, Commonwealth, Tax Law Improvement Project: 
Building the New Law (1995) Information paper No 2) is there a definition of complexity.
141 Law Reform Commission of Victoria, above n 123, 60 and Simon James and Alan Lewis, ‘Fiscal 
Fog’ [1977] British Tax Review 371. The measurement methods include the Flesch score (measures 
readability by sentence length and the number of syllables) and Cloze procedure (measures 
readability by assessing a reader’s ability to correctly replace missing word in a passage of 
legislation).
142 The Law Reform Commission of Victoria rewrote Division 16E of Part III at the request of the Law 
Council of Australia and submitted a draft to the Australian Taxation Office for comment see Law 
Reform Commission of Victoria, Annual Report (1991), 7. It was touted as a great advance (see 
Ed, ‘Snappy language: The Dingo Division’ (1991) 26 Taxation in Australia 246), but met with 
criticism (see Ian Turnbull, ‘Simplification: Dingos Revisited’ (1992) 27 Taxation in Australia 79; 
and Anthony H Slater, ‘Principle or prescription? Simplified tax legislation involves much more 
than "plain English" redrafting’ (1993) 1 Taxation in Australia Red 119). Also see response David 
St L Kelly, ‘Simplification: Dingos Revitalised’ (1992) 27 Taxation in Australia 270.
143 John F Avery Jones ‘Tax laws: Rules or principles?’ [1996] British Tax Review 580, 582 and 
Lehmann and Coleman, above n 23, 65.
144 lan G Wallschutzky, ‘TLIP: Stage 1 -  Benchmarking’ (1995) 12 Australian Tax Forum 115; 
Richard J Vann, ‘Improving Tax Law Improvement: An international perspective’ (1995) 12 
Australian Tax Forum 193; Ian Turnbull, ‘Drafting simple legislation’ (1995) 12 Australian Tax 
Forum 247; and Simon James, Adrian Sawyer and Ian G Wallschutzky, ‘The complexities of tax 
simplification: Progress in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom’ (1998) 14 Australian 
Tax Forum 29.
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This approach is also globally difficult to achieve as readability is dependant upon the 
target audience’s reading ability, which will vary depending upon factors such as age, 
education level and occupation. A failure to clearly articulate the intended audience will 
undermine the value of any rewrite (eg the Taxation Laws Improvement Project 
(TLIP) ) . 145 Despite TLIP over a two year period altering the target of the tax law rewrite 
from the general community to tax agents, the language of the draft legislation released 
did not change over that time period, nor were any earlier drafts revamped to reflect the 
newly identified audience. 146
Suggestions that the length of the law gives rise to complexity147 are subject to similar 
superficiality criticisms. In fact length may increase simplicity by providing a fuller 
explanation. In an electronic age, length is not as problematic. 148
The other key measurement approach is to focus on the cost of compliance. 149 Most 
academic research has focused on the compliance costs from the taxpayer’s 
perspective150 as the global costs of collection are easily obtained from the budgets of
145 Burton, above n 120. Subsequent studies indicate that although readability can be improved, this 
improvement does not necessarily translate into reduced compliance costs - see Adrian Sawyer, 
‘Rewriting tax legislation: Reflections on the New Zealand’s experience’ (2003) 57 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 578, 587.
146 The Project’s first information paper (above n 138, 3) identified taxpayers as the target of the 
rewrite. The second information paper stated the target was both the taxpayer and the tax adviser 
(above n 138, 5), while by late 1994 the Project Team determined that it was impractical to focus 
on the taxpayer audience. The law rewritten as a result of this focus would have been unsuitable for 
the reader group who could be expected to make the greatest use, the tax professional (Brian Nolan 
and Tom Reid, ‘Re-writing the Tax Act’ (1994) 22 Federal Law Review 448, 457). By June 1995 it 
was decided that the project should target "the suburban tax agent as a typical audience" (Brian 
Nolan, Robert Allerdice and Simon Gaylard, ‘The Tax Pyramid’ (Paper presented at Tax Law 
Improvement Project seminars, Perth, Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane, in June/July 1995), 3).
147 See, eg, Trevor Boucher, ‘Tax Simplification - Some Different Dimensions’ (paper presented to the 
Monash University Law School Foundation, Melbourne, 3 September 1991), 2; edited version ‘The 
simplification debate: Too simplistic’ (1991) 26 Taxation in Australia 277.
148 Note the insight of H Stone, ‘Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification’ (1923) 23 
Columbia Law Review 320 that the ever increasing length of legislation would put pressure on 
some new technology to facilitate the expeditious location of relevant law.
149 Joel Slemrod, ‘Did the Tax Reform Act of 1986 simplify tax matters?’ (1992) 6 Journal of 
Economic Perspective 45 suggests that the total operating costs of the tax system is a measure of 
the complexity of the system -  cited by Jeffrey Pope Policy Implications of research on compliance 
costs of taxation’ in John G Head and Richard Krever (eds), Taxation Towards 2000 Conference 
Series No 19, Australian Tax Research Foundation (2000), 617, 637.
150 Key academic studies on community compliance costs, which set out the trends in current 
Australian compliance cost research, include: Chris Evans, Jeff Pope and John Hasseldine (eds), 
Tax Compliance Costs: A Festschrift for Cedric Sandford (2001); Margaret McKerchar ‘The 
effects of complexity on unintentional noncompliance for personal taxpayers in Australia’ (2002) 
17 Australian Tax Forum 3; and a series of studies by Jeff Pope et al starting with Jeffrey Pope, 
Richard Fayle and Mark Duncanson, The Compliance Costs o f Personal Income Taxation in 
Australia 1986/87 Research Study No 9, Australian Tax Research Foundation (1990) and more 
recently Jeff Pope and Prafula Fernandez, ‘The Compliance costs of the superannuation surcharge 
tax’ (2003) 18 Australian Tax Forum 537. Comparative compliance costs studies include: OECD,
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the revenue authorities.1̂ 1 Although there has been a lot of research, the accuracy of the 
results have been questioned due to sample size, response rates152 and the difficulties in
153measuring the impact upon compliance costs when changes are implemented.
Thus, a lack of an agreed measurement benchmark means that it is difficult to validate a 
claim that a particular tax reform measure will produce a simpler income tax.154
3 The use o f simplicity within the thesis
From the above discussion what is simplicity and how is it measured is the subject of 
much conjecture and debate. Again, what is not questioned by any of the reports or 
authors is that simplicity is a key tax policy objective of a good tax system.155 Therefore 
the question is how it can be applied within the thesis.
Given the legal doctrinal focus of this thesis, many of the quantitative measurement 
benchmarks are not relevant. Therefore, for the purpose of the thesis, the simplicity of, 
or conversely, the complexity of, the legal rules relating to residency and source will be 
illustrated qualitatively through identifying when the law does not in certain 
circumstances give rise to simple clear outcomes, ie the circumstances illustrate that the 
law does not meet the seven concepts underlying the simplicity notion suggested by 
Cooper.156 Thus, if the law in application is:
Businesses’ Views on Red Tape: Administrative and Regulatory Burdens on Small and Medium- 
Sized Enterprises (2001), located at: http://wwwl.oecd.org/publications/e-book/4201101E.PDF on 
31 December 2003, which analyses and compares the small and medium business tax compliance 
costs for the period April 1998 to May 1999 (pre GST for Australia) of 11 countries, including 
Australia; Sandford, above n 117 for a contra on the reliability of such studies: and Chris Evans, et 
al ‘Taxation compliance costs: Some recent empirical work and international comparison’ (1998) 
14 Australian Tax Forum 93.
151 An example of a recent Government tax compliance cost study is: Australian Taxation Office, 
Commonwealth, International Benchmarking o f GST administration (2004), obtained by The 
Australian under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) 19 January 2004, 24. More generic 
studies on “whole of Government” compliance costs on small business include: Commonwealth, 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology Small 
Business in Australia -  Challenges, Problems and Opportunities: Recommendations and Main 
Conclusions (1996) and Small Business Deregulation Task Force, Commonwealth, Time for 
Business: Report o f the Small Business Deregulation Task Force (1996).
152 Joel Slemrod ‘Which is the simplest tax system of them all’ in Henry J Aaron and William G Gale 
(eds), Economic Effects o f Fundamental Tax Reform (1996) and Banks, above n 138, 5.
153 Cooper (1993), above n 113, 426.
154 Burton, above n 120, 203.
155 Despite this acceptance it has been difficult to achieve see, eg, Graetz, above n 34, 1410 notes 
“simplicity always seems to be the forgotten stepchild of income tax policy. Routinely lip service is 
offered to the idea that tax law ought to be as simple to comply with and administer as possible; 
then, after a nod and a wink, vaulting complexity overleaps itself.”
156 Cooper (1993), above n 113, 424.
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• not predictable -  there is difficulty in understanding a rule’s intended (and 
actual) scope;
• not proportional -  its complexity is disproportional to the complexity of the 
policy;
• not consistent -  involves arbitrary distinctions;
• associated with the imposition of high compliance burdens;
• difficult to administer;
• not co-ordinated with other tax rules; and
• expressed unclearly,
then it will be considered to have failed the simplicity objective in that circumstance, for 
that stakeholder. When focusing on reform, recommendations will be similarly 
examined using the policy objective to illustrate where a recommendation does give rise 
to greater simplicity within the context of Australia’s jurisdictional claim.
D. Prevention of tax avoidance
A fourth and final policy objective is the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion. 
Avoidance and evasion creates inequity of the system,157 reduces the productivity and 
efficiency of the economy, impacts adversely on government revenues, distorts 
macroeconomic policy, threatens the legitimacy of the tax system, erodes moral 
standards159 and results in a waste160 or misallocation of economic resources.161 
Although the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion appears to be more a strategy for 
achieving equity " and efficiency or an outcome of the achievement of simplicity, it was 
expressed overtly as an objective in the 1985 White Paper and has been used in other
157 Downing, above n 14, 128.
158 JA Kay, ‘The economics of tax avoidance’ [1979] British Tax Review 354, 356.
159 Neil Brooks, ‘The challenge of tax compliance’ in Chris Evans and Abe Greenbaum (eds), Tax 
Administration: Facing the Challenges o f the Future (1998), 7 and 12-15.
160 Downing, above n 14, 128.
161 Tax avoidance impacts upon distribution of resources between individuals and between different 
activities and sectors of the economy - Kay, above n 158, 356. Also see Christopher Bajada, The 
Cash Economy and Tax Reform Research Study No 36, Australian Tax Research Foundation 
(2001), 31-33.
162 Above n 27 and quote in text from Carter Commission.
163 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 15.
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reports as a justification for recommending change.164 Thus, prevention of tax avoidance 
and evasion is a relevant evaluative criterion in its own right.
The causes of avoidance and evasion include structural defects in tax legislation (such as 
difficulties in defining the tax base, multiple rates of tax on elements of the same tax 
base,165 steep progressive income tax166 and deficiencies in decision making and tax 
collection mechanisms167), increased burden of taxes and government regulation,168 
increase in means-tested transfers, stagnating real incomes and increases in 
unemployment, increases in self-employment, shift to services, forces of globalisation 
and a decline in tax morality.169
1 Defining tax avoidance and evasion
The terms “tax evasion”, “tax avoidance” and “tax planning” are often used 
interchangeably to describe the process by which taxpayers organise their affairs to 
reduce their overall tax liability. However, despite this common usage, each term has a 
specific legal meaning.170
Tax evasion, which is criminal in nature,111 is the reduction of tax by failing to comply
. . .  1 7 9with the law by not disclosing all income or by over claiming deductions. Tax
164 See, eg, the 1920 Royal Commission recommendations on taxation at source for dividends (above n 
4, 131) and the OECD uses the prevention of avoidance and evasion as part of its “effectiveness 
and fairness” taxation principle -  OECD, above n 24, 10. Also see Inspector-General, above n 26, 
1 .
165 Kay, above n 158, 356.
166 Bajada, above n 161, 29
167 Yuri Grbich, Institutional Renewal in the Australian Tax System (1984), 1.
168 Smith, above n 15, 352, notes that “. . . an injudicious tax offers a great temptation to smuggling . . 
. The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates the temptation, and then 
punishes those who yield to it ”.
169 Neil Brooks, above n 159, 9-11. Neil Bookes at 19 -22 summaries the various research models 
used to explain the causes of avoidance and evasion, eg economic, psychological, sociological and 
pragmatic models. Also see Bajada, above n 161, 29-31. Attitudinal studies have been also 
undertaken to explore perceptions of fairness and tax avoidance, see, eg, Lin Mei Tan and Carol 
Chin Fatt, ‘The impact of tax knowledge on perception of fairness towards taxation: an exploratory 
study’ (Paper presented at the 11th Australasian Tax Teachers Conference, Canberra, 6 February 
1999).
170 Michael Brooks and John Head, ‘Tax avoidance: In economics, law and public choice’ in Cooper 
(1997) above n 43, 53, 54 note that to an economist there would be no distinction between the 
different types of tax avoidance. Also see Frans Vanistendael, ‘Judicial interpretation and the role 
of anti-abuse provisions in tax law’ (1997), in Cooper (1997), ibid, 131 and Jeffrey Waincymer, 
‘The Australian tax avoidance experience and responses: A critical review’ (1997) in Cooper 
(1997) ibid, 247, 249.
171 Geoffrey Lehmann, ‘Judicial and statutory restrictions on tax avoidance’ in Richard Krever (ed) 
Australian Taxation Principles and Practice (1987), 295.
172 Asprey Report, above n 8, 143.
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avoidance, which lies somewhere between tax evasion and tax-planning activities, is a 
process by which tax is reduced by entering into transactions which have perceived legal 
consequences, but have no practical effect other than creating a deduction or reducing 
income. Tax planning is the minimisation of taxation to the extent it is legally 
possible and commercially practicable to do so.174
However, there is a fine line between tax avoidance and tax planning.17'’ What falls 
within each category depends upon perception and the legal context prevailing.176 For 
example, where tax planning becomes commercialised (ie arrangements that are 
marketed, such as the equity linked bonds and controller superannuation arrangements, 
which were marketed in the late 1990s), the ATO takes the view that the line between 
legitimate tax planning and avoidance has been crossed. The ATO refers to this 
marketing process as “aggressive tax planning”.177 When this line is crossed is often 
uncertain178 and it has taken the ATO over four years to attempt a definition.179 The 
ATO defines “aggressive tax planning” arrangements to be:
173 Lehmann, above n 171, 295 and Asprey Report, above n 8, 143. Vanistendael, above n 170, 131 
notes that “the distinction between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion is crucial but non­
lawyers tend to treat them as the same thing.”
174 Lehmann, above n 171, 295 and Vanistendael, above n 170, 132. The legality of tax planning is 
supported by the courts. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1, 
19-20 Lord Atkin stated that "[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax 
attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering 
them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an 
increased tax.”
175 This is a result of the conflict between the doctrine of Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke o f 
Westminster (ibid), which is based on a literal approach to interpreting tax legislation (taxpayers 
are taxed on the form of a transaction and not its substance) and to a purposive approach (law 
interpreted in accordance with the purpose or policy underlying the legislation. The purposive 
approach is supported by a general anti-avoidance provision (Part IVA of the 1936 Act) and an 
express legislative direction to the courts that when interpreting a provision they should give it the 
construction which favours the purpose of the legislation {Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) 
ss 15AA and 15AB). Also see Asprey Report above n 8, 143 and Carter Commission, above n 13, 
Vol 3 Appendix A, 538.
176 Philip F Vineberg, ‘The Ethics of Tax Planning’ [1969] British Tax Review 31, 35 notes that he
. . once suggested a rather subjective test of the difference between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. If you have a bright plan on how to save taxes, that is tax avoidance. If somebody else has 
a scheme to save taxes that is tax evasion". When this line is crossed is often uncertain - Stan Ross 
and Philip Burgess, Income Tax: A Critical Analysis (2nd ed, 1996), 293, 302.
177 Despite the Commissioner extolling the success in curbing aggressive tax planning, and reflecting 
that ‘[ajggressive tax planning undermines the policy intent of the law and erodes community 
confidence in the fairness and equity of the tax system,” the Commissioner did not define the term 
from when first mentioned in 1999 (Commissioner of Taxation, ‘Stand on aggressive tax planning 
feature of Tax Office Annual Report,’ ATO Media Release Nat 99/74, 26 October 1999).
178 This was confirmed by Australian National Audit Office, Commonwealth, The Australian Taxation 
Office's Management o f Aggressive Tax Planning (Audit Report No 23 2003-2004) release 29 
January 2004, paras 9 and 1.6, which states that aggressive tax planning is a ‘grey’ concept, which 
changes overtime, and what transactions are caught may be viewed differently by the community 
and the ATO.
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. . . those which, in the ATO’s view, are designed to attempt to place a 
participant in a position of gaining tax benefits either not available under the 
law or contrary to the intended policy of the law. It would be expected that 
the arrangement would be generally of a kind that the anti-avoidance 
provisions apply, on the assumption that the claimed tax benefits would be
i on
otherwise available under the general provisions of the law.
As well as domestic tax avoidance, tax avoidance or evasion can occur across 
jurisdictions. The terms have the same meaning as they do in the domestic context,
1 O 1
merely the mechanisms used are different.
2 Measuring tax avoidance and evasion
Much research in terms of tax evasion has focused upon measuring the so-called “black 
economy”. Techniques include voluntary survey and samples, non-voluntary tax 
auditing, labour market statistics, growth of large denominations of currency, monetary 
methods, and a range of economic modeling techniques.183 In respect of tax avoidance, 
again the focus has been on the amount of revenue avoided by taxpayers engaging in the 
activity. Similarly, as both these behaviors result in falling revenue and create inequity in 
the system, the usual response to evasion and avoidance is through piece-meal
179 This lack of response occurred despite clarity being actively sought by the tax representative bodies 
over a two year period - eg Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, National Tax Liaison 
Group (NTLG) Minutes for 9 March 2001, item 5, at URL 
http://www.ato.gov.au/large/content.asp?doc=/content/10503.htm&page=2#H8 as at 9 February 
2004, and Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, National Tax Liaison Group (NTLG) 
Minutes for 2 September 2003, item 2, at URL 
http://www.ato. gov.au/taxprofessionals/content.asp‘?doc=7content/40916.htm&page=5#H 7 as at 9 
February 2004.
180 NTLG 2 September 2003, ibid, Action Item NTLG0309/2. Also see list of indicators ANOA, 
above n 177, Appendix 2.
181 International tax avoidance and tax evasion are facilitated through the use of tax havens, the use of 
head companies in low tax jurisdictions, conduits for channeling income via tax treaties and bank 
secrecy rules -  OECD International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies (1987). 
The off shore tax avoidance undertaken is not subtle or contrived and in most cases it is undertaken 
in complete disregard of the myriad of legislative controls. These controls include transfer pricing 
rules, revised debt/equity mles dealing with thin capitalisation, a foreign tax credit system, foreign 
source income measures relating to controlling interests in companies and trusts, and the so called 
FIF provisions relating to non-controlling interests greater than $50,000 in trusts, companies and 
foreign life assurance policies.
182 Bajada above n 161, 20-28 and Chris Trengove, ‘Measuring the hidden economy’ (1985) 2 
Australian Tax Forum 85.
183 See Cash Economy Task Force, Commonwealth, The Cash Economy Under the New Tax System - 
Third Report (2003) at URL: http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/N9544CEbookfmal.pdf as 
at 31 December 2003. The Task Force concluded that while various studies estimate the cash 
economy to be between about 3% and 15% of GDP, the higher estimates are highly improbable 
given the small business sector's contribution to GDP. The Task Force also notes the modeling 
techniques which result in estimates at the high end of the range have been criticised by the OECD. 
For a contrary view see Bajada above n 161, 12.
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legislative reform184 and the ATO's tax compliance (anti-avoidance) strategies.18'̂ As a 
result, the studies tend to focus on the savings of particular measures rather that the 
impact upon the system as a whole. A further problem in measurement is the absence of 
a clear line between tax avoidance and tax evasion (discussed earlier), which means that 
it is difficult to come up with a clear and objective measurement.
3 The use ofprevention o f tax avoidance and evasion within the thesis
From the above it is clear that many of the more recent reports and inquiries see the 
prevention of tax avoidance and evasion as a separate tax policy aim of a good tax 
system. Again the issue is how best to use it in the context of the thesis.
Given the legal focus of this thesis, the existence of opportunities for tax avoidance or 
evasion in the legal rules relating to residency and source will be illustrated qualitatively 
through identifying instances where there appear to be evasion or avoidance 
opportunities. Similarly, in the reform context, the focus will be upon review of 
alternatives that limit the scope for evasion or avoidance opportunities.
IV. Justification for the adoption of the four tax policy objectives
From the above analysis, it is clear that the four evaluative tests as defined are 
appropriate tests for evaluating the effectiveness of the law relating to residency and 
source. However, there are a number of other tax policy objectives identified in the 
various reports and inquiries that could also be used in evaluating the adequacy of the 
law of residency and source in its practical application. Therefore, it is important to
184 Malcolm Gammie, ‘Tax avoidance and the rule of law: A perspective from the United Kingdom’ in 
Cooper (1997), above n 43, 181, 212 notes that the legislative response tends to target the 
symptoms of the problem rather than the underlying cause. This response is common as they are 
seen as inequitable and a threat to the revenue - eg Ligertwood Committee, above n 7, xiii.
Thus, tax avoidance and tax planning arrangements are attacked under the specific anti-avoidance 
provisions (there are still in excess of 500 such provisions) and by the general anti-avoidance 
provision (Part IVA of the 1936 Act). This trend continues. The ATO wams in NTLG minutes 2 
September 2003, above n 178, Item 2, that where “aggressive tax planning” arrangements do 
comply with the law, including Part IVA of 1936 Act, and the ATO believes that they are contrary 
to the policy intent of the law, the matter would be referred to Treasury for consideration of a 
policy response. International tax avoidance and tax evasion is being targeted through bi-lateral 
exchange of informational agreements and OECD attacks on foreign secrecy laws.
185 Tax evasion has been principally dealt with through audit and enforcement action by the ATO (see 
ATO Compliance Plans - Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Compliance Plan 2004-05 
(2004)) supported by legislative changes focused on enhanced registration and identification
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review the key alternative tax policy objectives in order to further justify why the four 
tax policy objectives chosen are the most appropriate in the context of the hypotheses. 
The following is an evaluation of the key alternative tax policy objectives.
A. Revisiting the jurisdictional claim
From a policy perspective, it is preferable to undertake a fundamental evaluation of 
Australia's taxation jurisdictional claims, than to adopt piecemeal solutions. As Abreu 
notes:
[i]t would be nice if we could stop reacting to problems in the tax system by 
attempting to design new and improved Band-Aids and could turn instead to 
a comprehensive examination of the structural features of the system that 
cause the problem to arise in the first place.186
To ensure such a fundamental evaluation of Australia's taxation jurisdictional claims it is 
necessary first to clearly articulate what is the scope of that claim, before comparing it 
with the existing claim.
For example, in evaluating residency rules applying to individuals, consideration must 
be given to determine who should be a resident and who should not. The possible range 
of persons who could be residents include:
• Australian citizens and permanent residents;
• other persons who live in the jurisdiction for a period and receive the benefits of 
that jurisdiction (visitors, long and short stay);
• persons who receive income from a jurisdiction for personal service performed 
on behalf of that jurisdiction (Australian employees posted abroad);
• persons who earn income from wealth originally amassed in the jurisdiction; or
• even persons who hold property in a jurisdiction or derive income from such 
property.
Who is ultimately included as a resident will also depend upon economic and social 
value judgments. Further, any analysis of residency solutions may also consider in
systems (eg the Tax File Number (TFN) System and the Australian Business Number (ABN) 
System). Also see ANTS, above n 1,150.
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tandem the impact of possible changes to the source concept and international 
developments around DTAs in light of international concerns about the impact of the 
Internet. It is only with this policy articulation that simple, equitable and efficient 
residency and source rules can be designed.
However, despite the perceived merits of such an approach there appears to be resistance 
to such a jurisdictional rearticulation.
1 Current resistance to jurisdictional articulation
From a practical view, the experience of reform process in other jurisdictions where 
individual residency rules have been reviewed (the United States (1984), New Zealand 
(1988), the United Kingdom (1993) and Ireland (1994))188 is that there has not been a
186 Alice Abreu, ‘The difference between expatriates and Mrs Gregory - Citizenship can matter’ 
(1995) Tax Notes International 1613, 1615.
187 The ATO argues that the challenges are not unique to Australia and the solutions lie with treaty 
partners and international forums such as the OECD - ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 12, vii.
188 United States: Prior to the introduction of the Deficit Reduction Act 1984 (US) residency in the 
United States was determined by reference to a person’s individual facts and circumstances. The 
test was too difficult to administer, there was abuse by non-resident green card holders and resident 
aliens were outside the United States tax net - see Leonard Rothschild Jr and Michael Schirmer, 
‘United States: Determining Residency for Federal Income Tax Purposes’ (1993) 47 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 85, Denis Sheridan, ‘Residence in the United Kingdom: 
Observations on the Inland Revenue Consultative Document’ (1988) 29 European Taxation 17, 28 
and Michael McIntyre, The International Income Tax Rules o f the United States (2"d ed, 1992) 1- 
21 .
New Zealand: As the ability to manipulate the existing tests would undermine the Branch 
Equivalent and trust regimes being recommended by the New Zealand Consultative Committee on 
International Tax Reform and Full Imputation it also recommended that the test should be amended 
(see New Zealand, Consultative Committee on International Tax Reform and Full Imputation, 
Second Report (July 1988) para 2.4). A revised residency test s 241 was introduced by the Income 
Tax Amendment Act (No 5) 1988 (NZ) based on the Committee's recommendation. The s OE1 is a 
restatement of the revised s 241(1 )-(5) of the Income Tax Act 1976 (NZ). For further discussion see 
Garth Harris, New Zealand's Intel-national Taxation (1990), 8-9.
In the United Kingdom the major reviews were the:
• 1936 Income Tax Codification Committee (above n 13) para 59. The Committee criticised 
the uncertainty in the law and implied that it had been maintained uncertain to benefit the 
Revenue - see Denzil Davies, Booth: Residence, Domicile and UK Taxation (1995), 167;
• 1955 Royal Commission (above n 13). The Commission recommended that legislation 
should be passed to codify as far as practicable the working rules for residence and 
ordinary residence -  see Sheridan, above n 188, 22, 25 and John F Avery Jones et al, 
‘Dual Residence of Individuals: the Meaning of the Expression in the OECD Model 
Convention -  T [1981] British Tax Review 15, 106;
• 1974 UK Inland Revenue review of 'ordinary residence' - see Finance Bill 1974, 
Explanation note on cl 18 (Foreigners Living in the UK for substantial periods) cited in 
Peter Whiteman et al (eds), Whiteman on Income Tax (3rd ed, 1988), 136;
• 1993 bill to amend the domicile law (withdrawn 26 May) - see Constance McCarthy (ed), 
‘United Kingdom: Law of Domicile’ (26 July 1993) Tax News Service 267;
• 1997 report of Joint Report of the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission 
{Private International Law: the Law o f Domicile Law Comm No 168; Scot Law Com No 
107 (September 1997)). Commission recommended changes to the law of domicile; and
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clear policy articulation of jurisdictional claim. Rather, Governments have tended to 
focus on solutions to specific problems identified by introducing more objective rules to 
deal with the problems encountered.189 The one exception is the 2003 United Kingdom 
review of residence and domicile rules, which has sought to develop fundamental 
principles to underpin any change.190
A similar outcome has been experienced in Australia. The 1997 consultant's report, 
prepared for the ATO's Electronic Commerce Project, only made piecemeal 
recommendations in respect of the residency rules.191 Similarly, in the 1999 Review of 
Business Taxation, in its final report, A Tax System Redesigned, despite its 
recommendations for international tax reform193 (in particular in respect of statutory 
source rules) and its recommendations in respect of an integrated tax design process,194 
failed to put fundamental reform of the “basic building” blocks of Australia’s tax system 
(residency and source) specifically on the agenda. Finally, in 2002 the Review of 
International Taxation Arrangements failed to even pick up the source rule 
recommendations let alone undertake any fundamental review.195
• UK Inland Revenue, Consultative Document, Residence in the United Kingdom: The 
Scope o f the United Kingdom Taxation o f Individuals (July 1988). Although the 
document recommended changes to the individual residence rules, the document was 
attacked for being driven by considerations of administrative ease rather than the good 
law criteria and fundamentally misstating the operation of the law (Sheridan, ibid) and 
failing to address treaty concerns (John Avery Jones, ‘Aspects not covered by the 
Consultative Document on Residence’ (1989) 29 European Taxation 39).
Ireland: In 1993 the Revenue Commissioners initiated the review of the residency tests (see 
generally Charles Haccius, Ireland in International Tax Planning (1995) 64). Ireland had five 
separate residency tests: four "resident" tests (the common law "the place of abode” and 
“substantial and habitual presence” tests and the statutory six month, and intention to reside tests 
(under s 206 of the Income Tax Act 1967 (IRE) (ITA 67)) and the common law "ordinary resident" 
test (see further Willie McAteer and George Reddin, Income Tax (1981) 202). The Community 
responded (see, eg, Institute of Taxation in Ireland, 1993 Pre-Budget Submission to the Irish 
Minister for Finance (14 December 1993) and Gearoid Griffin, President of the Institute of 
Taxation in Ireland, Submission to the Irish Minister for Finance concerning proposed changes to 
Ireland’s residency laws for individual, (5 May 1994)), with changes via the Finance Act 1994, s 
149.
189 For example, despite five major reviews in the United Kingdom (see above n 188) only a minor 
change has occurred in 1993, being the incidental work exclusion to the “place of abode test” being 
introduced via s 208 of the Finance Act 1993 (UK). Similarly, Ireland (via the Finance Act 1994, s 
149) merely adopted new objective tests for “resident” and "ordinary resident” individuals for 
purposes of the Income Tax Acts, the Corporation Tax Acts, the Capital Gains Tax Acts, and the 
Capital Acquisitions Tax Act 1976.
190 2003 UK Review of residence and domicile rules, above n 13.
191 Alan Tyree, et al, Computer Money Consulting Pty Ltd 's INNET 97/2 Report on Electronic 
Commerce Banking and Finance Issues (1997) at URL: 
http://www.ato.gov.au/content/Businesses/Downloads/cmc.rft. Part 2 as at 31 December 2002. The 
report has subsequently been removed from the ATO site.
192 A Tax System Redesigned, above n 10.
193 Ibid, Recommendations 22.18 to 22.24 and 23.1 to 23.3.
194 A Tax System Redesigned, above n 10, Recommendation 1.1.
195 Treasury Consultation Paper (2002), above n 11 and Board of Taxation, above n i l .
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2 Evaluating the resistance
The reasons are not evident for why these reports and reviews have pursued the 
pragmatic, yet piecemeal approach of concentrating on single issue solutions rather than 
encouraging fundamental reflection and change.196 This is particularly puzzling in 
respect of the 2002 Review of International Taxation Arrangements’ Consultation Paper 
given the views of the Review of Business Taxation in its A Strong Foundation 97 paper 
that:
[t]he rules governing business taxation are the result of an accelerating 
accretion of policy changes over several decades. This process of 
unstructured accretion has increased the complexity of changes and limited 
their effectiveness. While each policy change, or program of changes, has 
been designed to address particular problems, those policy changes are now 
revealed to have been additions to a system lacking a sound foundation.
The solution may simply be that the task is now just too hard, complex and costly. In 
reality, such change is always a combination of economic and social value judgments, 
which are not easily evaluated through legal analysis. Further, any analysis of any 
solutions must also consider in tandem the impact of possible changes to the source 
concept and international developments around DTAs in light of international concerns 
about the impact of the Internet.198
3 Use within the thesis
The fundamental evaluation of Australia's taxation jurisdictional claims is not feasible 
within the scope of this thesis, which is focused upon evaluating the existing legal rules 
within the jurisdictional claim. Thus, the approach in the thesis is to undertake legal 
analysis in terms of the narrow jurisdictional claim inherent in Australia’s current 
residency and source rules and to evaluate any reform proposals in light of the 
jurisdictional limitations.
196 Examples where specific fixes have been pursued rather than considering alteration to the residency 
rules are:
• the removal for some foreign employed taxpayers questions of cessation of residency via 
the introduction of s 23 AG of 1936 Act (see Chapter 3, Part II, B, 1); and
• the countering of concerns about avoidance of capital gains tax on assets that have 
"necessary connection with Australia" due to change in residency by reserving the right 
under s 104-160(3) of 1997 Act to tax persons on capital gains on assets either when they 
become non-resident or upon later disposal of assets (see Chapter 3, n 267).
197 A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 14.
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B. Consistency with the policy reasons for its introduction
The adoption of consistency with the policy reason as an evaluative tool on the face of it 
seems logical, as if the law is consistent with the tax policy the law must be sound. 
Further, in more recent times the policy can be found in the explanatory memorandums 
to taxation bills and the various parliamentary debates.199
1 Difficulties in use of the “ consistency with introduction policy ” approach
However, there are two fundamental problems with using this objective in the context of 
this thesis. First, consistency with the policy does not necessarily mean the law is sound. 
If the policy is developed for other than tax reasons, such as social welfare,200 then the 
resultant law may not be a good tax law.
The second problem is it is often difficult to identify the policy underlying a law 
because:
• the law, which was enacted a long time ago, was rarely accompanied by detailed 
secondary material (such as explanatory notes) that articulates the underlying 
policy;
• recently developed laws also sometimes lack clear underlying policy, as the 
principle policy reasons are often diluted or compromised due to concessions 
granted in the political process; or
• the underlying policy is implicit.
198 The ATO argues that the challenges are not unique to Australia and the solutions lie with treaty 
partners and international forums such as the OECD - ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 12, vii.
199 Since 1981 the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, s 15AA directs the courts in interpreting a provision 
to give it the construction which favours the purpose of the legislation and s 15 AB which indicates 
what information and what documents should be looked at to determine what was the purpose of 
the legislation. These amendments were introduced to overcome the literal approach to interpreting 
tax legislation, (ie taxpayers will be taxed on form of transaction not its substance) adopted by the 
courts - see Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke o f Westminster [1936) AC 1 and Slutzkin v 
Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1977) 7 ATR 166; 77 ATC 4076. Following the 
announcement of the legislation the High Court in Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) v Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297; 11 ATR 949; 81 ATC 4292 stated that they would 
repair a literal defect where it would give rise to an improper result (ie application of the Golden 
rule).
200 Examples are the politically astute 2001 election proposals in respect of a first child tax rebate (see 
Taxation Laws Amendment (Baby Bonus) Act 2002 (Cth)) and family tax benefit measures. Both 
the social policy measures add complexity to the tax law in a number of ways, are arbitrary and 
impose additional compliance costs.
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An example of obscure policy in older legislation is the absence of explicit reasoning 
behind the adoption of the source basis of taxation in most Australian colonies ahead of 
residency based taxation. As explained in Chapter 1, although a world wide basis of 
taxation was adopted in Australia's first colonial income tax law, introduced in 
Tasmania in 1880, the income tax systems introduced by the Commonwealth and the 
other Australian States/colonies were founded on source rather than residency.201
From the Committee debates in the Tasmanian House of Assembly on the failed Income 
Tax Bill 1866 (Tas), it is clear that residency was the preferred option.202 The reason for 
adoption of residency in Tasmania was that to tax only domestic sourced income would 
create incentive to shift income offshore.203 As a result, the world wide basis for taxing 
income was adopted in the failed Income Tax Bill 1873 (Tas),204 in the failed Income and 
Property Tax Bill 1879 (Tas),205 in the Real and Personal Estates Duty Act 1880 (Tas), 
in Tasmania's first general income tax Act {Income Tax Act 1894 (Tas),206 and in 
subsequent Acts.207
This lead was not followed in other colonies, or (later) the Commonwealth, despite 
residency being adopted in New Zealand in the 1890s.208 For example, the Victorian 
Legislative Assembly debates on the Land and Income Tax Bill 1894 (Vic) indicate that 
the issue of taxing foreign source income was discussed twice on 13 December 1894, 
and despite the world wide basis taxation models in Tasmania, New Zealand and the
201 Chapter 1, 6 and n 41.
202 Clause 3 of the Bill was amended to expand the scope of the Bill from source based taxation to 
taxing the foreign source income of residents - The Mercury 30 August 1866 - cited in Peter A 
Harris, Metamorphosis o f the Australasian Income Tax: 1866 to 1922 Research Study No 37, 
Australian Tax Research Foundation (2002), 31.
203 The Mercury 11 October 1873 cited in Peter Harris, ibid, 36.
204 Clause 3 of the Bill was amended to ensure that “. . . where any person residing in Tasmania 
derives any income from sources out of Tasmania” it would be taxed. To avoid double tax, the 
clause provided that such income would be exempt to the extent income tax had been paid in 
England or elsewhere - The Mercwy 11 October 1873 cited in Peter Harris, ibid, 36.
205 The Mercury 17 May 1879 cited in Peter Harris, ibid, 59.
206 Income Tax Act 1894 (Tas) s 14 imposed a “. . . tax on all income arising, accruing, received in, or 
derived from Tasmania.”
207 See, eg, Income Tax Act 1902 (Tas) s 14, and Land and Income Taxation Act 1910 (Tas) s 27. In 
all these subsequent Acts relief from any potential double taxation was provided for by permitting 
any taxpayer residing in Tasmania in receipt of foreign source income, to deduct from the income 
tax payable in Tasmania any income tax paid in respect of that foreign income derived in England 
or elsewhere (see, eg, 1894 Act, s 29, 1902 Act, s 52 and 1910 Act, s 114).
208 See, eg, the failed 1876 Victorian Land, Property, and Income Tax Bill (Vic) -  Peter Harris, above 
n 205, 41. Residency was adopted in New Zealand - see Land and Income Assessment Act 1891 
(NZ) and Land Tax and Income Tax Act 1892 (NZ). The failure to adopt residency is harder to 
understand given that all the Governments start with the 1842 United Kingdom Act as their model 
(Harris, ibid, 65, 80)
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United Kingdom being mentioned, no amendment was made to alter the source only 
basis of the Bill.209
Although it is unclear why most of the Australian colonies and later the Commonwealth 
adopted the source model, it is possible to elicit a number of reasons, which appear to 
have played a role in the adoption of the source basis of taxation.
First, a possible reason was that " . . .  there were virtually no Australian taxpayers who 
received an income from investments or business abroad." This view has some 
support in the recommendations of the 1920 Royal Commission on Taxation, which 
qualified its recommendation for the adoption of residency based taxation by stating:
[i]f the financial requirements prove to be such that the raising of additional 
revenue through taxation is unavoidable, then, in preference to a general 
increase of income Tax rates . . .  we recommend resort to the taxation of 
incomes derived abroad.
A second possible reason was a belief that ". . . apart from the question of revenue 
production, the practical disadvantages . . . outweighs the advantages" of a residency 
based system.2'2 The difficulties cited by the 1920 Royal Commission on Taxation,213 
included that a residency based system would create additional complexity (due to 
double taxation arising from the states adopting such a system) and that the taxes on 
resident’s foreign income would be an impediment to foreign investment.
The actual reasons for the source basis being adopted are probably a combination of the 
above factors (ie the additional revenue from adopting the residency basis did not out 
weigh the difficulties in adopting that basis). Ultimately, it was the need for revenue that 
forced the change214 and gave rise to a residency basis of taxation in Australia.
209 Victoria Parliamentary Debates/Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly (1866-1958), Vol 
75, 1018, 1019 and 1115 cited in Peter Harris, ibid, 138-9.
210 Seligman (1928), above n 13, 47.
211 1920 Royal Commission, above n 4, 108.
212 Ibid, 107.
213 Ibid, 108.
214 The emergence of income tax emerged in the Australian colonies and states (and ultimately its 
adoption by the Commonwealth) can be traced to the need to fund government deficits as the result 
of expansion (Tasmania and South Australia), the collapse of banks and the resulting financial 
crisis in the 1890's (New South Wales and Victoria), the removal of tariffs (Queensland and 
Western Australia) and a war (the Commonwealth). Also see the 1932 Royal Commission n 5, 65.
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A further problem is that in making its conditional, majority recommendation, the 1920 
Royal Commission did not consider how residency was to be implemented.216 Even in 
1927 when the Commonwealth made the decision to adopt a residency basis of taxation, 
the actual form of the test was not discussed. Thus, there was no clear articulation of 
Australia's taxation jurisdictional claims (ie no consideration was given to determine 
who should be a resident and who should not). So, the rules introduced in 1930 and 
1939 were developed in isolation by the bureaucracy with no clear theoretical 
articulation.
Even in more recent times, determining the policy can be difficult as the formation of a 
tax system (tax policy) is essentially a political process, with change generated from the 
arenas of politics, philosophy, ideology, economics and sociology.216 These arenas drive 
the tax policy debate on issues such as complexity, compliance costs, the tax mix (direct 
(income) taxes verse indirect (consumption) taxes verse wealth and transfer taxes) and 
effective tax rates.217 Thus, given these competing forces it is often difficult to find a 
single underlying policy. The problem can be summarised as:
. . . virtually everything government attempts to do with direct expenditure 
programs they also attempt (for better or for worse) to do with tax policy. 
Today, tax and spending issues cannot be neatly separated into the categories 
of “who gets whaf” and “who pays for it.” A modern tax system is a complex 
mix of both payments and benefits.
The final problem is that even if a stated policy is found in supporting documentation 
there may often be little comfort. Due to the process discussed above, the stated policy 
may not reflect the range of related policies which underlie the final policy position.
In summary, the difficulty in determining the policy underlying a law arises as
[tjhere is no country in which the whole system of taxation is one, logically 
worked out from the first principles. Everywhere the accidents of political
215 1920 Royal Commission, above n 4, 108.
216 See, eg, John Wilkes (ed), The Politics o f Taxation (1980), Sven Steinmo, Taxation and 
Democracy - Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State (1993) 
and Waincymer, above n 23, 1-39.
217 For example Alan J Auerbach, ‘Tax Reform, capital allocation, efficiency, and growth’ in Aaron, 
above n 152, 29.
218 Steinmo, above n 216, 1.
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and commercial considerations in past history are perpetuated, and condition 
the present system.219
Thus, if the policy is not clear then the consistency level is hard to measure. Even where 
consistency with policy exists, for the reasons mentioned above, it does not prove that 
the policy is a good tax policy. However, although consistency with policy itself may not 
be an evaluative tool, departure from policy may be indicative of why the law is not 
effective.
2 Use within the thesis
On balance, consistency with policy may not always assist in evaluating the 
effectiveness of a tax law as illustrated by the examples set out above. However, where 
the policy underlying the source or a residency rule is evident, and the law does not 
reflect that policy, then this outcome will be highlighted in the thesis.
C. Consistency with national or governmental economic objectives (fiscal strategies); 
ensuring economic growth; and providing for an international competitive economy
The three policy objectives (as named above) are related to efficiency and have been 
used in many reports as a focus for reform. Each tax policy objective will be briefly 
defined and the measurement issues briefly examined before their use within the thesis 
is addressed.
1 Consistency with the Government's fiscal strategy
Consistency with the Government's fiscal strategy has been used as a policy objective in 
some reports.220 The policy objective is simply - are the “reform proposals framed in a 
manner consistent with the Government’s fiscal strategy”? There is a rider that the 
proposal may not be required to meet the objective if there is a good reason.
Consistency with fiscal strategy is a practical barometer for identifying areas for reform. 
However, as with the consistency with government policy (discussed above), although
219 Sir Josiah Stamp, The Fundamental Principles o f Taxation in the Light of Modern Developments 
(1936), 25.
220 1996 FSI Paper, above n 12, 19.
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the fact that a law is consistent with the Government’s fiscal strategy may indicate 
fulfilment of the Government’s policy, it is not by itself a tax policy objective that can 
be used to evaluate the effectiveness of a tax law. Further, as fiscal strategies change in 
response to changing economic conditions and the changing social strategies of political 
parties in power, the test is only relative at the time the measure is introduced. Thus, as 
the main thesis is exploring the effectiveness of the law within existing jurisdictional 
claims then it is possible that measures introduced in the 1890’s will be inconsistent 
with the current fiscal strategy.
In light of the above discussion and given the legal focus of the thesis, the "consistency 
with the Government's fiscal strategy” objective is not an appropriate measure, and will 
not be adopted in the thesis.
2 International competitiveness (which involves countering international tax 
competition)
International competitiveness is used as a tax policy objective in a number of reports and 
inquiries. The policy objective is that:
the tax system should recognise the challenge of (international) tax 
competition and maximise the opportunities for broader microeconomic 
reform efforts to contribute to an internationally competitive economy.221
It is claimed that a competitive tax system enhances business activities by encouraging 
relocation in Australia, enhances employment prospects, and increases standards of 
living.222
In order to achieve this goal the suggested solutions involve abolishing inefficient and 
distorting taxes, removing taxes on business inputs and exports, encouraging productive 
investment, reducing tax avoidance and evasion, reducing complexity, reducing 
compliance costs ' and ensuring “that business decisions are not unduly constrained by 
the business tax system.” An internationally competitive economy requires, and is
221 Ibid. Also see 2003 UK Review of residence and domicile rules n 13, 1.
222 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), Australia’s Tax System and International 
Competitiveness (1993), 2.
223 Fightback, above n 14, 3; ACCI, ibid, 3 and 5; and ANTS, above n 1, 156.
224 Board of Taxation, above n 11, 31.
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sustained by, the efficient use of its economic resources.223 Thus, many of the measures 
and solutions appear to be underpinned by the objectives o f efficiency, simplicity and 
the prevention of tax avoidance and tax evasion. As satisfaction o f these objectives gives 
rise to a competitive economy, then the major reason for adopting “international 
competitiveness” as a stand alone policy objective is political, rather than tax policy.
Further, the measuring of international competitiveness requires extensive economic 
modeling of a number of economies. There are also difficulties in measuring changes in 
international competitiveness arising from changes in discrete rules such as the law 
relating to residency and source.
Again, in light of the above discussion, the doctrinal legal focus of the thesis, and the 
focus of the thesis on the domestic operation of those laws, international 
competitiveness is an incompatible policy objective.
3 Economic growth
A number of reports cite economic growth as a policy objective of the tax system.220 
This objective seems to fall outside the traditional tax policy objectives227 as the 
objective has been seen as merely an outcome affected by the efficiency effects arising 
from neutrality.228 However, in many other cases these words have often been used in 
the taxation context as euphuisms for advocating lower taxes.229
In the 1998 ANTS paper, the Treasurer conceded that it is difficult to measure economic 
growth. The Treasurer noted, however, that measurement is possible and has been 
theoretically shown by a range of studies.230 The modeling conducted to demonstrate the 
benefits of the proposed tax changes, involved the use of the Treasury’s Price Revenue 
Incidence Simulation Model (PRISMOD), which is a large scale, highly disaggregated 
model of the Australian economy. PRISMOD models 107 industries purchasing 1200
225 Ibid.
226 See, eg, Asprey Report, above n 8, 17; McCaw Report, above n 26; A Strong Foundation, above n 
27, 62 and a Tax System Redesigned, above n 10, 13.
227 Fisher, above n 23, 62.
228 A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 75.
229 Asprey Report, above n 8, 17. See claims in ANTS, above n 1, 156.
230 See claims in ANTS, above n 1, 153-202.
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inputs. Further, there are potential conflicts between economic growth and price stability 
and equity. 231
Given the complex nature of the measurement methodology, it would be impossible to 
use this objective in the context of a legal, doctrinally based thesis.
D. Miscellaneous policy objectives -  harmonisation, standardisation, inflation, and
depreciation
As a result, not all the policy objectives used in the reports are relevant as they are issue 
specific (eg focusing on inflation,232 double taxation233 or depreciation234) or are focused 
upon harmonisation (uniformity or standardisation) of specific tax laws of different 
jurisdictions. Further, as the thesis is a legally focused study, many of the objectives 
(in particular those that have an economics basis) may be inappropriate given the general 
measurement approach.236
E. Summary
All the additional tax policy objectives discussed above are useful in measuring the 
effectiveness of a tax law. However, for the reasons discussed above they in general will 
not be used within the thesis. The one exception is where the policy underlying the 
source or a residency rule is evident, and the law does not reflect that policy. Where this 
occurs this will be highlighted in the thesis.
231 Carter Commission, above n 13, Vol 2, 41-5 and 47-8 and McKerchar, above n 120, 24-36.
232 Committee of Inquiry into Inflation and Taxation, Commonwealth Inflation and Taxation (1975)
(Mathews Report), 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 16 and United Kingdom, Report o f the 
Inflation Accounting Committee: Inflation Accounting Cmd 6225 (1975).
233 1932 Royal Commission, above n 5, 65-78, Bruins, above n 13, Stamp, above n 219, 130-42 and 
Seligman (1928), above n 13.
234 Commonwealth Committee on Rates of Depreciation, Commonwealth, Report (1955).
235 1920 Royal Commission, above n 4, 3; 1932 Royal Commission, above n 5, 5; 1937 NSW
Taxation Investigation Committee n 115, 1; and 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 17.
236 For example the factors in economic allegiance (acquisition, situs, enforceability and domicile) 
used by Bruins, above n 13 are not appropriate evaluative tools in the context of this thesis given its 
focus on legal aspects. For similar reasons the use of tax policy objectives such as “tax distributions 
(ie the tax burden), as used in UK 1953 Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, 
above n 13, would be of little relevance as is the pure economic theory approach adopted in New 
Zealand, Tax Review 2001, Final Report (2001) (McLeod Report), at URL: 
http://www.treasurv.govt.nz/taxreview 2001/ located on 31 December 2003.
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V. Conflict between the tax policy objectives
The final issue, having defined the policy objectives to be used in the thesis, is how to 
give weight to the relative importance of each of the four policy objectives in evaluating 
the effectiveness of the law relating to residency and source and in evaluating reform 
options.237 This issue is crucial given that many of the objectives operate inconsistently, 
give rise to conflicting policy directions238 (as various tax rules serve different policy 
aims239) and are unable to provide definitive policy guidance.240 Thus, the more one tax 
policy objective is satisfied the less another may be adequately realised, for example:
adopting a particular tax provision might increase the rate of economic 
growth. However, the same provision might also reduce the fairness of the 
system by providing some group of individuals with a tax advantage relative 
to others in the same circumstances. 241
Ultimately the most appropriate balance adopted will arise from a compromise being 
struck between often unavoidable conflicts between the policy objectives.242 The first 
step is to identify the areas of conflict.
A. Identifying the conflicting policy objectives
The Asprey Report identifies three key areas of where policy objectives conflict: 
simplicity and efficiency, or equity (fairness) and simplicity or equity (fairness) and 
efficiency.243 Conflict can also occur with the anti-avoidance policy objective. Thus, 
policy makers have to choose, in deciding between alternative provisions, which 
objective has precedence.244 The following looks at the conflicts to determine which 
should have precedence.
237 A Strong Foundation above n 27, 65.
238 Carter Commission, above n 13, 3.
239 Asprey Report, above n 8, 20.
240 Downing, above n 14, 48 after noting the conflicts recommend any changes based upon economic 
efficiency should only be made having examined the possible effects on income distribution. Also 
Couzin, above n 138, 494 suggests that the cause of much complexity is the competing objectives 
of the tax system, which affect tax policy, the legislation and its administration.
241 Carter Commission, above n 13, 3.
242 The Asprey Report, above n 8, 12 and 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 14
243 Asprey Report, above n 8, 12 and 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 14.
244 A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 66, notes that different Governments give different weight to 
equity and efficiency.
61
1 Simplicity and efficiency/neutrality
Although conflict does arise between the tax policy objectives of simplicity and 
efficiency/neutrality, that conflict is not great as efficiency/neutrality is achieved through 
a comprehensive tax base (a simple, broad-based tax with uniform rates).245 However, as 
changes to economic efficiency will have impacts upon the distribution of income 
(vertical equity), any changes should only be made after considering those impacts.246
2 Equity and simplicity
The conflict between tax policy objectives of equity and simplicity is the hardest to 
resolve as equity is based upon individualising the tax system to deal with an 
individual’s multitude of different situations, which in turn gives rise to the most 
complex taxes (income tax, capital gains tax, gift and estate duties, and wealth taxes).24' 
This greater complexity may result in a decline in knowledge about and understanding 
of the law, placing in jeopardy “individual rights and liberties.”
Given this apparent irreconcilable conflict the Asprey Committee concluded “that a 
country may have a simple and efficient taxation system or an equitable one but not 
both.” 249
3 Equity and efficiency
The tax policy objectives of equity and efficiency/neutrality can also conflict. For 
example, measures, which make the system more equitable, often require complex 
legislative provisions, which in turn may also cause economic distortions. However, 
there is not always a trade off between equity and efficiency. ' For example, horizontal 
equity is integral in achieving efficiency in minimising any distortions in commercial
245 Asprey Report, above n 8, 20, Simons, above n 43, 158 and A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 75.
246 Downing, above n 14, 48.
247 Asprey Report, above n 8, 21.
248 Carter Commission, above n 13, 3.
249 Asprey Report, above n 8, 21.
250 1985 Draft White Paper, above n 9, 14.
251 Yuri Grbich, Adrian Bradbrook and Kevin Pose, Revenue Law: Cases and Materials (1990), 40.
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choices.252 Further, sometimes pursuit of efficiency can create additional complexity and 
create a greater risk for abuse.253
4 Prevention o f avoidance and simplicity, equity and efficiency
The tax policy objective of prevention of tax avoidance often conflicts with simplicity, 
as the specific and general anti-avoidance measures can create complexity and 
uncertainty. However, the ‘‘prevention of tax avoidance” objective complements both 
equity2'̂ 4 and efficiency by ensuring both vertical and horizontal equity objectives are 
met and by minimising distortions in investment decisions.
B. Weighting the objectives
Having identified the areas of conflict, there are two methods of attack: to avoid the 
conflict or to seek some form of compromise based upon weighing up and assigning 
relative values to each policy objective.“'^
1 Avoiding conflicts
The easy way to overcome conflict in tax policy objectives is to avoid the conflict. This 
can be achieved by looking at alternative methods, which do not have the unwanted 
negative effects on other objectives. For example, “the negative effects of an otherwise 
desirable tax provision on an objective can often be compensated for by introducing or 
changing other tax provisions.” 256
2 Choosing between the objectives where there is unavoidable conflict
Where conflicts between tax policy objectives are unavoidable the only solution is 
compromise. Any compromise, however, involves an evaluative process, which involves
252 2002 Consultation Paper n 11, 84.
253 As mentioned above (n 83) the active income exemption for the CFC rules was introduced to 
promote capital import neutrality. Paul J Keating, Commonwealth, Taxation o f Foreign Source 
Income: An Information Paper (1989), 6 notes that most countries accepted the increased 
complexity and avoidance risk when formulating a tight active income exemption.
254 Above n 27 and quote in text from Carter Commission.
255 Asprey Report, above n 8, 20.
256 Carter Commission, above n 13, 4. Also see David J Collins, ‘Designing a tax system for Papua 
New Guinea” (1985) 2 Australian Tax Forum 327, 331.
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knowledge of the trade offs. This involves estimating “the extent to which one objective 
will be sacrificed if another is to be realised more completely; and the relative 
importance attached to the competing objectives. 257
Any weighting of tax policy objectives will be value laden and in the end “we have to 
accept in the last resort pragmatism is likely to prevail over economic principle, 
perceived political rationality over economic rationality,” 258 and assign the relative 
weightings to each policy objective.
However, despite supporting a greater weighting for a range of tax policy objectives,259 
traditionally equity is domestically the tax policy objective given the greatest weighting 
by many of the reports and enquiries.260 The reasons are twofold.
First, it is argued that equity underpins the tax system. The Carter Commission argues 
that as tax transfers command over goods and services from individuals and families to 
the state:
[i]f equity were not of vital concern taxes would be unnecessary. The state 
could simply commandeer what it needed. The burden of a reduced private 
command over goods and services would then be borne by those individuals 
and families who happen to be within the reach of the state.261
Second, as seen from previous discussion, a failure to deliver an equitable tax system 
can work against other tax policy objectives such as prevention of tax avoidance and 
simplicity. A lack of equity can weaken "the social and political fabric of a country” as 
taxpayers seek to evade their taxes, resulting in high enforcement costs.262
257 Carter Commission, above n 13, 3.
258 Cynthia Coleman, ‘Why Tax Systems Differ’ (2001) Australian Tax Forum 411,413 citing Cedric 
Sandford, Why Tax Systems Differ (2000).
259 See, eg, A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 66, which recommend more weight be given to 
simplicity.
260 See, eg, Carter Commission, above n 13, 4 and A Strong Foundation, above n 27, 63. However 
over the last 20 years there appears to be a greater emphasis on efficiency than equity in many 
countries -  see Field, above n 53, John Head, ‘Tax Reform: A quasi-constitutional perspective’ in 
Cooper (1997) above n 43, 155, 179, and Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1363.
261 Carter Commission, above n 13, 4.
262 Ibid. Graetz (2001), above n 34, 1394-98 and 1406 argues that equity is also a crucial objective for 
international tax policy.
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C. Balancing the objectives in the thesis
From the above it is clear that any ranking of the criteria is open to challenge, as it is 
dependent upon a whole series of competing values. Further, while some of the tax 
policy objectives compete, others complement each other (horizontal equity and 
efficiency) or could be a facet of another (administrative efficiency and simplicity). 
However, it does appear that of the four tax policy objectives equity is seen as 
fundamental.
Given the doctrinal legal focus of the thesis, the approach adopted in the thesis, where it 
is demonstrated that one or more of the four tax policy objectives are not met (or they 
are in conflict), is that the equity policy objective will have primacy in evaluating the 
adequacy of the law and the reform options. However, where the equity objective leads 
to negative outcome in terms of simplicity (complexity) and tax avoidance, the reform 
option that will prevail is that which provides a balance between the equity tax policy 
objective and the simplicity and anti-avoidance tax policy objectives.
VI. Conclusion
The thesis seeks to distill the scope of the jurisdictional claim from the current residency 
and source rules. It also seeks to recast the existing rules in a way that jurisdiction is 
preserved but the resultant rules are more consistent with the four tax policy objectives 
identified (ie that the law can be modified within the jurisdictional framework to more 
closely meet that objective).
The approach adopted for each of the tax policy objectives used to qualitatively evaluate 
the effectiveness of the law of residency and source is set out in the following.
A. Equity
The equity of the legal rules relating to residency and source will be evaluated in the 
thesis by identifying when the law does not in certain circumstances give rise to either 
horizontal or vertical equity. Thus, the thesis will highlight where individuals in similar
65
circumstances are not being taxed similarly or where the tax burdens do not fall upon 
those with the greatest ability to pay.
Similarly when focusing on reform of the legal rules relating to residency and source, 
reform recommendations will also be measured by illustrating where the proposed 
reforms result in changes that ensure that individuals in similar circumstances will be 
taxed similarly or where the tax burdens fall upon those with the greatest ability to pay.
B. Efficiency
The lack of efficiency (neutrality), if any, in the legal rules relating to residency and 
source will be evaluated qualitatively by identifying when the law in certain 
circumstances gives rise to distortions such as a taxpayer being taxed differently due to 
the market in which the taxpayer operates (eg physical or electronic), or due to the 
nature of the business structure adopted. A lack of neutrality may also be demonstrated 
where income is taxed differently depending upon its characterisation or its source. 
Also, although distortions due to tax avoidance are discussed under the “prevention of 
tax avoidance” criterion, distortions arising from tax avoidance will also be briefly noted 
in evaluating neutrality.
C. Simplicity
The simplicity of, or conversely, the complexity of, the legal rules relating to residency 
and source will be qualitatively illustrated through identifying when the law does not in 
certain circumstances give rise to simple clear outcomes, ie the circumstances illustrate 
that the law does not meet the seven concepts underlying the simplicity.263 Thus, if the 
law in application is:
• not predictable -  there is difficulty in understanding a rule’s intended (and 
actual) scope;
• not proportional -  its complexity is disproportional to the complexity of the 
policy;
• not consistent -  involves arbitrary distinctions;
• associated with the imposition of high compliance burdens;
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difficult to administer;•
• not co-ordinated with other tax rules; or
• expressed unclearly,
then it will be considered to have failed the simplicity objective in that circumstance, for 
that stakeholder. When focusing on reform, recommendations will be similarly 
examined using the policy objective to illustrate where a recommendation does give rise 
to greater simplicity.
D. Prevention of tax avoidance and evasion
The extent to which the legal rules relating to residency and source meet the tax policy 
objective of preventing tax avoidance and evasion will be qualitatively illustrated 
through identifying where there appears to be evasion or avoidance opportunities. 
Similarly, in the reform context, the focus will be upon reviewing alternative rules that 
limit the scope for evasion or avoidance opportunities.
E. Conflicts between the objectives
Given the legal focus of the thesis the approach will be that where examples that one or 
more of the four tax policy objectives are not met or are in conflict, in seeking to 
evaluate the adequacy of the law and reform options in terms of the tax policy 
objectives, the focus will be on equity. However, as emphasised earlier, where the equity 
objective leads to negative outcome in terms of simplicity (complexity) and tax 
avoidance, the reform option that will prevail is that which provides a balance between 
the equity tax policy objective and the simplicity and anti-avoidance tax policy 
objectives.
F. Summary
In summary, given the legal focus of the thesis, the approach will be to use examples in 
practical operation of the law to qualitatively illustrate situations where equity, 
efficiency and simplicity and the specific objective of prevention of tax avoidance are 
not met and to evaluate the effectiveness of reform options through similar means.
263 Cooper (1993), above n 113, 424.
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Chapter 3
Residency of Individuals 
1. Purpose of this Chapter
As nation states consist of people, it is the individual who is impacted upon by the rules 
relating to residency and source. As mentioned in Chapter 1 the first focus of this 
chapter is to evaluate Australia's residency rules as they apply to individuals in light of 
the main thesis, ie, do the residency rules for individual taxpayers, contained in the 1997 
Act, satisfy the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of 
tax avoidance. Integral to this analysis is the need to first explore the operation of the 
rules (in Part II) in order to provide the necessary basis to enable evaluation of each 
category of the residency tests against the evaluative criteria (in Part III).
The latter part of the Chapter explores the sub-thesis (ie alternative approaches to the 
current rules that may better satisfy the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, 
simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance).
In Part IV comparative studies of the domestic approaches adopted in other jurisdictions 
are undertaken. A contextual review of the rules in selected jurisdictions is undertaken 
before evaluating the residency rules adopted more broadly. This contextual comparison 
highlights the hierarchy of residency tests in each jurisdiction, which cannot be 
demonstrated in the context of the evaluation of individual rules.
In light of the comparative analysis, a number of reform options (that are within 
Australia’s jurisdictional claims) are evaluated (in Part V) against the evaluative criteria 
in order to determine whether the proposed rules are more equitable, efficient, simple 
and able to prevent tax avoidance.
Finally, in Part VI the findings and recommendations made within the chapter are 
summarised.
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II. Exploring the Main Thesis -  Scope of the residency rules for
individuals
As mentioned above, the preliminary step in evaluating the main thesis is the need to 
explore the scope of the residency rules applicable to individuals. This first involves 
exploring the principal residency tests contained in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act before 
exploring the other residency definitions and rules that impact or alter the scope of the 
those principal residency tests in specific circumstances. Finally, as the domestic 
residency definitions can be overridden by the residency tie-breaker test contained in 
most Australian bilateral tax treaties (so-called “Double Tax Treaty” or “DTA”), for 
completeness it is important to explore the impact of DTAs on the scope of the domestic 
residency rules.
A. Defining the scope of the principal residency test for individuals
The exploration of the scope of the principal residency rules applicable to individuals 
contained in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act will be undertaken by first providing an overview of 
the rules and their interrelationship before exploring the scope of each of the rules in 
detail.
1 Overview of the principal residency rules
For the purposes of this research the term “Australian resident” is central and is defined 
in s 995-1 of the 1997 Act as a person who is a resident under the 1936 Act. The 
principal residency test in the 1936 Act is contained in s 6(1), which defines a “resident” 
or “resident of Australia” as follows:
“resident” or “resident of Australia” means-
(a) a person, other than a company, who resides in Australia and includes a 
person-
(i) whose domicile is in Australia, unless the Commissioner is satisfied 
that his permanent place of abode is outside Australia;
(ii) who has actually been in Australia, continuously or intermittently, 
during more that half of the year of income, unless the Commissioner 
is satisfied that his usual place of abode is outside Australia and that 
he does not intend to take up residence in Australia; or
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(iii) who is :
(A) a member of the superannuation scheme established by deed under 
the Superannuation Act 1990; or
(B) an eligible employee for the purposes of the Superannuation Act 
1976;or
(C) the spouse, or a child under 16 years of age, of such a person 
covered by sub-subparagraph (A) or (B);1 2
The definition contains four distinct residency tests. The first is the primary or common 
law test, which classifies an individual as a resident if he or she can be said to be 
actually “residing in Australia”. The three other tests (the domicile test, the 183 day test 
and the Commonwealth superannuation test) extend residency to individuals who may 
not reside in Australia in terms of the primary test.
The Explanatory Notes to the amending Act3 introducing the residency rules appear to 
indicate that the common law test has primacy in application, by stating that:
[i]f a person is in fact residing in Australia then, irrespective of his 
nationality, citizenship or domicile, he is to be treated as a resident for the 
purposes of the Act.4
However, that hierarchy is not generally borne out in practice where the courts tend to 
apply the relevant extension tests (ie either the domicile test, or the 183 day test or the 
Commonwealth superannuation test) in conjunction with the common law resides test.
A person who is not a resident under these tests is not an Australian resident for tax 
purposes. Although the concept of a “non-resident” in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act did not 
initially carry across to 1997 Act, it remains operative for the 1936 Act.5
1 The s 6(1) definition in the 1936 Act is identical to the original definition enacted by the Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1930 (Cth), except for the superannuation test (s 6(a)(iii)), which was added by 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1939 (Cth). The subsequent changes to the s 6(i) definition only 
reflect changes to the Commonwealth's superannuation scheme named in s 6(a)(iii).
In fact the definition of “Australian resident” in s 995-1 of the 1997 Act is used for the A New Tax 
System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) (the GST Act), s 195-1.
2 Note on Clause 2 in Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 
(Cth), 9.
3 The “residents” definition was introduced via s 2(i) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1930 (Cth).
4 Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 (Cth), 9.
5 The 1936 Act still has provisions that expressly treat “resident” persons as non-residents in limited 
circumstances. For example s 23AA(3) treats certain members of the US forces and dependents 
living in Australia as non-residents. For details of the replacement terminology in 1997 Act see 
Chapter 1, n 19.
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The scope of the s 6(1) residency tests will be explored by first examining the common 
law test before examining the three extension tests (the domicile test, the 183 day test 
and the Commonwealth superannuation test).
2 The primary or common law test
The primary test is whether a person can said to be “residing in Australia”. The purpose 
of the test was to extend the scope of the Act to income derived outside Australia where 
it is derived by persons who ordinarily live in Australia and those persons who have 
retained foreign nationality, citizenship or domicile but whose usual place of residence 
is Australia.6
(a) Overview
In an early case Dixon J in Gregory v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (WA) stated 
that the word “resident” in s 5 A of the 1922 Act:
. . . should receive the same meaning and application as "person residing" 
and “ordinary resident” have been given in England.7
Thus, in interpreting the meaning of the term “resides” the Australian courts initially 
relied on English precedents such as Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioners8 (Levene) 
and Inland Revenue Commissioners v Lysaght9 (Lysaght). Early authors also looked to 
English precedents in interpreting this aspect of the law.10 In more recent times, the 
principles arising from early Australian decisions have assumed pre-eminence. 
However, as these Australian decisions were decided in light of, and in reliance on, 
these early English decisions, the English decisions still have strong precedent value.11
6 Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 (Cth), 10. However, 
why the “resides’ test was adopted in preference to say a citizenship test is uncertain. Its roots 
probably lie in reliance on English and New Zealand models - see Peter Harris, Metamorphosis of 
the Australasian Income Tax: 1866 to 1922 Research Study No 37, Australian Tax Research 
Foundation (2002) 207.
7 Gregory v Deputy Commissioner o f Taxation (WA) (1937) 57 CLR 774, 777; 4 ATD 397, 399; 1 
AITR201, 202.
8 Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1928) 13 TC 486.
9 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Lysaght (1928) 13 TC 511.
10 See especially J P Hannan, A Treatise on the Principles o f Income Tax (1946) 250-279; A J 
Baldwin and J A L Gunn, The Income Tax Laws o f Australia (1937); and J V Ratcliffe, J Y 
McGrath and J W R Hughes, The Law of Income Tax (Commonwealth) (1938).
11 Gzell notes that Australian “. . . courts have tended to follow decisions of the UK courts not 
withstanding the contrast” in legislation -  see Ian Gzell, ‘Residency and Permanent
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The courts have given the word “reside” a very wide meaning. Justice Northrop in 
Applegate v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation 2 adopted the dictionary meanings of the 
word, describing “reside” to mean “. . . to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, 
to have one's settled or usual abode, to live, in or at a particular place”. Justice 
Williams in the Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation 4 
stated (obiter) that:
[t]he place of residence of an individual is determined, not by the situation of 
some business or property which he is carrying on or owns, but by reference 
to where he eats and sleeps and has his settled or usual abode. If he 
maintains a home or homes he resides in the locality or localities where it or 
they are situate, but he may also reside where he habitually lives even if this 
is in hotels or on a yacht or some other place of abode . . .
Accordingly, whether an individual is a resident will depend upon their individual 
circumstances (ie it is determined on a case by case approach).15
(b) Factors that assist in determining where a person resides
In looking at a person's individual circumstances there are a number of factors (but no 
simple test) that assist in determining where a person resides. These factors include:
• physical presence;
• term of any employment or appointment;
• nature of the person's family, business and social tie;
• frequency and regularity of a person's movements; and
• intention (purpose) of visit or trip.
Establishments’ (1997) Taxation Institute o f Australia 1997-98 Convention Papers 20, 21. 
However, Ian Gzell, ‘Concepts of Residence and Source into the 21st Century’ (Paper presented at 
the Taxation Institute of Australia’s Victorian Division’s International Tax into the 21st Century 
Red Series Intensive Retreat, 14-15 June 1996), 5 argues that given that many English and Scottish 
decisions have been decided on the subtlety of the differentiation between the terms “resident” and 
“ordinary resident”, Australian courts in applying the residency definition should not place any 
store on the United Kingdom decisions that turn on the meaning of the words. Also see Justices 
Kerwin (at 818) and Taschereau (at 823) expressed similar reservations about the application of 
these cases in Canada in Thomson v Minister o f National Revenue [1946] DTC 812.
12 (1979) 9 ATR 899, 905; 79 ATC 4307, 4313.
13 Viscount Cave LC used this same definition earlier in Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
(1928) 13 TC 486, 505. Similar concepts are found in obiter dicta of Huddleston B in Cesena 
Sulphur Co Ltd v Nicholson (1876) 1 TC 88, 103 who stated “[y]ou do not find any very great 
difficulty in defining what is the residence of an individual; it is where he sleeps and lives.”
14 (1941) 2 AITR 167, 172; 64 CLR 241, 249; 6 ATD 82, 87.
15 Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Miller {1946) 3 AITR 333; 73 CLR 93; 8 ATD 146.
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However, it must be remembered that although these factors, which are set out in the 
following, provide broad guidance, each determination of residency turns on its own 
particular facts.
(i) Physical presence
First, a physical presence in the country is a factor that determines where a person 
resides.16 In Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Efstathakis17 a physical presence in 
Australia for eleven years was an important factor in determining residence, while the 
actual number of days spent in Darwin was important in Gregory v Deputy 
Commissioner o f Taxation (WA). Similarly, physical presence was important in 
determining residence for a mythical tramp wandering the country and residency for a 
wealthy person wandering from hotel to hotel.19
The duration of physical presence can also indicate residency, however, mere presence is 
not always sufficient to establish residence. For example, foreign nationals on working 
holidays, who travel around the country living in temporary accommodation, would not 
usually be regarded as residing in Australia under the ordinary concepts test due to the 
transitory nature of their presence. In supporting this view the Commissioner, in 
Taxation Ruling TR 98/17, makes the pragmatic observation that “[i]n most cases, the
16 Ibid and Taxation Ruling TR 98/17, Income Tax: Residency Status o f Individual Entering 
Australia, paras 18, 22-28, 68-89. TR 98/17 replaced Taxation Ruling IT 2607, Income Tax: 
Residency Status o f  Visitors and Migrants that was withdrawn from 25 November 1998. IT 2607 
was withdrawn as it “. . . did not provide sufficient guidance about the ordinary meaning of 
residing here when the stay in Australia was between six months and two years” (TR 98/17 at para 
7). The Commissioner's views on lack of presence in determining the residency status of business 
migrants is set out in Taxation Ruling IT 2681, Income Tax: Residency Status o f  Business 
Migrants.
17 Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Efstathakis (1979) 9 ATR 82, 86; 78 ATC 4486, 4490.
18 Gregory v Deputy Commissioner o f Taxation (WA) (1937) 57 CLR 774; 4 ATD 397; 1 AITR 201.
19 Reid v Inland Revenue Commissioner (1926) 10 TC 673, 679 (Lord Clyde). Similarly in Levene v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners (1928) 13 TC 486, a taxpayer who stayed in hotels in England or 
abroad for over seven years was found to be a resident despite having no fixed abode.
20 The former IT 2607 (above n 16) provided a very pragmatic approach to determining when 
physical presence would indicate residency. The former IT 2607 stated at para 12:
“ . . .  as a general rule, a person whose intended visit to Australia was less than 6 months would 
not be regarded as "residing" in Australia during that visit . . . However, a person whose 
intended visit to Australia was greater than 2 years would generally be regarded as residing in 
Australia during that person's stay.”
This two year “rule”, although administrative, was commonly viewed as defining the period for 
retention of residency - see Pierre Fontaneau et al, ‘The idea of resident’ (1977) 12 Taxation in 
Australia 279, 283 and Arthur Andersen, Working Overseas (c 1988), 2.
21 TR 98/17, above n 16, para 55 and former IT 2607, above n 16, para 9.
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Commissioner accepts that a visit to Australia of less than six months is not sufficient 
time to be regarded as residing here.”22
Similarly long periods of presence may not indicate residency. This is illustrated at first 
instance in Re Executors of the Estate o f Subrahmanyam v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation where a taxpayer who lived in Australia from September 1994 until her death 
in June 1998 was found not to “reside” in Australia as she had never intended to make 
her home Australia.
Conversely, absence from Australia will not prevent residency being found.24 For 
example, “a migrant who settles with his family in Australia would usually be regarded 
as residing in Australia from the date of his arrival, notwithstanding that his business or
25personal interests might require him to be absent from Australia for extended periods”.
AAT Case 13559: Re Crockett and Federal Commissioner o f Taxation is illustrative. In 
that case a taxpayer who was employed as a permanent baggage handler in the United 
Kingdom and only spent 57 and 60 days in Australia in the 1988 and 1989 income years 
was still found to be resident in Australia as his family ties, locality of assets and home
22 TR 98/17, above n 16, para 62.
23 (2001) 47 ATR 1127; 2001 ATC 2177. The Full Federal Court, on appeal, overturned the AAT's 
decision on the grounds of misapplication of the 183 day test (Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v 
Executors o f the Estate o f  Santh Thevy Subrahmanyam (2002) 49 ATR 29; 2002 ATC 4001), but 
the finding that the taxpayer was not "resident" in Australia finding was not overturned. However, 
the AAT (SA Forgie) found on review that in absence of an usual place of abode outside Australia 
the deceased must be considered a resident in Australia under the 183 day test (Case [2002] AATA 
1298 re Executors o f  the Estate o f  Santh Thevy Subrahmanyam v Federal Commissioner o f 
Taxation (2002) 51 ATR 1173; 2002 ATC 2303).
24 This is illustrated by the Scottish mariner's cases where the seamen were found to be “ordinary 
resident” despite being at sea for the greater part of the year (In Re Young (1875) 1 TC 57) or the 
entire year (Rogers v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1879) 1 TC 225) and only returning home 
between voyages. Also see Case [2002] AATA 610 re Joachim and Federal Commissioner o f  
Taxation (2002) 50 ATR 1072; 2002 ATC 2089) where the taxpayer, who was a permanent 
resident of Australia, spent 316 days during the year of income as a first Officer on a Sri Lankan 
flagged ship. Senior Member MD Allen found that as he maintains a home for his wife and 
children in Australia he is a resident of Australia. These consistent decisions are explained by the 
statement of Rowlatt J in Pickles v Fulsham (1923) 9 TC 261 at 275 that “a sailor resides at the 
port where his wife and children live”.
Also in Slater v Commissioner o f Taxes [1949] NZLR 678; 4 AITR 249; 9 ATD 1 a medical 
practitioner, held as a prisoner of war between 1940 and 1944, was found to be “ordinarily 
resident” in New Zealand as his home was always in New Zealand, his family had been maintained 
there during his absence and he had not been resident elsewhere. Northcroft J stated that he was no 
more than a sojourner and although he had continued presence in prisoner of war camps, he could 
not said to be resident in the camps (683-4, 253 and 4 respectively).
25 See Macrae v Macrae [1949] 2 All ER 34, Stransky v Stransky [1954] 2 All ER 536, and TR 
98/17, above n 16, paras 52-60.
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were Australia.26 AAT Senior Member KL Beddoe decided that the taxpayer was a 
resident on the ordinary concepts test, finding that the factors of intention existed as:
. . . evidenced by the deliberate decision in 1987 to migrate to Australia, the 
subsequent application and grant of citizenship and the family and social ties 
with Australia evidenced by the fact that the applicant and his family lived in 
Australia until 1996.27
But where that absence is so great as to sever attachment, Australian residency ceases. 
An example is AAT Case 4833 where an Australian bom taxpayer who had left 
Australia for almost nine years, residing in Greece and the United States, was found to 
no longer be resident in Australia.
(ii) Term of any employment or appointment
Secondly, the term of any employment or appointment is another factor that may 
influence in the determination of residency. In Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v 
Pechey the taxpayer's appointment to the Cocos (Keeling) Islands for four weeks was 
held to be insufficient time to establish residence.
(Hi) Nature o f the person's family, business and social ties
Thirdly, the nature of the person's family, business and social ties (ie whether 
accompanied by family, location of assets in Australia, place where children are 
educated) can also determine residency. In Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v 
Efstathakis^ Mears J noted that:
26 (1998) 41 ATR 1156; reported in ATCs as Crockett (No 2) v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation 
99 ATC 2221.
27 Ibid, 1160 and 2224 respectively. This result is consistent with the early English Court of 
Exchequer case of Attorney-General v Coote (1817) 4 Price 183; abstract published in (1887) 2 
TC 385, where Sir C H Coote, who was bom, was domiciled and resided in Ireland for the greater 
part of the year, was found to be resident in Great Britain as he had lived for a few weeks, from 
time to time in a house he owned in London. Also see Case [2003] A AT A 279: Re Shand and 
Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation (2003) 52 ATR 1088, 2003 ATC 2080.
28 (1988) 20 ATR 3117; Case W14 89 ATC 201. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) 
concluded “. . . we cannot be satisfied that the applicant has resided in Australia in the sense that he 
has dwelt permanently or for a considerable period of time in Australia as at the relevant year ” (at 
3120 and 204 respectively).
29 (1975) 5 ATR 322; 75 ATC 4083.
30 See eg Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Efstathakis (1979) 9 ATR 82; 78 ATC 4486, Levene v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners (1928) 13 TC 486, and TR 98/17, above n 16, paras 57-51.
31 Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation v Efstathakis (1979) 9 ATR 82, 86; 78 ATC 4486, 4490.
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[a]ny submission that the respondent was resident in Australia during the 
relevant time only because of the exigencies of her service is, in my opinion, 
beside the point. The respondent . . . has continuously resided in Australia 
since August 1968 until this date. In July 1969, she married a Greek citizen 
who had resided in Australia continuously since 1965 and who at the end of 
1970, became a permanent citizen of Australia. She and her husband, since 
the date of their marriage, have set up a marital establishment and had their 
home in Sydney ever since that date. In light of these facts the respondent 
was, in my opinion, at the relevant time ordinarily resident in Australia.
In Gregory32 the fact that Darwin was the taxpayer's “. . . chief and principal place of 
business activity and social life” was also a factor in determining his residency.
(iv) Frequency and regularity of a person's movements
Fourthly, the frequency and regularity of a person's movements is another important 
factor in determining residency.33 In Lysaght34 it was the crucial factor in the House of 
Lords finding that the taxpayer, who had retired to Ireland but attended monthly 
directors' meetings, was a resident. The House of Lords found the taxpayer to be a 
resident despite the fact that the taxpayer's only place of abode was Ireland.
(v) Intention (purpose) of visit or trip
Finally, the purpose (ie intention) of a visit to Australia, and of a trip abroad is another 
factor that influences a residency determination.35 In Levene the taxpayer's purpose for 
travelling abroad was for his health and that of his wife. The House of Lords relied upon 
this stated purpose in determining that his place of residency was England (as “. . . none 
of these purposes was more than a temporary purpose” ). However, as it is clear from 
Lysaght residency can be established even where a person is compelled to reside
32 Gregory v Deputy Commissioner o f Taxation (WA) (1937) 57 CLR 11 A, 778; 4 ATD 397, 399; 1 
AITR 201, 202. See also Lloyd v Sulley (Surveyor o f Taxes) (1884) 2 TC 37, 45 (Lord Shand).
33 Loewenstein v De Salis (1925) 10 TC 424. See also Cooper v Cadwalader (1904) 5 TC 101 where 
an American resident in New York who leased a hunting lodge in Scotland was a resident there 
despite only living in Scotland for two months.
34 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Lysaght {1928) 13 TC 511.
35 See generally former IT 2607, above n 16, paras 9-11. Richards CB noted in the early English 
Court of Exchequer case of Attorney-General v Coote (1817) 4 Price 183; abstract published in 
(1887) 2 TC 385, that “. . . if the defendant came here for the purposes of establishing a residence, 
it were enough.”
36 Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1928) 13 TC 486, 506 (Viscount Cave LC).
37 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Lysaght (1928) 13 TC 511, 535 (Lord Buckmaster).
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T O
against his or her will. Absence of any intention to reside will also not prevent a
T Q
finding of residency.' Thus, purpose will generally be a factor of limited importance, as 
is a person's nationality40 or visa status.41
(vi) Summary
In summary, all the five factors discussed above must be taken into account when 
determining residency. It is only after weighing up the some time competing factors that 
arise in a particular factual circumstance can residency in that case be determined under 
the common law. Given the additional work associated with facts and circumstances 
analysis, as mentioned above, the courts tend to apply the relevant extension definition 
(ie either the domicile test, or the 183 day test or the Commonwealth superannuation 
test) in conjunction with the common law resides test.42
38 In Canberra Income Tax Circular Memorandum (CITCM) No 63, issued by the Commissioner of 
Taxation on 28 July 1932, an English domiciled wife of a State Governor who was appointed from 
the United Kingdom was considered to be a resident as she resided in Australia during the term of 
the Governor’s appointment, despite having a residence in the United Kingdom. Contrast this with 
CITCM No 490 issued on 6 June 1945 that ruled that the son and daughter of the United States 
Consul were considered as visiting Australia as their father could only be regarded as being 
temporarily in Australia.
39 This is illustrated in AAT Case 11255 (1996) 33 ATR 1264; Case 59/96 96 ATC 553 where the 
AAT found that the taxpayer on a student visa who attended secondary school in Australia and then 
spent four years at university in Australia clearly satisfied the definition of resident. Senior 
Member BH Pascoe noted (at 1268 and 556 respectively) that even if it was accepted “ . . . that the 
applicant could not form an intention to take up residence in Australia, this is only relevant to a 
person whose usual place of abode is outside Australia.” Similarly, in Re Mackenzie [1941] Ch 69 
an Australian domiciled woman was found to be ordinary resident in the United Kingdom after 
being committed to a sanatorium (ultimately for 54 years) four months after her arrival in the 
United Kingdom in 1885. Also see Miesegaes v Commissioners o f Inland Revenue (1957) 37 TC 
493 where a taxpayer, a child war refugee who subsequently attended boarding school in England 
to complete his education, was found to be ordinary resident in England despite being a minor.
40 Roger Hamilton, Robert Deutsch and John Raneri, Australian International Taxation (October 
2002), para 2.100 note that there will be very few cases where nationality will be a decisive factor 
and in only marginal cases will it be relevant. See also Anthony Sumpton, 'Residence' (1974) 3 
Australian Tax Review 13, 15 and 25.
41 AAT Case 11255 (1996) 33 ATR 1264; Case 59/96 96 ATC 553. Senior Member BH Pascoe 
noted (at 1267/556) that “[t]he definition of residence in s 6 of the Act requires the Commissioner 
to be satisfied that the taxpayer “does not intend to take up residence in Australia”. The words do 
not refer to “permanent residence”, simply “residence”. Similarly, the AAT found that little weight 
could be given to a letter seeking permanent residence for the taxpayer’s mother. Also see Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation v Executors o f the Estate o f Santh Thevy Subrahmanyam (2002) 49 
ATR 29; 2002 ATC 4001 where no weight was given to the grant of a temporary retirement visa. 
However, consistent statements of non-residency on a person’s immigration departure cards were 
found by Lindgren J in Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Wong (2002) 50 ATR 203, 206: 2002 
ATC 4538, 4540 to be persuasive in finding non-residency.
42 Clinton Alley and Duncan Bentley, Tn Need of Reform? A Trans-Tasman Perspective on the 
Definition of ‘Residence” (1995) 5 Revenue Law Journal 40, 48 suggested that it is often simpler 
to start with the specific deeming provisions rather than relying on the common law.
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3 Extension Tests
As mentioned above, there are three other tests (the domicile test, the 183 day test and the 
Commonwealth superannuation test) that extend the definition of resident to individuals 
who may not reside in Australia in terms of the primary test. In order to fully explore the 
scope of the residency tests, the broad scope of each test will be examined in turn.
(a) The domicile test
The first extension test is the so called “domicile test” in s 6(l)(a)(i) of the 1936 Act. 
Under s 6(l)(a)(i) persons whose domicile is Australia are treated as residents regardless 
of any physical presence in Australia.43 It merely was intended to place public officials 
located abroad in the same position as foreign public officials representing their 
governments in Australia.44
(i) What is domicile?
Domicile is a general common law concept, received from the United Kingdom upon 
settlement, which has been modified in Australia by the Domicile Act 1982 (Cth) 
(Domicile Act).45 Domicile is a legal relationship between a person and a country by 
which the person is able to invoke the country's laws as their own 46 In other words, a 
person's domicile is his or her “permanent” home rather than where he or she resides. In 
order to establish domicile, the person must have residence in a country, and have the
43 Where a migrant taxpayer living in Australia has left their dependants in the country of origin while 
establishing a base in Australia s 159J(3A) of the 1936 Act deems the dependants to be domiciled 
in Australia at all times the taxpayer is domiciled in Australia. This deemed residency ensures that 
the taxpayer is entitled to the dependent rebate (tax offset) in respect of their non-resident 
dependants (including a spouse and children). Section 159J(3A) was introduced to reverse the 
effects of the Domicile Act 1982 (Cth) - see Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax Assessment 
Amendment Bill (No 4) 1983 (Cth) 26.
44 Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 (Cth) 10. The 
Government had identified that the High Commissioner for Australia in London did not pay tax in 
Australia as services were rendered outside Australia; they were exempt from British income tax 
and received the general exemption available to residents on their Australian source income. 
Baldwin and Gunn, above n 10, 61, in 1937 note that “. . . since 1930 High Commissioners for 
Australia and Agents-General for the Australian States, together with members of their staffs and 
other public officials who are located abroad, have been treated as residents of Australia.”
45 The concept of domicile has its origins in the Roman Empire - Denzil Davies, Booth: Residence, 
Domicile and UK Taxation (1995) 167. Domicile has a greater component of pure intention -  
emotional permanence than residency and is found in expressions such as “Home is where the 
heart is” and “Once an Englishman, always an Englishman”-  see Joseph Isenbergh, International 
Taxation (2003), Vol 1, para P6.3 (electronic).
46 Henderson v Henderson [1965] All ER 179.
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intention to reside there permanently or indefinitely. There must be a combination of 
both of these elements for domicile to exist.47
Under the common law there are two types of domicile: domicile of origin and domicile 
of choice. At birth a person acquires a domicile of origin. The actual domicile adopted at 
birth is the domicile of the person upon whom the infant is legally dependent (ie a 
domicile of dependency). Therefore, at common law if the person is legitimate, they 
acquire the domicile of their father, if the person is illegitimate, they acquire the 
domicile of their mother, and if the person is a foundling, they acquire the domicile of 
the country in which they were found.
These common law rules are modified by s 9 of the Domicile Act, which moves away 
from using the concept of domicile based on legitimacy to domicile using the place of 
residence. Thus, where the parents have separated, one has died or the child is adopted 
the domicile of a child is linked to the parent with which it resides. A domicile of origin 
remains until there is an adoption of a domicile of choice.49 A domicile of choice is 
acquired in a country where a person voluntarily fixes their sole or chief residence in 
that country with the intention to continue to reside there indefinitely/0 A person may 
only have one domicile at any time.
The Commissioner in Taxation Ruling IT 2650 Income Tax: Residency -  Permanent 
Place of Abode Outside Australia sets out the factors considered to be important in 
determining a new domicile of choice:
[generally speaking, persons leaving Australia temporarily would be 
considered to have maintained their Australian domicile unless it is 
established that they have acquired a different domicile of choice or by 
operation of law. In order to show that a new domicile of choice in a country 
outside Australia has been adopted, the person must be able to prove an 
intention to make his or her home indefinitely in that country eg, through 
having obtained a migration visa. A working visa, even for a substantial
47 Case 78 (1944) 11 CTBR. The common law interpretation of “domicile” is very different to the 
civil law concept of domicile, which is akin to a “place of habitual abode”, similar to the United 
Kingdom's “ordinary residence” concept - see Denis Sheridan, ‘Residence in the United Kingdom: 
Observations on the Inland Revenue Consultative Document’ (1988) 29 European Taxation 17, 20.
48 Udny v Udny (1896) LR I Sc & Div 441.
49 Domicile Act 1982 (Cth) s 9(4). Also see Case [2003] AATA 279: Re Shand and Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation (2003) 52 ATR 1088, 2003 ATC 2080.
50 Domicile Act 1982 (Cth), s 10.
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period of time such as 2 years, would not be sufficient evidence of an 
intention to acquire a new domicile of choice . . .51
(ii) The “permanent place o f abode ” rebuttal
A finding that a person is domiciled in Australia will not equate with residence under 
the s 6(l)(a)(i) domicile test, as the person may avoid residency if the person can prove 
that he or she has established a permanent place of abode elsewhere.52 As the 
“permanent place of abode” rebuttal allows a person to escape the scope of the domicile 
test, it has been argued that the test is in fact a “permanent place of abode” test rather 
than a residency test.53
The purpose for the introduction of the rebuttal was to ensure that persons who had 
abandoned their Australian residence would not continue to be treated as residents. Such 
a protection was crucial at the time as, in the absence of DTAs, those persons would 
have been potentially subjected to double taxation in respect of the income earned in 
their new place of residence.54 The double tax problem was further compounded as the 
common law specified that domicile of origin would revive where domicile of choice is 
abandoned and the person has not yet acquired a new domicile of choice. The Domicile 
Act now mitigates this problem by deeming the domicile of choice to continue until 
another domicile is established.55
51 Taxation Ruling IT 2650, Income Tax: Residency -  Permanent Place o f Abode Outside Australia, 
para 21. See also paras 22 and 23.
52 An illustration is AAT Case 4833 (1988) 20 ATR 3117; Case W14 89 ATC 201. Here an 
Australian bom taxpayer that had left Australia for almost nine years, residing in Greece and the 
United States, was found to no longer be resident in Australia under s 6(l)(a)(i) domicile test. 
Although his domicile in Australia was conceded, the taxpayer was found to have permanent place 
of abode outside Australia. The AAT found that the “. . . applicant’s intention to remain outside 
Australia for a prolonged and undefined duration, is fatal to his cause” (at 3120 and 204 
respectively). Similarly in AAT Case 4834 (1988) 20 ATR 3121; Case WI3 89 ATC 196 a 
naturalised taxpayer who had migrated to Australia in 1962 but then returned to live in Greece 
from 1977 until 1988 (having visited Australia only twice: one month in 1979 and three months in 
May 1985) to carry out repairs on buildings was found not to be a resident under either s 6(l)(a)(i) 
nor ordinary concepts as their place of abode was outside Australia in the 1983 to 1986 income 
years. “Whilst it is true that the applicants retained assets in Australia including supermarket 
premises, their house and furniture, and some rental proceeds for the purposes of paying accounts, 
in every other sense the applicants were living outside Australia during those years and the period 
was long-term and indefinite” (at 3126 and 200 respectively).
53 This is the converse of New Zealand where the permanent place of abode test is used as a means of 
establishing residence, not as a means of proving abandonment - see Alley (1995), above n 42, 51.
54 Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 (Cth) 10. The 
Explanatory Notes do not explicitly spell out the double tax concern, but major concerns about 
double taxation existed during this period - see Edwin RA Seligman, Double Taxation and 
International Fiscal Cooperation (1928), 47-50.
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As the existence of a permanent place of abode results in taxpayers escaping the 
domicile test, it is important to determine what constitutes a “permanent place of 
abode”. Justice Fisher in Applegate v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation explained the 
scope of the words, in particular the significance of the word permanent, which he 
believed:
. . . is used to qualify the expression "place of abode" ie the physical 
surroundings in which the person lives, and to describe that place. It does not 
necessarily direct attention to the taxpayer's state of mind in respect of that or 
any other place . . .
To my mind the proper construction to place upon the phrase "permanent place 
of abode" is that it is the taxpayer's fixed and habitual place of abode. It is his 
home, but not his permanent home. It connotes a more enduring relationship 
with the particular place of abode than that of a person who is ordinarily 
resident there or who has there his usual place of abode. Material factors for 
consideration will be the continuity or otherwise of the taxpayer's presence, the 
duration of his presence and the durability of his association with the particular 
place.56
Although the taxpayer's intention to return is a factor to be considered, the taxpayer's 
objective intention in respect of the place of abode is crucial in determining whether he 
or she has established a permanent place of abode, ie the stay must not be intended to be 
temporary or transitory.57 Thus, the fact that a taxpayer's appointment is for a fixed term 
is not crucial in determining if the taxpayer has a “permanent place of abode” elsewhere, 
nor is a subsequent change in intention.58
55 Domicile Act 1982 (Cth) s 7.
56 (1979) 9 ATR 899, 910-11; 79 ATC 4307, 4317. Applegate, a solicitor, was asked by his firm to 
go to the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu) to establish a branch office and manage it. Applegate gave 
up the lease on his flat and moved with his family. Although his stay was for an unspecified time, 
he was forced by illness to return within two years. He claimed his foreign source income was 
exempt because he was a non-resident for tax purposes. Although the Full Federal Court held that 
he had retained his Australian domicile, they found that he had established a permanent place of 
abode elsewhere.
57 Ibid. In AAT Case 12551 (1998) 37 ATR 1263; Case 2/98 98 ATC 105 the AAT found that a 
physiotherapist who had been overseas from mid 1992 to mid 1997 was still a resident as she had 
not abandoned her domicile nor established a “permanent place of abode” elsewhere. She had “. . . 
maintained her touring activities satisfying me that she had never lost the essential character of a 
tourist. She was . . .  a typical Australian tourist seeing the world and obtaining work experience.” 
(at 1267 and 108 respectively). In contrast in Case [2002] AATA 670 re Wessling v Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation (2002) 50 ATR 1187; 2002 ATC 2097 the AAT (BJ McCabe) found 
that the taxpayer, who took special leave from her job to accompany husband on his three year 
contract of employment in Fiji, had made her home overseas with her three children, albeit for a 
limited time.
58 See, eg, Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Jenkins (1982) 12 ATR 745; 82 ATC 4098 where a 
bank officer, appointed to the New Hebrides for three years, who returned home unexpectedly after 
18 months, was found to have established a “permanent place of abode’ in the New Hebrides. See 
also Case R92 84 ATC 615; Case 145 27 CTBR (NS) 1131 where an engineer returned earlier than 
expected to Australia after a project in the Philippines, predicted to last a minimum of three to four
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(b) The 183 day test
As mentioned above the second extension test is the so-called “183 day test”. Under the 
183 day test in s 6(l)(a)(ii), persons who are present, continuously or intermittently in 
Australia for a total of more than 183 days are deemed to be residents. The test was 
introduced for the purpose of obviating the difficulties in establishing if a person is a 
resident in any country.59 An argument that the test has a role in determining 
continuation of residency has been rejected.60
The measurement for residency under the 183 day test in s 6(l)(a)(ii) is an income year 
(ie 1 July to 30 June). Thus, a taxpayer could spend up to 364 days in Australia without 
satisfying the 183 day test provided the 182 days were prior to 1 July and the balance 
were from 1 July. As a day is not defined (even by the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 
(Cth)) it is not clear what time period constitutes a day (ie whether part of a day 
constitutes a day). However, it appears that the 183 days need not be consecutive and the 
period includes days of arrival and departure and days of involuntary stay (due to 
sickness or industrial action).61
However, mere presence for 183 days is not sufficient by itself to establish residency. 
Persons may escape this deeming provision if they establish both that they have a usual 
place of abode outside Australia and do not intend to take up residency. This exception 
was enacted (in the absence of DTAs in 1930) to reduce the possibility of the double 
taxation by ensuring that the visitors were not treated as residents.62 A taxpayer’s
years, was completed in little over two years. See also the Commissioner's view on the decision in 
Taxation Ruling IT 2221, Income Tax: Income Derived by Non-Resident from ex-Australian 
Source, Permanent Place o f Abode.
59 Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 (Cth) 11.
60 The Commissioner in Case 29 (1985) 28 CTBR (NS) Case S I9 85 ATC 225 argued that a taxpayer 
who had been continuously present for more than 183 days was deemed under s 6(l)(a)(ii) to 
continue to be a resident for the whole of the year despite departing Australia for the New Hebrides 
in 14 April 1978. The Taxation Board of Review rejected this argument finding the taxpayer was 
not resident for the period 14 April to 30 June. The Board found the purpose of the 183 day test is 
to aid in determining residency and it plays no part in determining when someone departs Australia
- see especially Roach P at 248 and 232 respectively.
61 In other countries the days of arrival and departure are excluded from the 183 day calculation. 
Although focused on the interpretation of the words in art 15 of the OECD Model Convention, the 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs’s report, The 183 Day Rule: Some Problems o f Application 
and Interpretation (1991), illustrates the different calculation approaches taken in the past.
62 That is, to ensure there was “. . . no danger of treating as residents persons who are purely visitors”
- see Note on Clause 2 in Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922- 
1929 (Cth) 11. Also see Seligman (1928) above n 54.
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individual facts and circumstances will determine if a usual place of abode exists 
elsewhere and whether there was no intention to take up residency.
The exclusionary condition is not satisfied simply by the fact that the person does not 
have a usual place of abode in Australia; they must establish that they have a usual place 
of abode elsewhere.63 The use of the word “usual”, rather than “permanent”, to qualify 
the words "place of abode" does seem to imply that the exclusionary test is less stringent 
than that under the domicile test.64 Thus, “usual” in this context connotes that the “place 
of abode” be that “. . . in ordinary use, current, prevalent, habitual, customary”.65
Thus, overseas visitors on holidays or working in Australia (eg visiting academics) who 
are in Australia for more than 183 days would not be residents during their stay under 
this test, as they would usually have a usual place of abode elsewhere and would not 
have an intention of taking up residence in Australia.66
(c) The Commonwealth superannuation test
The third extension test is the so-called superannuation test. Under the superannuation 
test in s 6(l)(a)(iii), a person who is either a member of the superannuation scheme 
established by deed under the Superannuation Act 1990 (Cth) or an eligible employee or 
for the purposes of the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) (the “named schemes”) is 
deemed to be a resident. These superannuation schemes are the Commonwealth 
Superannuation Scheme (CSS) and the Public Service Scheme (PSS).
The purpose for introducing the superannuation test was to bring within the Australian 
taxable field the salaries paid to locally engaged High Commission staff, who had 
recently been extended the benefits of the Commonwealth superannuation scheme.67
63 Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Executors o f the Estate o f Santh Thevy Subrahmanyam 
(2002) 49 ATR 29; 2002 ATC 4001. See also Justice D Graham Hill, ‘Contemporary Tax Practice’ 
(Paper presented at the 14th Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Auckland, 18 
January 2002) 13-14.
64 Hamilton, above n 40, para 2.120.
65 Case G 54 (1956) 7 TBRD 311, 313 (FC Bock).
66 Former IT 2607, above n 16, para 16.
67 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 September 1939, 964 (Sir 
Percy Spender, Assistant Treasurer).
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However, currently locally engaged staff are now expressly excluded from joining both 
the PSS and CSS schemes.68
The spouse, or a child under 16 years of age, of such a person is also deemed by that 
relationship to be a resident under the test, regardless of the degree of actual connection 
between the spouse and/or child and Australia. Further, in respect of the Superannuation 
Act 1976 (Cth) the person does not need to contribute to the superannuation fund, all 
they have to be is an “eligible employee”69 or a member of the 1990 Superannuation 
fund.70 This test has a strict application.71
It is also important to note that the scope and relevance of the superannuation test long 
term may be potentially reduced following the enactment on 30 June 2004 of the 
Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice o f Superannuation Funds) Act 2004 
(Cth).72 The Act generally will enable employees, from 1 July 2005, to choose the 
complying superannuation fund to which their employers are required to make 
compulsory superannuation contributions. Although contributions made on behalf of 
public servants to the current Commonwealth superannuation schemes (CSS and PSS) 
are deemed to satisfy the choice of fund requirements, there is scope in the future to
68 See s 3(1) of the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) (and the Public Service Act 1922 (Cth), s 7(1) and 
Division 10 of Part III) and Superannuation Act 1990 (Cth), s 3.
69 An “eligible employee” is defined in s 3(1) of the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) to be a 
“permanent employee”, which in turn is defined in s 3(1) to be an “officer” for the purposes of the 
Public Service Act 1922 (Cth). Section 7(1) of the Public Service Act 1922 (Cth) defines an 
“officer” to be a person appointed or transferred to the service but does not include an “employee”, 
which is in turn defined in s 7(1) to be persons employed under Division 10 of Part III of the 
Public Service Act 1922 (Cth) (ie continuing, short-term, fixed-term or overseas employees).
70 A member is defined to include permanent employees, holders of statutory office, the 
Commissioner and temporary employees {Superannuation Act 1990 (Cth) s 6(1)). All these terms 
are defined in s 3, with the terms “permanent employee” and “temporary employee” adopting the 
meanings assigned by the Public Service Act 1922 (Cth). However, expressly excluded from the 
definition of “temporary employee” in s 3 are persons engaged or appointed for employment 
outside Australia. Also excluded under s 6(2)(a) are persons who are not an “eligible employee” 
for the purposes of the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth).
71 An illustration of the strict application of the superannuation test is AAT Case 8892 (1993) 27 ATR 
1136; Case 11/94 94 ATC 175 which concerned an Australian customs officer, on leave without 
pay from the Australian Customs Service who was employed in the Solomon Islands for three 
years. As he continued to contribute to his Commonwealth superannuation scheme, he was an 
eligible employee for the purposes of the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) and deemed to still be a 
resident of Australia under s 6(l)(a)(iii).
72 This Act was introduced on 26 June 2002 as Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice o f 
Superannuation Funds) Bill 2002. The 2002 Bill was a replacement for the Superannuation 
Legislation Amendment (Choice o f Superannuation Funds) Bill 1998, which was introduced on 12 
November 1998, but had stalled in the Senate before subsequently lapsing with the dissolution of 
Parliament on 5 October 2001.
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allow public servants a choice of funds. If this occurs, the number of persons to whom 
the superannuation residency test applies will fall conversely.73
(d) Summary
Thus, the definition of residency for an individual in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act (via s 995-1 
of the 1997 Act) consists of the resides test and three extension tests. As discussed 
above, although the common law test was intended to have primacy in application, that 
hierarchy is not generally borne out in practice where the courts tend to apply the 
relevant extension definition (ie either the domicile test, or the 183 day test or the 
Commonwealth superannuation test) in conjunction with the common law resides test. 
As a result of the principally case-by-case nature of all of these rules, a large body of 
common law has been adopted through the use of common terminology and further 
developed through litigation. The consequence of this will be dealt with later in the 
context of the evaluation of the four tests.
B. Defining the scope of the specific purpose residency test for individuals
Contained within the tax laws and related legislation there exists a number of specific 
residency definitions and other rules that impact upon the scope of the s 6(1) rules 
discussed above. The scope of these rules is examined by looking at the impact of:
• the continuous foreign service exemption;
• alternative income tax law definitions; and
• the other definitions contained in related tax legislation.
1 Continuous foreign service exemption
Section 23AG of 1936 Act provides an exemption with progression for income arising 
from continuous foreign service. Exemption with progression means that although the 
foreign service income is exempt, that income is still taken into account in determining
73 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice o f Superannuation Funds) Act 2004 (Cth), ss 
32C(1), (3) (4) and 32NA(2)(a). Indicative of change is the Government’s announcement that the 
PSS would can from a defined benefit scheme to a fully funded accumulation scheme from 1 July 
2005 - Minister for Finance and Administration, ‘New Superannuation Arrangements for 
Australian Government Employees’ (Press Release No 29, 17 October 2003).
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the rate of tax applicable to other taxable income earned by the resident. The section was 
introduced as part of the foreign tax credit system for the purpose of ensuring the 
administrative integrity of the foreign tax credit system, by removing many small 
taxpayers from its operation.74
Section 23AG, which only applies to residents, provides that where a taxpayer receives 
foreign employment income in respect of a period of continuous foreign service of not 
less than 91 days, that income will be exempt from Australian tax. The exemption will 
not apply where the foreign income is exempt from foreign tax in the overseas country 
because of:
• a “double tax agreement” or law of the country that gives effect to a double 
tax agreement;
• the foreign country does not tax employment income; and
• a law or an international agreement dealing with privileges and immunities of 
diplomats or consuls or of persons connected with international organisations 
applies.
Thus, the only situations where a tax liability will arise are where the service does not 
constitute “foreign service”, the employment period does not exceed 91 days or where 
the income is exempt in the country of origin.75
In summary, although s 23AG does not limit the scope of the primary residency tests (ie 
the jurisdictional, claim), the effect of s 23AG, from a practical viewpoint, is to remove 
the need to resolve questions of cessation of residency for some foreign employed 
taxpayers (ie, those residents engaged in foreign service without other Australian taxable 
income).
74 Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment (Foreign Tax Credits) Bill 1986 (Cth), 22. 
Section 23AG replaced the former s 23(q) of 1936 Act, which exemption most foreign income 
(including foreign salary and wages) provided it was liable to tax in country of source.
75 The foreign service requirement can be difficult to satisfy as illustrated in the Full Federal Court 
decision in Chaudhri v Commissioner o f Taxation (2001) 47 ATR 126; 2001 ATC 4214 where a 
taxpayer who was employed as a merchant seaman aboard a Panamanian ship was not exempt 
under s 23AG on income earned despite spending more than 91 days in foreign seas. He failed to 
satisfy the Court that his employment was foreign service income earned in a “foreign country”. 
The Court noted that whilst the dictionary definition of “country” could contemplate inclusion of 
the high seas, the ordinary English use of the word would be a political entity capable of imposing 
income tax law.
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2 Alternative definitions in the income tax law
As well as using the common law concept of “residency” in the 1936 Act, there are three 
other specific purpose residency definitions used (or intended to be used) in the income 
tax law: “ordinarily resident”, “Territory resident” and “temporary resident”. There is 
also the term “foreign resident”, which is defined in s 995-1 of the 1997 Act to be 
someone who is not a resident of Australia under the 1936 Act. As the term is merely 
the restitution of the concept of “non-resident” as discussed above, it will not be 
discussed in this context.
(a) Ordinarily resident
The term "ordinarily resident" is used in ss 23(a)(ii), 23(v), 23AA,76 128J(l)(b), 
251U(l)(e), 252(3)(b), 252A(2A)(b) of the 1936 Act and in number of DTAs.77 The 
term “ordinarily resident” has a slightly different meaning to the term “resident”. The 
term is equivalent to the United Kingdom term “ordinary resident”.78
The United Kingdom courts have explored the differences in meaning between the terms 
“resides” and “ordinarily resident”.79 Viscount Cave LC in Levene80 stated that the 
words “ordinary resident” “. . . connotes residence in a place with a degree of continuity 
. . . apart from accidental or temporary absences”. This view was supported by others 
like Lord Sumner in Lysaght*1 who stated that “. . . the converse to ‘ordinarily’ is 
‘extraordinarily’ and that part of the regular order of a man's life, adopted voluntarily 
and for a settled purpose, is not ‘extraordinarily’”.
76 Section 23AA was enacted in Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act (No 2) 
1963 (Cth). It included the concepts of “Australian citizen” and “ordinarily resident”.
77 It is used in respect in the “Government Remuneration Article” in the German (arts 17(2)), 1968 
United Kingdom (art 15(1)), French (art 18(2)) and Japan (art 14(2)) DTAs, in the “Residency” 
Article in the South African (art 3(1 )(c)) and 1968 United Kingdom (art 3(1 )(c) and (d)) DTAs, 
and in the United States DTA (art l(4)(b)) to limit scope of Articles 19 (Governmental 
Remuneration), 20 (Students) and 26 (Diplomatic and Consular Privileges).
78 The terms “ordinary” and “ordinarily” resident are used interchangeably in United Kingdom tax 
legislation. The origins the “ordinary” resident term lie in early United Kingdom tax legislation -  
see United Kingdom, Report o f the Income Tax Codification Committee Cmd 5131 (1936), 38.
79 Gregoiy v Deputy Commissioner o f Taxation (WA) (1937) 57 CLR 774; 4 ATD 397; 1 AITR 201; 
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Lysaght (1928) 13 TC 511 (Lord Sumner) and Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v Coombe (1932) 17 TC 405, 410 (Lord Clyde).
80 Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1928) 13 TC 486, 507.
81 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Lysaght (1928) 13 TC 511.
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In Canada, Justice Rand in Thomson v Minister o f National Revenue agreed stating that 
the term “ordinary resident” carries a restrictive signification and means . . residence 
in the course of the customary mode of life of the person concerned, and is contrasted 
with special or occasional or casual residence.”82 Thus, the term is equated with habitual 
residence. This is further illustrated in cases where a person who is not “resident”, 
having left a country for work purposes83 or for military service,84 is found to be 
“ordinary resident” in that country.
As a result of the United Kingdom precedent the concept of “ordinary resident” is 
expanded in those sections. Thus, a person may be deemed to be “ordinarily resident” in 
Australia in the context of s 23AA of the 1936 Act, through the mere availability of 
living accommodation in Australia (ie the “place of abode” test).85 However, it is 
interesting to note that the place of abode test only has had limited operation in the 
United Kingdom since 1993 due to subsequent statutory override.86
(b) Territory resident
The “Territory resident” test exists in Division 1A of Part III of the 1936 Act. Division 
1A exempts Norfolk Island residents from tax on income derived from sources in and 
outside of the Territory (including Australia).87 As well, a non-territory resident 
individual who derives income from an office or employment is also exempt on that 
income if the Commissioner is satisfied that the individual intends to remain in that 
Territory for a continuous period of more than six months.88
The purpose of the Division LA is to safeguard against exploitation of the tax exempt 
status of Territory residents by persons not resident in the Territory. Under s 24C of the 
1936 Act, a “Territory resident” is defined as a person, other than a company, who 
“resides” and has his or her “ordinary place of residence” in a prescribed territory,89 and
82 Thomson v Minister o f National Revenue [ 1946] DTC 812, 815.
83 Cohen v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1946) 13 SATC 362.
84 Slater v Commissioner o f Taxes [1949] NZLR 678; 4 AITR 249; 9 ATD 1.
85 Cooper v Cadwalader (1904) 5 TC 101 and Attorney-General v Coote (1817) 4 Price 183; abstract 
published in (1887) 2 TC 385.
86 Finance Act 1993 (UK), s 208. This is illustrative of the dangers of using definitions importing 
from other jurisdictions, as the words can bring with them the associated interpretations without 
importing the safeguards of any later legislative override.
87 1936 Act, ss 24F and 24G( 1 )(a) to (d).
88 1936 Act, s24G(l)(e).
89 Under s 24BB of the 1936 Act Norfolk Island is a prescribed territory.
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would not be a resident of Australia, but for Norfolk Island being deemed to be subject 
to the operation of the Act (via s 7A(2) of 1936 Act) (ie it excludes persons who are also 
Australian residents in terms of various residency tests).
As the definition incorporates the “resides” concept, its scope is prima facie the same as 
that of the resides test in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act (see previous discussion in Part II A 2). 
However, given that residence is only one part of the test it is not clear to what extent 
the “resides” concept is qualified by the term “ordinary place of residence”. This 
uncertainty is due in part to the fact that what constitutes an "ordinary place of 
residence" is not defined.90
The term “ordinary place of residence” may be equivalent to “ordinarily resident”. 
However, this is unlikely as usage of both terms is incompatible since the term 
“ordinarily residence” describes a lessor form of attachment to a country than 
“residence”. An alternative interpretation is that given that the Part is intended to only 
provide tax exemption for persons who genuinely live in the territory, the words 
“ordinary place of residency” may impose a physical residence requirement (ie requires 
a place of residence (home or apartment) in the Territory).91 Although this later 
interpretation is supported by extrinsic material, the actual meaning remains unclear.
(c) Temporary resident
The term “temporary resident” does not currently exist in Australian tax law. However, 
the term was contained in two 2002 tax Bills seeking to enact a series of concessions for 
expatriates working in Australia.92 Therefore, a brief discussion of its scope is useful as 
it is illustrative of the tendency for drafters to create specific purpose residency rules to 
ensure that the scope of the measures is limited to a narrower group than those caught 
under the general residency definitions.
90 Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax Assessment Act (No 4) 1973 (Cth), 7.
91 Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax Assessment Act (No 4) 1973 (Cth), 1 and Commonwealth, 
Second Reading Speech, House of Representatives, 30 August 1973 (Frank Crean, Treasurer), 
reproduced in Butterworths, Taxation Laws o f Australia: Legislation and Official Explanations 
(1972-1974), vol 6, 395.
92 The concept of “temporary residents” was included in both the Taxation Laws Amendment (No 4) 
Bill 2002 (Cth) (introduced on 30 May 2002) and Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 7) 2002 
(Cth) (introduced on 23 October 2002) as part of a reform of expatriate taxation. However, due to
90
Under these proposed rules a “temporary resident” was to be defined in s 995-1 of the 
1997 Act to be an individual who has not been resident in Australia at any time during 
the 10 years before becoming a resident, has not been a resident for more than 4 years, 
holds a temporary visa, and has not applied for a permanent visa. Special rules applied 
to New Zealand citizens.
In summary, in the limited circumstances mentioned above, the principal residency rules 
for individuals in s 6(1) of the 1936 have been modified.
3 Other residency definitions in related tax acts
There are also other definitions of “resident” in Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth)93 and 
in the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) which modify the scope of the operation of tax 
and tax related (eg Medicare levy) laws.
First, a “resident taxpayer” is defined in s 3(1) of Income Tax Rates Act as someone who 
is not a “prescribed non-resident”, this being defined to be all non-residents except non­
residents who receive a benefit under certain Acts (including the Social Security Act). 
This means that in certain circumstances, a non-resident who receives government 
benefits (eg a payment under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)) is taxed at resident 
rates.
Second, an “Australian resident” is defined in s 3(1) of the Health Insurance Act 1973 
(Cth) to mean “a person who resides in Australia and who is . . .  an Australian citizen”, 
a New Zealand citizen who is lawfully present in Australia, a person who has been 
granted an entry permit in force under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) or in limited 
circumstance, a person who holds temporary entry permit.
As a result, in some limited circumstances a person may be liable to pay the Medicare 
levy94 but may not be eligible for Medicare benefits,95 while others will have eligibility
the opposition parties in the Senate opposing the bills passage, the Government has abandoned the 
expatriate reform proposals -  see discussion in Chapter 1, n 33.
93 See, eg, under s 3(1) of the Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) there are seven residency definitions: 
“resident trust estate”, “resident beneficiary”, “resident taxpayer”, “non-resident trust estate”, “non­
resident beneficiary”, “non-resident taxpayer” and “prescribed non-resident”. Only the “resident 
trust estate” definition has any consistency with the 1936 Act.
94 Section 251S(l)(a) of the 1936 Act imposes the Medicare levy on the taxable income of an 
individual who at any time during the year of income was a resident of Australia. The Medicare
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for Medicare benefits but no Medicare levy is payable.96 Thus, illegal immigrants and 
persons who have overstayed their legal time limit (prohibited non-citizens), temporary 
residents and persons merely visiting Australia97 may be liable for Medicare levy as they 
are deemed residents under the 183 day test in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act,98 but would not 
normally be “Australian residents” under the Health Insurance Act and would therefore 
be ineligible for Medicare benefits.99
In summary, although the principal residency rules for individuals in s 6(1) of the 1936 
Act is not modified by these two definitions, their existence creates another level of 
compliance that must be addressed.
C. Defining the impact of tax treaties on the domestic residency test for individuals
Finally, before the operation of the four tests can be evaluated against the objective 
criteria, it is important to explore the impact of bilateral tax treaties. The examination of 
DTAs will be done in two parts: first by establishing the context in which DTAs operate 
and second, by exploring the application of DTAs to residency and the application of the 
tie breaker tests in detail.
levy is not payable under s 251T(a) by a person who was a “prescribed person”. Section 251 U( 1) 
defines a “prescribed person” as one who is either a member of the Defence forces, or receives 
specific pension under either the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) or the Veterans' Entitlements Act 
1986 (Cth) or the head or member of staff of a diplomatic mission or consular post established in 
Australia, or a member of the family of such persons, provided they are not Australian citizens and 
not ordinarily resident in Australia.
95 As s 10(l)(a) of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) only gives a Medicare benefit for medical 
expenses that are incurred in respect of a professional service rendered in Australia to an “eligible 
person”, persons who are not eligible do not get the benefit. Under s 3(1) an “eligible person” 
means an Australian resident or an “eligible overseas representative”. An “eligible overseas 
representative" is a head or member of staff of a diplomatic mission or consular post established in 
Australia, or a member of the family of such persons, provided they are not Australian citizens nor 
a person domiciled in Australia but who, under an agreement between the Government of the 
Commonwealth and the Government of that other country, is to be treated, for the purpose of the 
provision of medical, hospital and other care. See also Taxation Ruling IT 2615, Income Tax: 
Medicare Levy - Test for Australian Residency - Payable by Australians Living Overseas and by 
Visitors to Australia, para 23.
96 Ibid IT 2615, para 18.
97 Subject to any declaration that the Minister might make under s 6(1) of the Health Insurance Act 
1973 (Cth). Section 251U(l)(f) of the 1936 Act provides that a person whom the Minister for 
Community Services and Health has certified under subsection 6(1) of the Health Insurance Act to 
be ineligible for Medicare benefits in respect of medical services, or free treatment and care in a 
public hospital, is exempt from the levy.
98 Generally, a person visiting Australia for a short period whose usual place of abode is outside 
Australia is treated as a non-resident for income tax purposes and is not liable for the levy - IT 
2615, above n 95, para 21.
99 Ibid para 13.
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However, it is important to note that bilateral tax treaties take a number of forms. There 
are the wider agreements (eg DTA/Double Tax Conventions (DTCs)), more narrowly 
focused agreements (eg Airline Profit Agreements and Superannuation Double Coverage 
Agreements) and agreements to update terms in existing agreements (eg Protocols). As 
the focus of this examination will be on DTAs/DTCs, and the Protocols that update 
them, the term “DTA” will be used as a short hand title for these various agreements.
1 Context
In order to fully understand the impact of DTAs upon the domestic residency rules it is 
important in turn to put the operation of bilateral tax treaties in context by looking at the 
role of tax treaties and how they are interpreted. This examination will form the basis for 
further detailed examinations of treaty provisions in this and subsequent chapters.
(a) Role o f Tax Treaties
As mentioned above, in order to avoid double taxation, bilateral agreements exist 
between Australia and other countries.100 Double tax can arise as a consequence of the 
operation of the residency tests and of similar tests in other jurisdictions, as the 
interaction of the tests result in a person having more than one place of residence (ie 
dual residency).101 The double taxation arises if both Australia and the foreign 
jurisdiction claim the right to tax that dual resident's income.102 Double taxation can also 
occur where a taxpayer is a non-resident deriving income with an Australian source or a 
resident deriving income with a foreign source.
Thus, these agreements operate by countries (referred to as “contracting states”) agreeing 
to limit their rights to tax in respect of taxpayers and transactions in their jurisdictional
100 As at 31 July 2003 Australia had bilateral tax treaties with 43 countries, consisting of 42 
comprehensive agreements and four airline profits agreements. This includes the Mexico DTA and 
the revised 2002 United Kingdom protocol contained in the International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Act 2003 (Cth), assented to on 5 December 2003. As all treaties, including DTAs, are 
not automatically operational upon ratification, they require Australian legislative incorporation 
(Koowarta v Bjelke-Peter sen (1982) 153 CLR 168). DTAs are incorporated into the domestic law 
as Schedules to the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth).
101 Gregory v Deputy Commissioner o f Taxation (WA) (1937) 57 CLR 774, 778; 4 ATD 397, 399; 1 
AITR 201, 202.
102 See, eg, Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Efstathakis (1979) 9 ATR 82; 78 ATC 4486. The 
1975 Asprey Committee noted that “ . . . the resulting competition of jurisdiction to tax must be 
accepted and adjusted where possible by appropriately drafted provisions of double taxation 
agreements” - Taxation Review Committee, Commonwealth, Full Report (1975) 254-5.
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claim. This is achieved by the contracting states apportioning their rights to tax.103 
Australia's DTAs generally follow the OECD Model Conventions.104 Under the OECD 
Model Conventions the country of residency has the right to tax unless the transaction is 
closely associated with the economic activity of the source country.105
As a result of the sharing of the taxing rights, many of the treaty provisions may be 
inconsistent with those of the 1997 Act. To overcome this problem, s 4(2) of the 
International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth) states that the treaty provisions prevail, 
except where the general anti avoidance provision (Part IVA of the 1936 Act) or specific 
tax credit limitation provisions (s 160AO of the 1936 Act) have operative effect. 
Conversely, many treaties give Australia the right to tax certain receipts, which are not 
taxable under the 1997 Act. For example, the 1997 Act does not tax exempt income, 
although such income could fall within the terms of the business profits article in many 
Australian treaties. Thus, the existence of a right to tax in a treaty does not result in the 
amount being taxed in that state unless there is domestic law that catches that amount.106
(b) Interpretation o f DTAs
DTAs are international agreements that are normally “. . . interpreted in accordance with 
the rules of interpretation recognised by international lawyers”.107 The High Court in 
Thiel v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation found that the Vienna Convention on the
103 The rights to tax can be exercised either solely by one contracting state or shared. Sole rights are 
usually exercised in respect of personal service income, whilst shared rights exist in respect of 
property income, such as interest, dividends and royalties.
104 Until 1992 there were three model OECD treaties - OECD, Draft Double Taxation Convention on 
Income and Capital (1963) (1963 Model); OECD, Model Double Taxation Convention on Income 
and Capital (1977) (1977 Model) or the OECD, 1992 Model Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital (1992) (1992 Model). Attached to each model was a commentary on its operation (1963 
OECD Commentary, 1977 OECD Commentary and 1992 OECD Commentary respectively). The 
1992 Model has been regularly subjected to minor amendments and adjustments, with five versions 
published. The latest version, the Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 2003 (2003 
Model) and commentary (2003 OECD Commentary), has operation from 28 January 2003.
105 Gzell (1996), above n 11, 14.
106 See Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Lamesa Holdings BV (1997) 36 ATR 589, 592; 97 ATC 
4752, 4755. The converse can apply with income exempt in one jurisdiction being taxable in the 
o ther-sce Enoch v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (2002) 51 ATR 1014; 2002 ATC 2201.
107 Thiel v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1990) 171 CLR 338; 21 ATR 531; 90 ATC 4717 
(McHugh J). See also James Buchanan and Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd 
[1978] AC 141 and Shipping Corporation o f India Ltd v Gamlen Chemical Co (A/asia) Pty Ltd 
(1980) 147 CLR 142 cited in Tom Magney, Australia’s Double Tax Agreements: A Critical 
Appraisal o f Key Issues (1994) 8. The ATO's approach to interpreting DTAs is set out in Taxation 
Ruling TR 2001/13, Income Tax: Interpreting Australia's Double Tax Agreements. Also see 
Richard Vann, ‘Tax Treaties in the 1990s’ (Paper presented at the Taxation Institute of Australia’s 
3rd National Tax Retreat, Coolum, 24-26 August 1995), 6-10 and Cahiers de Droit Fiscal 
International: Interpretation o f Double Taxation Conventions, Vol LXXVIIa (1993).
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Law of Treaties allowed the court to have recourse to the OECD Model Convention and 
Commentary as a means of providing guidance to the meaning of terms used by the 
contracting states in the DTAs.108 It did not matter that the Model Convention and 
Commentary was not actually used in the treaty negotiation but:
. . . the relevant rules which it lays down are applicable, being no more than 
an endorsement or confirmation of existing practice: Commonwealth v 
Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1 at 93-4, 222; 46 ALR 
625; Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251 at 276, 282. . .
they are documents which form the basis for the conclusion of bilateral 
double taxation agreements of the kind in question and, as with treaties in 
pari materia, provide a guide to the current usage of terms by the parties.109
As a result, in order to understand the scope of these tests the principal resource is the 
Model Conventions and Commentaries.110 However, where a term is not defined in the 
Commentary it shall “. . . have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that 
State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies,”* 111 unless a contrary 
intention exists.
This may explain why the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bills, introducing the 
Australian DTAs, are generally of little assistance in interpreting the DTAs. Except for 
the 1968 United Kingdom and the Singapore DTAs112 all other tax treaties entered into 
from 1974 until 1995 did not even describe the residency tie breaker tests in the treaties, 
let alone seek to clarify the intended scope of the provision.113 Since 1995 there have
108 Thiel v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1990) 171 CLR 338; 21 ATR 531; 90 ATC 4717.
109 Thiel v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1990) 171 CLR 338, 349-50; 21 ATR 531, 536-7;
90 ATC 4717, 4722-3 (Dawson J).
110 See also J F Avery Jones et al, ‘Dual Residence of Individuals: the Meaning of the Expression in 
the OECD Model Convention -  T [1981] British Tax Review 15, reproduced in (1982) 16 Taxation 
in Australia 818 and J F Avery Jones et al, ‘Dual Residence of Individuals: the Meaning of the 
Expression in the OECD Model Convention -  IF [1981] British Tax Review 104, reproduced in 
(1982) 16 Taxation in Australia 905. Garth Harris, New Zealand's International Taxation (1990) 
60 notes that as many terms in the DTAs do not appear in New Zealand's domestic law, there is 
little option other than to adopt the treaty interpretation.
111 2003 Model, above n 104, Art 3.2.
112 Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) Amendment Bill 1968 (Cth) 
UK, 31-34; and Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) Amendment 
Act 1969 (Cth) Singapore, 7 which refers to the United Kingdom DTA description.
113 See, eg, Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) Amendment Bill 1974 
(Cth) Germany, 6; Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) Amendment 
Bill 1976 (Cth) Netherlands, 11 and France, 24; Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax 
(International Agreements) Amendment Bill 1977 (Cth) Belgium, 8; Explanatory Memorandum, 
Income Tax (International Agreements) Amendment Bill 1980 (Cth) Philippines, 39 and Swiss, 51; 
Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) Amendment Bill (No 2) 1980 
(Cth) Canada, 8; Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) Amendment 
Bill 1981 (Cth) Malaysian, 11 and Sweden, 26; Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax
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been changes, with the Explanatory Memorandum in respect of new or revised DTAs 
entered into between 1995 and 2000 listing the tie breaker tests. However, these 
Memorandum provide little information on the scope of these tie breaker tests.114 Since 
2002 the information contained within Explanatory Memorandum has expanded.115
Another uncertainty in interpretation of DTAs arises from the fact that as there have 
been a number of OECD Model Conventions and the Models introduced since 1992 are 
being constantly updated.116 As a result of these changes, there is much debate about 
which version of the OECD Commentary on the Model Convention should be used 
when interpreting a DTA. Although there is support for using the version of the 
Commentary existing at the time the DTA was negotiated,117 the OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs believes . . that existing conventions should, as far as possible, be 
interpreted in the spirit of the revised Commentaries even though the provisions of these 
conventions did not yet include the more precise wording . . of later Models.118 The
(International Agreements) Amendment (No 2) Bill 1981 (Cth) Denmark, 9; Explanatory 
Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) Amendment Bill 1983 (Cth) USA, 18, 
Ireland, 38, Italy, 51, Korean, 65 and Norway, 80; Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax 
(International Agreements) Amendment Bill 1984 (Cth) Malta, 17; Explanatory Memorandum, 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 3) 1985 (Cth) Finland, 58; Explanatory Memorandum, 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 3) 1986 (Cth) Austria, 58; Explanatory Memorandum, Income 
Tax (International Agreements) Amendment Bill (No 2) 1989 (Cth) Papua New Guinea, 36 and 
Thailand, 53; Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment (International Agreements) 
Bill 1990 (Cth) China, 14, Sri Lanka, 34 and Fiji, 56; Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax 
(International Agreements) Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth) Hungary, 17 and Kiribati, 37; Explanatory 
Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) Amendment Bill (No 2) 1991 (Cth) India, 
13 and Polish, 47; and Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) 
Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth) Indonesian, 17, Vietnamese, 58 and Spain, 96 (citizen test mentioned 
at 97).
114 The 1995 -  2000 Explanatory Memorandum tended to merely repeat the word of the Article (see, 
eg, Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) Amendment Bill 1995 
(Cth) New Zealand, 14-16; Explanatory Memorandum, International Tax Agreements Amendment 
Bill 1995 (Cth) Czech Republic, 16; Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment 
(International Tax Agreements) Bill 1996 (Cth) Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, 14; 
Explanatory Memorandum, International Tax Agreements Amendment Bill 1999 (Cth) South 
Africa, 18, Slovak Republic, 67 and Argentina, 100; and Explanatory Memorandum, International 
Tax Agreements Amendment Bill (No 1) 2000 (Cth) Romania, 14).
115 See, eg, Explanatory Memorandum, International Tax Agreements Amendment Bill (No 1) 2002 
(Cth) Russia, 18 and 19 and United States Protocol, 50; Explanatory Memorandum, International 
Tax Agreements Amendment Bill (No 2) 2002 (Cth) Canadian Protocol, 16 and 15 and 
Explanatory Memorandum, International Tax Agreements Amendment Bill 2003 (Cth) United 
Kingdom, 28 to 30 and Mexico, 97 to 99.
116 This is to ensure that the current Model reflects accurately the views of members at any point in 
time - 2003 OECD Commentary, above n 104, para 11 of Introduction.
117 Crown Forest Industries Limited v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 802 and commentary by James 
Hausman, ‘Interpreting Tax Treaties - A Canadian Perspective’ (2001) 55 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 93, 94.
118 2003 OECD Commentary on introduction, above n 104, paras 33-35.
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courts have used later Model Commentaries, but usually only where the changes are 
minor and have no substantial effect on the outcome.119
For the purposes of this thesis the Commentary to be used in analysing the scope of the 
DTAs is the 2003 OECD Commentary.120
2 DTAs in detail
(a) Application of DTAs to residency
DTAs do not normally concern themselves with the residency rules of the Contracting 
States or lay down the conditions under which a person is to be treated fiscally as 
“resident”.121 Rather, the residency concept in DTAs is of importance in:
• determining the scope of the DTA;
• solving cases where double taxation arises as a consequence of double residence, 
by providing a residency tie breaking test that determines which of the 
contracting states has primacy in respect of a taxpayer with dual residency; and
• solving cases where double taxation arises as a consequence of taxation in the 
State of residence and in the State of source or situs 122 by eliminating taxation in 
the source country; limiting taxation in the source country; and providing relief 
for tax paid in the source country.123
All Australian DTAs, except for the Japan DTA,124 contain residency tie breaker tests, 
usually located in Article 4. As each treaty comes into existence through negotiation the 
language of every treaty differs. The variation in many cases, however, is minor as all 
Australian Treaties since 1963 have been based upon the OECD Model Convention
119 See David Oliver, ‘Current Notes: Employees and Double Tax Agreements’ [1995] British Tax 
Review 529, 532, who illustrates the point by reference to R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex 
parte Commerzbank AG [1991] STC 271; BTC 161.
120 2003 OECD Commentary, above n 104.
121 Ibid, Commentary on art A, para 4.
122 Ibid.
123 Thiel v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1990) 171 CLR 338, 357; 21 ATR 531, 542; 90 ATC 
4717, 4727 (McHugh J). See Hamilton, above n 40, para 6.140.
124 Dual residency issues under the Japanese DTAs are dealt with through the competent authority 
procedures in art 20 - Hamilton, ibid. The 1946 United Kingdom and the 1953 United States DTAs 
did not contain tie-breaker tests for dual residents, rather tax credits were the means of granting 
double tax relief -  see Memorandum, Income Tax Assement Bill 1947 (Cth), 76 and Explanatory 
Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) Bill 1953 (Cth), 54 respectively.
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existing at that time.125 Thus, although the language of the tie breaker tests vary, all the 
five tie breaker tests contained in Article 4(2) of the 2003 OECD Model Convention are 
represented in Australian DTAs.126
The five tests set out in the Article 4(2) of the Model Convention apply in the following 
declining hierarchy, ie a taxpayer will be deemed to be resident:
• in a State in which the person has a permanent home available;
• if the person has a permanent home available in both States, then residency is in 
the State in which the person's personal and economic relations are closest 
(centre of vital interests);
• if the centre of vital interests cannot be determined, or there is not a permanent 
home available, then place of habitual abode is determinative;
• if a habitual abode is found in both States or in neither of them, place of 
residence will be determined by the person's nationality;
• but if the person is a national of both States or of neither of them, the competent 
authorities of the Contracting States shall settle the question by mutual 
agreement.127
Australia has been reluctant to adopt the OECD tie breaker tests. Only the 1995 New 
Zealand DTA128 contains the first four of the above tests129 in the above hierarchy,130 
and only two treaties have expressly adopted the mutual agreement tie breaker test.131
125 Above n 104.
126 2003 Model, above n 104.
127 Avery Jones (1981a), above n 110, 17 and 820, observe that by preferring criteria linked to 
permanent connection rather than arbitrary length of stay rules the Model gives “. . . taxpayers a 
better opportunity to seek a judicial or administrative resolution of the issue without resort to the 
mutual agreement procedure.”
128 For detailed analysis of the New Zealand-Australia DTA see Michael Dirkis, ‘Australia-New 
Zealand Tax Treaty’ (1995) 49 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 583.
129 The four tests adopted are the availability of a permanent home in the State, the place of closer 
personal or economic relations, the place of habitual abode, and citizenship.
130 This is a change from the 1972 Treaty where the “place of habitual abode” had precedence over the 
“personal or economic relations” criteria. J McCormack and A Archer, ‘The New Australia/New 
Zealand Double Tax Agreement: A Review of the Critical Issues’ (Paper presented at the ATAX 
Second Annual International Tax Weekend Workshop, Sydney, 26-28 May 1995) para 2.2.3 claim 
that the relegation of the “place of habitual abode” test will make it more difficult for individuals to 
lose their original residency status under the Treaty than was possible under the 1972 Treaty.
131 Outside the Japan DTA, which (in absence of any tie breaker tests) relies on the competent 
authority, the 2000 Romania DTA was the first Australian DTA to contain an express mutual 
agreement tie-breaker provision, followed by 2003 United Kingdom DTA. Australia has 
traditionally opposed such clauses as it has historically believed residency is a matter of fact and 
should not be determined by competent authorities.
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A finding of residency under tie breaker tests in most of Australia's DTAs only 
determines residency for the purposes of applying the other articles in that DTA. 
However, where a Dual Residency Article exists, a finding of residency under tie 
breaker tests gives the "resident" country the exclusive right to tax income arising in the 
country and to tax income arising in a third country. 132
The tie breaker test excludes from the definition of resident any person who is liable to 
tax in that state in respect only of income from sources in that state. 133 The Model 
Commentary indicates that the class of persons is foreign diplomatic and consular staff 
serving in their territory. 134 Thus, residents of Norfolk would not be residents under the 
agreement as they are exempted from tax on income from sources outside Australia. 135 
This means the treaty partner is not estopped from taxing individuals whose income has 
not been subjected to tax in Australia. However, such a clause can cause a problem 
where the country taxes on a source basis, as no one qualifies as a resident. 136
(b) Examination o f the tie breaker tests in detail
In order to understand the operation of the DTA tie breaker tests it is necessary to 
explore the scope of each tie breaker test and the interrelation between them. As the tests 
are principally objective and use terminology not generally in use in all jurisdictions, 137 
the Model Commentary provides contemporary guidance on the meaning of the tests. 
The tests will be examined in the following order:
• Availability of permanent home test;
• Personal and economic relations test;
132 A dual residency Article is found in only nine of Australia's pre 1983 DTAs -  Singapore art 16, 
Germany art 20, Netherlands art 22, France art 21, Belgium art 22, Philippines art 22, Switzerland 
art 21, Malaysian art 20 and Italy art 22. However, the dual residency Articles are not all the same 
and operate in two distinct ways. The dual residency Article in Singapore's DTA limits the tax 
exemption in the other territory only to the territorial tax and third country income that is subject to 
tax in the country of deemed residency. In the other eight DTAs the Article operates by reserving 
the right to tax, for the country of deemed residency, to the territorial and third country income.
133 Except for the Singapore DTA, which was based on the 1963 Model, above n 104. The change was 
needed to deal with the fact that Singapore taxes on a source basis - see Gzell (1996), above n i l ,  
16.
134 2003 OECD Commentary on art 4, above n 104, para 8.
135 1936 Act, s24F.
136 Article 3 of the Singapore/Australia agreement ensures that income of Singapore residents not 
subject to tax, as being derived from sources outside Singapore, is not relieved of Australian tax - 
see Gzell (1996), above n 11, 15.
137 Avery Jones (1981a), above n 110, 22 and 824-5.
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• Habitual abode test;
• Nationality test; and
• Mutual agreement
In undertaking this examination any variation away from the OECD Model in individual 
Australian DTAs will be highlighted in order to illustrate that there exists an underlying 
complexity arising from the failure by Australia to adopt standard OECD clauses in 
Australian DTAs.
(i) Availability o f permanent home test
The principal test in the Model Convention for determining residency of an individual is 
the "availability of a permanent home". It is the principal test in all but two of 
Australia’s DTAs. 138 In order to understand the scope of the test it is necessary to 
explore its three key elements: a “home”, “permanent” and “availability for use”.
First, a “home” is described in the Commentary to be any form of home and illustrates 
this by reference to “house or apartment belonging to or rented by the individual” and to 
a “rented furnished room” . 139 It is argued that since the test is expansive, the use of 
words such as “house, apartment or rented furnished room” in the Commentary are 
merely illustrative of types of permanent dwellings as are the words “belonging to or 
rented”. If the test was narrowly interpreted then houseboats or caravans would not 
qualify as permanent dwellings140 and individuals could escape the test by merely 
renting a house in the name of a private company141 or by having the property rented by 
a spouse with whom the individual cohabitated. 142 It has also been argued that use of the 
word “home” is significant as it implies that elements of domesticity must exist. 143
138 The United States (2002) and Japan DTAs.
139 2003 OECD Commentary on art 4, above n 104, para 13. William Schofield, 'Expatriate Tax 
Issues: The Application of Double Tax Treaties in the Context of Australian Taxation' (Paper 
presented at the Taxation Institute o f Australia’s 2001 Queensland State Convention, Gold Coast, 
18 May 2001) 4 notes that this reflects the practice of employers of inbound expatriates who 
provide accommodation (leased or owned) to their employees.
140 Schofield, above n 139, 4.
141 Avery Jones (1981a), above n 110, 22 and 824-5.
142 Ibid 29 and 831.
143 Garth Harris, above n 110, 61. This inference is drawn from the use of the word in the domestic law 
of countries such as New Zealand (the former “home” test in the Income Tax Act 1976 (NZ) s 241) 
and France (the habitual abode (“foyer”) test under administrative and traditional case law).
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Second, the concept of “permanence” is crucial under the test. In order to satisfy the test 
the person must own or possess a home and . . must have arranged and retained it for 
his permanent use as opposed to staying at a particular place under such conditions that 
it is evident that the stay is intended to be of short duration.”144 Occasional availability 
for the short periods associated with “travel for pleasure, business travel, education 
travel, attending a course at a school” will not satisfy the permanence requirement.145
Finally, it is essential that the dwelling be available to the person at all times 
continuously,146 ie it cannot be leased in the individual’s absence. Thus, the availability 
of a holiday home kept available permanently may also satisfy the test.147
Australia has generally adopted in DTAs the permanent home test as its primary tie­
breaker test. The only variation is found in the 2002 United States DTA where the test is 
expressed in terms of “maintenance” of a permanent home rather than “availability”. 
Article 4(2) of the United States DTA also requires that “regard shall be given to the 
place where the individual dwells with his family”. Thus, this test is harsher than the 
“availability” test as maintenance of residence is required, not just availability. It is 
difficult to establish the existence of a “permanent” home if the individual resides 
elsewhere.
(ii) Personal and economic relations test
The second tie breaker test is “personal and economic relations” test. Where an 
individual has a permanent home in both Contracting States, the place of residency is 
the State with which the personal and economic relations of the individual are closer (ie 
the centre of vital interests).148 Australian treaties tend to use the words “personal and 
economic relations” or “economic and personal relations” rather than “centre of vital 
interests”.149
144 2003 OECD Commentary on art 4, above, para 12.
145 Ibid, para 13
146 Ibid.
147 Avery Jones (1981a), above n 110, 25 and 826.
148 2003 OECD Commentary, above n 104, art 4, para 14. It is suggested that the reason for linking 
permanent home and vital interests tests is that it is unlikely that someone would have vital interests 
in a place without having a permanent home there -  Avery Jones, ibid 107 and 908.
149 The term “centre of vital interests” is used in conjunction with “economic and personal relations” in 
the Indian, Hungarian and United Kingdom (2003) DTAs.
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The Commentary notes that in order to ascertain to which of the two States the person’s 
personal and economic relations are closer, regard must be had . . to his family and 
social relations, his occupations, his political, cultural or other activities, his place of 
business, the place from which he administers his property, etc. The circumstances must 
be examined as a whole.”150 Where there are conflicts between place of economic 
interests and personal interests, the place of closer personal interests is preferred.151 
Where a person with a home sets up a second home in another State, the person’s centre 
of vital interest may not change, particularly if the person retains the first home “. . . in 
the environment where he has always lived, where he has worked, and where he has his 
family and possessions.” 152
Although Australian DTAs tend to adopt the “personal and economic relation” test, it is 
not always the second tier test. In 17 of the DTAs the “habitual abode” test (discussed 
next) is placed ahead of the “personal and economic relations” test.153 Thus, the 
“personal and economic relations” test is only the second tier test in 24 of the DTAs.154 
The reasons for this departure from the OECD Model Conventions is unclear,155 
particularly given that a determination under “permanent home” and the “personal and 
economic relations” tests would incorporate consideration of the same criteria. Thus, 
the test is effectively otiose in these treaties.
(Hi) Habitual abode
In the cases where the residence cannot be determined by reference to the centre of vital 
interests rule or there is not a permanent home in either State, the next step is the 
“habitual abode” test. Thus, where the individual has a permanent home available in 
both States, and the State with which the taxpayer had closer personal and economic 
relations is unknown then residency is in the State where the individual stays more
150 2003 OECD Commentary on art 4, above n 104, para 15.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 The Australia’s DTAs that rank the “habitual abode” test second are with Singapore (1969), 
Belgium (1977), Germany (1972), Malaysia (1980), Denmark (1981), United States (2002), Ireland 
(1983), Italy (1982), Papua New Guinea (1989), Thailand (1990), Fiji (1990), Kiribati (1991), 
Indonesia (1992), Sri Lanka (1992), Taiwan (1997), Poland (2000), and Slovak Republic (2000).
154 The "personal and economic relations” test is ranked second in the DTAs with France (1976), 
Netherlands (1976), Canada (1980), Philippines (1980), Switzerland (1980), Korea (1982), 
Norway (1982), Sweden (1982), Malta (1984), Finland (1984), Austria (1986), China (1988), India 
(1992), Hungary (1993), Spain (1993), Vietnam (1993), New Zealand (1995), Czech Republic 
(1996), Argentina (2000), Romania (2000), South Africa (2000), Russia (2002) United Kingdom 
(2003) and Mexico (2003).
155 Avery Jones (1981 a), above n 110, 25 and 826.
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frequently (a habitual abode).156 In determining frequency regard is had to total presence 
at each permanent home.157 Where the individual does not have a permanent home in 
either State and the State with which the personal and economic relations of the 
individual are closer is unknown (eg a person going from one hotel to another158) then 
residency is in the State where the taxpayer spends the most time.
What the time period is for comparison under the test is not defined. The Commentary 
states that there is sufficient presence in time for it to be possible to determine whether 
the residence in each of the two States is habitual and to determine also the intervals at 
which the stays take place.159
The “habitual abode” test is not universally adopted in Australian DTAs, being found in 
only 20 of Australia’s DTAs either as an independent test, or as a gloss to the “personal 
and economic relations” test.160 The continued use of the “habitual abode” test in 
Australian treaties negotiated since 1967, and its elevated position in 17 of those treaties 
is somewhat surprising given that the test is encapsulated in the higher level of 
attachment tests, the “permanent home” and “closer personal and economic relations” 
tests. However, this fact seems to have finally “dawned” on the Government given the 
non-inclusion of the “habitual abode” test in post 2002 DTAs (in the Russian, 2003 
United Kingdom and Mexican DTAs) and recognition in the Explanatory Memoranda 
that “personal and economic relations” includes habitual abode.161
(iv) Nationality
Where it is impossible to determine a habitual abode, the residency will be in the State 
o f which the individual is a national. This “fourth level” tie breaker test is rarely used as 
an independent tie breaker test (the exceptions being the 1995 New Zealand and the 
2003 United Kingdom DTAs). The nationality test, which appears in 15 other Australian 
DTAs, is used as an element for determining the place of “habitual abode” or the place
156 2003 OECD Commentary on art 4, above n 104, para 17.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid para 18.
159 Ibid para 19.
160 The “habitual abode” test is the second ranked test in the 17 countries listed above n 124 and in the 
New Zealand DTA (1995). It is also used as a gloss to the second ranked "personal and economic 
relations” test in the Norway (1992) and India (1992) DTAs.
161 See, eg, Russia Explanatory Memorandum, above n 115, 19 and the Mexico Explanatory 
Memorandum, above n 115, 99.
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of “dosest economic relations”.162 Again, it is not clear why Australia has departed from 
the OECD Model Convention and not used nationality as a tie-breaker. However, the 
use of the test as gloss may indicate that the Australian negotiators believe that the 
“closest economic relations” test encompasses nationality.
(v) Mutual agreement
Finally, if the individual is a national of both Contracting States or of neither of them, 
then it is up to the competent authorities to resolve the difficulty by mutual agreement 
according to the procedure established in Article 25. As mentioned above, only two of 
Australia's recent treaties include an express tie breaker test, which allows resort to a 
mutual agreement clause.163 Why there is this reluctance to include one of the OECD 
tests is uncertain. It can only be assumed that Australian negotiators hold a view that a 
residency determination is ultimately factual, outside the scope of an administrative 
agreement.
(c) Summary
All but one of Australia’s DTAs do provide a mechanism for resolving dual residency 
problems via a series of tie breaker tests. The effect of the DTA tie breaker tests is to 
limit the scope of the domestic residency tests where a dual resident individual is found 
to be more closely tied to the other contracting state. Thus, each DTA only impacts on 
Australia’s jurisdictional claim (the residency rules) to remove double taxation in 
respect of a person who is a dual resident under the domestic law of both contracting 
states.
162 The “nationality” tie breaker test is used as a gloss to the “personal and economic relations” test in 
the DTAs with Malaysia (1980), Philippines (1980), United States (2002), Norway (1982), Korea 
(1982), Malta (1984), Thailand (1990), Fiji (1990), Sri Lanka (1992), India (1992), Spain (1993), 
Czech Republic (1996), Slovak Republic (2000), Russia (2002), and Mexico (2003). The “habitual 
abode” gloss is only used in the DTA with Norway (1982).
Article 4(l)(b)(ii) of the United States (2002) protocol confines the United States definition of 
resident under the treaty to a United States citizen, other than a United States citizen, who is a 
resident of a State other than Australia for the purposes of a DTA between that State and Australia. 
It also should be noted that Art 1(3) of United States DTA (2002) permits the United States to tax 
former “long-term residents” without regard to the treaty. This consistent the United States’ 
domestic “exit” rules - see discussion below in n 405.
163 Only the Romania DTA (2000) and United Kingdom DTA (2003) contain a mutual agreement 
provision in the tie breaker test.
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Finally, as Australia’s DTAs have been developed in the main over the last 35 years 
through country by country negotiation, the tie breaker tests adopted and the order in 
which they appear varies from DTA to DTA.
D. Summing up the scope of the residency tests for individuals
In summary, the residency tests for individuals are found in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act. They 
consist of the primary “resides” test and three extension tests (the “domicile” test, or the 
“183 day” test or the “Commonwealth superannuation” test). That hierarchy is not 
generally borne out in practice where the courts tend to apply the relevant extension tests 
in conjunction with the common law resides test.
To add to this matrix there are other specific residency tests that for specific purposes 
limit the scope to the general rules (eg, ordinarily resident and Territory resident) and 
other definitions also exist in related legislation (eg, Income Tax Rates Act and the 
Medicare levy).
The final piece of the puzzle is the residency tie breaker tests in DTAs, which have the 
effect of altering the scope of the domestic residency tests where a dual resident 
individual is found to be more closely tied to the other contracting state.
Ill Exploring the Main Thesis -  Evaluating the effectiveness of the
residency rules for individuals
The above overview of the individual residency rules reveals a complex matrix of 
imprecise and often subtly different rules. The purpose of this Part is to explore whether 
these rules fail, in their practical application, to satisfy the “essential objectives” of 
equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance. The evaluation will be 
undertaken by illustrating circumstances where the law struggles to satisfy each of the 
evaluative criteria. The evaluative criteria are addressed in the following order:
equity; 
efficiency; 
simplicity; and
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the prevention of tax avoidance.
Where some examples illustrate that a number of the evaluative criteria are not satisfied, 
to avoid duplication in text and analysis, it is proposed to discuss them in the context of 
the more relevant evaluative criteria only, with a passing reference being made to the 
other shortcomings.
A. Equity
Consistent with the definition in Chapter 2, in determining compliance with the equity 
objective, the following discussion will highlight where individuals in similar 
circumstances are not being taxed similarly (horizontal inequity) or where the tax 
burdens do not fall upon those with the greatest ability to pay (vertical inequity). The 
approach to be adopted is to examine the residency rules more broadly, before focusing 
on specific equity issues in relation to the superannuation test in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act 
and the DTA tiebreaker tests.
1 “Facts and circumstance ” tests (the resides, domicile, 183 day, ordinarily resident 
and territory resident tests)
Under the resides, domicile and 183 day tests in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act, and the territory 
resident test in s 24C of the 1936 Act an individual must determine, in light of the 
individual’s personal circumstances, whether he or she "resides" in Australia/Territory, 
has a “permanent” or “usual” place of abode, or even if she or he has the intention 
(objectively) to take up residency.164 Similarly the ordinarily resident test also turns on 
the facts and circumstances of the individual taxpayer. As a result, an individual’s 
residency status under the resides, domicile, 183 day, ordinarily resident and territory 
resident tests rules can turn on a minor variation in circumstances or, hypothetically, 
even on a difference in a single fact.
164 Although s 6(l)(a)(i) and (ii) requires that the Commissioner be satisfied that a “permanent place of 
abode is outside Australia”, or that a “usual place of abode is outside Australia” and there exists no 
intention to take up residency (respectively), s 169A of the 1936 Act allows the Commission can 
rely on a statement by the taxpayer in their return that these conditions exist. Section 169A( 1) was 
enacted by Taxation Laws Amendment Act 1986 (Cth) to facilitate the self assessment system, 
introduced for the year of income ended 30 June 1987 onwards.
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Given that minor variations in a taxpayer’s circumstances may determine residency it is 
possible that persons in similar circumstances could have different residency status. For 
example a different occupation can vary residence. A sailor is more likely to be found 
resident than an oil worker, who is absent from Australia for similar periods, due (as 
discussed above in Part II, A 2(a)(i)) to the discounting of importance of the “physical 
presence” element of residency by the Courts in respect of sailors. As horizontal equity 
is found where individuals in similar circumstances are taxed similarly (emphasis 
added), the individual “fact and circumstances” nature of these tests means that in 
application they fail to deliver horizontal equity.
2 The superannuation test
As discussed above, the superannuation test in s 6(1 )(a)(iii) of the 1936 Act deems 
residency where a person is a member of either of two specified Commonwealth 
superannuation schemes (PSS or CSS). The rule also deems residency for that person’s 
spouse and/or child less than 16 years of age.
The test also appears to lack horizontal equity (ie taxpayers in similar economic 
circumstances are not treated similarly) in two ways. As discussed in the following, it 
applies inconsistently to public servants and to the spouses and children of public 
servants.
(a) Inconsistent application to public servants
First, the test only deems some Commonwealth public servants to be residents, with the 
majority of government employees (including members of the defence forces165, 
employees of Commonwealth statutory authorities and business enterprises, and 
university staff) escaping its net, as they do not belong to the two named schemes. It also 
fails its last stated policy purpose of including “. . . all Commonwealth public servants 
as residents”.166 As a result, the rules lack horizontal equity (ie taxpayers in similar 
economic circumstances are not treated similarly).
165 Defence force personnel are expressly excluded from the definition of “eligible employee” - 
Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) s 10.
166 Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 2) 1992 (Cth) 181.
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In fairness to the test, it was never intended to cover all government employees, nor 
even cover all Commonwealth public servants (as was mis-stated in an Explanatory 
Memorandum in 1992).167 As mentioned previously, the purpose for the introduction of 
s 6(l)(a)(iii) was to . . bring within the Australian taxable field the salaries paid . . 
to locally engaged High Commission staff.168 In response to questions in the House of 
Representatives concerning its scope he stated that the superannuation test was “. . . only 
designed to extend the provisions of the main act to those who are employed in the High 
Commissioner's office”.169
In respect of subsequent amendments to the rules, necessitated by changes to the 
Commonwealth's superannuation scheme, governments have continually stated that the 
amendments did not alter the operation of, and the policy underlying, s 6( 1 )(a)(iii).170 
However, subsequent changes to the various Commonwealth superannuation schemes 
entitlement rules caused by changes to the public service's conditions of employment 
that resulted in removing eligibility for locally engaged overseas employees have in fact 
resulted in a policy change as the test can no longer achieve its original intention.171
As well as inequity between Commonwealth public servants, a similar inequity exists in 
respect of state/territory government employees. State/territory government employees 
posted to overseas missions, fulfilling similar duties to their Commonwealth 
counterparts, would not be deemed to be residents under this test.172
Thus, in summary by only targeting a public servant who belongs to the two named 
schemes the rule does not deliver horizontal equity (ie taxpayers in similar economic 
circumstances are not treated similarly).
167 The Explanatory Memorandum erroneously states at 181 that the purpose for the introduction of 
the superannuation test was “. . . to include all Commonwealth public servants as residents.” 
Simply reading the Explanatory Notes, Income Tax Assessment Act 1930 (Cth), or the Second 
Reading Speech, Income Tax Assessment Act 1939 (Cth), would have avoided this error.
168 Spender, above n 67, 964
169 Spender, above n 67, 968.
170 See Second Reading Speech, Income Tax Assessment Amendment Bill (No 3) 1976 (Cth) and 
Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 2) 1992 (Cth), 182.
171 See definitions of an “eligible employee” in respect of the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) or a 
“member of the 1990 Superannuation fund”, above n 69 and 70.
172 However, they may be deemed to be residents under the domicile test, but only if a permanent 
place of abode is not found elsewhere. The purpose of the domicile test was to extend the scope of 
the Act to ensure that “. . . Agent-Generals for the Australian States together with members of their 
staffs, to be treated as residents” - Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1922-1929 (Cth) 10.
108
(b) Inconsistent application to spouses and children o f public servants
Secondly, the test deems the spouse, or a child less than 16 years of age, of an eligible 
employee to be a resident, regardless of the degree of actual connection between the 
employee and his or her spouse and children. This element of the test can result in 
horizontal inequities in a number of ways. For example:
• if an Australian public servant, being a member of the named schemes, 
marries a foreign national, that person is deemed to be a resident of Australia 
even though they have no connection with Australia;
• if persons separate but do not divorce, and one spouse is a member of one of 
the named superannuation schemes, the other will remain a resident of 
Australia no matter where he or she actually resides. Further, he or she is 
unable to renounce their residency without a formal dissolution of the 
marriage, or their former spouse ceasing to be a member of the scheme; and
• a person taking an overseas posting, where his or her spouse was an eligible 
person for the purposes of the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth), would remain 
a resident173 and be subjected to a greater rate of tax than a person on the 
same income who did not have a spouse who was an eligible employee.174
Thus, the test is inequitable as its effect is to capture persons within the residency 
definition, who would not otherwise be residents, merely because they enjoy a familial 
relationship with a public servant who is eligible for membership of one of two named 
superannuation schemes.
The purpose for including the spouse and dependants of the taxpayer less than 16 years 
in the superannuation test in s 6(l)(a)(iii) was to entitle the High Commission officials 
to dependency deductions (now concessionary rebate tax offsets). This policy objective 
is no longer relevant as dependants are now deemed to be resident (by s 159J(3 A) of the 
1936 Act) for the purposes of the s 159J concessionary rebates, if their parent has an
173 See AAT Case 13165 re Ardia and Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1998) 40 ATR 1029; 98 
ATC 2248, which illustrates the impact of deeming residency of a spouse merely because of the 
other spouse's membership of an eligible superannuation scheme.
174 John Passant, ‘Residency: The Strange Case of the Commonwealth Superannuation Test’ (1995) 
7(5) CCH Journal o f Australian Taxation 34. However, the Commissioner in a private ruling 
indicated that the strict application of this rule could be softened in some cases, see John Passant, 
‘The Commonwealth Superannuation Residency Test: An Update’ (1996) 7(6) CCH Journal of 
Australian Taxation 28.
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Australian domicile. Further, as such rebates have all but disappeared for most 
taxpayers, any minor advantages which may exist have been outweighed by the major 
problems it creates through it’s over reach.
The rule also appears to amount to discrimination based upon marital status.175 
Although such discrimination is not strictly illegal under the 1936 Act (and in particular 
this test176), it is inconsistent with the intent of the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination o f All Forms o f Discrimination against Women177 and the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).178
As in respect of public servants the domicile test lacks horizontal equity in that spouse 
and children of other Commonwealth, state and territory public servants, in similar 
economic circumstances, are not treated similarly.
175 However, mere financial disadvantage may not be sufficient to establish discrimination. The Tax 
Court of Canada in Neil Barry McFadyen v Her Majesty the Queen 2000 DTC 2473, 2488 found 
that provisions of the Income Tax Act RSC C 1985, 5th Supplement (as amended) did not 
contravene s 15(1) of the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, as a spouse of a diplomat 
posted abroad could not prove he was discriminated in the sense required by the Charter (ie 
“suffered prejudice, stereotyping and historic disadvantage or are subject to pre-existing 
disadvantage, vulnerability or prejudice”). He had merely suffered financial disadvantage.
176 The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) aims “to eliminate, so far as is possible, discrimination 
against persons on the ground o f . . . marital status . . .  in the areas o f . . . the administration of 
Commonwealth laws and programs” (s 3(b)). However, although
• s 12 binds the Crown in right of the Commonwealth;
• s 26 declares that it “is unlawful for a person who performs any function or exercises any power 
under a Commonwealth law . . .  to discriminate against another person, on the ground of the 
other person's . . . marital status;” and
• discrimination would occur under s 6 (as a determination under s 6(l)(i)(c) of 1936 Act “. . . is 
likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging persons of the same marital status”);
the Commissioner of Taxation’s actions are exempted under s 40 (2)(c) (ie “Nothing in Division 1 
or 2 affects anything done by a person in direct compliance with any of the following as in force on 
1 August 1984: . . (c) the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936").
However, it is arguable that the exemption under s 40(2)(c) of the Sex Discrimination Act ceased 
as at 1 July 1997 with the enactment of the 1997 Act. The still operative 1936 provisions were 
incorporated via Schedule 1, s 2 of the Income Tax (Consequential Amendments) Act 1997 (Cth) 
(which amends the definitions of “this Act”, “assessable income”, “exempt income” and “taxable 
income” in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act to refer to the “ 1997 Act”). Thus, as the residency test in s 6(1) 
of 1936 Act operate via incorporation into the 1997 Act, it is difficult to see how the exemption for 
the 1936 Act can continue to apply.
177 GA Res 34/180, UN GAOR, 34th sess, 107thplen mtg, 193, UN Doc A/Res/34/180 (1979). Article 
9.1 of the convention states that “States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, 
change or retain their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien 
nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality 
of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband.”
178 The United Nations Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Discrimination against Women 
is incorporated into Australian law via the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).
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3 Problems caused by interrelationship of DTAs
Finally, a lack of horizontal equity inherently exists from the existence of DTAs, as only 
residents of the States that are parties to the treaty can avail themselves of the DTA tie 
breaker test. As a result some dual resident migrant individuals in a DTA country will be 
treated differently to those dual resident individuals from non-DTA countries.
As a result some individuals from countries that are a major source of Australia's 
migrant populations (eg Greece and Lebanon179) face double taxation in the absence of 
treaties, particularly where both Australia and the country of income source claim 
taxation jurisdiction. This is illustrated by the facts Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v 
Efstathakis.m  Mrs Efstathakis, despite being taxable in Greece in respect of her Greek 
Press and Information Service salary income, was also taxable on that same income as a 
resident in Australia.
However, this is a natural consequence of the DTA process as the inequity only arises 
from obtaining equity for other taxpayers covered by DTAs. Further, this inequity is likely 
to be short term as the number DTAs is likely to increase, following the Government’s 
2003 announcement to escalate Australia's future treaty negotiation program.181
4 Summary
From the above discussion, it is evident that the residency tests for individuals, fail the 
horizontal equity evaluative criterion (ie where individuals in similar circumstances are 
not being taxed similarly). The rules fail to deliver horizontal equity as:
• the facts and circumstances tests (the resides, domicile, 183 day, ordinarily 
resident and territory resident tests) can result in persons in similar circumstances 
having different residency statuses;
179 In 2001 there were 116,431 people bom in Greece and 71,349 bom in Lebanon -  see Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Commonwealth, 2001 Census o f Population and Housing (2001) at URL: 
http://www.abs.gov.au as at 30 April 2004.
180 Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Efstathakis (1979) 9 ATR 82; 78 ATC 4486.
181 Treasurer ‘Review of International Taxation Arrangements’ (Press Release No 32, 13 May 2003), 
Attachment E. These announcements arose from recommendations by Review of Business 
Taxation, Commonwealth, A Tax System Redesigned (1999), recommendations 22.21 to 22.24; 
Treasury, Commonwealth, Review o f International Taxation Arrangements: Consultation Paper
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• the superannuation test creates different residency outcomes for CSS and PSS 
members and their families when compared to other public servants in similar 
overseas postings; and
• dual resident individuals covered by a DTA are treated differently to dual residents 
who are not covered by a DTA.
B. Efficiency (Neutrality)
In light of the discussion in Chapter 2, the efficiency (neutrality) objective is satisfied if 
the rules relating to residency of individuals give rise to distortions such as a taxpayer 
being taxed differently due to the market in which the taxpayer operates (eg physical or 
electronic).182
The principal residency rules in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act (common law, domicile, 183 day 
and superannuation tests), the specific tests (ordinarily resident and Territory resident) 
and the tie breaker tests do not treat an individual differently because they operate in 
either the physical or electronic markets. However, as illustrated in Part III D, these rules 
are able to be manipulated to minimise or avoid tax. Thus, there is a lack of neutrality as 
a result of the distortion caused by or flowing from tax avoidance. Further, the 
developments in mass communications technology and the spread of the Internet on the 
residency rules183 are more about the Internet increasing the number of people able to 
manipulate the rules rather than whether the rules give rise to distortions in application 
to markets or structures.
In summary, although the residency rules apply the same tests to persons regardless of 
their mode of conducting business, they are not efficient as distortions arise from tax 
avoidance through manipulation of the rules (see Part III D).
(2002), 41; and the Board of Taxation, International Taxation: A Report to the Treasurer (2003), 
Recommendation 3.7, 96.
182 OECD Taxation and Electronic Commerce: Implementing the Ottawa Taxation Framework 
Conditions (2001), 10.
183 Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Tax and the Internet: Discussion Report (1997), 45 
(ATO’s first Internet Report).
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C Simplicity
In determining compliance with the simplicity objective, the following discussion will 
highlight the extent to which the residency rules for individuals in application are:
• not predictable;
• not proportional;
• not consistent;
• associated with the imposition of high compliance burdens;
• difficult to administer;
• not co-ordinated with other tax rules; or
• expressed unclearly.
As a number of these elements overlap, a single rule may satisfy a number of the elements. 
Where the overlap occurs the rule will be assessed against the most relevant evaluative 
element. The extent to which a rule satisfies these elements will determine the extent to 
which the rules will be considered to have failed the simplicity objective in that 
circumstance. The assessment will follow the order of evaluative elements above.
1 Predictability
The first element for judging simplicity is to determine whether in applying the 
residency rules for individuals, the results are predictable (ie it is easy to understand a 
rule’s intended and actual scope).
The principal factor that influences predictability of the residency rules for individuals is 
that a person's residency depends upon their individual personal facts and 
circumstances.184 As mentioned above in considering the equity evaluative criterion, an 
individual under the “resides”, “domicile” and “183 day” tests in s 6(1) and the 
“Territory resident” test in s 24C of the 1936 Act must determine, in light of their 
personal circumstances, whether he or she “resides” in Australia/Territory, has a
184 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Miller (1946) 3 AITR 333; 73 CLR 93; 8 ATD 146.
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“permanent” or “usual” place of abode, or even if she or he has the intention 
(objectively) to take up residency.185
As illustrated in the analysis of these tests in Part II, finding where an individual resides 
under these tests is not as simple186 as finding “. . . where he sleeps and lives.” 187 The 
determination of residency under these rules can turn on a single fact, resulting in an 
outcome in many circumstances that was difficult to predict. A symptom of the 
problems with predictability is that even the ATO is unable to give determinative public 
rulings (rather than guidelines) on the operation of these rules in respect o f the majority 
of taxpayers.188 Even the AAT and courts arrive at different conclusions as illustrated by 
the 2002 litigation involving the Estate of Mrs Subrahmanyam (discussed previously).189
Similar difficulties apply in respect of the ordinarily resident test (which also turns on 
the facts and circumstances of the individual taxpayer). Although some tiers of the DTA 
tie breaker test also suffer from a lack of predictability (personal and economic relations, 
habitual abode and mutual agreement tests), they are balanced by more predictable tests 
(availability of permanent home and nationality tests).
Although the application of the residency rules is unpredictable190 Gzell notes that as “ . . 
. the notion of residency is based upon ordinary English usage . . .  it is sufficiently broad 
to enable the Courts to grapple with endless factual differences.”191 Prebble agrees 
stating “[individuals are physical . . . and the legal concepts of residency relate them to 
another physical fact: a taxing jurisdiction.”192 Gzell sees the odd decisions as
185 As noted at n 164, although under s 6(l)(a)(i) and (ii) requires that the Commissioner be satisfied 
that “permanent place of abode is outside Australia” or that a “usual place of abode is outside 
Australia” and there exists no intention to take up residency (respectively), s 169A of the 1936 Act 
allows the Commission can rely on a statement by the taxpayer in their return that these conditions 
exist.
186 Alley (1995), above n 42, 48 notes that determining where a person resides may not have been 
much of a difficulty in 1876 in applying the obiter dicta of Huddleston B in Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd 
v Nicholson (1876) 1 TC 88, 103; 1 Ex D 428, 452, but that is not the case today. Also see Davies, 
above n 45, 23-28 and Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1928) 13 TC 486, 528, where 
Viscount Sumner noted “. . . the words are plain and it is only their application that is haphazard 
and beyond all forecast.”
187 Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd v Nicholson (1876) 1 TC 88, 103; 1 Ex D 428, 452.
188 ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 183, 100 and see the Preamble in both IT 2650, above n 51, 
and to the former IT 2607, above n 16.
189 Above n 23.
190 ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 183, 100.
191 Gzell (1996), above n 11, 8.
192 John Prebble, ‘Ectopia, Tax Law and International Taxation’ [1997] British Tax Review 383, 388. 
However, Prebble concedes that people’s mobility make it more difficult to refine residency rules 
to pure physical location.
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illustrative of the point that the concept of residence is broad, . . capable of being 
applied to multifarious factual situations, albeit that the results of the concept may not 
always result in a decision which receives universal approbation.”193 The flexibility of 
the rules194 means that . . as society's perceptions change, so will the notion of 
residence.”195 More prescriptive rules will impede the ability of the law to develop.
However, this flexibility must be weighted up against the need for predictability, 
particularly in a self assessment environment where the onus of determining a person’s 
residency status lies with that individual.196 On balance, the outcome under the resides, 
domicile, 183 day, territory resident, ordinarily resident and some tiers of the DTA tie 
breaker tests is, in many circumstances, difficult to predict.
2 Proportionality
The second element forjudging simplicity is to determine whether the complexity of the 
residency rules is proportional to the complexity of the policy. If the law is more 
complex than the policy, then the law will fail this element of the simplicity criterion.
The policy underlying the residency rules, as articulated previously, is conceptually 
relatively simple. For example, the broad purpose of the s 6(1) “resides” test was to 
extend the scope of the 1936 Act to income derived outside Australia by persons who 
ordinarily live in Australia and by persons who, despite having retained foreign 
nationality, citizenship or domicile, have their usual place of residence in Australia.197
Similarly the clear purpose of the domicile test (s 6(l)(a)(i) of 1936 Act) was to extend 
the scope of the Act to ensure that Commonwealth and State diplomats and members of
193 Gzell (1996), above n i l ,  and Gzell (1997), above n 11, 5 and 21 respectively.
194 Prebble, above n 192, 389 notes that as people’s mobility make it more difficult to refine residency 
rules to pure physical location, jurisdictions in defining their residency rules have adopted physical 
facts, metaphysical facts (such as intention) and resort to formal, arbitrary criteria where dual 
residency occurs. Thus, “[t]he arbitrariness of residency rules results . . . from practical difficulty, 
not from conceptual impossibility.”
195 Gzell (1996), above n 11, 8.
196 A hybrid form of self assessment for individuals has operated in Australia since the 1986-87 
income year. Under this system there is no checking, in most instances, of the return on lodgement. 
However, unlike the full self assessment regime applying to companies and superannuation funds, 
the Commissioner still calculates the individual’s liability and issues an assessment notice. For a 
history of self assessment see Michael Dirkis and Michael Payne-Mulcahy, ‘Time for a change: 
Self assessment 14 years on’ (2002) 36 Taxation in Australia 417 and Peter Costello, 
Commonwealth, Review o f Aspects o f Income Tax Self Assessment: Discussion Paper (2004), 2-5.
197 Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 (Cth) 10.
115
their staffs were treated as residents,198 while the purpose of the 183 day test (s 
6(l)(a)(ii)) was to obviate the difficulties in establishing a person’s residency in any 
country.199 As discussed above, the other 1936 Act residency tests (superannuation test 
and the Territory resident test) also have relative straightforward policy objectives.
However, despite these fairly simple policy objectives the fact and circumstances 
approach adopted in the resides, domicile, 183 day and Territory resident tests makes 
these rules more complex than the underlying policy. Further, the “domicile” 
terminology is also conceptually complex as the underlying concepts are highly 
artificial.200 A finding of “domicile of origin” can result in persons, having left a place 
with no intention to return, being regarded as domiciled in that place as they had not 
formed the requisite intention to settle elsewhere.201 It has far wider impact than merely 
deeming residency for Australian diplomats posted overseas.
The one exception to simple policy concepts is the use of the word “ordinarily resident” 
in the 1936 Act. Its use is reflective of a fine policy distinction on the lower levels of 
attachment required for the application of certain rules. As the distinction between the 
concepts of “resides” and “ordinarily resident” (as discussed above) is very subtle, the 
complexity of the policy objective is increased.
Thus, complexity arising from the fact and circumstances approach adopted in the 
resides, domicile, 183 day and Territory resident tests is disproportional, in general, to 
the underlying policy. These also fail this element of the simplicity criterion.
3 Consistency
The third element forjudging simplicity is to determine whether the residency rules lack 
consistency (ie give rise to arbitrary distinctions). If the rules operate in a way that gives 
rise to arbitrary outcomes, then rules will be deemed to fail this element of the simplicity 
criterion.
198 Ibid, 10.
199 Ibid, 11.
200 Peter Whiteman et al (eds), Whiteman on Income Tax (3rd ed, 1988) 140.
201 Eg, persons living in the United Kingdom for periods of 35 and 39 years were found to have 
retained their domicile of origin in South Africa and Canada respectively - see Buswell v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners (1974) 49 TC 334 and Inland Revenue Commissioners v Bullock (1976) 
51 TC 522.
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The interaction of the residency rules and DTAs can, in limited circumstances, result in 
inconsistent treatment of diplomatic and consular representatives of foreign missions in 
Australia and their families when compared with other resident taxpayers. Under the 
resides test in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act such diplomats could be resident under Australia's 
domestic law as they have a physical presence in Australia and have a “settled or usual 
abode, to live, in or at”.202 If the diplomats are residents, then their private income 
sourced in Australia and capital gains made on investments in commercial undertakings 
in Australia would be assessable.203 Their official salary and offshore income remains 
exempt.204
As a result of this domestic residency determination, the diplomat is entitled to the 
residential tax free threshold. Further, any interest, dividends or royalties income 
derived from Australian sources is not taxed at the diplomat’s marginal tax rate. As 
diplomats are residents of their home country under DTAs, such income is subject to a 
maximum tax rate limitation specified in the DTA (eg interest income is taxed at the 
maximum rate of 10 percent under most DTAs).205 Further, the diplomat may also be 
entitled to concessional rebates, as domestically they are residents.
Thus, the application of the residency rules under s 6(1) of the 1936 Act deliver 
inconsistency in treatment between foreign diplomatic and consular staff and their 
families when compared to other foreign nationals working in Australia.206
202 Applegate v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1979) 9 ATR 899, 905; 79 ATC 4307, 4313.
203 Experience indicates that generally foreign diplomats and consular representatives qualify as 
residents of Australia for Australian income tax purposes during their period of service in Australia 
except where their posting to Australia is of a very short duration. The factors that lead to these 
conclusions are that most representatives are posted for a fixed term exceeding two years (some 
have been in Australia in excess of 10 years) and that most representatives establish homes in 
Australia, with their spouses and children. The children attend schools and in general they become 
part of the community.
204 Section 23(a)(ii) exempts diplomatic and consular representatives in Australia from all income tax, 
except on their private income having its source in Australia and capital taxes on investments made 
in commercial undertakings in Australia, by reference to the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities 
Act 1967 (Cth) s 7(4) and the Consular Privileges and Immunities Act 1972 (Cth) s 5(4). Section 
23(c)(iii) exempts income earned in the capacity of a representative of any government, or member 
of the entourage of that representative. This privilege does not extend to officers who are 
Australian citizens or permanent residents: Morris v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1989) 20 
ATR 1666; 89 ATC 5303.
205 If a bilateral tax agreement (DTA) exists between Australia and the diplomat’s country, then the 
extent to which the diplomat's private income sourced in Australia or capital gains made on 
investments in commercial undertakings in Australia are assessable will be determined by the 
agreement.
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4 Level o f compliance burden
The fourth element forjudging simplicity is to determine qualitatively the level of cost 
(the burden) imposed upon the individual taxpayer in complying with the law. If 
examples indicate that the compliance costs are high, the residency rule fails this 
element of the simplicity criterion.
As with the predictability element of the simplicity test, the principal factor that 
influences compliance costs arising from the residency rules for individuals is that a 
person's residency depends upon their individual personal facts and circumstances. 
These compliance costs are potentially incurred at both the individual and employer 
level in determining whether an individual is a resident.
An individual, in a self assessment environment must determine, in light of their 
personal circumstances, whether they are residents under the resides, domicile and 183 
day tests in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act. In order to obtain certainty, taxpayers can seek a 
private binding ruling.207 Although the actual number of rulings requested related to 
residency is unknown, the size of the compliance burden can be gauged through the 
number of published ATO Interpretative Decisions (ATOIDs). ATOIDs are non-binding 
interpretative decisions, which in the main are derived from private rulings, which are 
issued to improve the accuracy and consistency of decision making in the ATO.
A search of the word “resident'” on the ATOIDs section of the ATO website gives rise to 
over 500 hits.208 Further analysis of that data reveals that between 2002 and 2004 
ATOIDs relating to residency of individuals accounted for between 9% and 15% of all 
ATOIDs released. If these percentages apply equally in the same proportion to private 
ruling requests, then the ruling requests relating to residency could be in excess of
206 There is also inconsistency on a broader policy front as Government’s have sought to remove a 
number of concessions in respect of education and health for foreign diplomats and their families. 
Despite this approach the residency rules continue to deliver a revenue advantage.
207 Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Part IVAA
208 URL at http://www.ato.gov.au located on 23 April 2004. Of the 2001 ATOIDs 58 resident hits (40 
related to individuals (69%)), of the 1116 2002 ATOIDs 140 resident hits (101 related to 
individuals (72%), of the 1135 2003 ATOIDs 181 resident hits (142 related to individuals (79%) 
and of the 350 2004 ATOIDs 60 resident hits (54 related to individuals (90%)).
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600.209 Given accountancy costs range from $200 per hour upwards, the potential cost of 
such private ruling requests still represents a major compliance cost on individuals.
There are also compliance problems for employers who are required to withhold 
differing levels of tax instalments depending upon the residency status of the employee. 
So if a young person with a “foreign” accent and a backpack seeks employment in a bar, 
the bar owner in theory must try to determine that person's residency status. The 
existence of a tax file number is of no assistance to the bar owner as a person does not 
require Australian residency to obtain a tax file number. Potentially the employer incurs 
compliance costs as the residency status of the individual depends upon their facts and 
circumstances; it is not possible for employers to use a checklist to determine the 
residency status of potential employees.
In reality, many employers are ignorant of their obligations. The ATO also noted, in its 
1997 report on taxation and the Internet, concerns about “ . . . increased accidental non- 
compliance, as small to medium businesses engage in international trade and become 
subject to international taxation obligations with which they may not be familiar.”210
Ironically, even the “continuous foreign service” exemption in s 23 AG of the 1936 Act, 
which was introduced with the purpose of ensuring the administrative integrity of the 
foreign tax credit system by removing many small taxpayers from its operation,211 is 
difficult to apply and carries high compliance burdens. In May 2004 the Minister for 
Revenue conceded that “the process of determining if a taxpayer qualifies for a foreign 
employment exemption is currently demanding.”212 For example, each time that a break 
occurs in foreign service of more than 24 hours a taxpayer needs to calculate “absentee 
credits” (which are accumulated for each day of eligible service) in order to ensure they 
still meet the eligibility requirements.213
209 Based upon 9% of the Private Binding Rulings issued to non-business individuals. In 2002-03 the 
ATO issued 7,631 Private Binding Rulings, 60% of which were issued to non-business individuals 
- see Review of Aspects of Income Tax Self Assessment: Discussion Paper, above n 196, 16.
210 ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 183, vii.
211 Explanatory Memorandum to Foreign Tax Credits Bill, above n 74, 22.
212 Minister for Revenue and the Assistant Treasurer ‘Simplification of foreign employment 
exemption’ (Press Release C035/04, 11 May 2004).
213 The Minister (ibid) announced simplification of these rules from 1 July 2005, by clarifying what 
types of leave may count towards eligible service, and simplifying the calculation required to 
determine if other types of absences constitute a break in this eligible service. Thus, any accrued 
leave, other than long service leave, will be included in a taxpayer’s period of foreign service for 
the purposes of establishing whether the taxpayer has met the required minimum 91 days 
continuous service. In addition, other types of temporary absence will not break continuity of 
foreign service provided that the time away does not exceed one sixth of the total number of days 
of foreign service.
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In summary, the requirement in most of the residency tests to determine an individual’s 
residency status via his or her individual personal facts and circumstances is a major 
contributor to compliance costs for affected individuals.
5 Difficulty in administration
The fifth element for judging simplicity is to determine whether there are any 
administrative difficulties in applying the residency rules for individuals. If the rules are 
difficult to administer then the rules will fail this element of the simplicity criterion.
In many ways, this element is the mirror of the compliance costs for individuals 
(discussed above). However, the enactment in 1987 of s 23 AG of the 1936 Act has the 
effect, from a practical viewpoint, of removing the need to resolve questions of 
cessation of residency for some foreign employed taxpayers, thereby reducing the 
Commissioner’s workload.214
However, as s 23 AG of the 1936 Act does not resolve the residency issue, the principal 
factor that still influences administrative costs arising from the residency rules for 
individuals is that a person's residency depends upon their individual personal facts and 
circumstances. As a result it is impossible for the ATO to give simple broad binding 
pronouncements on how the law operates in respect of the majority of taxpayers,215 as 
illustrated by Taxation Ruling IT 2650 (which is merely a guideline rather than a firm 
statement on the application of the law).216 The result is the Commissioner must incur
214 The Commissioner has released only 3 rulings on the general operation of s 23AG - see Taxation 
Ruling TR 96/15, Income Tax: Foreign Tax Credit System: Issues Relating to the Practical 
Application o f s 23AG, Class Ruling CR 2001/33, Income Tax: Exempt Foreign Employment 
Income: Australian Federal Police Employees Stationed in the Solomon Islands as Members o f the 
International Peace Monitoring Team and Class Ruling CR 2004/109, Income Tax: Exempt 
Foreign Employment Income: Section 23AG: Australian Federal Police Personnel on Long Term, 
Non-diplomatic Posting to East Timor (Timor-Leste) Under the Auspices o f  the Timor-Leste Police 
Development Program. However, the one gap arises from the ATO’s reluctance to publish a list of 
countries that do not tax employment income. Although it would have a monitoring cost it would 
mitigate against individuals (seeking employment in places where salary and wages are exempt or 
no income tax is levied) receiving erroneous advice.
215 ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 183, 100. However, the ATO has posted on its website non­
binding indicative commentary (and examples) on residency of individuals - see URL: 
http://www.ato.gov.au/individuafs/content.asp?doc=/content/12503.htm&pc:::::001/002/012/003&m 
nu=l 113&mfp=001/002&st=&cy=l located on 7 June 2004.
216 See the Preamble in both IT 2650, above n 51, and to the former IT 2607, above n 16. However, 
TR 98/17, above n 16, is claimed to be an interpretative document rather than a document 
providing guidance.
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the costs associated with responding to individual private rulings requests, which is a 
costly exercise (see discussion on ATOIDs above).
Finally, in order to overcome the inequity that can emerge in the application of the 
residency rules the Commissioner will often issue concessionary tax rulings in order to 
achieve the desired position.217 Such administrative outcomes are achieved through 
reliance on the Commissioner’s power of general administration of law, which 
embodies the good management rule.218 This creates further administrative difficulties 
for the Commissioner who must balance the administrability of the law with the plain 
intent of the words of the legislation.219
In summary, the requirement in most of the residency tests to determine an individual’s 
residency status via his or her individual personal facts and circumstances remains a 
major contributor to tax administration difficulties for the Commissioner.
6 Co-ordinated with other tax rules
The sixth element for judging simplicity is to determine whether residency rules for 
individuals are co-ordinated with other tax rules. If the law operates independently of 
other tax rules, the rules will fail this element of simplicity. This will be explored at two 
levels, first in terms of related tax acts and then in terms of the OECD model 
Convention.
(a) Other definitions in related tax acts
Although the residency rules under the income tax law are consistent with those 
operating under the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) (the
217 This is illustrated in residence by the fact that the former Taxation Ruling IT 2268, Residency
Status o f Overseas Students Studying in Australia, para 10, (which concessionally deems overseas 
students to be residents if their course of study extends beyond six months) was fundamentally 
inconsistent with the approach adopted in respect of other taxpayers in the former IT 2607, above 
n 16, paras 9, 11, 12. It has been recently argued that a differential treatment between new arrivals 
and foreign students still continues -  see Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Nation Tax 
Liaison Group (NTLG) Minutes for 26 March 2003, item 16, at URL:
http://www.ato. gov.au/taxprofessionals/content.asp?doc=/content/35852.htm&pc=001/005/036/00 
l/002&mnu=&mfp=&st=&cy:=l located on 3 May 2004.
218 Taxation Administration Act 1953, s 3A.
219 For a discussion of the Commissioner’s powers see Michael Carmody, ‘The Art of tax 
administration: Two years on’ (Paper presented at 6Ih International Conference on Tax
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GST Act), as the GST Act has adopted the same “Australian resident” test contained in 
the 1936 Act,220 the rules are inconsistent with other residency provisions in related tax 
laws. For example under s 3(1) of the Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) there are seven 
residency definitions: “resident trust estate”, “resident beneficiary”, “resident
taxpayer”,221 “non-resident trust estate”, “non-resident beneficiary”, “non-resident 
taxpayer” and ‘prescribed non-resident”. Only the “resident trust estate” definition has 
any consistency with the 1936 Act.
As discussed above, the difference in the tests for residency adopted in the 1936 Act and 
in s 3(1) of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) result, in some limited circumstances, 
in a person being liable to pay the Medicare levy, but not being eligible for Medicare 
benefits. Other persons will have eligibility for Medicare benefits but no Medicare levy 
is payable. This arises as the Health Insurance Act residency definition is based upon an 
immigration basis, while the s 6(1) residency definitions, which are broader in scope, are 
based upon taxation concepts of residency.222
The Medicare levy inconsistencies are “. . . the direct and intended result in many cases 
of the different legislative policy adopted in each of the relevant Acts as to which 
persons should be treated as Australian residents”.223 The ATO concludes “[i]t is 
unlikely, in the view of this Office, that many cases will arise where the difference in the 
tests for residency in the two Acts produces what might be regarded as an inappropriate 
result that could not have been intended by the legislature.”224
Despite there being different policy reasons for the various definitions, the 
interrelationship of the various definitions should not result in inconsistent treatment of 
taxpayers in similar economic circumstances. This conflict can be avoided by the 
adoption of the similar definitions, or limiting Medicare levy liability to those entitled to 
receive medical benefits under the Health Insurance Act.
Administration, Sydney, 15 April 2004), 9-11, at URL:
http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/content/sp200401.htm located on 3 May 2004.
220 The definition of “Australian resident” in s 995-1 of the 1997 Act is adopted in s 195-1 of the A 
New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) (the GST Act).
221 The operation of this definition has been discussed above.
222 IT 2615, above n 95, para 17.
223 Ibid para 23.
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(b) Divergence from the OECD model
The second area of divergence is the variations in the form of residency tests in each 
treaty (resulting in part from a failure to adopt the OECD model residency article). This 
idiosyncratic approach to wording in Australian DTAs can only lead to interpretative 
issues, particularly where there is wide divergence from the OECD Model Convention. 
Such variations also tend to slow the DTA negotiation/renegotiation process. As a result 
such arbitrary departures tend to counter the simplicity objective.
In summary, the domestic residency rules for individuals diverge from definitions in 
related tax acts and the DTA rules also diverge from the terms adopted in the OECD 
model. This divergence is a further erosion of simplicity.
7 Clarity
The final element for judging simplicity is to determine whether the law is expressed 
clearly. If the law is expressed unclearly, the law will fail this element of simplicity. A 
lack of clarity can arise in three situations.
First, a lack of clarity arises where a taxpayer is resident for only part of the year. 
Although it is clear under the “resides” or “domicile’ tests225 that residency commences 
from date of arrival in Australia, it is not clear under the 183 day test. The older 
precedents indicate that a finding of residency under the 183 day test deems the person 
to have been resident for the whole year,226 while a more recent Board of Review case 
indicates that apportionment is possible.227
It is also argued that the pro-rating of the tax-free threshold may solve some 
problems.228 Despite the pro-rating of tax thresholds, the potential inclusion of otherwise
224 Ibid.
225 Case 29 (1985) 28 CTBR (NS); Case S i9 85 ATC 225.
226 Gregory v Deputy Commissioner o f Taxation (WA) (1937) 57 CLR 774; 4 ATD 397; 1 AITR 201.
227 Hamilton, above n 40, para 2.150. However, the case cited in support may have limited precedence 
value as Case 29 (1985) 28 CTBR (NS); Case S I9 85 ATC 225 concerned departure from 
Australia. The Board found the purpose of the 183 day test is to aid in determining residency and it 
plays no part in determining when someone departs Australia - see especially PM Roach at 248 and 
232 respectively.
228 Hamilton, above n 40.
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exempt offshore income derived prior to arrival in Australia remains an equity issue.229 
Without a definite start date for residency, the 183 day test fails the clarity criterion.
Secondly, as discussed above, there is a lack of clarity in the definition of “Territory 
resident” in s 24C of the 1936 Act. A “Territory resident” is defined as a person, other 
than a company, who “resides” and has his or her “ordinary place of residence” in a 
prescribed territory. Given that residence is only one part of the test it is not clear to 
what extent the “resides” concept is qualified by the term “ordinary place of residence”. 
This uncertainty is due in part to the fact that what constitutes an “ordinary place of 
residence” is not defined.
The term “ordinary place of residence” may be equivalent to “ordinarily resident”. 
However, this is unlikely as usage of both terms is incompatible since the term 
“ordinarily residence” describes a lessor form of attachment to a country than 
“residence”. An alternative interpretation is that given that the Part is intended to only 
provide tax exemption for persons who genuinely live in the territory, the words 
“ordinary place of residency” may impose a physical residence requirement (ie require a 
place of residence (home or apartment) in the Territory).230 Although this later 
interpretation is supported by extrinsic material, the actual meaning remains unclear. 
Given this lack of clarity, the territory resident test fails the clarity element.
Finally, and most significantly, another area where clarity is lacking is that there is no 
express hierarchy between the four tests set out in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act (ie does the 
resides test have precedence over domicile test etc). Although illustrative of poor clarity 
in drafting, this is in practice a cosmetic concern. As mentioned early in this chapter, the 
courts tend to apply the relevant extension tests (ie either the domicile test, or the 183 
day test or the Commonwealth superannuation test) in conjunction with the common
229 Another illustration of the law seeking to capture income derived whilst non-resident is in div 16E 
of the 1936 Act. Where a “qualifying security” (in terms of the definition in s 159GP( 1)) is held by 
a person who is a non-resident for whole or part of the year s 159GW denies the operation of 
certain parts of div 16E. The effect of s 159GW(2)(c) is that “. . . in the year the payment is made, 
amounts that would otherwise have been assessable under section 159GQ in respect of the 
payment, but which are excluded by the operation of paragraph 159GW(l)(a), are to be brought to 
account as assessable income. This means that these accruals amounts are effectively taxed on a 
realisation basis” (see the Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 2) 1986 
(Cth), 76). The words of s 159GW(2)(c) clearly catch amounts that “would have been included in 
the assessable income of the taxpayer of any year or years of income under section 159GQ in 
respect of the payment in respect of the period of non-residence.”
230 Above n 91.
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law resides test. In summary, both the 183 day and the Territory resident tests are 
expressed unclearly.
8 Summary
From the discussion above, the residency rules relating to individuals fail the elements 
that gauge simplicity. Specifically, as the outcome under the resides, domicile, 183 day, 
territory resident, ordinarily resident and some tiers of the DTA tie breaker tests can turn 
on a single fact (the facts and circumstances), the outcome in many circumstances is not 
predictable. Further the complexity arising from the facts and circumstances approach 
adopted in the resides, domicile, 183 day and territory resident tests is disproportional in 
general to the underlying policy, and is a major contributor to compliance costs for 
affected individuals and to tax administration difficulties for the Commissioner.
As well, the residency rules under s 6(1) of the 1936 Act, in conjunction with the rules 
under the Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth), deliver inconsistency in treatment between 
foreign diplomatic and consular staff and their families when compared to other foreign 
nations working in Australia. Finally, the domestic residency rules for individuals 
diverge from definitions in related tax acts and the DTA rules also diverge from the 
terms adopted in the OECD model and both the 183 day and the Territory resident tests 
are expressed unclearly.
In conclusion, most of the residency rules relating to individuals fail the elements that 
gauge simplicity (ie they are not predictable, not proportional, not consistent, are 
associated with the imposition of high compliance burdens, are difficult to administer, are 
not co-ordinated with other tax rules and are expressed unclearly).
D. Tax Avoidance
In determining compliance with the prevention of tax avoidance objective, the following 
discussion will identify three circumstances where in the application of the law there 
appears to be evasion or avoidance opportunities (ie under the 183 day test, the domicile 
test and generally in respect mobility of residence).
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1 Domicile test
The first area of manipulation relates to the domicile test in s 6(1 )(a)(i) o f the 1936 Act. 
As discussed above, under the domicile test a finding that a person is domicile in 
Australia will not equate with residence where a person can prove that he or she has 
established a permanent place o f abode elsewhere. However, the scope of this rebuttal 
has been expanded by the decision in Applegate, where Fisher J found that the phrase 
“permanent place of abode” was not intended to mean that the taxpayer needed to 
establish a permanent home, rather the taxpayer merely has to establish a home (ie “the 
taxpayer's fixed and habitual place of abode”).231 As a result, the scope of the domicile 
test has been narrowed by this expansion.
Thus, an Australian domiciled taxpayer merely has to establish an abode in the foreign 
country (ie not being a temporary or transitory abode)232 to avoid the domicile test. This 
ability to avoid the test could include the very taxpayer the domicile test was intended to 
capture, “. . . the High Commissioners for Australia and Agent-Generals for the 
Australian States together with members of their staffs . . . “,233 This avoidance occurs in 
at least two circumstances.
First, Article 14 of the Japan DTA could exclude the personal service income of such 
persons from income tax in Japan, provided they are not permanent Japanese residents. 
However, although these Articles reserve Australia's right to tax these government 
employees, it does not follow that the right to impose income tax actually exists under 
the 1997 Act due again to the scope of the “permanent place of abode” rebuttal.
Secondly, under Article 19 of the United States DTA, each country gives up the right to 
impose income tax on wages, paid to a citizen of the other contracting state, for personal 
services performed in their jurisdiction, provided the services performed relate to 
governmental functions. Thus, a state government employee posted to a foreign mission,
231 (1979) 9 ATR 899, 910-11; 79 ATC 4307, 4317. Applegate, a solicitor, was asked by his firm to 
go to the New Hebridies (now Vanuatu) to establish a branch office and manage it. Applegate gave 
up the lease on his flat and moved with his family. Although his stay was for an unspecified time, 
he was forced by illness to return within two years. He claimed his foreign source income was 
exempt because he was a non-resident for tax purposes. Although the Full Federal Court held that 
he had retained his Australian domicile, they found that he had established a permanent place of 
abode elsewhere.
232 Ibid.
233 Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 (Cth) 10.
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or an Australian domiciled taxpayer locally engaged by an Australian mission, could be 
exempt from income tax on her or his personal service income derived in the United 
States.234 As the income is sourced where it is earned,235 and as non-residents they are 
only taxable under s 6-1 of the 1997 Act on income with an Australian source, they 
would also escape Australian tax. For the locally engaged staff that have severed ties 
with Australia for some time, the existence of a permanent abode in the foreign country 
would be relatively easy to establish.
Thus, diplomatic staff will have usually had a “fixed and habitual place of abode” in the 
place of posting, thereby having in terms of the dicta in Applegate a “permanent place of 
abode.”236 This is contrary to the stated purpose of the rebuttal ie to ensure that persons 
who had abandoned their Australian residence would not be caught.237 On the facts of 
Applegate complete abandonment to the extent intended had not occurred.238
Outside these extreme examples, other taxpayers are able to thwart the domicile test (as 
expanded by Applegate). Thus, the domicile test fails to meet its legislative intention of 
capturing government workers and also fails to satisfy the specific criterion of 
prevention of tax avoidance.
2 183 day test
The second area of manipulation occurs in respect of the 183 day test in s 6(1 )(a)(ii) of 
the 1936 Act. The 183 day test, which is intended to capture persons who spend more 
than 183 days in the jurisdiction, in fact, often fails to capture such persons due to 
defects in the measurement rules.
234 Under the Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 893 such income is exempt provided the 
employee is not an US citizen, the services performed are of a character similar to those performed 
by US employees in the foreign country, that country must grant a similar exemption for US 
employees and that the government body is not a commercial entity. Also see ATO Intrepretative 
Decision ATO ID 2002/283 (Withdrawn 14.9.04)) Income Tax: Assessability o f Salary and Wages 
Earned by Locally Engaged Staff o f any Australian Embassy in the United States -  An Australian 
Resident. Sweden, which also exempts income of non-nationals who are resident in Sweden and 
locally engaged employees with foreign embassies and consulates, is intending to tax this income 
from the assessment year 2008 -  see Ed, ‘Proposal on taxation of employment income from foreign 
embassies and consulates in Sweden’ IBFD Tax News Service - Headlines (3 June 2004).
235 Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v French (1957) 7 AITR 76, 86; 98 CLR 398, 415; 11 ATD 
288, 296 (Williams J): “. . . the real source of the income in any practical sense must be the place 
where this personal exertion takes place.”
236 Domicile Act 1982 (Cth) s 7.
237 Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 (Cth) 10.
238 A description of facts of Applegate is above n 56.
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As mentioned previously (Part I, A, III (b)) the measurement for residency under the 183 
day test is an income year (ie 1 July to 30 June). Thus, a taxpayer could spend up to 364 
days in Australia without satisfying the 183 day test provided the 182 days were prior to 
1 July and balance were from 1 July. This provides a major tax planning opportunity, 
particulaly for expatriate experts employed in Australia in their first and last year of their 
assignment.239
Thus, the 183 day test fails to satisfy the specific criterion of prevention of tax avoidance 
as specific classes of persons can easily avoid the test.
3 Mobility o f residence
The final area of manipulation relates to the mobility of residence. It is generally 
recognised that the residency rules are confined by jurisdictional boundaries. Combine 
these physical limitations with the sometimes facts and circumstances nature of the 
residency tests and the conditions have been created to enable manipulation of a person's 
residency status. Traditionally, high wealth taxpayers (successful musicians, sports 
persons and business people)240 take advantage of the individual, physically based, 
residency tests in order to select their desired residency (or non-resident) status.241
They have been able to do this, by manipulating their circumstances to obtain residency 
in a lower taxed jurisdiction while, in many cases, retaining essential links with their 
country of origin.242 For example, a person may seek to take advantage of a migration 
program to a country offering a better environment for their families (such as Australia), 
while at the same time avoiding the residency downside243 by keeping income earning 
assets outside Australia's tax net.244
239 Andersen, above n 20, 4.
240 A recent example of such a mobile individual was the late Sir James Goldsmith who was reported 
as flying to Spain to die to avoid high French death duties - see Fred Brenchley, ‘Goldsmith avoids 
tax on death bed’ Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 21 July 1997, 12. This phenomenon is 
not new. The 1920s have been called the golden age of residence litigation in the United Kingdom 
when the low taxed south of France was crowded with expatriate British living on their war loan 
interests - Sumpton, above n 40, 31.
241 This problem internationally has been accelerated by the removal of border controls. The 183 day 
test is reliant on tight border controls. Where there are no controls tax authorities have evidentiary 
difficulties in enforcing the 183 day test -  see Brian Arnold and Michael McIntyre, International 
Tax Primer (1995), 21. This is not such a problem in Australia as Australia still maintains robust 
immigration/border controls.
242 OECD, International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies (1987), 24.
243 The phenomenon of split households where children and a parent or grandparent live in one state 
while the parent is based in the state of origin, but regularly commutes to the emigre state is
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Concerns about the malleability of the residency rules have been heightened by the 
developments in mass communications technology and the spread of the Internet. As the 
Internet has no jurisdictional boundaries245 it is argued246 that it is possible for some 
taxpayers to operate via the Internet in a particular country without actually being 
physically present in the country.247 The ATO in its 1997 report on taxation and the 
Internet found that the application of the existing jurisdictional rules is doubtful248 as the 
residency concept, which is based upon physical or territorial nexus with Australia, is 
likely to erode.249 The ATO believes that the effective application of the residency rules 
is in serious doubt; they were designed for an era in which electronic commerce did not 
exist.250
Similar concerns have been expressed by other commentators who argue that the future 
of both the 183 day test, and to a lesser extent the resides test, is questionable in light of
documented in L Pan (ed), Chinese Overseas (1999) cited in Nolan Sharkey, An Examination o f  
the Individual Residency Rules, Policy, Practical Operation and Foreign Comparisons (MTax 
paper, University of New South Wales, ATAX, 1999), 3.
244 The Commissioner has attempted to limit the ability of migrants to obtain the Australian lifestyle 
for their families, while attempting to exclude their foreign income from Australia's tax net - IT 
2681, above n 16.
245 ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 183, 45.
246 Alan Tyree et al, Computer Money Consulting Pty Ltd's INNET 97/2 Report on Electronic 
Commerce Banking and Finance Issues (1997) Australian Taxation Office at URL: 
http://www.ato.gov.au/content/Businesses/Downloads/cmc.rft. Part 2 as at 31 December 2002. The 
report has subsequently been removed from ATO site. In Part 6 of the report the authors create 
Scenario 5S which illustrates this problem. It involves an Australian resident with an international 
reputation in environmental consulting establishing a Web Page located in the Bahamas, 
purchasing a yacht as his base of operations and the latest communications equipment so he can 
operate on the Web, run video conferences, and communicate anywhere in the world from his 
yacht. He conducts his contracts in Australia and elsewhere by sub-contracting physical analysis, 
preparing the report on the yacht and receiving payments via Internet money stored on his hard 
disk. He redirects some of that money to pay his subcontractor, and invests surplus money through 
offshore intermediaries. They conclude that the former resident seems to have abandoned his 
Australian residence and, without some legislative amendment, will not be taxed as an Australian 
resident. They further argue no country may have jurisdiction over his consultancy income if he 
consults from his yacht on the high seas. Other examples have been cited of telecommuting 
knowledge workers (lawyers and consultants) and physicians remotely diagnosing patients on the 
Internet (see Dale Pinto, ‘The Nation State: Will it Survive Globalisation?’ (2000) 3 Journal o f 
Australian Taxation 136, 140 and 147) and executives (Gzell (1997), above n 11, 23).
247 The facts of a Canadian case, R & L Food Distributors Ltd v Minister for National Revenue [1977] 
CTC 2579; 77 DTC 411, illustrates this is a real life possibility. Here the shareholders of a 
company spent more than 183 working days in Canada during the year but returned to their 
permanent homes in the United States at night (except for only 6 to 7 nights during the year). The 
Tax Review Board found that this lifestyle did not amount to a presence (a sojourn) in Canada for a 
period of 183 days nor had they established temporary residence in Canada.
248 Finding 18, ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 183, 100.
249 Pinto, above n 246, 148.
250 ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 183, 35. At footnote 68, the report states that “[t]he US has 
already acknowledged this in adopting residence based taxation as a preferred base for taxation.”
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the development of electronic commerce given the reliance of the tests on geographic 
location.251 The ATO, in its 1997 report on taxation and the Internet concludes that:
[t]he global nature of the Internet creates challenges for tax jurisdictions and 
the current . . . residency . . . rules [and i]t is likely that the existing 
international rules will need to be substantially revised in light of electronic 
commerce.252
A 1997 consultant's report, prepared for the ATO's Electronic Commerce Project also 
recommended radical reform.253
Despite these concerns the ATO is uncertain whether there has been an increase in funds 
mobility due to the development of the Internet.254 In fact, the ATO acknowledges that 
there . . is no immediate appreciable impact upon tax collections.”255
Further, although other commentators concede the existence of the traditional threat of 
highly trained professionals seeking low jurisdiction countries, they believe the threat 
should not be exaggerated as there is an open question whether the individual residency 
tests are “. . . more prone to manipulation in the digital age.”256 In fact tax is rarely the 
only or even the main reason for emigration257 as many people will choose to live in a 
higher tax rate country for lifestyle reasons.258 This is illustrated by the failure of the 
Singapore Government's tax incentives, introduced to lure back Singaporeans living 
abroad. Emigration is unlikely unless it offers an equivalent or better environment.259
251 It is argued that in the context of the internet the 183 day test is untenable - see Zak Muscovitch, 
‘Taxation of Internet Commerce’ (1996) at URL: http//www2.magmacom.com/%7Edbell/tax.htm 
as at 24 April 1997. Also see similar concerns in Clinton Alley, Duncan Bentley and Simon James, 
‘In Need of Reform? A Trans-Tasman Perspective on the Definition of ‘Residence” (Paper 
presented at the 13th Annual Australasian Tax Teachers’ Association Conference, Sydney, 3 
February 2001) 10.
252 ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 183, vii.
253 Tyree et al, above n 246, Part 2.
254 Bentley notes the ATO has concerns about business migration to low tax jurisdictions -  Duncan 
Bentley, ‘The ATO, Tax and the Internet: The Emperor’s New Clothes?’ (1999) 9 Revenue Law 
Journal 98, 119.
255 ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 183, v. But they did believe that tax revenues are likely to be 
affected by the stages of development of electronic commerce.
256 Gitte Heji, ‘The Internet Fails Tax Mesh’ Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 22 July 1999.
257 International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies, above n 136, 24.
258 Uta Kohl, ‘The Horror-Scope for the Taxation Office: The Internet and its Impact on ‘Residence’” 
(1998) 21 University o f New South Wales Law Journal 436, 438.
259 International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies, above n 136, 24.
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Thus, the scenario of the yacht bound Internet consultant avoiding tax worldwide is a 
little far-fetched260 as “[w]hat these visionaries do not seem to understand is that most 
people would rather part with their tax than be permanently seasick.”261 In fact Kohl 
argues that the domicile test in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act proposes a great hurdle to those 
who do not wish to absent themselves from Australia indefinitely,262 as a taxpayer with 
an Australian domicile regains residency when they lose his or her overseas permanent 
place of abode.263
It follows that it is believed by some that the residency test is fairly immune from 
Internet manipulation as it relies on substantive rather than formal ties264 and in general 
it has been . . assumed that peoples' work is more immobile than their capital.”265
In conclusion, the residency rules have equal applicability to persons operating in both 
the electronic and physical markets. However, due to the development in electronic 
communication the residency rules continue to be subject to “. . . tax planning, 
particularly from defects such as over reliance on form and geographical location.” 
Further, “[t]he Internet provides ample opportunity for jurisdiction shopping in relation 
to the parking of important sources of wealth (and power) such as intellectual property 
in low tax jurisdictions.”266 Thus, the residency tests again fail to satisfy the specific 
criterion of prevention of tax avoidance as mobile residents, assisted by the growth of 
the Internet, can easily avoid the tests.267
260 Tyree et al, above n 246, Part 6 Scenario 5S.
261 Kohl, above n 258, 438. However, from 2002 people are in fact able to participate in a continuous 
circumnavigation of the world as part of “a luxury community at sea” if they purchase one of the 
110 custom designed “residences” on a ship, named “the world” -  see ‘Unending Rewards Aboard 
‘The World” [2001] 1 Christie’s Great Estates 20-1.
262 Kohl, above n 258, 439.
263 Alley (1995), above n 42, 52.
264 Kohl, above n 258, 440.
265 Marin Wolf, ‘Does Globalisation Render States Impotent?’ [2000] British Tax Review 537, 539.
266 ATO’s first Internet Report, above n 183, 100.
267 For completeness it is important to note that in respect of gains in respect of specific assets (ie 
those that have “necessary connection with Australia” as defined in s 136-25 of the 1997 Act), 
there are anti avoidance rules to stop avoidance of tax through changes in residency. Thus, 
Australia reserves the right to tax persons on capital gains either when they become non-resident or 
upon later disposal of assets “necessary connection with Australia” (see 1997 Act ss 104-160(3), 
104-165(2)) and 104-165(3)). However, these rules do not stop tax avoidance as both enforcement 
difficulties result in taxpayers ignoring the rules (see Sullivan, above n 354, 1707-8) and there are 
some impediments arising under DTAs (see Ian Gzell, ‘Treaty Protection from Capital Gains Tax’ 
(2000) 29 Australian Tax Review 25). A number of countries adopt a variety of trailing and exit 
tests to tax income/gains of departing residents -  see Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International: The 
Tax Treatment o f Transfer o f Residence by Individuals Vol LXXXVIIb (2002).
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4 Summary
From the discussion above, it is apparent that the resides, the 183 day and the domicile 
tests in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act fail to counter tax avoidance where it is carried out by 
persons who have mobile income sources.
E. Conclusion
In summary, from the above it is clear that the existing law for determining the residency 
of an individual is inadequate. Overall it fails in identified ways to satisfy the equity, 
efficiency, simplicity and prevention of tax avoidance evaluative criteria. Even the 
superannuation test, which is the one rule that is simple and is not manipulated, fails the 
horizontal equity requirement. The major weakness in the other residence tests for 
individuals (resides, domicile, 183 day, Territory resident and ordinarily resident tests 
and elements of the DTA tie breaker tests) is the “individual fact and circumstances” 
element of the tests, which in certain situations:
• results in horizontal inequity;
• gives rise to the lack of simplicity; and
• leaves the rules open to manipulation.
Further, as indicated above, although the facts and circumstances element of the tests 
does cater for an individual’s circumstances, individual facts and circumstances does not 
equate to horizontal equity.
Given that the rules fail all the criteria, there is no need to address any potential conflicts 
in the evaluative criteria. However, it is important to briefly note that although it is 
argued that qualifying a “facts and circumstances” test by objective criteria can provide 
the balance between simplicity and equity, 268 this has not occurred in the Australian 
context. Instead, the “permanent” or “usual” place of abode qualifications to the 
domicile and the 183 day tests (respectively) and the intention (objectively) to take up 
residency qualification to the 183 day test provide opportunities for manipulation and do 
little for simplicity.
268 Arnold, above n 241, 22.
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Thus, to ensure that the residency rules relating to individuals do better meet the 
evaluative criteria it is clear that the rules need to be reformed.269 The potential reform 
options are the focus of the following discussion.
IV. Exploring the Sub-Thesis - Models for reform
A. Overview
The sub-thesis is that the domestic law can be modified within the jurisdictional 
framework to more closely meet the evaluative criteria (ie alternative approaches to the 
current rules that may better satisfy the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, 
simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance). In order to establish the sub-thesis a 
two-step approach will be adopted.
First, in Part IV a review of the residency rules adopted domestically in a number of 
jurisdictions will be undertaken in conjunction with a selective examination of specific 
residency tests against the evaluative criteria. As the Australian DTAs are based upon 
the OECD model convention, and the variations away from the OECD model are 
identified in the analysis of DTAs in Part II, the comparative study will not encompass 
DTAs.
The comparative review will be two staged. Initially, the review will look at the 
residency rules for individuals in the context of each country’s tax system. The countries 
examined will be divided into common law countries that tax through a single code 
(Canada, New Zealand and the United States), common law countries that operate on a 
schedular system (Ireland and the United Kingdom) and the European civil law 
countries (France and Germany). The countries chosen are a representative sample from 
both common and civil law jurisdictions and include both countries with schedular tax 
legislation and countries with a single tax code. This approach allows for comparison of 
the various hierarchies of residency tests adopted in each country within the three 
jurisdictional types, which cannot be demonstrated by merely evaluating the broad 
categories of residency rules for individuals used world wide.
269 In fact as far back as 1975 the Asprey Committee (Asprey Report, above n 102, 260) found that 
there was “ . . . a case for extending the exercise of jurisdiction to tax on the basis of residence so 
that all foreign income is subject to Australian tax and credit so far as administratively feasible.”
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The comparative studies of the domestic approaches adopted in foreign jurisdictions are 
completed by comparing and evaluating the individual residency test. As the tests can be 
classified into three broad categories, the tests will be evaluated under the following 
three categories:
• individual facts and circumstances;
• an arbitrary number of days; and
• specific criteria.
This process will assist in identifying alternative models and potential solutions to the 
problems encountered in Australia's domestic law.270 Thus, in Part V, in light of the 
comparative analysis, a number of reforms options (that are within the jurisdictional 
limitations) are reviewed against the evaluative criteria in order to determine whether 
the proposed rules are more equitable, efficient, simple and more able to prevent tax 
avoidance.
B. Comparing foreign residency rules in their domestic tax system context
As mentioned above, I intend to first review the residency rules for individuals in a 
number of jurisdictions in the context of each country’s tax system. To facilitate this 
review, the countries examined have been divided into common law countries that tax 
through a single code, common law countries that operate on a schedular system and the 
European civil law countries.
1 Residency rules in common law countries taxing through a single code
The first part of the comparative review of residency rules in other jurisdiction focuses 
on three common law countries which, like Australia, principally have a single federal 
government income tax code: Canada, New Zealand and the United States.
270 As noted by Review of Business Taxation, Commonwealth, An International Prospective: An 
Information Paper Commissioned from Arthur Andersen Examining How Other Countries 
Approach Business Taxation (1998) iii and 3 a review of other jurisdictions will not give a 
blueprint for reform as they are often struggling with the same tax issues. However, it does give 
some guidance in developing the best approach tax problems.
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(a) Canada
The terms “resident” and “ordinarily resident” are used in the Canadian Income Tax Act 
1985.271 However, despite the term resident being used more than 400 times in the 
Income Tax Act,212 leaving aside deeming provisions, neither the term resident, nor the 
term ordinarily resident, are defined. Thus, the Canadian tax law relies principally on the 
common law to determine residency of individuals on the basis that they are “resident" 
or “ordinarily resident” in Canada.273 Although the outcome under common law is 
ultimately determined by an individual’s facts and circumstances, the Canada Customs 
and Revenue Agency in administrating the law looks to four factors:
• the permanence and purpose of the stay abroad,
• residential ties with Canada,
• residential ties elsewhere, and
• the regularity and length of visits to Canada.274
Although the concepts “ordinarily resident” (ie a taxpayer has a settled routine of life, 
regularly, normally or customarily lives)275 and “resident” have a different meaning at 
common law, under the Canadian tax law a person who is ordinarily resident is deemed 
to be a resident.276
The Income Tax Act (Can)277 deems persons to be residents if they:
• “sojourn” in Canada for more than 183 days in a year;278
271 Income Tax Act RSC C 1985, 5th Supplement (as amended).
272 Edwin Kroft, ‘Jurisdiction to Tax: An Update’ (1993) Canadian Tax Foundation Corporate 
Management Tax Conference papers 1:6.
273 Thomson v Minister o f National Revenue [1946] DTC 812.
274 Canada, Customs and Revenue Agency, Determination o f an Individual's Resident Status, 
Interpretation Bulletin IT-221R3. See also Thomas Gillespie, ‘Relief for Employees Working 
Abroad: 1983 Federal Overseas Employment Tax Credit and 1983 Quebec Overseas Employment 
Deduction’ in Canadian Tax Foundation, Report o f Proceedings o f the Thirty-Fifth Tax Conference 
(1983)443.
215 It covers former residents who have not severed all links with Canada see -  McFadyen v The 
Queen [2000] DTC 2473. Also see Jack Bernstein and Kay Leung, ‘Who is Ordinarily Resident in 
Canada?’ (2001) 22 Tax Notes International 1309 and Jack Bernstein and Kay Leung, ‘News 
analysis: CCRA updates residency guidance’ (2002) 26 Tax Notes International 260.
276 Income Tax Act RSC C 1985, s 250(3).
277 The fundamental concepts underlying the rules can be traced back to 1927 -  see Kroft, above n 
272, 1:6. They were last modified in 1999 -  see Bernstein (2001), above n 275.
278 Income Tax Act RSC C 1985, s 250(l)(a).
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• are members of Canadian Forces279 or overseas Canadian Forces school staff280 
or their dependent child;281
• are an ambassador, high commissioner, minister, agent-general or other 
Canadian or provincial government official or their dependent child;282
• are participants in certain international aid projects or their dependent child;283 or
• are persons exempt under a DTA because they were related to, or a family 
member of, a Canadian resident individual.284
The 183 day test is not based upon mere presence, but rather a person “sojourning”. 
Unfortunately the terms “sojourn” and “day” are not defined.285 To compound the 
problem, the word “sojourn”, has an uncertain meaning and is not used in statutes in 
other countries.286
Finally, where a person fulfils the residency requirements under the Income Tax Act but 
is deemed under the tie breaker test in a DTA to be a resident in another state, the person 
is treated as non-resident for tax purposes.287
In summary, the rules for determining residency of an individual are principally based 
upon a facts and circumstances resides test, a 183 day test and objectives tests 
principally related to government service and exemption from foreign source income 
due to a DTA.
(b) New Zealand
New Zealand's residency test for individuals, which was revised in 1988, is found in s 
OE1 of the Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ).288 The primary rule is a “facts and
279 Ibid s 250(1 )(b).
280 Ibid s 250(l)(d.l).
281 Ibid s 250(1 )(f).
282 Ibid s 250(1 )(c) and (f).
283 Ibid s 250(1 )(d) and (f).
284 Ibid s 250(l)(g).
285 See generally Gwyneth McGregor, ‘Deemed Residence’ (1974) 22 Canadian Tax Journal 381-90.
286 Ibid 384-5.
287 Ibid s 250(5).
288 Section OE1 is a restatement of the revised s 241(1 )-(5) of the Income Tax Act 1976 (NZ). Section 
OE 1 has been incorporated into the latest rewrite of the New Zealand tax law, the Income Tax Act
2004 (NZ). The Act, which received Royal Assent on 7 May 2004, will come into force on 1 April
2005 and, unless the context requires otherwise, will apply to income derived in the 2005/06 and 
subsequent tax years.
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circumstances” test, which determines residency if the individual has an enduring 
relationship with New Zealand.289 Under this test, a person is a resident if they have “a 
permanent place of abode” in New Zealand.290 The fact they have “a permanent place of 
abode” elsewhere is expressly ignored.
The second test is a 183 day test. Residency is deemed to arise where an individual is 
present in New Zealand for more than 183 days in any 12 month period.291 Residence is 
deemed to have commenced from the first day within the 12 month period the individual 
was personally present in New Zealand. A day is defined to include part of a day.292
The third residency test determines when an individual is deemed to have lost 
(abandoned) residency (ie has become a non-resident). Non-residency occurs where the 
resident individual is absent for more than 325 days in any 12 month period.293 Non­
residency is deemed to occur from the first day of absence.
However, there is a lack of linkage and a lack of clear hierarchy between the three tests. 
For example, there is uncertainty around the implicit linkage between the “permanent 
place of abode” and the “abandonment” test.294 There is also debate about whether the 
“183 day” test or the “abandonment” test has predominance.295 This is an issue where 
the 183 days straddle two income years (ie who is deemed to be a resident in the second 
year) and an individual is subsequently absent from New Zealand for more than 325 
days in that second income year (ie is deemed to have lost residency in the same year).
Finally, there is a government service provision, which deems all government employees 
acting in any capacity for the government to be residents despite being absent for 325 
days.296 The rule does not apply to persons employed in state owned enterprises.297
289 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ)sOEl(l).
290 These words have similar meaning to the Australian “permanent place of abode” test (discussed
above at Part II A 3 (a) (ii)) - see Garth Harris, above n 110, 10-15, C J Mancer, Staples' Guide to 
New Zealand Tax Practice (54th ed, 1994) para 975 and Inland Revenue, New Zealand, IR 292: 
New Zealand tax residence (2001) see URL:
http:/Avww.ird.gov.nz/library/publications/geninfo/ir292.pdf located on 30 May 2004.
291 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OEl(2).
292 Ibid sOE 1(4).
293 Ibid s OEl(3).
294 The linkage between Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OEl(l) and s OEl(3) is not expressed but is 
implied - see Garth Harris, above n 110, 9. This view is consistent with the approach adopted in 
1988 draft legislation - see New Zealand, Consultative Committee on International Tax Reform 
and Full Imputation, Second Report (July 1988) para 2.4.
295 See Garth Harris, above n 110, 9-10 and C J Mancer, above n 290, 808-9.
296 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OEl(5).
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Thus, the New Zealand approach is a residency test, which contains a balance of both 
“facts and circumstances” test (contained in the “place of permanent abode” test) with 
objective tests (183 day, government service and an abandonment tests).
(c) United States
The residency rules adopted under the Internal Revenue Code o f 1986 (US) seek to 
determine tax residency by two distinct, independent methods: by immigration status 
and by physical (substantial) presence.
First, the residency rules seek to align an individual’s immigration status with their tax 
status by the use of two immigration based tests of residency: the “citizen” test and the 
“green card” test. Thus, under the Code all citizens298 of the United States, wherever 
resident, are liable for income tax on their worldwide income (“citizen test”).299 
Similarly, “resident aliens” are deemed to be residents and liable for taxes on a 
worldwide basis.300 A “resident alien” is an individual that has lawfully entered the 
United States as a permanent resident (“green card” test).
The second method of attachment is by “substantial presence” test. There are two tests. 
First, a taxpayer is deemed to be a resident if they are present in the United States for 
more than 183 days.301
Second, a taxpayer is deemed to be resident if the taxpayer is present in the United 
States for more than a notional 183 days, calculated with reference to the days in the 
current year and the number of “deemed” days in the preceding two years. The 
individual must be present for a minimum 31 days during the calendar year for the test to 
apply.302 The test does not use the actual days spent in prior years, but a discounted 
calculation whereby the days in the preceding year are counted as a third of a day while 
the days present in the second preceding year are counted as a sixth of a day. For
297 Garth Harris, above n 110, 16.
298 A citizen is a person bom or naturalised in the United States - Reg 1.1-1(c).
299 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 1. The income upon which the taxpayer is assessed is 
determined by § 61, taxable income by § 63.
300 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 7701 (b)( 1 )(A)(i). However, unlike the citizen test these 
rules do not apply to estate or gift taxes, which are determined upon concepts akin to domicile -  
see Joseph Isenbergh, International Taxation (2000), 19.
301 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 7701(b).
302 Ibid § 7701 (b)(3)(A)(i).
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example, a person spending a 121 days in the United States each year, over a three year 
period, would not be resident under this “carry over days” test as the total number of 
days under the formula would be less than 183 day (ie 181.5 days).303
However, where individuals spend less than 183 days in the United States they may 
escape residency under the “carry over days” test if they can establish that their tax home 
is in a foreign country for the whole of the year and they have a closer connection to 
such foreign country than to the United States (the “closer connection” exception).304 
The “tax home” is defined to be the place of the individual's place of business, or place 
of abode,305 while the place of “closer connection” is determined by a list of subjective 
and objective factors.306
The substantive presence test will not apply where the individual is an exempt 
individual, that is, they are:
• foreign government representatives and their families;307
• visiting teachers, trainees, and students;308
• professional athletes competing in charity sports events;309
• persons unable to leave the United states due to a medical condition;310
• persons in transit between two foreign ports;311 or
• commuters residing in Mexico or Canada.312
However, these exemptions only protect non-residents where the non-resident retains the 
status giving rise to the exemption. Thus, a graduate student who remains in the United 
States after graduation could be deemed a resident for the whole year if they remain in 
the country for more than 183 days after graduation.313
303 121 current year days plus 40.3 first preceding year days (1/3 of 121) plus 20.17 second preceding 
year days (1/6 x 121) = 181.5 days -  see Isenbergh (2003), above n 46, para P6.15.
304 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 7701(b)(3)(B).
305 Ibid § 911(d)(3) (without regard to the second sentence thereof).
306 Ibid reg 301.7701(b)-2(d)).
307 Ibid § 7701(b)(3)(D), 7701(b)(5)(B); Reg 1.7701(b) -  3(b)(2).
308 Ibid § 7701(b)(5)(C).
309 Ibid § 7701 (b)(6)(A)(iv).
310 Ibid § 7701 (b)(3)(D)(ii). However, this only extends to persons prevented from leaving the United 
states due to illness, not persons who enter the United States for treatment -  see Isenbergh (2000), 
above n 300, 19.
311 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 7701 (b)(7)(C).
312 Ibid § 7701(b)(7)(B).
313 Isenbergh (2000), above n 300, 24.
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Finally, a person can elect to be a United States resident in a calendar year, provided 
they meet the substantial presence test in the following year.314
Thus, the main components of United States tests for determining an individual’s 
residency are based upon determinative criteria. Only the “closer connection” exemption 
to the carry over days substantial presence test is based upon the individual facts and 
circumstances criterion.
(d) Summary
Despite similar tax code structures and being common law jurisdictions, the rules for 
determining residency vary between the jurisdictions from a system heavily weighted on 
individual facts and circumstances (Canada) to a system consisting of objective rules 
(the United States). What is common across these three common law jurisdictions is that 
all the countries use to varying degrees an individual’s facts and circumstances in 
conjunction with objective tests.315
2 Residency rules in common law countries that operate on a schedular system
The second stage of the comparative review of residency rules in other jurisdictions is to 
examine the rules operating in two common law countries which have a schedular 
income tax code: Ireland and the United Kingdom.
(a) Ireland
Under Irish tax law there are three key concepts used in determining residency for 
individuals: “resident”, “ordinary resident” and “domicile”.316 A finding that an 
individual satisfies one, or a combination, of the “resident”, “ordinary resident” or 
“domicile” tests will determine an individual's liability according to the test or 
combinations of the tests satisfied. Thus, an individual who is:
314 Ibid § 7701(b)(1).
315 Arnold, above n 241.
316 The tests for “resident” and “ordinary resident” individuals operate for the purposes of the Tax 
Acts, the Capital Gains Tax Acts, and the Capital Acquisitions Tax Consolidation Act 2003 (IRE)
- the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE), s 818. Also see Joe Martyn, Paul Reck, and Terry 
Cooney (ed), Taxation Summary (27th ed, 2003).
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• “resident”, “ordinary resident” and “domiciled" is taxed on their world wide 
income;
• not resident, but is “ordinary resident” and “domiciled” will be taxed as a 
resident317 but not in respect of foreign income derived from a profession or trade 
carried outside Ireland and other foreign income that is less than a prescribed 
amount;318
• “resident”, but is not “ordinary resident” and not “domiciled” will be taxed on 
Irish and United Kingdom sourced income and remittances of foreign income;319 
and
• not “resident” and not “ordinary resident” is only taxable on income from the 
exercise of trade profession or employment in Ireland and all other Irish source 
income.
The principal residency test is a 183 day test. Thus, an individual is a “resident” for a 
year of assessment if the individual is present, at any one time or several times during 
the year for a period amounting to 183 days or more.
The test also deems an individual to be resident if the individual has a combined 
presence in Ireland of 280 days or more, taking into account the number of days on 
which the individual is present in the current year and the number of days on which the 
individual was present in the preceding year of assessment. However, it does not apply 
where a person was present in Ireland for less than 30 days in an income year.320 The 
impact of the extended 183 day test is that residence is established where average 
presence over two years is 140 days per year.321
Also, an individual can elect to be treated as resident, provided the individual can satisfy 
an authorised officer that the individual has the intention to be a resident and that the 
individual will be resident in the State for the following year.322
317 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE), s 821 (ss 17, 18, and Ch 1 of Part3).
318 Ibid, s 821.
319 Ibid, s 71.
320 Ibid, s 819(1).
321 See generally Revenue Ireland, Residence Manual: Legislative Notes on Sections 149-158 Finance 
Act 1994 (1996).
322 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE), s 819(3).
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The concept of “ordinary residence” is also defined.323 An individual becomes ordinary 
resident if the individual has been resident in Ireland for each of the three preceding 
years324 and will cease to be ordinary resident only when the individual has not been 
resident in Ireland in the three preceding years.325
There are specific rules to deal with partial year residency (arrivals and departures)326 
and rules that offer relief for residents who spend at lease 90 days working outside 
Ireland and the United Kingdom.327
The final test is a “domicile” test. As mentioned previously, the domicile test is the 
common law concept, ie is a legal relationship between a person and a country by which 
the person is able to invoke the country's laws as their own.328 As this is similar to the 
Australian “domicile” test (discussed in Part II A 3(a)) I do not propose to repeat that 
examination.
Thus, in summary, the main components of Irish tests for determining an individual’s 
attachment (“resident”, and “ordinary resident”) are established by the objective criterion 
of the number of days physically present in Ireland. Only the “domicile” criterion is 
based upon determination of an individual’s facts and circumstances.
(b) United Kingdom
The concepts of “resident”, “ordinary (or ordinarily) resident” and “domicile” determine, 
to varying degrees, the incidence of tax for individuals under the United Kingdom's 
income tax,329 capital gains tax330 and inheritance tax.331 Under the United Kingdom’
323 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE) s 820.
324 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE) s 820(1).
325 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE) s 820(2).
326 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE) s 822.
327 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE) s 823.
328 Henderson v Henderson [1965] All ER 179.
329 Thus, under s 18(l)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (UK) (ICTA), sch 
D taxes resident persons on gains accruing from property and possessions (Cases IV and V) or 
trade, profession, or vocation carried on, no matter where derived (Cases I and II). Where the 
person is a non-resident Commonwealth citizen, they are taxed on income from a trade, profession, 
or vocation carried on in the United Kingdom (s 18(1 )(a)(iii)).
330 Capital gains tax is payable on a gain on the disposal of the asset by a person who is resident or 
ordinarily resident (ss 1 and 2 of the Taxation o f Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (UK) (TCGA)), 
regardless of the jurisdictional location of asset. Under s 12 of the TCGA the gain on an asset 
located outside the United Kingdom will be exempt where the resident or ordinary resident 
individual in not domiciled in the United Kingdom. Where taxpayer is neither resident nor ordinary
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schedular tax system (which categorises income into schedules according to 
characterisation and source)332 each specific residency definition determines the 
quantum of assessable income under each schedule.
The principal determinative of residency is the “resides” test, which is a common law 
facts and circumstances test.333 Common law residency is determined by reference to 
factors such as physical presence in United Kingdom, residence in previous years, 
regularity of visits to the United Kingdom, the purpose of those visits and whether a 
place of abode is located in the United Kingdom.334
However, for income tax, the “resides” test is supplemented by three statutory rules that 
deal with Commonwealth and Republic of Ireland citizens temporary abroad, residents 
abroad, and temporary residents in the United Kingdom. These statutory rules are found 
principally in Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (UK) (ICTA). The tests include 
concepts of “ordinary resident” and “domicile”, which are again common law based.
The principal statutory test, found in s 336 of the ICTA, is a negative phrased variation 
of a 183 day test. Thus, s 336 provides that individuals who are in the United Kingdom 
temporarily, who do not intend to reside in the United Kingdom and have not actually 
resided for a whole six months, will not be taxed:
• on income chargeable under Schedule D in respect of possessions and securities 
earned outside the United Kingdom;335
resident, but carries on a trade in the United Kingdom, gains on the disposal of assets situated in 
the United Kingdom are taxable (TCGA s 10).
331 Domicile is the key concept under the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (UK) (IHTA). All transfers of 
property, wherever situated, during the last seven years of their life and on their death will be 
subjected to tax under s 1 of the IHTA. Only transfers of property located in United Kingdom are 
taxable for persons domiciled outside the United Kingdom (IHTA s 6(1)).
332 The schedular system has existed since 1803 - Davies, above n 45, 16.
333 United Kingdom Codification Committee, above n 78, 35 noted in 1936 that the probable 
explanation for the absence of specific residency definitions “. . . is that the original Acts were 
drawn at a time when, as compared with the present conditions, transport facilities were 
rudimentary and the mobility of the population almost negligible.”
334 Whiteman, above n 200, 114, Sumpton, above n 40, 15 and Abimbola Olowofoyeku, ‘Where is my 
home? Reflections on the law of residence’ [2003] British Tax Review 306.
335 Section 336(1) and (1A). Section 336(1) first appeared as s 8 of the Income Tax Act 1799 (UK) - 
Davies, above n 45, 85.
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• from the 2003-04 tax year, on certain pension and social security income and 
foreign benefits chargeable under Parts 10 and 11 of Income Tax (Earnings and 
Pensions) Act 2003 (UK); and336
• for years prior to 2003-04 tax year, emolument income charged under Cases I to 
III of Schedule E.337
If the individuals stay for six months they become liable for tax on that income.338 The 
six month period is calculated in calendar months.339 A finding of residency, where an 
individual has exceeded the six months, will result in a tax liability to United Kingdom 
tax for the whole of the tax year of arrival unless an exemption is issued by the 
Commissioners of National Revenue for the period up to the date of arrival.340
Further, under the common law the availability of living accommodation for temporary 
residents deems the person to be resident and ordinary resident (the so called “place of 
abode” test).341 The Inland Revenue states that the “place of abode” test will be satisfied 
if upon arrival an individual owns accommodation in the United Kingdom, buys 
accommodation during the tax year, enters into a lease of three or greater years duration 
or the accommodation is acquired or leased in a subsequent year.342
However, the test has been overridden by statute in two distinct situations. The 
availability of living accommodation in the United Kingdom will not determine purpose
336 Section 336(1A). Parts 10 and 11 of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (UK) 
(ITEPA) were inserted following the repeal of Schedule E, s 19( 1)(1) of the ICTA by ss 722 to 724 
of the ITEPA for the 2003-04 tax year and subsequent tax years.
337 Section 336(2). Section 336(2) originates in the Finance Act 1956 (UK) - Davies, above n 45, 85.
338 Students who are in the United Kingdom for the purpose of education, will be treated by the Inland 
Revenue as not being “ordinary resident” provided they are in the United Kingdom for less than 
four years, they do not buy accommodation, enter a three year lease, or plan to return regularly 
after completion of study - Inland Revenue, United Kingdom, IR 20 Residents and Non-residents: 
Liability to Tax in the United Kingdom (1999) at URL: 
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/pdfs/ir20.htm. para 3.13 located on 12 December 2003.
339 Wilkie v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1952] 1 All ER 92; (1951) 32 TC 495, 508. Despite this 
decision the Inland Revenue since 1972 has calculated the period using 183 days (IR 20, above n 
336). Davies (above n 45, 87-90) notes that although this methodology works to the advantage of 
taxpayers it is suspect to challenge. The Inland Revenue ignores the day of arrival and departure in 
the calculation - IR 20, above n 339, para 1.2.
340 Extra-statutory concession 11A - IR 20, above n 338, para 1.5. However, overseas income is 
taxable on the accrual or remittance basis for the period from the day of arrival to 5 April next. 
Income arising in the Republic of Ireland is liable on the accrual basis even though the recipient 
may be not domiciled or not “ordinary resident” in the UK - IR 20, above n 338, Ch 5.
341 Cooper v Cadwalader (1904) 5 TC 101 and Attorney-General v Coote (1817) 4 Price 183; abstract 
published in (1887) 2 TC 385.
342 IR 20, above n 338, para 3.11.
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or intent under s 336 nor will it determine residence where the individuals perform their 
work either entirely or principally offshore (s 3 3 5).343
The Inland Revenue will also administratively claim residence and ordinary residence in 
respect of an individual where an individual satisfies the habitual visits test.344 Under the 
habitual visits test if individuals visit the United Kingdom on an average of 91 days or 
more over a four year period, they will be deemed to be resident in the fifth year.345
The term “ordinary residence” is used in s 334 of ICTA.346 Section 334 seeks to tax 
individuals (Commonwealth and Republic of Ireland citizens) that are “ordinarily 
resident” as if they were resident, where they have left the United Kingdom for the 
purposes of occasional residence abroad. As discussed earlier, in the context of 
Australia’s resides test, the words “ordinary resident” are defined by the common law as 
connoting “. . . residence in a place with a degree of continuity and apart from accidental 
or temporary absences.”347
Although the "domicile" concept has a key role in the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (UK) 
(IHTA), it also is important under the income tax law. Under the ICTA persons, who are 
not domiciled in the United Kingdom and, if a Commonwealth citizen or Irish citizen, 
not ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, will only be taxable on remittances of 
foreign source income taxable under Schedule D Cases IV and V.348
The “domicile” concept is similar to that inherited in Australia and derives from the 
common law. However, the test is a rule of limitation (ie it limits liability), rather that a 
rule that attracts full world wide taxation (ie a general attachment rule) as in Australia. 
There is no single United Kingdom domicile; rather an individual is domiciled in one of 
the kingdoms of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. As in Australia, the domicile 
concept in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland was modified by the Domicile and
343 Sections 335(2) (incidental work exclusion to the “place of abode test”) and 336(3) (exclusion) 
were only introduced in 1993 via Finance Act 1993 (UK) s 208.
344 IR 20, above n 338, paras 2.8-2.10, 3.3 and 3.5.
345 This test appears to have been derived from the decision in Kinloch v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners (1929) 14 TC 736.
346 Section 334 has remained substantially in its current wording since the Income Tax Act 1918 (UK), 
but can trace its origins back to s 39 of the Income Tax Act 1842 (UK) - Davies, above n 45, 97-9.
347 Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1928) 13 TC 486, 507 (Viscount Cave LC).
348 ICTA, s 65(4). The former ITCA, s 192(2) also turned on the domicile concept, excluding foreign 
emoluments of persons not domiciled in the United Kingdom from charge under Schedule E.
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Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 (UK) to ensure that a husband's domicile no longer 
determines a wife’s domicile.
In summary, the United Kingdoms' rules are predominantly reliant on the determination 
of the facts and circumstances of the individual. As a result, a non-binding booklet 
issued by Inland Revenue (IR 20 Residents and non-residents: Liability to tax in the 
United Kingdom)349 is used by revenue authorities as a code of practice350 and is cited by 
most authors as illustrative of the law’s operation.351
(c) Summary
Despite similar schedular tax code structures and being common law jurisdictions, the 
rules for determining residency vary between a system heavily weighted on individual 
facts and circumstances (United Kingdom) to a system consisting of objective rules 
(Ireland).
3 Residency rules in civil law jurisdictions
The third stage of the comparative review of residency rules in other jurisdictions is to 
examine the rules operating in two civil law countries: France and Germany.
(a) France
France has principally adopted a facts and circumstances approach to determining 
“domicile” (residency) of an individual. Under the Code General des Impots (FRA)352 
individuals are “domiciled” (resident) in France if:
• their home (“foyer”) is in France (ie the place where the person lives, the 
“centre of family interest”, the usual place of abode);353
349 IR 20, above n 338, Preface.
350 Davies, above n 45, 22.
351 Ibid and Whiteman, above n 200.
352 Code General des Impots (FRA), Art 4B. The civil law concept of domicile differs from the 
common law concept. It means the “place of factual residence with an intention of underdetermined 
duration”, ie the place which constitutes a permanent residency for most of the time - see Walter 
Ryser, ‘Switzerland’, in Timothy J Lyons, Huub Bierlaagh and Ramon J Jeffery (eds), 1BFD: The 
International Guide to the Taxation o f  Trusts (4 December 2002), Switzerland 16.
353 Francis Lefebvre, France: Business Law, Taxation, Social Law (1992, updated 1994), 234.
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• their principal abode (“lieu du sejour”) is in France. If a person resides in 
France for more than six months, they are usually deemed to have their 
principal abode in France; 354
• they carry out a professional activity (including employment) in France, 
unless the professional activity is incidental;
• France is the centre of their economic affairs; or
• they are civil servants exercising their duties in other countries.
Although there is no express priority in the test, the Supreme Court in the Larcher case 
indicates that the home test was determinative, with the main abode test only being 
resorted to when the home cannot be determined with certainty.355
Thus, the French residency rules for individuals are principally based upon an 
individual’s facts and circumstances, with the only objective element of the French test 
being the government service rule that deems individuals engaged in government service 
offshore to be residents.
(b) Germany
The German definition of a resident individual is two tiered. First, an individual is 
defined to be a resident of Germany if they are “domiciled” (Wohnsitz) in Germany. 
“Domicile” is defined to be a home or dwelling maintained by the individual in the long 
term.356
Second an individual is resident if their “customary place of abode” {gewöhnlicher 
Aufenthalt) is within the domestic territory of Germany.357 An individual is deemed to 
have a “customary place of abode” if the duration of their domestic stay exceeds six 
months over two years.358
354 Inst, 26 July 1977; 5 B-24-77, No 4: D Admin. 5B-1121, No 6, 15 March 1993 - see Philippe 
Juilhard, ‘Towards a New Definition of Tax Residence in France - A Critical Analysis of the 
Larcher Case’ (1996) 50 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 141.
355 Conseil d’Etate, 3 November 1995, no. 126513, Larcher cited in Juilhard, ibid and Louan 
Verdoner, ‘Major economic concepts in tax treaty policy’ (2003) 31 Intertax 147, 150.
356 German Fiscal Code {Abgabenordnung ("AO")) § 8. Domicile is determined by external and 
recognisable facts rather than the intent of the individual. Thus, the legal right to occupancy may be 
sufficient to create domicile even if an individual resides abroad (eg a person who leases an 
apartment in Germany but is temporarily abroad) - see Ryser, above n 352.
357 German Income Tax Law (Einkommensteuergesetz) s 1 § 1.
358 Abgabenordnung § 9 AO.
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Thus, the German two tiered test has both an objective 183 day test and a fact and 
circumstances “home” test.359
(c) Summary
The civil law jurisdictions examined display a similar variation in residency rules as 
operate in both the common law single code and schedular tax codes systems. Again the 
rules for determining residency vary between a system heavily weighted on individual 
facts and circumstances (France) to a system consisting principally of objective rules 
(Germany).
4 Traits emerging from comparative study
The above examination confirms that whether a jurisdiction adopts a facts and 
circumstance criterion or a more objective criteria in determining residency does not 
have any relevance to the basis of the legal system (civil or common law) nor to the 
structure of the tax codes (singe code or schedular code). Nations set their residency 
rules based upon each jurisdiction’s own economic and social value judgments. 
Therefore, any examination of these foreign domestic residency rules against the 
evaluative criteria is best done on a rule-by-rule basis.
C. Comparing specific residency rules applicable in other jurisdictions
What can be drawn from the above contextual examination of the residency rules for 
individuals in other jurisdictions is that there are three broad categories of residency 
tests. Thus, connection to a jurisdiction is found through tests based upon:
• individual facts and circumstances tests (such as domicile, resides, home 
(permanent/habitual), ordinarily resident, centre of family or economic interests, 
and place of abode tests);
• an arbitrary number of days (so called 183 day test); and
359 A similar two tier test is adopted in Czech Republic, Hungary, and Luxembourg -  see United 
Kingdom, HM Treasury and Inland Revenue Reviewing the Residence and Domicile Rules as they 
Affect the Taxation o f Individuals: A Background Paper (2003), 12-22.
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• specific criteria (citizenship, immigration status, and engagement in government 
service or other related activity).360
Given that all tests fall within these three categories, the three categories will be the 
basis for the following evaluation of the residency rules adopted in other jurisdictions. 
However, given a number of the foreign residency tests that have been adopted in 
Australia, and that I have already extensively evaluated the Australian rules, I will not be 
evaluating all the foreign residency tests identified against the evaluative criteria. Such 
an examination would merely duplicate this earlier analysis.
Therefore, the testing of specific residency tests adopted in other jurisdictions against the 
evaluative criteria will be limited to more unique foreign tests that have not been the 
subject of, or subsumed in, the previous analysis of Australia’s rules. However, 
observation will be made where the form of the common residency rule adopted in 
another jurisdiction overcomes some of the weaknesses identified in respect of the 
Australian rule.
1 Fact and circumstances tests
As there has already been an extensive review of fact and circumstance tests in the 
Australian context, the following seeks to merely give an overview of the range of fact 
and circumstance tests adopted in other jurisdictions before briefly reviewing the tests in 
light of the evaluative criteria.
(a) Overview
There is a variety of fact and circumstances tests used to determine residency. The 
United Kingdom and Australia have a number of fact and circumstances residency tests
360 Richard Vann, ‘International aspects of income tax’ in Victor Thuronyi (ed) Tax Law Design and 
Drafting (Vol 2, 1998) 718, 719 suggests a general legal concepts (domicile and citizenship) 
category rather than the specific criteria category adopted above. Also see Alley, Clinton, Bentley, 
Duncan, and James, Simon, ‘The New Zealand definition of ‘residence’ for individuals: Lessons 
for Australia in a ‘global’ environment’ (2001) 4 Journal o f Australian Taxation 40, 43.
Australia’s residency rules for individuals also fit with the three categories, that is:
• the resides, domicile, ordinarily resident, and Territory resident tests, the usual and 
permanent place of abode glosses and elements of the tie breaker tests in the DTA’s are in 
the individual facts and circumstances category;
• the 183-day test is in the arbitrary number of days category; and
• the superannuation test is in the specific criteria category.
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in common, being the resides, domicile and ordinarily resident tests. The civil law 
concept domicile is used in Hungary, Saudia Arabia and Korea, 361 while Australia and 
Canada also share a common resides test. Other fact and circumstances tests are 
expressed in terms similar to the tie breaker test in the OECD model. These tests can be 
classified as follows:
• availability of a family/permanent home test (Austria, Netherlands, Czech 
Republic, France, Finland and Belgium);
• the centre of social and economic interest test (Austria) and place from which he 
manages his fortune, business or carries out his occupation (France, Netherlands 
and Belgium); or
• permanent or habitual abode tests (Hungary, New Zealand and United Kingdom).
Thus, the foreign fact and circumstances tests offer a diverse range of possible test 
criteria in order to determine whether an individual has, through their personal 
circumstances, established sufficient connection with a country. Their commonality lies 
in the fact that they require case by case application.
As the problems associated with the common law domicile and ordinary resident tests 
have already been reviewed in the context of Australia’s residency rules (see generally 
Part III) and the scope of the centre of social and economic interests (ie centre of vital 
interests) tests were examined in the context of the OECD Model Convention (Part II C 
(b)(ii)), it is not proposed to repeat this discussion. Similarly, given that the scope of the 
availability of permanent home and the habitual abode tests were examined in the 
context of the OECD Model Convention (Part II C (b)(i) and (ii)) and residency and 
permanent place of abode tests have been evaluated in the context of Australia’s 
residency rules (Part III), it is not intended to repeat this analysis in detail.
361 As mentioned (Ryser, above n 352) the civil law concept of domicile (which is the “place of factual 
residence with an intention of underdetermined duration”) differs from the common law concept. 
The concept is used in the definition of residency in Saudi Arabia’s new Income Tax Law (issued 
by way of Royal Decree Ml of 15/01/1425 AH (6 March 2004) and published in Official Gazette 
No. 3990 of 11/3/1425 AH on 30 April 2004) and executive regulations (issued on 15 August 2004 
by the Department of Zakat and Income Tax). Thus, an individual is a resident if they have a 
(permanent) domicile in Saudi Arabia and whose stay in Saudi Arabia has been at least 30 days in a 
tax year -  see Ed, ‘Saudi Arabia: Executive regulations regarding new Income Tax Law issued’ 
IBFD Tax News Service - Headlines (25 August 2004).
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However, given that different residency, place of abode and dwelling tests have been 
given common labels, it is important to highlight variations in structure in order to 
identify reform models. Therefore, the following discussion will focus on aspects of the 
residency test and permanent abode/home/dwelling tests, before briefly revisiting the 
evaluation of the facts and circumstance model.
(i) Resides test
A number of jurisdictions use a residency based test. However, despite the similarity in 
labelled tests in Australia, Ireland and the United Kingdom, some of the tests are in fact 
not fact and circumstances tests. For example the concept of “ordinarily” resident in 
Ireland is based upon a prescribed presence in Ireland over three preceding years (an 
arbitrary day test), while the United Kingdom and Australian concept of “ordinarily” 
resident embodies residency with a degree of continuity determined in light of the 
individual’s facts and circumstances.
(ii) Abode/home/dwelling tests
In a number of jurisdictions the ownership or availability of place of abode (a home) (eg 
Austria and Netherlands) is one of the tests for determining residency. Determination of 
the existence of a home is generally a question of fact (ie a fact and circumstance test).
The threshold level of when use of accommodation will be considered to be a home 
varies from country to country ranging from the availability of temporary 
accommodation362 to a permanent home (eg Belgium and France).363 Where the test 
requires availability of a permanent home the test usually adopts the wording of the 
OECD tie-breaker test. As the scope of this test has been discussed in the context of 
Australia’s DTAs, (see Part II C 2 (b)(i)), I do not propose to repeat that discussion.
362 In the United Kingdom a person who lived for a few weeks, from time to time in a house he owned 
in London was found to be resident see Attorney-General v Coote (1817) 4 Price 183; abstract 
published in (1887) 2 TC 385.
363 Edwin R A Seligman, Essays in Taxation (3rd ed, 1900), 109 notes that existence of permanent 
residence (or domicile) is a defensible basis in determining sufficient connection to tax, while mere 
temporary residence is inadmissible as a test as the relationship between the individual and the 
government is too slight.
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However, in other countries the mere ownership of a home is sufficient to deem 
residency. For example, in the United Kingdom, the common law deems persons to be 
resident and ordinary resident if they have living accommodation in the United Kingdom 
(“place of abode” test).364 The United Kingdom’s Inland Revenue states that the “place 
of abode” test will be satisfied if upon arrival an individual owns accommodation in the 
United Kingdom, buys accommodation during the tax year, enters into a lease of three or 
greater years duration or the accommodation is acquired or leased in a subsequent 
year.365
Similarly, in Mexico the home does not need to be an individual’s principal or 
permanent abode and there is no minimum period of “ownership”. However, unlike the 
United Kingdom, the home test is the principal test of residency in Mexico.366
In summary, the home test is used in a limited number of countries as a domestic test to 
determine residency. It is more commonly used as a residency tie breaker test by 
countries using the OECD model treaty.
(b) Evaluation
Although it is claimed that the fact and circumstances tests are more “. . . compatible 
with the political theory that government power comes from the consent of the 
governed,”367 they do not satisfy the evaluative criteria. First, as discussed in the context 
of the Australian tests (see Part III A 1) the horizontal equity criterion is not met under 
facts and circumstance tests as minor variations in a taxpayer’s circumstances may result 
in taxpayers in similar circumstances being taxed differently.
Second, as discussed in the context of evaluating the Australian tests (see Part III C), 
fact and circumstance tests will generally fail the simplicity criterion. The case by case 
determinations of all key concepts means the rules can give rise to arbitrary outcomes,
364 Cooper v Cadwalader (1904) 5 TC 101 and Attorney-General v Coote (1817) 4 Price 183; abstract 
published in (1887) 2 TC 385.
365 IR 20, above n 338, para 3.11.
366 Terri Grosselin and Koen van’t Hek, ‘Latin America tax scene’ (2001) 29 Interfax 312, 314 and 
‘Mexico -  Tax residency definition change’ Ernst & Young Human Capital HR & Tax Alerts 
(January 2004). An individual who does not maintain home in Mexico will be considered a resident 
if they have vital interest in Mexico (ie if more than 50% of income comes from Mexico or Mexico 
is the principal site of the individual’s professional interests).
367 Michael McIntyre, The International Income Tax Rules o f the United States (2nd ed, 1992) 1-21.
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impose high compliance costs, create uncertainty and are hard to administer.368 Finally, 
as the tests rely upon individual facts and circumstances they are easy to manipulate (see 
Part III D 3) and they generally fail the tax avoidance criterion.
Thus, the foreign facts and circumstance tests, other than offering a range of possible 
test criteria, provide little guidance for reform as they too do not satisfy the evaluative 
criteria. Where the tests have been modified to alter the criterion from fact and 
circumstances to tests based upon a specific fact (eg home ownership) or a period of 
time (eg Irish ordinarily resident test), the outcome is similar as the tests fail different 
criteria (ie they fail to meet the horizontal equity and tax avoidance criteria, but will 
generally satisfy the simplicity requirement).
2 Arbitrary (183) day tests
As there has already been an extensive review of Australia’s 183 day test (see Part III), 
the following seeks to provide an overview of the range of arbitrary day tests adopted in 
other jurisdictions before briefly reviewing the tests in light of the evaluative criteria.
(a) Overview
The most common determinative criterion, adopted in a vast majority of countries, is a 
substantive presence test gauged through presence in a jurisdiction for a prescribed 
number of days (usually 183 days). The so-called 183 day tests adopted in the various 
jurisdictions can be classified into a number of different time periods in which presence 
(“sojourn”) will be sufficient to amount to residency. Thus, a person is deemed to be 
resident if they are present for a:
• 183 days (six) months in total, or consecutively, in the country (for example, 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Iceland and Turkey);
• total of 183 days (or six months) in a tax year/calendar year (for example, 
Canada, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungry, Iceland, Ireland, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Saudi Arabia,369 Spain and United States);
368 Whiteman, above n 200, 137.
369 Above n 361.
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• total of 183 days (or six months) in any 12 month period (for example, Finland, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden);
• year continuously (for example, Korea).370
Thus, as well as the number o f days varying between countries, the period over which 
the actual presence must occur varies between countries (ie between six and 12 months) 
as does the requirement of whether the number of days must be consecutive. Even what 
constitutes a day also varies between countries. For example, in New Zealand a day is 
defined to include part of a day ,371 while the day of arrival and the day of departure are 
not used in calculating presence under the United Kingdom’s residency test.372
Further, unlike Australia, in order to minimise avoidance by persons leaving the country 
before the specified time period is satisfied, and returning once the period restarts a 
number of countries (Norway,373 the United States374 and Ireland375) have adopted tests 
that seek to take into account presence in prior years.
In summary, although the existence of a “ 183 day test” style test in most jurisdictions 
initially conjures assumptions of uniformity, the actual criteria used to establish the 
prescribed physical presence varies across the various jurisdictions.
(b) Evaluation
In evaluating the Australian 183 day test it was found that the test failed to satisfy the 
equity and tax avoidance criteria (see Part III A and D), while the facts and circumstance 
elements of the Australian test failed the simplicity criterion (see Part III C). Although it 
is likely similar criticism will apply to the arbitrary tests adopted in a number of
370 UK, Inland Revenue Reviewing the Residence and Domicile Rules, above n 359, schedule 3.
371 See above n 292.
372 See above n 339.
373 A taxpayer who has stayed in Norway (using the “day of physical presence” test contained in Art 
15(2) of 2003 OECD Model Convention) for at least 183 days in a 12 month period is a resident. If 
spread over two years, then residency occurs in the year in which 183 days requirement is satisfied. 
Residency is deemed to occur where the individual’s total presence in the country is 270 days in a 
three year period (ie an average of 90 days per year). Loss of residency only occurs if residency is 
established in another state and the person does not have a permanent home and has spent less than 
61 days is spent in Norway - Fredrick Zimmer, ‘Norway adopts new tax residency rules’ (2003) 31 
Tax Notes International 95.
374 See above n 302 and 303.
375 See above n 321.
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jurisdictions, the sheer diversity in how the test is applied necessitates some further 
analysis.
First, the arbitrary day test lacks horizontal equity, as persons engaged in cross-border 
activities are also likely to be deemed a resident of more than one country376 resulting in 
taxpayers being liable for tax in two jurisdiction on the same income (ie taxpayers in 
similar circumstances are taxed differently). They often only catch taxpayers who are 
unsophisticated, unadvised,377 unlucky (an individual taxpayer being deemed a resident 
due to a tail wind causing the taxpayer to arrive half an hour earlier)378 or poor planners 
(where the taxpayer did not take into account that time period covered a leap year).379
The stricter the test, the more likely that double taxation will occur. Thus, the more the 
measurement of a 183 day presence in a country is done over a longer period (eg any 12 
months in New Zealand) and the more countries deem residency based upon patterns of 
presence (eg taking into account presence in prior years) the greater the number of 
individuals that will be dual residents.
This double tax problem can be moderated by the use of DTAs, tax credits and fact and 
circumstance exemptions (eg the United States “closer connection exemption”380 and 
Australia’s permanent place of abode elsewhere exemption (see Part II A 3 (b)). 
However, the use of fact and circumstance exemptions can compromise simplicity, and 
DTAs offer only a partial solution as DTAs do not exist between all countries.381
Second, generally 183 day tests will fail to satisfy the anti-avoidance criterion. Such test 
can be easy to avoid by remaining out of the country for the required number of days, or 
breaking the continuity of presence by leaving the country for a short period of time. 
Although these weaknesses can be overcome by measuring the required presence over a 
longer period or by including in the calculation presence in prior periods, this can impact
376 Arnold, above n 241.
377 Arnold, above n 241.
378 Alley (1995), above n 42, 52 cites as an example the case of an unlucky taxpayer (an university 
lecturer) who arrived on day 365 of his absence due to a tail wind, thereby retaining his residence 
in New Zealand. Unfortunately the judgment in Case FI38 (1984) 6 NZTC 60,237; TRA Case 21 
(1984) 8 TRNZ 140 does not record this fact.
379 Similarly in Wilkie v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1952] 1 All ER 92; (1951) 32 TC 495 a 
taxpayer was found not to be resident for more than six months in a leap year (365 days) as he had 
been present for only 182 days and 20 hours.
380 For example see the United States’ “closer connection exception”, above n 304.
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upon horizontal equity. Further, enforcement of the “number of days” test is also 
difficult, as the period of residency may be difficult to establish where border checks 
have been removed or where a regional citizenship (such as a potential EU citizenship) 
replaces or overlaps member state citizenship.382
In summary, the more expansive 183 day tests adopted in New Zealand, Ireland and the 
United States are models that overcome the Australian test’s failure of the tax avoidance 
criterion. However, they achieve this through reducing horizontal equity.
3 Specific criteria tests
The following seeks to merely give an overview of the range of specific criteria tests 
before summarising the common failures in light of the evaluative criteria. As the 
specific criteria tests can be broken into two categories (government service and 
immigration based tests) the following examination will follow that categorisation.
(a) Government Service tests
The following analysis seeks to provide an overview of the government service tests 
adopted in other jurisdictions before briefly reviewing the tests in light of the evaluative 
criteria.
(i) Overview
Many countries adopted specific government service residency tests. Such tests are 
driven by the desire of nations to ensure that those persons serving those nations remain 
residents regardless of their period of absence from their home state.
As discussed above, Canada deems members of Canadian Forces,383 overseas Canadian 
Forces school staff,384 ambassador, high commissioner, minister, agent-general or other
381 For example, see the facts of Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation v Efstathakis (1979) 9 ATR 82; 
78 ATC 4486 above n 17.
382 Sheridan, above n 47.
383 Income Tax Act RSC C 1985 (Can), s 250(1 )(b).
384 Ibid s 250( 1 )(d. 1).
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Canadian or provincial government officials,385 and the dependent child of such 
persons386 to be residents.
Similarly, the New Zealand and French approach is to deem all government employees 
(civil servants) acting in any capacity for the government (exercising their duties) to be 
residents.387 While the New Zealand rule does not apply to persons employed in state 
owned enterprises,388 a similar rule in Korea deems directors and personnel engaged in 
overseas service on behalf of an employer who is a Korean resident or Korean domestic 
company to be resident.389
Other nations rely on the citizen or domicile tests to deem residency coupled with the 
Government service Article in DTAs (such as Article 27 of the OECD model), which 
enures that the taxing rights of Government employees lies with the state for which they 
work.
(ii) Evaluation
Leaving aside the political/national imperative, government service tests are difficult to 
justify in terms of the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the 
prevention of tax avoidance.
Although government service tests create horizontal equity between all government 
workers (ie government workers in similar economic circumstances are treated 
similarly) they perpetuate horizontal inequity between those workers and all other non­
resident workers employed by the non-government sector. However, the government 
service tests do generally satisfy the simplicity criterion as the rules apply in a 
predictable way, are not complex, result in low compliance costs, and are expressed 
clearly. The government service tests also meets the “co-ordinated with other tax rules” 
element of the simplicity criterion, as they are consistent with the government service 
rules in most DTAs.
385 Ibid s 250(1 )(c).
386 Ibid s 250(1 )(f).
387 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OEl(5) and Code General des Impots (FRA), Art 4B, respectively.
388 Garth Harris, above n 110, 16.
389 Korea, Ministry of Finance and Economy, Korean Taxation (2002), 29.
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On balance, the rules may be justifiable upon Government policy reasons; however they 
cannot be justified under the evaluative criteria.
(b) Immigration tests
There are two main immigration based residency tests, the citizenship test and the lawful 
non-citizen residency test (ie “green card” test in the United States). The following 
analysis seeks to provide an overview of the immigration tests adopted in other 
jurisdictions before briefly reviewing the tests in light of the evaluative criteria. This 
analysis will be undertaken by first giving an overview of the citizenship test. The 
citizenship test overview will be followed by an overview of the lawful non-resident test 
before both tests are evaluated against the evaluative criteria.
(i) Citizenship - overview
Citizenship is one of the traditional ways that sufficient connection can be established. 
In fact, political allegiance (ie citizenship) of the taxpayer is the oldest principle of 
attachment.390 Despite it being the oldest form of attachment, it also is only adopted in a 
few nations (such as the Argentina,391 Bulgaria, Japan, Philippines,392 and the United 
States393). The United States, however, is the only industrialised country to tax the 
worldwide income of its non resident citizens.394 Although not a test of attraction, the 
concept of citizenship is also used in Australia in s 23AA of the 1936 Act (to ensure 
that an income exemption does not apply to Australian citizens) and in Article 1 (I)(ii) of 
the 2003 United Kingdom Treaty (to define nationality).
390 Seligman (1900), above n 362, 109.
391 Argentina only adopted a citizenship test, qualified by an existing residency requirement, in 1998 - 
see Alejandro Messineo, ‘Tax Reform under way’ (1998) 32 Tax News Service 181. In contrast, 
Mexico moved away from a citizenship model in 1968.
392 The Philippines have had a citizenship model since 1918 - see Richard Pomp, ‘The Experience of 
the Philippines in Taxing its Nonresident Citizens’ in Jagdish Bhagwati and John Wilson (eds), 
Income Taxation and International Mobility (1989) 45.
393 The citizen test was adopted in the United States in 1913 - Jagdish Bhagwati and John Wilson, 
‘Income Taxation in the Presence of International Personal Mobility: An Overview’ in Bhagwati, 
ibid, 27 and Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in America (1967) 333.
394 United States, Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Background Materials on Business Tax 
Issues (2002), 54 at http://www.haise.gov/jct/x-23-02.pdf accessed on 30 January 2004. Also 
Seligman (1900), above n 362, 108.
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Unlike the lawful non-citizen residency test, there is a strong political theory underlying 
the concept of citizenship and why citizens living abroad continue to have a tax liability. 
As citizenship is founded in political rights, it involves political duties.395
Broadly, as citizenship offers privileges (such as the right to vote, a right to protection 
and a right to return) it should entail obligations (in respect of military service and fiscal 
responsibility).396 As the right to vote means that the individual can influence how 
revenue is raised and spent, it is seen as inequitable and unreasonable to have the 
obligations lapse while still enjoying the rights.397 Thus, citizens living abroad (continue 
to receive legal and technical business infrastructure, military protection, passport and 
embassy services) have responsibility to their country.398
Citizenship based taxation is also seen as important for developing countries. Where a 
skilled individual emigrates the developing country loses the person’s skills (which 
arise from a large education investment by the state), the potential future taxes and the 
ability to recoup the education investment in the individual.399
Despite these arguments, this approach is not universally accepted. In 1900 Seligman 
questioned the validity of arguments underlying a citizenship test. He stated that:
[i]n the modem age of the international migration of persons as well as 
capital, political allegiance no longer forms an adequate test of individual 
fiscal obligation. It is fast breaking down in practice, and it is clearly 
insufficient in theory. 400
Further, Canada’s Royal Commission on Taxation (the Carter Commission) 
recommended “. . . that residence continue to be the principal basis for determining 
liability to tax, largely because residence seems to imply a closer association than 
citizenship between the taxpayer and the use of services provided by a taxing 
jurisdiction.”401
395 Seligman (1900), ibid.
396 Richard Musgrave, ‘Foreword’ in Bhagwati, above n 392, xii and Kohl, above n 258, 441.
397 Seligman (1900), above n 362, 108.
398 US Joint Committee on Taxation, above n 392, 54 and Seligman (1900), above n 362, 108.
399 Musgrave, above n 396.
400 However, Seligman (1900) (above n 362, 109) argues that persons who are permanently resident in 
a place ought to contribute to that nation’s expenses.
401 Canada, Report o f the Royal Commission on Taxation (1966) Vol 4, 541.
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(ii) Lawful non-resident -  overview
The second immigration test is the lawful non-citizen residency test, which deems tax 
residency for alien persons given the right to reside in a state for a fixed or indefinite 
period. Unlike the citizenship test it is a creature of modem immigration mles and is not 
expressly supported by the rights and obligation arguments advanced for citizenship.402 
The lawful non-citizen residency test is only adopted as a tax residency test in a few 
nations, including Japan and the United States. However, only the United States seeks 
to tax these persons on their worldwide income, no matter where they reside.
(iii) Evaluating the immigration tests
Regardless of the rights and obligation argument underlying the immigration tests, it is 
important to determine whether the tests satisfy the evaluative criteria of equity, 
efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance.
First, the use of the immigration tests to determine residency and a world wide tax 
liability results in a lack of horizontal equity (ie taxpayers in similar economic 
circumstances are not treated similarly) with taxpayers with little connection to a 
jurisdiction being caught, while those with much closer ties, escaping liability.403 For 
example, a non citizen may be able to reside in the country for a number of days each 
year (eg up to 120 days per annum in the United States) and not be caught within the 
tests, while a citizen living offshore is potentially liable on their world wide income.404 
Horizontal equity can be improved if their country of citizenship excludes tax of foreign 
source income earned by non-resident citizens.
Also, horizontal inequity arises through double taxation of dual resident non-resident 
citizens. Dual residency occurs where the country of residency also seeks to tax those 
non-resident citizens as residents. Double taxation will occur for the dual resident in the
402 Seligman (1900), above n 362, 109.
403 Although the US Joint Committee on Taxation (above n 398, 54) argues that world wide taxation 
gives rise to horizontal equity, the Committee did not analyse whether the rule of attachment (the 
citizenship test) gives rise to horizontal equity.
404 Kohl, above n 258, 449 notes that citizenship does not fully recognise the equitable notion that 
those who pay the taxes should actually have the ability to indirectly or directly benefit from them. 
A citizen who is liable for the tax may never set foot in a country and never use the roads. They 
may never enjoy the community services as in many instances citizenship will not give automatic 
rights to pensions, social security, health services and even some tax concessions.
160
absence of double tax relief under DTAs and if country of citizenship does not fully 
credit or exclude income taxed in country of residence.
The citizen and lawful non-citizen residency tests generally satisfy the simplicity 
criterion because the rules apply in a predictable way, they are not complex, result in low 
compliance costs, are expressed clearly and co-ordinate with the immigration rules.
Finally, the rules fail to satisfy the prevention of tax avoidance criterion. The 
immigration tests do not stop mobility as they are easily avoided by rescinding 
citizenship.405 Further, it is very difficult to enforce non-resident citizen compliance 
with the former country’s tax laws.406 For example, it is claimed that only 10 percent of 
US nationals residing abroad long-term meet their tax return filing obligations.407 This 
problem is compounded by the absence of an international tax authority or 
administrative cooperation from the country of residence408 Thus, the immigration tests 
fail to satisfy the prevention of tax avoidance criterion.
In summary, although such tests are extremely simple, the simplicity is gained at the 
expense of equity.409 Further, without specific rules to deal with citizens leaving the 
jurisdictions for tax purposes410 and the ability to enforce filing obligations on absentee 
citizens, the rules fail to prevent tax avoidance.
405 In fact the solution has been to enact specific legislation to countering renouncement of citizenship 
for tax purposes. Thus, s 877(a) of the Internal Revenue Code o f 1986 (US) removes for 10 years 
any advantages arising from non-residency from taxpayers who seek to avoid tax by relinquishing 
United States' citizenship or resident aliens (who have been residents for three consecutive years). 
Further, in March 1996 amendments to the immigration law (Immigration and Nationality Act 
(US)) were passed that have the effect of prohibiting the issue of a visa to a former United States' 
citizen, where the former citizen has renounced her or his citizenship to avoid United States' tax. 
These rules have resulted in 107 persons (from a population of over 258 million) being listed 
between 1997 and 1999 - see Martin Sullivan, ‘Democrats Revisit Expatriate Tax: With Neutrality 
and Justice for all?’ (1999) 19 Tax Notes International 1705. Also see Alice Abreu, ‘The 
Difference between Expatriates and Mrs Gregory - Citizenship can Matter’ [1995] Tax Notes 
International 1613, Charles M Bruce, ‘Permanent Tax Exile - The plight of former US citizens?’ 
(1996) 50 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 205, Sanford Goldberg et al, ‘Taxation 
Caused by or after a Change in Residence (Part 1)’ (2000) 21 Tax Notes International 643, and 
Sanford Goldberg et al, ‘Taxation Caused by or after a Change in Residence (Part II)’ (2000) 21 
Tax Notes International 741.
406 P Webster, A Treatise on the Law o f Citizenship in the United States (1891) cited in Bhagwati, 
above n 392, 28 and Pomp, above n 392, 47.
407 Musgrave, above n 396, xiii. See also Sheridan, above n 47, 22.
408 Re Visser [1928] Ch 877 and Government o f India, Ministry o f Finance (Revenue Division) v 
Taylor [1955] AC 491. See also Musgrave, above n 396, and Pomp, above n 392, 47. Co-operation 
has been achieved in Australia in some limited cases through bi-lateral negotiation (eg Foreign 
Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), which provides for reciprocal enforcement of specific tax debt 
judgments of Papua New Guinea and New Zealand, and Art 25(2) of the United States' DTA).
409 Kohl, above n 258, 440. Kohl argues that the nexus between residency and tax should be the 
equitable notion and that will not be achieved by the adoption a citizenship test.
410 Special rules that retain taxing rights despite absence from the jurisdiction are more commonly 
used, as citizenship alone does not stop evasion of jurisdiction. There are three approaches
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4 Summary
Having evaluated the various tests within the three categories of residency tests for 
individuals that operate in other jurisdictions (ie the individual facts and circumstances 
tests, the arbitrary number of days tests and the specific criteria tests), what emerges is 
that those rules, like the rules operating in Australia, are unable to satisfy all the 
evaluative criteria. This occurs despite similarly named tests being structured differently 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, the availability of a home test can be a 
fact and circumstance based test in some jurisdictions, while being a specific factor test 
in others.
D. Conclusions
In the above Part (Part IV), a comparative review of the residency rules adopted 
domestically in a number of jurisdictions was undertaken in two stages. Initially, the 
review looked at the residency rules for individuals in the context of each country’s tax 
system. The countries examined were divided into common law countries that tax 
through a single code, common law countries that operate on a schedular system and the 
European civil law countries.
This initial review was intended to provide a comparison of the various hierarchies of 
residency tests adopted in each country within the three jurisdictional types, which could 
not be demonstrated by merely evaluating the broad categories of residency rules for 
individuals used world wide. In doing so, the review confirmed that whether a 
jurisdiction adopts a facts and circumstance criterion or a more objective criterion to 
determine residency is not the result of the legal system (civil or common law) nor of the 
structure of the tax codes (single code or schedular code). Nations set their residency 
rules based upon their own economic and social value judgments.
The second stage of the comparative review was to examine the foreign domestic 
residency rules against the evaluative criteria on a rule-by-rule basis. This was done by 
comparing and evaluating the individual residency test within the three broad 
approaches adopted world wide (individual fact and circumstances tests, arbitrary
adopted: to ignore the change; to tax but defer taxation until realisation (trailing approach); or to 
treat the act of expatriation as a taxable event deeming realisation of all gains.
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number of days tests, and specific criteria tests) to determining connection to a 
jurisdiction.
What emerges from this second stage of the comparative review is that the residency 
rules adopted world wide, like the rules operating in Australia, are unable to satisfy all 
the evaluative criteria. Another outcome was that, despite a number of the categorised 
tests having similar names, often the tests were structured differently from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. These structural differences may offer ideas, if applied in Australia that may 
result in rules that better satisfy the evaluative criteria. The exploration and evaluation of 
the possible reform options will be the focus for the balance of the chapter (ie Part V).
V. Exploring the Sub-Thesis - Reform options
A. Overview
In Part III of the thesis it was established that Australia’s current rules for determining 
the residency of an individual failed to satisfy the evaluative criteria of equity, simplicity 
and the prevention tax avoidance. In order to explore the sub thesis, that the law can be 
modified within the jurisdictional framework to more closely meet the evaluative 
criteria, a review of residency models adopted in other jurisdictions was conducted in 
Part IV. Although it was established that no individual country’s model or particular 
residency test satisfied all the evaluative criteria, the process did reveal a number of 
refinements which, with further analysis, may provide the basis for modification of 
Australia’s domestic law so that it more closely meets the evaluative criteria. Thus, the 
purpose of this Part is to explore the approaches for modifying the existing rules such 
that they better meet the evaluative criteria.
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Part V), given that the policy objectives do conflict, any 
modification to existing laws could favour one policy objective over another. Therefore, 
as stated in Chapter 2, where the tax policy objectives are in conflict the principal focus 
will be on ensuring equity. However, where the equity objective leads to a negative 
outcome in terms of simplicity (complexity) and tax avoidance, the reform option that 
provides a balance between the equity tax policy objective and the simplicity and anti­
avoidance tax policy objectives should prevail.
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Therefore, the approach adopted for reform involves changing some of the existing tests 
from the “fact and circumstance” model to the “arbitrary number of days” or specific 
criteria models (ie trading-off equity for simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance). 
This is because as “[a]ny greater certainty by means of statutory rules can be achieved 
only at the expense of being arbitrary.”411 Such an approach, in a self assessment 
environment, carries with it the advantages of reducing the compliance costs due to 
reducing complexity and providing greater certainty for the majority of taxpayers. 
Provided these gains in simplicity outweigh any potential loss of horizontal equity 
arising from double taxation, then the result is a more balanced approach for 
determining residency of individuals.
B. Reform options
Having clarified the evaluative methodology, the next step is to consider each of the 
residency rules and determine whether the rules can be modified, within the 
jurisdictional framework to better meet the evaluative criteria. The process will consider 
the various reform options in respect of each of the residency rules before settling on the 
preferred reform options (see Part VI)
1 183 day test
There are two elements to the 183 day test in s 6(l)(a)(ii). The first element is that 
residency is deemed if a person is present in Australia for a total of more than 183 days 
in an income year. The second element is a fact and circumstance exemption that allows 
persons to escape the deeming test if they establish both that they have a usual place of 
abode outside Australia and do not intend to take up residency. In order to explore the 
possible options for reforming, the two elements of the 183 day test are examined 
separately below, before setting out the recommendations for reform.
(a) Deeming test
The 183 day test fails the tax avoidance criterion (see Part III D 2). This failure is due in 
part to the measurement period being the year of income. Therefore, persons who are in 
Australia for period up to 364 days could avoid the 183 day test if only 182 days is spent
411 Carter Commission, above n 401.
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in each income year. This problem is common with many of the 183 tests used in other 
jurisdictions (see Part IV C 2) which contain similar limitations on their scope (ie they 
require continuous presence or use calendar year or income (fiscal) years as the 
measurement period).
However, a number of the tests used in other jurisdictions412 counter this problem (ie of 
persons avoiding the test by spending periods in excess of 183 days in two income years) 
by measuring presence over any 12 month period. Although this approach reduces tax 
avoidance it does have a wider impact upon horizontal equity as more taxpayers may be 
caught that are also resident elsewhere. However, the potential for double taxation is 
abated by both the “usual place of abode” and “intention to reside” glosses and the DTA 
tie-breaker tests. Therefore, the change in jurisdictional claim is relatively minor and the 
overall thrust and nature of the test remains.
The scope of the test could be further expanded if the prior year presence tests (similar to 
the United Kingdom and United States tests) were adopted. These are very wide tests as 
they take into account periods of less than 183 days in a number of prior tax years (see 
Part IV B 1(c) and 2 (b)). However, this change would be a major extension to intended 
jurisdictional claim, which is currently based upon annual measurement.
(b) Fact and circumstance exemption
The “usual place of abode” and the “intention” glosses to the Australian 183 day test 
were enacted at a time when Australia had no DTAs, to ensure horizontal equity by 
ensuring that there was “. . . no danger of treating as residents persons who are purely 
visitors.”413 However, the “individual fact and circumstances” element of the tests result 
in horizontal inequity, give rise to a lack of simplicity and leave the 183 day rule open to 
manipulation (see Part IV).
Given these problems the temptation is to recommend removal of the “intention” and 
“place of abode” glosses to the 183 day test in order to increase simplicity and counter
412 These tests are used in countries such as Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway and 
Sweden. Norway has changed its 183 day test from continual presence to a cumulative presence of 
183 days in any 12 month period -  see Zimmer, above n 373.
413 Note on Clause 2 in Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 
(Cth) 11.
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avoidance. However, this would have the effect of increasing horizontal inequity for 
persons engaged in cross border activities, usually those taxpayers who are 
unsophisticated, unadvised, unlucky or poor planners (see Part IV C 2(b)). In fact, it is 
argued that the criteria for establishing residence (such as the 183 day test) should be 
less rigorous than the abandonment test, due to the increased risk to horizontal equity for 
those engaged in cross border activities.414
The double tax problem can be moderated through the use of DTAs and tax credits. 
However, this is only a partial solution as DTAs do not exist with all countries and tax 
credits are not always available in the other country of residence.415 As a result many 
countries use fact and circumstance exemptions.416
(c) Finding the balance
Although increasing simplicity can result in a decrease in horizontal equity through 
potential double taxation, the use of DTAs can moderate or remove the potential 
inequity. Given that Australia has treaties with all countries that are and have been a 
major source of Australia's migrant populations (except for Greece and Lebanon), and 
taking into account Australia escalating its treaty negotiation program, in the foreseeable 
future the DTA tie breaker rules should be open to the majority of persons caught in 
double tax situations.417
An alternative to the new DTA program that would also reduce horizontal inequity would 
be the enactment of a series of exemptions specific for classes of persons (students,
414 Arnold, above n 241, 22. Arnold and McIntyre in their theoretical model (which has its origins in 
the United States citizen model and the OECD Model Convention tie breaker tests) use a two part 
formulation. First, if the individuals are present in a country for 183 days or more in a taxable year 
they are residents for that year unless they establish that they do not have a dwelling in the country 
and are not citizens of the country. Second, if they have a dwelling in the country they are residents 
unless they also have a dwelling in another country.
415 See, eg Richard Vann, ‘Improving Policy for the Taxation of Expatriate Employees in Australia’ 
(2001) 7 New Zealand Journal o f  Taxation Law and Policy 70, 73-4.
416 For example, the United States uses a “closer connection exemption” (see above n 304), while 
other jurisdictions use the OECD Model Convention tie breaker tests (ie having a 
dwelling/family/permanent home elsewhere or your centre of social and economic (vital) interest 
test elsewhere).
417 Treasurer ‘Review of International Taxation Arrangements’ (Press Release No 32, 13 May 2003), 
Attachment E.
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visiting teachers or persons on specific classes of tourist visas418), similar to the tests used 
in the United States (see Part IV 1(c)). As these exemptions rely on specific criteria, they 
are generally extremely simple. However, horizontal inequity would remain between 
persons within the specific exemptions and those persons not covered by a DTA that fall 
outside the exemption. Despite the merits of this approach, governments are often 
reluctant to pursue such approaches as such rules give away taxing rights, without similar 
concessions being granted to Australians.
In light of the above discussion and the need to counter avoidance and the resultant 
simplicity it is recommended that the 183 day test be revised to change the measurement 
period to any 12 month period, rather than a tax year. The suggested extension to the test 
to take account of prior year presence cannot be supported in the context of the sub­
thesis, as it is a large extension of the jurisdictional claim.
Further, to increase simplicity, the “usual place of abode” and the “intention” glosses to 
the Australian 183 day test should be repealed. Given that the glosses were introduced to 
stop double taxation, and that role is now covered by DTAs, the practical effect of the 
any increase in jurisdictional claim would only be limited to that class of persons not 
covered by a DTA. The impact of this minor increase in jurisdiction could be further 
reduced by targeted exemptions for specific categories of non-DTA persons who would 
have had concessional treatment had a DTA been in place (eg students and visiting 
teachers).
However, the removal of the glosses would be a major variation to the structure of the 
183 day test as the tie breaker tests contained in DTAs are different from the “usual 
place of abode” and “intention to reside” glosses. Although the practical outcome may 
be similar, the change does amount to a change in the domestic jurisdictional claim and 
as a result, this change cannot be recommended in the context of the sub-thesis.
Despite the retention of the glosses, the change in measurement period will result in a 
test which is simple, less easy to manipulate, does not create major horizontal inequities 
and will have the effect of ensuring that the domestic law of individual residency, within
418 Arnold and McIntyre in their theoretical model suggest that individuals who have either resident or 
non-resident status for visa or immigration purposes might be presumed to have the same status for 
income tax purposes -  see Arnold, above n 241, 22.
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the jurisdictional framework, more closely meets the “essential objectives” of equity, 
efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance.
Further, two technical amendments could also add further simplification. First, the law 
should be amended to clarify how the period is calculated by defining what time period 
constitutes a day (ie whether part of a day constitutes a day).419 Also, as it is not clear 
under the 183 day test that residency commences from date of arrival in Australia (see 
Part III C 7), the law also needs to be amended to clarify this point.
Despite that only limited change to the 183 day rule is possible within the jurisdictional 
claim, these minor changes will ensure that the 183 day test more closely meets the tax 
policy objective of simplicity.
2 Domicile test
The domicile test under s 6(l)(a)(i) of the 1936 Act is a cessation test that determines 
when residency ceases. Thus, persons who are domiciled in Australia will remain 
resident until they establish a permanent place of abode elsewhere.
As both the “domicile” element and the “permanent place of abode” gloss are fact and 
circumstances tests, these rules fail a number of the elements that gauge simplicity (ie 
they are not predictable, not proportional and not consistent, are associated with the 
imposition of high compliance burdens, and are difficult to administer) (see Part III). 
The domicile test also fails to meet its legislative intention of capturing government 
workers (due to the Federal Court’s interpretation of “permanent place of abode” in 
Applegate42°) and also fails to satisfy the specific criterion of prevention of tax 
avoidance.
In order to address these concerns, the options for reforming the domicile test are 
examined below, before setting out the recommendations for reform.
419 Section 36 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), which defines dates, is silent on what 
constitutes a day.
420 Applegate v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1979) 9 ATR 899; 79 ATC 4307.
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(a) Evaluating options for reform
Despite claims that the domicile test poses a great hurdle to those who do not wish to 
absent themselves from Australia indefinitely421 (because a taxpayer with an Australian 
domicile regains residency when they lose his or her permanent place of abode422) and 
that it is a “better” test than citizenship (as a person has only one domicile at one 
time)423 there is broad support for the repeal of the domicile test.424
The residency cessation tests, adopted in other jurisdictions, range from fact and 
circumstances tests (such as the establishment of a dwelling in another jurisdiction) to 
specific time limit tests (see Part IV C). In some jurisdictions both style of tests are 
used.425
The dwelling test is more commonly used as a residency tie breaker test by countries 
using the OECD Model Convention (see Part IV C 3(a)). The dwelling test suffers from 
the difficulties of all fact and circumstances tests in respect of simplicity, equity and the 
prevention of tax avoidance.
As evidenced by the many and varied time limits used in the time-based tests used in 
other jurisdictions, it is clear that there is no preferred time limit. The choice of the 
appropriate time limit is arbitrary and dependent upon government policy. For example, 
the United States has adopted a statutory 10 year rule,426 while in the recent past a “two 
year” administrative rule had been adopted both in Australia427 and Canada.428
Arnold and McIntyre in their theoretical residency model suggest a further variation, ie 
“[individuals who have established residence in a country cannot relinquish residence
421 Kohl, above n 258, 439.
422 Alley (1995), above n 42, 52.
423 Sheridan, above n 47, 22.
424 Kohl, above n 258, 439 and Sheridan, above n 47, 22.
425 For example, New Zealand requires absence for only 325 days provided there was no permanent 
place of abode in New Zealand during the period of absence and the person is not engaged in 
Government service - Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OEl(3). Also, Arnold and McIntyre in their 
theoretical model suggest that citizens of a country are residents unless they have established a 
dwelling abroad and are regularly outside the country for more than 183 days per year -  see 
Arnold, above n 241, 22.
426 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986 (US), s 877(a) removes for 10 years any advantages arising from 
non-residency from taxpayers who seek to avoid tax by relinquishing United States' citizenship.
427 Above n 20.
428 Bernstein, above n 275, 262.
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Status until they have established residence status in another country.”429 This approach 
seeks to ensure horizontal equity by excluding from the tax net those persons subject to 
residency taxation in other jurisdictions.
In a similar vein, in the 1997 consultant's report, prepared for the ATO's Electronic 
Commerce Project, it was recommended that:
[consideration be given to changing the definition of individual residence to 
ensure that previous permanent residents remain residents for a period, say 2 
years, after leaving Australia . . . This means that Australians operating from 
locations offshore might still be liable for Australian tax even though they 
have escaped being classified as a resident.430
However, this later approach fails the horizontal equity criterion and persons who have 
establish residency in another jurisdiction will be subject to double taxation.
It must be noted, however, that the mobility of residence in an electronic commerce age 
will not be stopped by any of the measures discussed (see Part III D 3). Although 
extended residency ties such as citizenship or domicile appear superficially attractive to 
capture the fleeing rock star, actor, tennis player, golfer or motor bike racer these tests 
tend to create complexity and fail to counter systemic non-compliance.
The approach adopted in a number of countries is to create rules that specifically deal 
with persons fleeing the jurisdiction for tax purposes and/or use extended source rules to 
tax income with a strong attachment to the jurisdiction 431 These rules in turn in the EU 
have been difficult to enforce as such exit rules are seen as incompatible with the 
principle of freedom of establishment, as set out in Article 43 of the European 
Community Treaty.432 However, exit taxes and other tax retention strategies are not 
residency rules, rather, they are anti-avoidance measures aimed at preserving taxing 
rights outside the operation of the residency rules. Therefore, these retention rules will 
not be discussed as they are outside the scope of this thesis.
429 Arnold, above n 241, 22.
430 Tyree et al, above n 246, Recommendation 6.11.
431 As these persons often visit their "home" jurisdiction an alternative approach advocated by Sharkey 
is to adopt the "habitual visitor" concept from the United Kingdom or the Canadian "sojourners" 
concept - Sharkey, above n 243, 7. However, such tests can be inequitable (by capturing regular 
tourists with little economic attachment to Australia) and are uncertain (being common law or 
administratively based).
432 Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v Ministere de L'Economie, des Finances et de /'Industrie (C- 
9/02) handed down the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on 11 March 2004.
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(b) Finding the balance
Thus, on balance, given the failure of the domicile test to meet the evaluative criteria, 
and the fact that since Applegate its policy purpose has been thwarted, the test should be 
replaced with an objective time limit test so that abandonment is certain. As a two year 
period was used as an administrative rule in the past, that time period could be used in 
the test. Such a test will be simpler. To counter blatant manipulation, the test should 
carry a gloss that Australian residents cannot relinquish residence status until they have 
established residence status in another country.
However, despite the merits of this suggested reform, the replacement of the domicile 
concept with a number of days would amount to a major alteration of Australia’s 
jurisdictional claim. Therefore, these improvements cannot be achieved within the 
jurisdictional framework.
Although the domicile test must remain, the ‘'permanent place of abode” gloss should be 
amended to restore the original intent of the test, ie that the test does not apply where 
persons have established a home in another jurisdiction. Therefore, the adoption of the 
suggested gloss “that Australian residents cannot relinquish residence status until they 
have established residence status in another country” would have the effect of meeting 
the original jurisdictional claim and reduce the scope for manipulation. Although this 
approach is different to the current “domicile test” gloss, it does not appear to practically 
increase or decrease the original jurisdictional claim. Thus, such a change would more 
closely meet the “essential objective” of the prevention of tax avoidance, within the 
intended jurisdictional framework.
3 Superannuation test
In Part III it was found that the superannuation test is the one domestic residency rule 
that is simple and is not able to be easily manipulated. However, the test fails the 
horizontal equity requirement as it applies inconsistently to tax only some categories of 
public servants and to treat the spouses and children of public servants differently to 
other spouses and children.
171
Further, the test also fails its original intention (ie to extend the scope of the Act to 
ensure that . . the High Commissioners for Australia and Agent-Generals for the 
Australian States together with members of their staffs, [are] treated as residents . . .” 
liable for tax as other residents).433 Also, the scope and relevance of the test long term 
may be potentially reduced following the enactment on 30 June 2004 of the 
Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Act 2004 
(Cth). This Act provides scope to allow public servants to choose their preferred 
superannuation fund in the future. If this occurs, the number of persons to whom the 
superannuation residency test applies will fall conversely. This in turn will increase the 
number of persons able to avoid the operation of the test by merely choosing an 
alternative superannuation fund to CSS or PSS.
In order to address these concerns, the options for reforming the superannuation test are 
examined below, before setting out the recommendations for reform.
(a) Evaluating options for reform
Given that:
• entitlement to superannuation is ultimately determined by the CSS and PSS 
schemes434 residency plays little or no role in that determination; and
• the purpose was to permit locally engaged staff to participate in the 
superannuation arrangements and they are expressly excluded from membership 
under both superannuation tests435
there is no further reason for the continued existence of the test. However, as the 
effectiveness of the domicile test to ensure public servants serving in other jurisdictions 
remain residents is doubtful following the decision in Applegate, consideration must be 
given to enacting a government employee/service test.
Many countries (including Canada, France and New Zealand) adopted specific 
government service residency tests (see Part IV C 3(b)). Some countries extend the test
433 Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 (Cth) 10.
434 See Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth), s 3(1) and Superannuation Act 1990 (Cth), s 6(1).
435 Ibid n 70 and 71.
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to persons employed in state owned enterprises. However, such tests are driven by the 
desire of nations to ensure that those persons serving those nations remain residents 
regardless of their period of absence from their home state.
Leaving aside this political/national imperative, government service tests are difficult to 
justify in terms of horizontal equity. Although, the tests create horizontal equity between 
all government workers they perpetuate horizontal inequity between those workers and 
all other non-resident workers employed by the non-government sector. They do, 
however, generally satisfy the simplicity criterion.
(b) Finding the balance
On balance, given that the superannuation test no longer fulfils the purpose for which it 
was introduced, the test should be repealed. Although the repeal may result in a practical 
reduction in the potential jurisdictional claim, that wider jurisdiction was never intended 
to be claimed, except in respect of a very narrow class of persons. Thus, the repeal of the 
test will have the effect of restoring the intended jurisdictional claim and thereby ensure 
that the domestic law of individual residency more closely meets the “essential 
objectives” of horizontal equity.
Further, ignoring the operative effect of the current domicile test, a pure resides test will 
potentially capture public servants working abroad, thereby stemming any potential 
jurisdiction or revenue loss. If a government service rule was to replace the 
superannuation test, the test would increase horizontal inequity as more public servants 
would be treated differently to other employees. However, although the government 
service rule may be justifiable on Government policy reasons, it is difficult to justify in 
the context of the evaluative criteria.
In summary, within the strict citeria of the sub-thesis the repeal of the superannuation 
test would amount to a minor variation in the jurisdictional claim. However, as this 
extension was not part of the intended jurisdictional claim, its removal will ensure that 
the domestic law of individual residency more closely meets the “essential objectives” 
of horizontal equity, within the intended jurisdictional framework.
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4 Resides test
The resides test under s 6(1 )(a) of the 1936 Act results in horizontal inequity, is complex 
and is open to manipulation (see Part III). In order to address these concerns, the options 
for reforming the resides test are examined below, before setting out the 
recommendations for reform.
(a) Evaluating options for reform
Countries such as the United States, have responded to the concerns about complexity 
and avoidance436 arising under fact and circumstance tests by replacing them with 
specific criteria tests (eg citizenship)437 and/or specific time period tests (eg New 
Zealand and Norway)438 (see Part IV). Thus, simplicity has been put ahead of the full 
consideration of an individual’s personal circumstances.439
Despite the adoption of more objective tests, most countries, even in the reform context, 
have retained limited fact and circumstance tests (see Part IV C 1). The reasons for 
countries retaining such tests vary, but in the main it is concerns that pure presence tests 
will often fail to capture persons who otherwise have strong attachment to the 
jurisdiction.440
A “fact and circumstances” test is even used in the OECD Model Convention’s tie­
breaker test (ie the concept of permanent home (dwelling)). This concept is narrower
436 McIntyre, above n 367.
437 The Deficit Reduction Act 1984 (US) Introduced the statutory definition of United States resident - 
see Leonard W Rothschild Jr and Michael G Schirmer, ‘United States: Determining residency for 
Federal income tax purposes’ (1993) 47 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 85.
438 See, eg, Norway has changed from an “intention” basis to an factual test tiered test based upon a 
number of days, with loss of residency occurring if: the person does not have a permanent home; 
residency is established in another state; and less than 61 days is spent in Norway - see Zimmer, 
above n 373. Also Chartered Institute of Taxation (UK), which in commenting on proposed United 
Kingdom enquiry into individual residency rules, recommended the replacement of the resides test 
with a test based upon the number of days present in the United Kingdom coupled with a weighted 
average test in respect of prior year presence - see Chartered Institute of Taxation (UK) Reviewing 
the Residence and Domicile Rules as they Affect the Taxation o f Individuals: A Background Paper, 
1 August 2003, para 8.2. This is consistent with the recommendations of the United Kingdom, 
Final Report o f the Royal Commission on the Taxation o f Profits and Income Cmd 9474 (1955), 
para 292. The Commission viewed the devotion by Inland Revenue of a great deal of time and skill 
in considering and adjudicating upon individual residency cases as the major reason for the 
adoption of fixed rules to determine residency.
439 Ibid 1955 United Kingdom Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income and Davies, 
above n 45, 25.
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than residence, focusing on the existence of accommodation for permanent use (see Part 
II C 2(b)(i)). Therefore, although it suffers from the complexity and avoidance issues of 
all fact and circumstance tests (see Part IV C 3(a)), its narrower focus on the existence 
of accommodation makes it easier to apply than a resides test. This test also has the 
advantage of being consistent with the residency rules in many countries and with the 
OECD Model Convention.
(b) Finding the balance
In order to counter avoidance and to ensure horizontal equity, a facts and circumstance 
“resides” test of some form needs to be retained. It is argued that the current resides test 
should be retained due to the inherent flexibility of the resides concept (“. . . as society's 
perceptions change, so will the notion of residence”), which helps to counter tax 
avoidance.441 By taking account of family circumstances, the “resides” rule catches 
those who seek to place their families in a country offering a better environment for their 
families, while at the same time avoiding the residency downside (and paying for those 
advantages) by keeping income earning assets outside the jurisdiction's tax net.
However, despite these claims, the resultant complexity is not fully compensated by this 
flexibility as the resides test is only likely to evolve at the margins. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that this evolution will result in a new concept that will counter the mobility 
problems, facilitated by the growth in electronic communication.442
The residency tests used in other jurisdictions do give a range of alternative tests that 
could simplify the law, however, simplicity is generally achieved through narrowing the 
intended jurisdiction claim. Therefore, within the terms of the sub-thesis, the resides test 
cannot be modified to better meet the evaluative criteria without creating a major 
variation to the jurisdictional claim.
440 Sharkey, above n 243, 8 notes that many prescriptive rules tend to focus on the individual and 
thereby often fail to capture such persons.
441 Gzell (1996), above n 11, 8.
442 Ibid, 9. Prebble, above n 192, 389 notes that as people’s mobility make it more difficult to refine 
residency rules to pure physical location, jurisdictions in defining their residency rules have 
adopted physical facts, metaphysical facts (such as intention) and resort to formal, arbitrary criteria 
where dual residency occurs. Thus, “[t]he arbitrariness of residency rules results . . . from practical 
difficulty, not from conceptual impossibility.”
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5 Other definitions
Contained within the tax laws and related legislation there exist a number of specific 
residency definitions and other rules that impact upon the scope of the s 6(1) rules (see 
Part II B). They include:
• s 23AG of 1936 Act, which provides an exemption with progression for income 
arising from continuous foreign service;
• the term “ordinarily resident” is used in ss 23(a)(ii), 23(v), 23AA, 128J( 1 )(b), 
251U(l)(e), 252(3)(b), 252A(2A)(b) of the 1936 Act and in number of DTAs;
• the “Territory resident” test exists in Division 1A of Part III of the 1936 Act, 
which provides the basis for Norfolk Island residents to be exempt from tax on 
income derived from sources in and outside of the Territory;
• a “resident taxpayer” as defined in s 3(1) of Income Tax Rates Act, which 
enables, in certain circumstances, a non-resident who receives government 
benefits is taxed at resident rates; and
• an "Australian resident" is defined in s 3(1) of the Health Insurance Act 1973 
(Cth), to determine who is entitled to Medicare benefits.
The ordinarily resident and territory resident facts and circumstance tests fail to deliver 
horizontal equity (as they can result persons in similar circumstances having different 
residency status) and are not simple (ie lack predictability, impose compliance and 
administrative burdens) (see Part III A 1 and C ). The continuous foreign exemption (s 
23AG of the 1936 Act) lacks simplicity by carrying high compliance costs, while the 
Income Tax Rates Act and the Health Insurance Act residency definitions rules, although 
targeted to certain policy outcomes, are not coordinated with other definitions leading to 
unnecessary complexity.
(a) Evaluating options for reform
Other than the “ordinary” resident test, the other specialist residency tests are policy 
specific to Australia, thereby limiting the scope for comparison with other jurisdictions. 
Further, there are limitations on the avenues to reform some of the specific residency 
tests, as alterations to the definitions in the Medicare and Rates Act could impact upon
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social security and health policy. For example, if special definitions used to determine 
liability to the Medicare levy and entitlement to the benefits o f that levy were matched, 
complexity would be reduced but this would impact upon both health policy and 
possibly Government revenue.
This is not the case with “ordinary” resident. The difference between the terms 
“resident” and “ordinary resident” is subtle.443 However, despite this subtlety, Dixon J in 
Gregory v Deputy Commissioner o f  Taxation (WA) when considering the meaning of the 
word "resident" in s 5A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1934 (Cth) did not 
differentiate, stating that the word resident “. . . should receive the same meaning and 
application as “person residing” and “ordinary resident” have been given in England.”444 
Further, given that the ordinary residence concept does not determine liability (as it does 
in the United Kingdom and Ireland (see Part IV B 2)) the subtle difference is of lesser 
importance in Australian law. Therefore, the “ordinarily resident” tests in ss 23(a)(ii), 
23(v), 23 AA, 128J(1 )(b), 251U(l)(e), 252(3)(b), 252A(2A)(b) of the 1936 Act could be 
replaced with the resides test without dramatically altering the scope or intent of the 
sections.
Similarly, the words “ordinary place of residence" in the “Territory resident” definition 
in s 24C of the 1936 Act could use the “resides” test without dramatically altering the 
scope or intent of the section. These changes would create consistency and lessen 
complexity by removing unnecessary definitions.
(b) Finding the balance
On balance, the “ordinarily” resident and “ordinary place of residence" tests could be 
replaced in the 1936 Act by the “resides” test, in order to create consistency and lessen 
complexity. The effect of these changes would be that the domestic law of individual 
residency, within the broad jurisdictional framework, will more closely meet the 
“essential objective” of simplicity.
443 United Kingdom Codification Committee, above n 78, 38 noted that it is impossible to accept that 
the words describe the same degree of residence.
444 Gregory v Deputy Commissioner o f Taxation (WA) (1937) 57 CLR 774, 111; 4 ATD 397, 399; 1 
AITR 201, 202.
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6DTAs
Australia’s DTAs have been developed in the main over the last 58 years through 
country by country negotiation, the tie breaker tests adopted and the order in which they 
appear varies from DTA to DTA (see Part II C). This variation in wording creates 
inconsistency and complexity. Also, a lack of horizontal equity inherently arises from 
the existence of DTAs, as only resident of the States that are parties to the treaty can 
avail themselves of the DTA tie breaker test. As a result some dual resident migrant 
individuals in a DTA country will be treated differently to those dual resident 
individuals from non-DTA countries.
(a) Evaluating options for reform
As discussed above, the horizontal inequity issue should be short term, as the 
Government is escalating Australia's future treaty negotiation program. However, the 
variations in the form of residency tests in each treaty (resulting in part from a failure to 
adopt the OECD model residency article) and with the vagueness of the terms used in 
the various tests are longer term problems. This idiosyncratic approach to wording in 
Australian DTAs can only lead to interpretative issues, particularly where there is wide 
divergence from the OECD Model Convention. Such variations also tend to slow the 
DTA negotiation/renegotiation process. As a result such arbitrary departures tend to 
counter the simplicity objective.
(b) Finding the balance
As Australia’s DTAs generally follow the OECD Model Convention the only change 
required would be to ensure that in treaty negotiations the tie breaker tests are equivalent 
to those in Article 4 of the OECD Model Convention. Over time, as treaties are 
renegotiated, the effect of this change in treaty policy will be that the law of individual 
residency, within the jurisdictional framework, will more closely meet the “essential 
objective” of simplicity.
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7 Miscellaneous changes
Finally, there are some minor changes which if adopted may improve simplicity without 
adversely impacting upon the other policy objectives.
First, as noted in Part II, there is a lack of clarity about the operational order of the 
various residency tests in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act (ie a lack of hierarchy). This lack of 
clarity arises as the 1930 Explanatory Notes appear to indicate that the common law test 
has primacy in application,445 while the courts tend to apply the specific statutory tests 
(ie the domicile, 183 day or Commonwealth superannuation tests) prior to or in 
conjunction with the general common law resides test. Thus, simplicity is reduced as the 
interrelationship between the primary residency rules is unclear.
The creation of a formal hierarchy of tests is a structural change, which would aid 
simplicity (by creating certainty) while not impacting on the other tax policy objectives. 
A recommended structure would be to order the statutory the tests, stating with the 
attachment rule (183 day tests), followed by the cessation rule (domicile test) and the 
special criteria rules (superannuation test and possibly some of the specific purpose tests 
such as the “Territory resident” test). The resides test, if retained will continue as a catch 
all test.
A second minor change would be to rewrite the residency rules in the “plain” English 
gender neutral style, consistent with the language of the 1997 Act and relocate the 
revised definition in the 1997 Act. This would also result in increased simplicity as the 
language, would be consistent with the 1997 Act, and compliance costs for tax 
professionals would be reduced as the tests would be contained in the principal 1997 
Act.
Thus, these two minor changes will have the effect of ensuring that the domestic law of 
individual residency, within the jurisdictional framework, more closely meets the 
“essential objectives” of simplicity.
445 Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 (Cth), 9.
179
C. Summary
In the above analysis each of the Australian residency rules has been examined to 
determine whether the rules can be modified, within the jurisdictional framework to 
better meet the evaluative criteria. It has been recommended that the superannuation 
test should be repealed and the ordinary resident test removed. Although changes to the 
resides, 183 day and the domicile tests have been recommended, only those minor 
changes which do not extensively modify the jurisdictional claim can be adopted. These 
changes, combined with some technical alternations will result in the individual 
residency rules better meeting the evaluative criteria. However, greater improvement 
could be achieved through more major variations to the jurisdictional claim.
VI. Conclusions
A. The main thesis
The purpose of the analysis in Parts II and III of this Chapter was to establish the main 
thesis in respect of the residency rules applicable to individuals, that is:
The law, as applying in the 1997 Act, is inadequate as the law fails in its 
practical application to satisfy the "essential objectives” o f equity, 
efficiency, simplicity and the prevention o f tax avoidance.
In Part II of the Chapter, the scope of the residency rules for individual residency was 
explored, covering:
• the principal rules (resides, domicile, 183 day and superannuation tests) in s 6(1) 
of the 1936 Act;
• the other residency tests (continuous foreign service exemption, other definitions 
(ordinarily, Territory and foreign residents) and definitions in other Acts); and
• the impact of the DTA tie breaker tests.
These tests were evaluated in Part III against the evaluative criteria (equity, efficiency, 
simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance). Overall they fail in identified ways to
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satisfy the equity, efficiency, simplicity and prevention of tax avoidance evaluative 
criterion. The superannuation test, which is the only rule that satisfies both the simplicity 
and tax avoidance criteria, failed the horizontal equity requirement. For the balance of 
the residence tests for individuals (resides, domicile, 183 day, Territory resident and 
ordinarily resident tests and elements of the DTA tie breaker tests) the major weakness 
is the individual facts and circumstances element of the tests in certain situations which:
• results in horizontal inequity;
• gives rise the lack of simplicity; and
• leaves the rules open to manipulation.
Further, although the facts and circumstances element of the tests does cater for an 
individual’s circumstances, it does mean that there is horizontal equity. These problems 
arise in part from the fact that the law has not been formulated from basic principles, 
rather it has arisen from . . the accidents of political and commercial considerations in 
past history . . . perpetuated”.446
Thus, it has been established that residency rules applicable to individuals in the 1997 
Act are inadequate as the law fails in its practical application to satisfy the “essential 
objectives” of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance.
B. The sub-thesis
The purpose of the analysis in Parts IV and V of this Chapter was to establish the sub­
thesis in respect of the residency rules applicable to individuals, that is:
The domestic law can be modified within the jurisdictional framework to 
more closely meet the "essential objectives” o f equity, efficiency, simplicity 
and the prevention o f tax avoidance.
In the above Part IV a comparative review of the residency rules adopted domestically 
in a number of jurisdictions was undertaken in two stages. Initially, the review looked at 
the residency rules for individuals in the context of each country’s tax system. The
446 Sir Josiah Stamp, The Fundamental Principles of Taxation in the Light o f Modern Developments 
(1936) 25.
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countries examined were divided into common law countries that tax through a single 
code, common law countries that operate on a schedular system and the European civil 
law countries. The purpose of this contextual review was to provide a comparison of the 
of residency tests adopted in the context of the legal systems of each country. This 
contextual comparion could not be demonstrated by merely evaluating the categories of 
residency rules on a rule-by-rule basis.
However, the contextual review merely confirms that nations set their residency rules 
based upon each jurisdiction’s own economic and social value judgments. Whether a 
jurisdiction adopts “fact and circumstance” criterion or more objective criteria does not 
have any relevance to the basis of the legal system (civil or common law) nor to the 
structure of the tax codes (single code or schedular code).
The second stage of the comparative review examined the foreign domestic residency 
rules against the evaluative criteria on a rule-by-rule basis. This was done by comparing 
and evaluating the individual residency test within the three broad approaches adopted 
world wide (individual facts and circumstances tests, arbitrary number of days tests, and 
specific criteria tests) to determine a connection to a jurisdiction.
What emerged from this second stage of the comparative review is that the residency 
rules adopted world wide, like the rules operating in Australia, are unable to satisfy all 
the evaluative criteria. Another outcome of the study was that although there were a 
number of similarly named tests, often the tests were structured differently from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Finally in Part V, changes to the current Australian residency rules were explored to 
determine whether modifications to the rules would better satisfy the evaluative criteria. 
The reform recommendations arising are set out in the following.
1 183 Day Test
In light of the need to counter avoidance and the resultant simplicity it is recommended 
that the 183 day test be revised to change the measurement period to any 12 month 
period, rather than a tax year. However, further changes to increase simplicity by
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repealing pre DTA 183 day test glosses (ie the “usual place of abode” and the 
“intention” glosses) cannot be adopted as the change would amount to a major variation 
of Australia’s jurisdictional claim.
Despite the inability to alter the glosses, the change to the measurement period should 
result in a test which is simple, less easy to manipulate and does not create major 
horizontal inequities. The test, as modified, will have the effect of ensuring that the 
domestic law of individual residency, within the broad jurisdictional framework, more 
closely meets the “essential objectives” of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the 
prevention of tax avoidance.
Further technical amendments could also add further simplification. First, the law 
should be amended to clarify how the period is calculated by defining what time period 
constitutes a day (ie whether part of a day constitutes a day). Also, the law needs to be 
amended to clarify that under the 183 day test residency commences from date of arrival 
in Australia. As a result the effect of these changes will ensure that the domestic law of 
individual residency, within the jurisdictional framework, more closely meets the tax 
policy objective of simplicity.
2 Domicile test
Given the failure of the domicile test in s 6(1 )(a)(i) of the 1936 Act to meet the 
evaluative criteria, and the fact that since Applegate its policy purpose has been 
thwarted, it was suggested that the test should be replaced with an objective time limit 
so that the point of abandonment is certain. However, despite the merits of this 
suggested reform, the replacement of the domicile concept with a number of days would 
amount to a major alteration of Australia’s jurisdictional claim.
It was recommended, however, that although the domicile test must remain, the 
“permanent place of abode” gloss should be amended to restore the original intent of the 
test, ie that the test does not apply where persons have established a home in another 
jurisdiction. The adoption of the gloss that Australian residents cannot relinquish 
residence status until they have established residence status in another country would 
have the effect of meeting the original jurisdictional claim and reduce the scope for
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manipulation. Thus, such a change would more closely meet the “essential objective” of 
the prevention of tax avoidance, within the intended jurisdictional framework.
3 Superannuation test
Ignoring the operative effect of the current domicile test, a pure resides test will 
potentially capture public servants working abroad. Therefore, the repeal of 
superannuation test will not impact upon the jurisdictional claim. Further, the repeal of 
the test will have the effect of ensuring that the domestic law of individual residency, 
within the intended jurisdictional framework, more closely meets the “essential 
objectives” of horizontal equity.
As the resides test will potentially capture public servants working abroad, there is no 
need for a government service rule to replace the superannuation test. Such a test would 
increase horizontal inequity, as more public servants would be treated differently to 
other employees. Although the government service rule may be justifiable on 
Government policy reasons, it is difficult to justify in the context of the evaluative 
criteria.
4 Resides test
The review of the residency tests in other jurisdictions revealed a range of alternative 
tests that could simplify the law. However, simplicity is generally achieved through 
narrowing the jurisdiction claim. Given that the reform solution in terms of the sub­
thesis should not limit the jurisdictional claim, none of the alternatives are viable. 
Therefore, the test cannot be modified within the jurisdictional claim to better meet the 
evaluative criteria.
5 Other definitions
On balance, it is concluded that the terms “ordinary resident” and “ordinary place of 
residence" could be replaced in the 1936 Act by the resides test which would create 
consistency and lessen complexity by removing unnecessary definitions. The effect of
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these changes is that the domestic law of individual residency, within the jurisdictional 
framework, will more closely meet the “essential objective” of simplicity.
6DTAs
As Australia’s DTAs generally follow the OECD Model Convention the only change 
would be to ensure that in treaty negotiations, the tie breaker tests are equivalent to those 
in Article 4 of the OECD Model Convention. The effect of these changes is that the law 
of individual residency, within the jurisdictional framework, will more closely meet the 
“essential objective” of simplicity.
7 Miscellaneous changes
The creation of a formal hierarchy of tests is a structural change, which would aid 
simplicity (by creating certainty) while not impacting on the other tax policy objectives. 
A recommended structure would to be to order the statutory tests, starting with the 
attachment rule (183 day tests), followed by the cessation rule (domicile test) and the 
special criteria rules (superannuation test and possibly some of the specific purpose 
tests, such as the “Territory resident” test). The resides test, if retained, will continue as 
a catch all test.
A second minor change would be to rewrite the residency rules in the “plain” English 
gender neutral style consistent with the language of the 1997 Act and relocate the 
revised definition in the 1997 Act. This would also result in increased simplicity as the 
language would be consistent with the 1997 Act, and compliance costs for tax 
professionals reduced as the tests would be contained in the principal 1997 Act.
Thus, these two minor changes will have the effect of ensuring that the domestic law of 
individual residency, within the jurisdictional framework, more closely meets the 
“essential objectives” of simplicity.
Thus, although not every individual residency test is able to be amended, overall it has 
been established that residency rules applicable to individuals in the 1997 Act, if 
modified within the jurisdictional framework as recommended, will more closely meet
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the "essential objectives” of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of tax 
avoidance.
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Chapter 4
Residency of companies and trusts
1. Purpose of this Chapter
Having evaluated in Chapter 3 the domestic residency rules applicable to individuals in 
terms of the main thesis and sub-thesis, the focus of this Chapter is to similarly evaluate 
the residency tests for companies and trusts in the context of both the thesis and sub­
thesis. Although it has been argued that the concept of permanent establishment (which 
sets the threshold for countries to impose source-based taxation of business income1 2) 
should be treated as akin to a residency rule, that rule of attachment will be examined 
in the context of source taxation in Chapter 5.
As the residency rules for companies and trusts under the tax laws are distinct 
(reflecting their differential tax treatments) they will be examined separately.3 Thus, in 
Part II the operation of the residency rules relating to companies will be explored in 
order to provide the necessary basis to enable evaluation of those rules against the 
evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, simplicity and prevention of tax avoidance (in 
Part III).
Parts IV and V of the Chapter explore the sub-thesis (ie alternative approaches to the 
current rules that may better satisfy the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, 
simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance) through the use of comparative studies 
of the domestic approaches to company residency adopted in other jurisdictions. 
However, as in Chapter 3, this latter analysis will be restricted to the domestic residency
1 Michael J Graetz ‘Taxing international income: Inadequate principals, outdated concepts, and 
unsatisfactory policies’ (2001) 26 Brooklyn Journal o f International Law 1357, 1421. Robert 
Couzin in Corporate Residence and International Taxation (2002), 4 notes that “permanent 
establishment” is the means by which a state taxes an item of income, earned by persons who do 
not exhibit the nexus for residence taxation, as if the income was earned by a resident. This is 
justified on the basis that the income is of a kind that establishes a secondary nexus sufficient to 
warrant this treatment.
2 Kerrie Sadiq, 'Jurisdiction to tax and the case for threshold reform' (Paper presented at the 16th 
Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Adelaide, 30 January 2004), 2.
3 The order of discussion reflects the importance of each category to the tax system, ie in 2001-02 
648,504 company returns were lodged disclosing net tax liability of $27.6 billion, while only 
455,980 trusts were lodged -  see Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Taxation Statistics 
2001-02 (2004) 51 and 90.
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rules. DTAs will not be compared as the Australian DTAs are based upon the OECD 
Model Convention and the variations away from the OECD Model are identified in the 
analysis of DTAs in the various Parts of the Chapter.
This process will be repeated for trusts, with Part VI exploring the operation of the 
residency rules relating to trusts, which will provide the necessary basis to enable 
review of those rules against the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, simplicity and 
prevention of tax avoidance (in Part VII). Where the residency tests for trusts have 
common features, discussion will not be repeated; rather the discussion will focus on 
the specific features of the test in that context. In Part VIII a comparative analysis in 
respect of trusts will be undertaken, followed by analysis of reform options (in Part IX) 
in light of the evaluative criteria in order to determine whether the proposed reforms 
deliver more equity, efficiency, simplicity and are more able to prevent tax avoidance.
Finally, the findings and recommendations made within the chapter are summarised in 
Part X.
II. Exploring the Main Thesis -  Scope of the residency rules for
companies
As mentioned above, the preliminary step in evaluating the main thesis is the need to 
explore the scope of the residency rules applicable to companies. This first involves 
exploring the principal residency tests contained in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act before 
exploring the other residency definitions and rules that impact or alter the scope of the 
those principal residency tests in specific circumstances. Finally, as the domestic 
residency definitions can be overridden by the residency tie-breaker test contained in 
most Australian DTAs, for completeness it is important to explore the impact of DTAs 
on the scope of the domestic residency rules.
Prior to exploring the scope of the principal residency rules applicable to companies, the 
preliminary step is to define what a company is in this context.
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A. Defining a company
A “company” for the purposes of the 1997 Act is defined in s 995-1 as:
(a) a body corporate; or
(b) any other unincorporated association or bodies of persons; 
but does not include a partnership or a non-entity joint venture.4 5678
This definition is wider than the definition of “company” under the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth),'’ and includes within the definition unincorporated bodies like football clubs 
and political parties. Also, “corporate limited partnerships”, “corporate unit trusts” and
o
“public trading trusts” are treated as companies under the 1936 and 1997 Acts
B. Defining the scope of the principal residency test for companies
The exploration of the scope of the principal residency rules applicable to companies 
contained in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act will be undertaken by first providing an overview of 
the rules and their interrelationship before exploring the scope of each of the rules in 
detail.
1 Overview of the principal residency rules
An "Australian resident", as defined in s 995-1 of the 1997 Act, is a person (including a 
company) who is a resident under the 1936 Act. The principal company residency tests 
are in s 6(1 )(b) of the 1936 Act, which states that a:
“resident” or “resident of Australia” means . . .
(b) a company which is
* incorporated in Australia, or
* not being incorporated in Australia, carries on business in Australia and has 
either:
* its central management and control in Australia, or
4 An “entity” is defined in s 960-100(1) of the 1997 Act to include “. . . (b) a body corporate . . . (e) 
any other unincorporated association or bodies of persons". It is these entities that are liable for tax 
under the Act (s 9-1).
5 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9.
6 1936 Acts 94.
7 1936 Act Division 6B - ss 102D to 102L.
8 1936 Act Division 6C - ss 102M to 102T.
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* its voting power controlled by shareholders who are residents of 
Australia;
Thus, the definition contains alternative three statutory tests for determining residency: 
an “incorporation” test, a “central management and control” test and a “voting power 
control” test. Thus, the definition deems residency if the place of creation is in Australia 
or where the place of business activity is Australia and its management is in Australia or 
its ownership is Australian. This is the same company test adopted in the 1930's when 
the Commonwealth9 and some states10 introduced the residency basis of taxation. On 
repeal of the 1922 Act the company definition was incorporated unchanged into the 
1936 Act.* 11
The scope of the alternative three statutory tests in s 6(1 )(b) of the 1936 Act for 
determining company residency (the incorporation, central management and control and 
voting power control tests) are explored in the following paragraphs.
2 The scope o f the incorporation test
The first statutory test for corporate residency is “whether the company was 
incorporated in Australia”. The test means that “... incorporation in Australia in itself 
[is] decisive of residence . . .”,12 reversing the common law presumption that 
incorporation will not be decisive in determining residency.13 The test was designed to 
capture companies “incorporated in Australia to operate outside Australia” and to ensure 
that residency could be determined regardless of where “the head office of control may 
be situated”.14
9 This definition of a resident company was first introduced into the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1922 (Cth) via s 2(i)(b) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1930 (Cth).
10 For example, a residency basis of taxation was introduced in South Australia via s 4 of the 
Taxation Act 1931 (SA) and in Victoria via s 2 of the Income Tax Acts Amendment Tax Act 1931 
(Vic). Tasmania also followed suit while Queensland fully exempted ex-Australian income. In 
New South Wales ex-Australian income was only partially taxed (income from non-investment 
trade or business), as was ex-Australian income in Western Australia (export income).
11 1936 Acts 6(1 )(b).
12 Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1941) 64 CLR 241, 251; 2 
AITR 167, 174; 6 ATD 42, 45 (Williams J).
13 See eg De Beers Consolidated Mines v Howe (1906) 5 TC 198, 212-213 (Lord Lorebum LC) and 
Todd v Egyptian Delta Land Investment Co Ltd [1929] AC 1, 14 (Viscount Summer). As see 
Couzin, above n 1, 29-55 for a history of the presumption.
14 Note on Clause 2 in Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 
(Cth), 11.
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The theoretical basis for the incorporation test is the view that by giving the company its 
existence and the advantages of incorporation in the jurisdiction, the quid pro quo for 
the company is taxation as a resident (ie a tax loyalty argument).15 There are also 
traditional, practical reasons for the “incorporation” test. As the owners of a company 
would normally incorporate a company in their place of residence, it is appropriate that 
the location of company residency be that of its owners. Thus, “the consequences that 
follow from being treated as a resident are the quid pro quo for the privilege of 
incorporation”.16
As “company” is defined in s 995-1 of the 1997 Act to include “. . . any other 
unincorporated association or bodies of persons" not all companies are caught within 
this test.
3 Central management and control test 
(a) Overview
The second statutory test in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act, the central management and control 
test, has been adopted from the common law of the United Kingdom.17 The definition 
was intended to apply “ . . . to companies . . . whose central management and control is 
in Australia” thereby ensuring that a “. . . number of companies incorporated outside 
Australia whose sole or principal business is located in Australia” were taxable as 
residents.18
The test’s theoretical origins lie in the " . . .  chief and principal place of business activity 
and social life"19 criterion under the common law tests for the residency of individuals.20
15 Roger Hamilton, Robert Deutsch and John Raneri, Australian International Taxation (October 
2002), para 2.180.
16 Richard Vann, ‘Central Management and Control: Do We Need It’ (Paper presented at the ATO 
Advanced Workshop on Residency, Sydney, 31 August 1995), 7.
17 Taxation Review Committee, Commonwealth, Full Report {1975) (Asprey Report), 255.
18 Note on Clause 2 in Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 
(Cth), 11.
19 This factor is illustrated in Gregory v Deputy Commissioner o f Taxation (WA) (1937) 57 CLR 774; 
1 AITR 201; 4 ATD 397.
20 De Beers Consolidated Mines v Howe [1906] AC 455, 458; (1906) 5 TC 211, 212-213 (Lord 
Lorebum LC) stated, “. . . in applying the concept of residence to a company, we ought, I think, to 
proceed as nearly as we can upon the analogy of an individual. A company cannot eat or sleep, but 
it can keep house and do business. We ought, therefore, to see where it really keeps house and does 
business.”
191
This rationalisation was accepted by the High Courts decision in Koitaki Para Rubber
21Estates Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation where Starke J noted that:
It is unnecessary for me to traverse again the “weary road of the tax cases.”
A company may be a “resident” for the purposes of Income Tax Acts and it 
may have more than one residence for the purposes of these Acts. A 
company resides “wherever it keeps house and does business.” . . .  If its 
central management and control abide in a particular place the company 
resides there for the purposes of income tax.
The test is in some ways akin to a source rule in that the place of closest economic 
connection with the company’s income is likely to be the place of central management 
and control.22
The test appears on its plain reading to consist of two elements: the first element is that 
the company must be carrying on business in Australia and the second element is that it 
must have its central management and control in Australia. Before examining the scope 
of each element of the central management and control test, it is important to determine 
whether the first element (carries on a business) has an independent role in terms of the 
test, in light of conflicting legal interpretation that calls into question its independent 
operation.
(b) Is the “carries on business in Australia” element relevant?
The High Court in Malayan Shipping Co v Federal Commissioner of Taxation ' found 
that once central management and control was established, it would be inferred that a 
business is being carried on. As Williams J noted:
In Mitchell v Egyptian Hotels Ltd [1915] AC 1022, at p 1073 Lord Parker of 
Waddington said: "Where the brain which controls the operations from 
which the profits and gains arise is in this country, the trade or business is, at 
any rate partly, carried on in this country." The purpose of requiring that, in 
addition to carrying on business in Australia, the central management and 
control of the business or the controlling shareholders must be situate or 
resident in Australia is, in my opinion, to make it clear that the mere trading 
in Australia by a Company not incorporated in Australia will not of itself be 
sufficient to cause the company to become a resident of Australia. But if the 
business o f the company carried on in Australia consists o f or includes its
21 (1941) 64 CLR 241, 246; 2 AITR 167, 170; 6 ATD 82, 85.
22 Richard Vann, ‘Prologue’ in Richard Vann (ed), Company Tax Reform (1988), ixxvii.
23 (1946) 71 CLR 156; 8 ATD 75; 3 AITR 258.
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central management and control, then the company is carrying on business 
in Australia and its central management and control is in Australia.“4 
[Emphasis added]
Justice Dixon also expressed a similar view in North Australian Pastoral Co Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner o f Taxation. Justice Dixon stated that:
[i]n the first place, it is well to remember that the basal principal is that a 
company resides where its real business is carried on and that is for the 
purpose of ascertaining where that is that the subsidiary principal is invoked 
that the place where the superior direction and control is exercised 
determines where the real business is carried on.
Despite the “carries on business” element of the test has been broadly accepted as 
otiose,20 there are those who believe that . . to be resident it must be positively shown 
that the acts of management and control are genuinely accompanied by acts of carrying 
on business.”27 Similarly, the 2002 Review of International Taxation Arrangements 
(RITA) Consultation Paper notes that the case law is not entirely clear and illustrates the
uncertainty by revealing that the Commissioner applies the test so that the carries on
28business element is separate to the central management and control element.
In light of this uncertainty, and recommendations by the Board of Taxation in 2003 to 
repeal the central management and control test,29 the Government sought the release of a
24 (1946) 71 CLR 156, 159; 8 ATD 75, 77; 3 AITR 258, 261.
25 (1946) 71 CLR 623, 629; 8 ATD 121, 125; 3 AITR 314, 319. Also see San Paulo (Brazilian) 
Railway Company v Carter (1895) 3 Tax 407, 410 (Lord Halsbury LC) who noted that the phrase 
“where trade is carried on” has two meanings: one being where the day to day business is 
conducted (“. . . where things corporeally exist or are dealt with”), the other the place where “. . . 
the conduct and management, the head and brain of the trading adventure” is located which may be 
different.
26 Asprey Report, above n 17, 255, NE Challoner and JM Greenwood Income Tax Law and Practice 
(Commonwealth) (2nd ed, 1962), 42, Uta Kohl, ‘The Horror-Scope for the Taxation Office: The 
Internet and its Impact on ‘Residence’” (1998) 21 University o f New South Wales Law Journal 
436, n 45, Tom Magney ‘Australia-Singapore Taxation Aspects of Carrying on Business in 
Singapore -  Part IT (1975) 4 Australian Tax Review 67, 69, Sadiq, above n 2, 9 and Richard Vann 
and Ross Parsons, ‘The foreign tax credit and reform of international taxation’ (1986) 3 Australian 
Tax Forum 131, 148.
27 See eg Hamilton, above n 15, para 2.190. Similarly, AJ Baldwin and JAL Gunn, Income Tax Laws 
o f Australia (1937) 168, notes that “if the business of the company carried on in Australia consists 
of or includes its cental management and control,” then the company is a resident. Although John 
Vincent Ratcliffe, John York McGrath and JWR Hughes, The Law o f Income Tax (The 
Commonwealth) (1938), 105-6 recognises that the words “carries on business” could be redundant, 
the authors suggest that the phrase could be used “. . . in the sense of ‘carries on its trade or other 
operations in Australia’ as distinct from the management and control of those operations.”
28 The Treasury, Commonwealth, Review o f International Taxation Arrangements (2002) 54 (RITA 
Consultation Paper).
29 Board of Taxation, Commonwealth, International Taxation: A Report to the Treasurer (2003) 109 
(Recommendation 3.12).
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taxation ruling to clarify the operation of the test.30 The Commissioner responded 
confirming that the test was a two tier test in Taxation Ruling TR 2004/15, Income Tax: 
Residence of Companies Not Incorporated in Australia -  Carrying on Business in 
Australia and Central Management and Control. Given the importance of this issue it 
is crucial to examine the Ruling in order to evaluate whether the Commissioner has 
established that the “carries on business” element of the test is still an independent test.
The Ruling argues that on both precedent and statutory interpretative grounds, the two 
elements of the test are in fact distinct elements which must both be satisfied for the 
residency to be found.
The statutory interpretation arguments are that the two elements of the test are separate 
requirements under the basic rules of statutory interpretation as:
• the plain words of an Act must be given full meaning and effect;
• courts should not easily consider any word or sentence used in an Act as 
superfluous or of limited meaning; and
• that judicial statements regarding the construction of an Act must never supplant 
or supersede the actual words of the statute itself. Ultimately, each case must be 
governed by the Act and not judicial formulae.34
The second line of argument is based upon distinguishing the precedent value of 
Malayan Shipping and other cases. The Ruling initially seeks to argue, by implication, 
that Malayan Shipping should be limited to its facts. It argues that Williams Ts
30 Treasurer ‘Review of International Taxation Arrangements’ (Press Release No 32, 13 May 2003).
31 The draft of this Ruling (Draft Taxation Ruling TR 2004/D7, Income Tax: Residence of 
Companies Not Incorporated in Australia -  Carrying on Business in Australia and Central 
Management and Control) was released on 23 June 2004 for public comment, with public 
comment required by 6 August 2004. The Ruling issued as a final on 20 October 2004.
32 Taxation Ruling TR 2004/15, Income Tax: Residence o f Companies Not Incorporated in Australia 
-  Carrying on Business in Australia and Central Management and Control, para 28 citing Broken 
Hill South Ltd (Public Officer) v Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 337, 371; 1 
AITR 106, 126; 4 ATD 163, 180 (Dixon J) and Jackson v Secretary, Department o f Health (1987) 
75 ALR 561, 571 (Northrop J).
33 TR 2005/15, ibid, para 28 citing Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 
194 CLR 355 and Beckwith v R (1976) 135 CLR 569. In Beckwith at 574, Gibbs J stated that, ‘[a]s 
a general rule a court will adopt that construction of a statute which will give some effect to all the 
words which it contains’. Also see Chaudhri v Federal Commission o f Taxation (2001) 47 ATR 
126, 128; 2001 ATC 4214, 4216.
34 TR 2004/15, ibid, para 38 citing Paisner v Goodrich [1955] 2 QB 353, 358, John v Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation (1989) 166 CLR 417; 20 ATR 1; 89 ATC 4101, Ogden Industries Pty
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comments (cited above) are explicable in the context of Malayan Shipping as in the case 
there was no need to examine the carries on business requirement due to the fact that the 
two separate requirements in the second statutory test were met by the same set of facts 
and activities.35 Also, it is argued that the extract from Mitchell v Egyptian Hotels Ltd, 
cited in Malayan Shipping by Williams J (see above), only indicates that mere trading is 
not sufficient to establish residency (ie there must also be central management and 
control). It does not support the further proposition that if you have central management 
and control you are also invariably carrying on a business in that jurisdiction.36
As a result, the Ruling concludes that only where a company’s business is management 
of its investment assets, and it undertakes only minor operational activities (as in 
Malaysan Shipping), will the factors that determine where a company is carrying on a 
business be similar to those determining where it is exercising central management and 
control. It is only in that situation that the location of central management and control 
may be indicative of where the company carries on business.
The Ruling then seeks to limit the precedential value of other decisions by arguing that:
• the Australian cases on central management and control, apart from Malayan 
Shipping, do not turn on the residence of the company under the second statutory 
test (including North Australian Pastoral Co Ltd), rather they considered 
provisions requiring a person to be a ‘resident’ in a particular place;
• although the statement by Lord Lorebum in De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v 
Howe . . that a company resides where its real business is carried on . . . and 
the real business is carried on where the central management and control actually
35
36
37
38
Ltd v Lucas [1970] AC 113, 127 (Lord Upjohn) and Brennan v Comcare (1994) 50 FCR 555; 
(1994) 122 ALR 615, 634.
Ibid, para 34.
Ibid, para 37.
Ibid, para 6.
Ibid, footnote 5. Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1973) 129 CLR 177; 
73 ATC 4114; 4 ATR 75, considered the former s 7(1) of the 1936 Act, Waterloo Pastoral Co Ltd 
v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation [1946] 72 CLR 262; 3 AITR 329; 8 ATD 165 and North 
Australian Pastoral Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1946) 71 CLR 156; 8 ATD 75; 
3 AITR 258 considered the former s 23(m) of 1936 Act, and Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1940) 64 CLR 15; 2 AITR 136; 6 ATD 42 (High Court); 
Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1941) 64 CLR 241; 2 
AITR 167; 6 ATD 82 (Full High Court) considered the former s 23(n) of 1936 Act. Support for the 
Commissioner’s view is found in Baldwin (above n 27, 171) who notes in 1937 that the definition 
in s 6(1) is only conclusive of residence elsewhere and residence under these provisions must be 
determined in accordance with the common law.
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abides” seems to support one element view, the De Beers case involved the 
question of the residence of a company under taxation laws that did not include a 
statutory definition of that concept; 40 and
• in Mitchell the company was held to be carrying on a business wholly outside the 
United Kingdom notwithstanding that its central management and control was in 
the United Kingdom.41
In light of these arguments, the Ruling concludes that for a company to be a resident 
under the second statutory test the two separate requirements must be met. This 
interpretation will give effect to all the words of the second statutory test, which is a 
preferable interpretation to one which makes the words “carries on business in 
Australia” superfluous and unnecessary.
However, despite the Commissioner’s attempt to restrict the impact of Malaysian 
Shipping to cases where the business is the management of investments, the 
Commissioner’s arguments struggle in light of the overwhelming weight of precedent 
endorsing the statements of Williams J in Malaysian Shipping.42
39 De Beers Consolidated Mines v Howe [1906] AC 455, 458; (1906) 5 TC 211, 213 (Lord Lorebum 
LC). TR 2004/15 notes (at footnote 6) that the principle has been subsequently adopted in Koitaki 
Para Rubber Estates v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1941) 64 CLR 241; 2 AITR 167; 6 
ATD 82, North Australian Pastoral Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1946) 71 CLR 
156; 8 ATD 75; 3 AITR 258, Unit Construction Co Ltd v Bullock [1960] AC 351, Esquire 
Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1973) 129 CLR 177; 73 ATC 4114; (1973) 4 
ATR 75, and many other cases.
40 TR 2004/15, above n 32, para 40.
41 Ibid, para 36.
42 See, eg, Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1973) 129 CLR 177; 73 
ATC 4114; (1973) 4 ATR 75, Waterloo Pastoral Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation 
[1946] 72 CLR 262; 3 AITR 329; 8 ATD 165, North Australian Pastoral Co Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation (1946) 71 CLR 156; 8 ATD 75; 3 AITR 258, and Koitaki Para Rubber 
Estates Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1941) 64 CLR 241; 2 AITR 167; 6 ATD 82. In 
July 2000, as part of consultation on the proposed entity tax measures (see Review of Business 
Taxation, Parliament of Australia, A Tax System Redesigned (1999), sections 11, 12, 13, 16 and 
recommendations 6.7, 6.20, 6.21, 6.22, 6.23 and 18.6) the residency test recommended for an 
“entity” was a central management and control test without the carries on business element.
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(c) The first element - Carries on business test
In light of the uncertainty about whether the “carries on business in Australia’' element 
does have independent operation (highlighted above) and given that the “carries on 
business in Australia” element is also a common operational element of the voting 
power test, in order to avoid duplication and to ensure relevance, the scope of the words 
“carries on of a business” will be discussed (below at Part 2 B(4)(b)) in the context of 
the voting power residency test.
(d) The second element - central management and control
The second element of the test (central management and control) focuses on the 
“management and control” exercised by the directors, not the “control” of the company 
by shareholders through the general meeting, which is the focus of the “voting power 
control” test. Therefore, while the words “management” and “control” are distinct 
terms, in this context they are often interpreted together. The word “central” in the 
formulation qualifies the words “management and control” in order to indicate that the 
test is focused on the people who occupy the pinnacle of power, the directors, not the 
minor day to day managers.43 This approach differs from modem corporate regulation 
adopted under the Corporations Act 2007 (Cth), which acknowledges that day-to-day 
managers can have defacto control of a company and that this practical control can 
circumvent, in some circumstances, the legal control exercised by the board.
Ascertaining a company’s residence under this test is mainly a question of fact.44 
However, it is possible to distil from the cases a number of factors that will assist in 
determining with whom the central management and control lays. The company's
43 The importance of the word “central” was stressed as long ago as 1930 by the then Leader of the 
Opposition, Sir John Greig Latham, who in the House of Representatives noted that the removal of 
the word “central" could result in a company being “. . . held to be a resident in Australia, although 
there was no real and genuine control of it in the Commonwealth.” He also warned that the words 
could be interpreted as “whole management and control should be in Australia” which would 
facilitate tax avoidance (see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 
29 July 1930, 4859 (Sir John Greig Latham, Opposition Leader)). Peter Gillies agrees, observing 
that in order to indicate that he was concerned to identify the people who occupy the pinnacle of 
power Lord Lorebum LC in De Beers Consolidated Mines v Howe [1906] AC 455 inserted the 
adjective “central” to his test -  ‘Understanding Company Residence: Central Management and 
Control’ (1989) 1(4) CCH Journal o f Australian Taxation 52, 54.
44 Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation (1941) 64 CLR 241, 246; 2 
AITR 167, 170; 6 ATD 82, 85. Couzin, above n 1,44 notes that “[wjhile the test for residence is a 
question of law, its application is a pure question of fact. Corporate residence is found not where 
central management and control should abide but where it actually does abide.”
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Constitution (memorandum and article of association) will normally provide that the 
power to control the company is vested in a board of directors.45 However, these 
documents are not conclusive as the application of the test is determined . . not 
according to the construction of this or that regulation or by-law, but upon a scrutiny of 
the course of business and trading” .46 Thus, a single person alone may exercise central 
management and control. This would occur where a chairman or managing director 
exercised powers conferred by the articles or the board is merely a “cypher” for a 
controlling shareholder as in Malaysian Shipping,47
Lord Radcliffe also applied this view of constituent documents in Unit Construction Co 
Ltd v Bullock. The House of Lords found in Unit Constructions that the central 
management and control of African subsidiaries of a United Kingdom parent company 
was being exercised by the directors of the parent company, despite constituent 
documents giving the power to the directors of the African subsidiaries. The facts 
revealed that the directors of the parent company were actually making all major and 
some minor decisions on behalf of the African companies. The chairman of the board of 
all the subsidiary boards accepted this despite no formal agreement being entered into.
It is clear from the judgement of Gibbs J in Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation,4<) however, that “control” has to be actual control, not 
implied. Justice Gibbs in rejecting the Commissioner's argument (that as the trustees 
carried out the directions of an accounting firm in Australia that the central management 
and control was in Australia) held that:
[t]he firm had the power to exert influence, and perhaps strong influence, on 
the appellant, but that is all . . .  /  do not believe that they would have acted 
on instruction . . .  It was in my opinion managed and controlled there, none 
the less because the control was exercised in a manner which accorded the 
wishes of the interests in Australia [emphasis added] . 50
45 A replaceable rule in the Company Constitution requires that “the business of the company is to be 
managed by or under the direction of directors -  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 198A(1).
46 De Beers Consolidated Mines v Howe [1906] AC 455, 458 (Lord Lorebum LC).
47 Richard Shaddick, ‘International Tax and structures’ (Paper presented at the 1996 Taxation 
Institute of Australia’s Queensland Convention, Brisbane, 24-25 May 1996) 112, 116.
48 (1959) 38 TC 712, 741; [1960] AC 351, 370-1.
49 (1972) 129 CLR 177; 72 ATC 4076; 3 ATR 105.
50 Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1972) 129 CLR 177,190-1; 72 ATC 
4076; 4086; 3 ATR 105, 115.
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Although Gibbs J's decision in Esquire Nominees Ltd was subsequently overturned by 
the High Court, his views on central management and control were not one of the issues 
subject to the appeal. 51
Further, it is argued that the Unit Constructions and Esquire Nominees cases are 
distinguishable on their facts.52 In the Unit Constructions case the directors stood aside 
completely, while in Esquire Nominees the directors continued to meet, make decisions 
exercising independent discretion, and did not solely act on instruction. ' Thus, control 
must be “actual” control/ 4
In order to determine residency, it is necessary, once central management and control 
has been established, to ascertain where it is exercised. The location of the company’s 
central management and control . . is a question of fact to be determined in light of all 
the relevant facts and circumstances.There are a number of factors that determine the 
place where central management and control is exercised.
Generally, physical locations, such as the place of incorporation and the location of the 
registered office, are usually not indicative of where “central management and control” 
is exercised. However, they may be relevant factors in the ultimate conclusion/ 6
The more likely locations will be the place where the board of directors meet. In fact, 
the RITA Consultation Paper argues that central management and control will, in 
practice be found where the board of directors meet as the test is focused on the persons 
who have the ultimate power, the directors, not the managers responsible for the day to
51 Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1973) 129 CLR 177; (1973) 4 ATR 
75; 73 ACT 4114. Two of the four judges noted that the company had been found to be resident of 
Norfolk Island, another noted the issue was not in dispute and the fourth was silent on the issue -  
see Couzin, above n 1, 88.
52 Magney (1975), above n 26, 76.
53 The crucial determinant is that Gibbs J did “. . . not believe that they would have acted on 
instruction”. The Esquire Nominee approach has been followed in more recent cases such as Re 
Little Olympian Each Ways Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 561 and New Zealand Forest Products Finance 
NV v Commissioner o f Inland Revenue (1995) 17 NZTC 12073 -  see J David B Oliver, ‘Company 
Residence -  Four Cases’ [1996] British Tax Review 505.
54 TR 2004/15 (above n 32, paras 19 and 20) notes that “where a parent company exercises central 
management and control in Australia over a subsidiary . . .  the subsidiary would need to also be 
carrying on business in Australia for it to be a resident under the second statutory test.” Also see 
BW Noble Ltd v Mitchell (1926) 11 TC 372.
55 TR 2004/15, ibid, para 15.
56 Gillies, above n 43, 59.
57 De Beers Consolidated Mines v Howe [1906] AC 455, The Calcutta Jute Mills Company Limited v 
Nicholson (1876) 1 TC 82, and Cesena Sulphur Co Ltd v Nicholson (1876) 1 TC 88.
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day operations. Although the place of meeting may, in some circumstances, be where 
central management and control is found, in other situations “central management and 
control” is located at the place of principal business activity (as that is where the 
important decisions are undertaken) . ' ’9 The place of business can also determine the 
place where central management and control is exercised, even where the board meets 
away from the place of business.60 Thus, the simplified explanation in the RITA 
Consultation Paper is somewhat misleading.
However, according to the Ruling the Commissioner will, as a matter of practical 
compliance, accept that central management and control is in Australia if the majority of 
the board meetings are held in Australia (ie when the majority of directors of the 
company meet in Australia) and will be outside Australia if the majority of the board 
meetings are held in a single jurisdiction outside Australia. This position is conditional 
upon the central management and control being exercised by a board of directors at the 
board meetings and that there are no circumstances to indicate the central management 
and control outcome is artificial or contrived.61
In summary, although in theory the central management and control test is a statutory 
test, by adopting a test developed by the common law the scope of the test has been 
defined by a long lineage of United Kingdom and Australian judicial decisions.
• 58
58 RITA Consultation Paper, above n 28, 54.
59 In North Australian Pastoral Company Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1944) 71 CLR 
623; 3 AITR 314; 8 ATD 121, Dixon J concluded that a pastoral company does not carry on “ . . . 
a financial or trading business the control and management of which might be considered to 
depend on decisions of policy and upon the judgement and capacity of the general manager 
independently of the locality. It was essentially localised. There has not been a case so far in which 
. . .  the company has been held not to reside there.” (634; 322; 129). Also see Shaddick, above n 
47, who notes that “. . . the place of directors’ meeting is significant only in so far as those 
meetings constitute the medium through which central management and control is exercised.”
60 Similarly, in The Waterloo Pastoral Company Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1946) 72 
CLR 262; 3 AITR 329; 8 ATD 165 Williams J noted that the “. . . board of the appellant had 
power under the articles of association to require that all important decisions should be subject to 
its confirmation, and it could have met regularly and exercised this control instead of leaving these 
decisions to Messrs Bowater and Bingle. But to exercise this control effectively it would have been 
necessary for the directors to visit the stations and meet there because so many of these decisions 
could only be made on the spot.” (267; 332; 168).
61 TR 2004/15, above n 32, paras 15-18.
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4 Voting power control test
(a) Overview
The “voting power control” test is the third of the statutory residency test for companies. 
It appears to be based upon the views expressed by the 1920 United Kingdom Royal 
Commission on The Income Tax that even where trading operations are carried on 
abroad principally through a subsidiary company, the company should be deemed to be 
controlled in the United Kingdom:
. . .  if the majority of the voting power of the company can be exercised in 
this country. In other words, our suggestion is that no distinction should be 
drawn between provable active control and complete potential control. 62
This view is reflected in the common law.63
The voting power control test was intended to apply “. . . to companies . . . whose 
shareholders controlling the voting power of the company are residents of Australia” to 
ensure that the resident shareholders, who receive tax free dividends arising from profits 
not taxed outside Australia, are taxable on those dividends.64 Thus, its focus is on 
shareholder control, not management control.
The test has two elements: the company must be carrying on business in Australia and 
its voting power must be controlled by shareholders who are residents of Australia. In 
applying the test, unlike the central management and control test, it is clear that the 
“carries on business” element of this test needs to be examined separately. The reason 
that the test cannot be satisfied by merely meeting the voting power control threshold is 
that mere underlying ownership does not equate to the carrying on of a business. 
Therefore the carries on business element will be examined first, followed by an 
examination of the voting control element.
62 United Kingdom, Report o f the Royal Commission on the Income Tax Cmd 615 (1920), 9. This 
concept was adopted by United Kingdom, Report o f  the Income Tax Codification Committee Cmd 
5131 (1936), in s 7 of its draft Income Tax Bill.
63 In British American Tobacco Co v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1943] AC 335, 339, Viscount 
Simon stated that owners of the majority of the voting power in the company are persons who were 
“in effective control of its affairs and fortunes”.
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(b) The first element -  Carries on business in Australia
There are three parts to the “carries on business” element. They are:
• the existence of a business;
• the fact it is being carried on; and
• that the activity is conducted in Australia.
These three parts are examined in the following.
(i) Defining a business
The first step is to determine whether the activity undertaken is a business.6' Business is 
defined in s 995-1 of 1997 Act to “. . . include any profession, trade, employment, 
vocation or calling, but does not include occupation as an employee.” As the definition 
lacks detail, the common law further expands this definition. In Grieve v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue (NZ) Richardson J stated:
In common usage ’business' has had and has long had a wide and flexible 
meaning. In the sense in which it is used in the legislation imposing a 
charge for tax in respect of revenue earning activities The Oxford English 
Dictionary definitions "a pursuit demanding time and attention; a serious 
employment as distinct from a pastime . . . ; trade; commercial transactions 
or engagements' and Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
definitions 'a usually commercial or mercantile activity customarily engaged 
in as a means of livelihood and typically involving some independence of 
judgment and power of decision . . .  a commercial or industrial enterprise' 
reflect the underlying notion . . .  66
64 Note on Clause 2 in Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 
(Cth), 11.
65 Williams J in Malayan Shipping Co v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1946) 71 CLR 156; 8 
ATD 75, 3 AITR 258 indicated that “mere trading” would not satisfy the test. Also Hamilton, 
above n 15, para 2.200 question the effect of the dicta on the test, concluding that it only applies to 
companies engaged in trading activities.
66 [1984] NZLR 101, 106. The quote was cited with approval by Burchett J in Federal 
Commissioner o f  Taxation v Bivona (1989) 20 ATR 282, 290; 89 ATC 4183, 4190-1.
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Whether a taxpayer is carrying on a business is a question of fact. The courts have 
identified the following criteria as important factors to be weighed in determining if a 
business exists:67
(a) the repetition of transactions or activities; 68 
O5) the commercial nature of the activities; 69
(c) the size and scale of the activities; 70
(d) the existence of a profit motive;71
72(e) organisation and system underlying the activities;
(f) the inherent characteristics or qualities of the property dealt in; and
(g) the inherent characteristics of the taxpayer.74
67 Michael Kobetsky, ‘Chapter 4: Business Income’ in Michael Kobetsky, Michael Dirkis and Ann 
O’Connell, Income Tax: Text, Materials and Essential Cases (2001, 3rd ed) 138-139.
68 Although sustained, regular or frequent transactions do not in themselves signify a business, they 
are a useful indication of a business: London Australian Investment v Federal Commissioner o f 
Taxation (1977) 138 CLR 106; 7 ATR 757; 77 ATC 4398. An isolated transaction can constitute a 
business: see Fairway Estates v Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation (1970) 123 CLR 153; 1 ATR 
72; 70 ATC 4061, where one loan by a property development company to a mine was considered 
to indicate the carrying on of a business. See also Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation v Whitfords 
Beach (1980) 150 CLR 355; 12 ATR 692; 82 ATC 4031 and Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v 
Myer Emporium (1987) 18 ATR 693; 87 ATC 4363.
69 The transaction must have a commercial character, ie trade on open market with all willing and 
suitable customers. Where it is merely preparatory to starting a business, the transaction will not 
have that commercial character (Ferguson v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1979) 9 ATR 
873; 79 ATC 4261). The length of time the property is held is relevant. The longer it is held, the 
less likely it is to be a business (Eames v Stepnell Properties (1967) 43 TC 678).
70 The scale of operations is a factor, but a person may carry on business in a small way (Thomas v 
Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1972) 3 ATR 165; 72 ATC 4094 and Federal Commissioner 
o f Taxation v Walker (1985) 16 ATR 331; 85 ATC 4168). However, the smaller the operation the 
more likely it is not to be a business.
71 The mere realisation of an asset will not give rise to the motive. It can be inferred in certain 
circumstances - see Thomas v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1972) 3 ATR 165; 72 ATC 
4094.
72 Bowen CJ and Franki J in Ferguson v Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation (1979) 9 ATR 873, 887; 
79 ATC 4261, 4264 stated “organisation of activities in a business-like manner, the keeping of 
books, records and the use of system may all serve to indicate that a business is being carried on. 
The fact that, concurrently with the activities in question, the taxpayer carries on the practice of a 
profession or another business does not preclude a finding that his additional activities constitute 
the carrying on of a business. The volume of his operations and the amount of capital employed by 
him may be significant.”
73 Goods unsuitable for domestic use will suggest a business activity, eg pig iron (Edwards v 
Barrstow [1964] AC 14), while conversely, goods suitable for domestic use will not suggest 
domestic activity, eg toilet paper (Rutledge v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1929) 14 TC 4).
74 The inherent characteristics of the taxpayer were in the past, indicative of a business being carried 
on, eg if a company carried on an activity, it was more likely that the activity would be part of a 
business than if an individual carried on the activity (Lewis Emanuel v White (1965) 42 TC 362). 
Current decisions do not seem to take this view.
However, in Radnor Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1990) 21 ATR 608; 90 ATC 
4637, Davies J observed that “. . . when a taxpayer is a trustee, it is less likely that a finding will be 
made that the sale of shares was an operation in the course of carrying on a business of investing 
for profit and more likely that the finding will be made that the sale was a mere realisation or 
change of investment” (619-620; 4649). Although the Commissioner's appeal was dismissed in 
Radnor Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1991) 21 ATR 1410; 91 ATC 4689 the Full
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The weight that is given to each of these factors varies from case to case as each case is 
decided in terms of questions of fact and degree.7'̂  In different factual situations some of 
these factors will carry more weight than another factor. Justice Webb in Martin v 
Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation b confirmed this stating that:
The test is both subjective and objective: it is made by regarding the nature 
and extent of the activities under review, as well as the purpose of the 
individual engaging in them, and . . .  the determination is eventually based 
on the large or general impression gained.
However, the Ruling argues that the concept of business in the second statutory test (and 
presumably the third statutory test) is wider than its ordinary meaning and “extends to 
undertakings of a business or a commercial character.” 77 With respect, there is no reason 
to treat the concept of “business” as being any different than its ordinary meaning for the 
purposes of the definition of resident for companies. The concept of “business” will 
ordinarily extend to undertakings of a business or a commercial character including 
management of investment assets.
Federal Court conceded that the existence of a trustee undertaking the activity is not decisive, but it 
is a relevant factor.
75 Shepherd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1975) 5 ATR 646; 75 ATC 4244.
76 (1953) 90 CLR 470; 5 AITR 548, 551. Although the Full Court overturned Webb J’s decision, his 
view was not specifically rejected. It was subsequently endorsed by Fisher J in Ferguson v Federal 
Commissioner o f  Taxation (1979) 9 ATR 873, 881; 79 ATC 4261, 4268-9.
77 TR 2004/15, above n 32, para 42. The Ruling argues that “if the objects of a company are business 
objects and the company actually carries out these business objects, then the company is carrying 
on business: IRC v Westleigh Estates [1924] 1 KB 390, 408, 409 (Sir Ernest Pollock, MR). If a 
company gainfully uses its property in letting it out for rent, the inference is that the company is 
carrying on business {American Leaf Blending Co Sdn Bhd v Director-General o f  Inland Revenue 
(Malaysia) [1978] 3 All ER 1185, 1189 (Lord Diplock)) as ‘the purchase of property to rent out, 
whether or not after renovating it, and the proprietorship of that property, constitute an undertaking 
of a business or commercial kind’ - Lilydale Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f 
Taxation (1987) 18 ATR 508; 87 ATC 4235 (Pincus J). Also see California Copper Syndicate 
(Limited and Reduced) v Harris (1904) 5 TC 159; Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
o f Taxation (1973) 129 CLR 204, 221; 73 ATC 4114, 4123; 4 ATR 75, 85 (Menzies J) and (1973) 
129 CLR 204, 229; 73 ATR 4114, 4128; (1973) 4 ATR 75, 91 (Stephen J) and Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation v Total Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd (1979) 9 ATR 885; 79 ATC 4279.
78 In TR 2004/15, ibid, para 42. The reason for this approach seems to be that the Commissioner is 
unduly concerned that cases, which were decided in the context of trusts {Charles v Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation (1954) 90 CLR 598; 6 AITR 85; 10 ATD 328, Radnor Pty Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1990) 21 ATR 608; 90 ATC 4637), may have operation in 
respect of companies. This is reflected in the Commissioner’s alternative view (in para 45) that 
“the second statutory test refers to a narrow concept of carrying on of a business, such that a 
company that invests with the purpose of obtaining gains from that investment may not be carrying 
on a business.”
204
(ii) Is there a business in existence being carried on?
Having found a business, the next question is, is there a business in existence being 
carried on? In the Taxation Ruling TR 2004/15 the Commissioner states that in the 
statutory context it is assumed that all companies (other than dormant companies) are 
carrying on a business.79 However, this is not supported in the case law. In Southern 
Estates Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation and Softwood Pulp and Paper Ltd 
v Federal Commissioner of Taxation the Courts held that in both cases the companies 
were not carry on a business as the activities undertaken were preliminary to 
commencing a business.80
Although Brett LJ in Smith v Anderson Brett LJ noted that “[t]he expression ‘carrying
o i
on’ implies a repetition of acts”, subsequent cases have found that a single activity can 
constitute the “carrying on of a business”. In United Dominions Corporation Ltd v 
Brian Pty Ltd Dawson J noted that “. . . the emphasis which will be placed upon
oi
continuity may not be heavy”.
Thus, if a business is not being conducted or is no longer being conducted then the test 
is not satisfied.
(Hi) Is the business in Australia?
The final aspect of the “carries on business” element to be determined is whether the 
location of the business is in Australia. This will normally be determined in the course 
of finding whether a business is being carried on. However, it may be difficult to 
ascertain in the circumstances where the business involves mail order and electronic 
commerce. These difficulties will be discussed later in the chapter.
79 TR 2004/15, ibid, para 45.
80 Southern Estates Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1966) 117 CLR 481; 10 AITR 
525; 14 ATD 543; and Softwood Pulp and Paper Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1976) 
7 ATR 101; 76 ATC 4439.
81 (1880) 15 Ch D 247, 277-78 (Brett LJ).
82 Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 247 and Canny Gabriel Castle Jackson Advertising Pty Ltd v 
Volume Sales (Finance) Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 321.
83 (1985) 157 CLR 1, 15 (Dawson J).
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(c) The second element - Voting power controlled by shareholders who are residents of 
Australia.
Having found that, a business is being carried on in Australia, the next step is to 
determine the scope of the “voting power control” element. To do so, it is necessary to 
examine the meaning of the key words: “voting power”, “control” and “resident in 
Australia”.
(i) Voting power
The words “voting power” have not been judicially considered in the context of 
s 6(1 )(b) of the 1936 Act. However, the words “voting power in the company” were 
considered by the High Court in the context of the former ss 80A(1) and 80C(1) of 1936 
Act. In Kolotex Hosiery (Australia) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation84 
Barwick CJ concluded that voting power includes not only the powers vested in the 
shareholders but also the voting power of an office holder exercised at the general 
meeting. In the current context, even if all the shareholders of a company are Australian 
residents, the company may still be a non-resident if a non-resident executive director 
controls more than half the company’s voting power.
(ii) Control
o  c
The word “control" has been considered a number of times. The courts have found 
that “control” in s 6(1 )(b) of the 1936 Act means the “actual” control of the voting 
rights, not the mere holding of those rights. It has been argued that the test looks at the 
exercise of the actual control, not the merely the capacity to control. In other words, in 
order to demonstrate control of voting power, that control must have been exercised in 
the general meeting. Thus, the test cannot be satisfied where the controlling resident 
owners abstain from voting at the general meeting. Further, as the test is based upon 
actual control, it cannot be satisfied where controlling resident owners have beneficial
84 (1975) 132 CLR 535; 5 ATR 206; 75 ATC 4028.
85 Adelaide Motors Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1942) 66 CLR 436; 2 A1TR 341; 7 
ATD 147; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Commonwealth Aluminium Corp Ltd (1980) 143 
CLR 646; 11 ATR 42; 77 ATC 4151; West Australian Tanners and Fellmongers Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation (1945) 70 CLR 623; 3 AITR 242; 8 ATD 25.
86 Hamilton, above n 15, para 2.200 and Geoffrey Lehmann and Cynthia Coleman, Taxation in 
Australia (1998, 5th ed), para 18.160.
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control, the actual control being vested in a non-resident trustee or nominee. Indirect 
forms of control, such as voting agreements with share holders, may also not satisfy the 
actual control requirement.
Thus, to satisfy the “voting power control” test, the resident shareholders must have 
actual control over 50 percent of the voting power. Legal capacity to control must also 
exist.87 The importance of control at the general meeting, however, should not be 
overstated. Where a resident shareholder’s control is through the board of directors, the 
central management and control test is more likely to have operation, deeming
o o
residency.
Further, control can be exercised through indirect actual control. Justice Kitto in Mendes 
v Commissioner o f Probate Duties (Vic) endorsed (obiter dictum) an indirect control 
qualification, stating if:
. . .  a company A, which by virtue of its voting power in a general meeting 
of company B controls that company, has a controlling in company C if 
company B holds the majority of votes in the General meeting of company
c. 90
Thus, it is arguable that control can exist indirectly where a third company controlled 
the first company through the majority ownership of a second company that has the 
majority of shares in the first company.
(iii) Resident in Australia
The final element of the test is that the shareholders must be “resident in Australia”. 
This requirement is somewhat circular, merely requiring that the shareholders (trustees, 
companies, individuals etc) satisfy the residency rules set out in tax law.
87 Mendes v Commissioner o f Probate Duties (Vic) (1967) 122 CLR 152 and Lehmann, ibid.
88 Kohl, above n 26, 449.
89 Mendes v Commissioner o f Probate Duties (Vic) (1967) 122 CLR 152.
90 Mendes v Commissioner o f Probate Duties (Vic) (1967) 122 CLR 152, 162. The qualification 
arose from the dicta of Viscount Simon in British American Tobacco Co v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners [1943] AC 335, 339-340. Also see commentary by Kohl, (above n 26, 449) and 
Lehmann (above n 86).
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(d) Summary
In summary, in order for a company to be found resident under the voting control test 
the shareholders must have actual direct or indirect control of the majority of the voting 
power and the company must carry on business in Australia. Both elements of the test 
must be satisfied. However, in reality the test is of minimal significance, except in 
respect of tax havens, as a finding of residency under the test may often be overridden 
by the tie breaker tests in Australia’s DTAs.91
5 Summary o f Part B
Thus, the definition of residency for a company in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act (via s 995-1 of 
the 1997 Act) consists of the incorporation, central management and control and the 
voting power control tests. Unlike the incorporation test, both the central management 
and control test, and to a lesser extent the voting power control test, are fact and 
circumstance tests. Further, by adopting the common law central management and 
control terminology as an essential element of the central management and control test, 
this second statutory test has imported within its scope a large body of common law, 
which has been further developed through subsequent litigation. The limitations and 
problems associated with the scope of tests will be dealt with later in the context of the 
evaluation of the three tests.
C. The scope of the specific corporate residency tests
As well as the three primary residency tests in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act there are also 
specific “residency” definitions. They can be divided into two classes: those applying in 
respect of deemed companies and those that operate for specific tax policy purposes. 
The scope of these specific residency definitions is set out in the following, except for 
the rules relating to dual resident companies which are explored in the context of DTAs.
91 Kohl, ibid.
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1 The deemed company rules
The first category of specific residency tests are those in respect of “corporate limited 
partnerships”92 and “resident unit trusts”93 (for the purposes of “corporate unit trusts”94 
and “public trading trusts”9̂ ), both of which are treated as companies under the tax law. 
The scope of these specialised rules is explored in the following.
(a) Special rules for corporate limited partnerships
The first deemed company specific residency definition relates to “corporate limited 
partnerships.” The rules relating to “corporate limited partnerships” were introduced in 
response to the potential negative revenue impact of losses flowing through limited 
partnerships. To limit the flow through of losses the Commonwealth passed provisions 
to treat limited partnerships as companies from 19 August 1992.96 It was conceded they 
had revenue benefit but the change was advocated on the basis of an equity objective of 
treating like structures comparably.97
To overcome the practical problem that limited partnerships lack legal personality the 
1936 Act imposes liability on each partner and each partner is deemed to be jointly and
QO
severely liable for the amounts so charged.
A preliminary issue to discussing the residency rules for corporate limited partnerships 
under the 1997 Act is to determine what “corporate limited partnerships” are for the 
purposes of the 1997 Act.
92 1936 Act s94T.
93 1936 Acts 102H, 102Q.
94 1936 Acts 102 J.
95 1936 Acts 102R.
96 Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 6) 1992 (Cth). Limited partnerships were viewed as a tax 
effective vehicle for infrastructure and other large-scale investments. They were also used for film 
or other investments where deductions in excess of cash contributed could be available.
97 Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 6) 1992 (Cth), 3. This approach 
has been criticised -  see Miranda Stewart, ‘Towards flow through taxation of limited partnerships: 
It’s time to repeal Division 5A’ (2003) 32 Australian Tax Review 171.
98 1936 Acts 94V.
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(i) What is a corporate limited partnership
For the purposes of the income tax laws a “corporate limited partnership” is defined to 
be a “limited partnership.”99
In Australia limited partnerships are a creation of State statutes. There has been limited 
partnership legislation in Queensland since 1876, Tasmania since 1908 and in Western 
Australia since 1909,100 with limited liability partnership provisions being added to the 
partnership Acts in New South Wales in 1991,101 Victoria in 1992102 and South 
Australia in 1997. Generally a limited partnership is partnership in which one or more 
partners’ liability is limited.104 The statutes prescribe four general characteristics for 
registration as a limited partnership. They are that:
• one or more general partners must be liable for all debts and obligations;
• one or more limited partners who contribute capital cannot be required to 
provide funds in addition to the capital contribution;
• limited partner cannot draw capital during the continuance of the partnership; 
and
• limited partners cannot take part in the active management of the partnership.
However, a “limited partnership” for the purposes of the income tax laws is defined to 
be “. . . a partnership where the liability of at least one of the partners is limited”.105 A 
general partnership will not be a limited partnership merely because one of its members
99 1936 Act s 94D. Section 94D also contains further deeming tests which bring into the operative 
rules limited partnership formed before 19 August 1992.
100 The Irish 1781 model limited partnership was adopted in New South Wales from 1853 to 1874 and 
in Queensland from 1876 to 1988 (Mercantile Acts 1876-1896 (Qld) ss 53-68). The Queensland 
provisions were modernised in 1988 (Partnership (Limited Liability) Act 1988 (Qld)). The Limited 
Partnerships Act 1908 (Tas) and the Limited Partnerships Act 1909 (WA) were based on the 
United Kingdoms Limited Partnership Act 1907 (UK).
101 Partnership Act 1892 (NSW) ss 49-80.
102 Partnership Act 1958 (Vic) ss 49-80.
103 Partnership Act 1891 (SA) ss 47-83.
104 They are the modem statutory equivalent of the Roman “societas” (see Terence Dwyer and 
Deborah Dwyer, Parliament of the Australian Capital Territory, Australian Capital Territory 
Attorney-General's Department Review o f ACT Partnership Law: Consultative Document (1992), 
2) and the medieval commenda (see Keith Fletcher, Higgins and Fletcher: The Law o f  
Partnerships in Australia and New Zealand (2001, 8th ed) LBC Information Services, Sydney, 
269). Such arrangements operated between financers and merchants, where by the financier 
provided finance in return for a share of the profits. As they did not participate in the management 
of the business they were not liable for losses beyond their finance. They flourished in Europe but 
fell into disrepute in Tudor England.
105 1936 Acts 6(1).
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is a company.100 Expressly excluded from the definition are venture capital limited 
partnerships (VCLP),107 Australian Fund of Funds (AFOF)108 and venture capital 
management partnerships (VCMP)109.110
Also excluded from these provisions are foreign hybrids (foreign hybrid limited 
partnerships and hybrid limited companies, including United States’ limited liability 
companies and other similar entities that are taxed on a partnership basis in their country 
of formation)* 111 as partnerships for all purposes of the income tax law.112 These entities 
can only be foreign hybrids if, amongst other things, they are at no time during the
1 1 Tincome year Australian residents.
(ii) Residence test
The definition of “resident corporate limited partnership” is found in s 94T of the 1936 
Act. For the purposes of the income tax law, a corporate limited partnership is a 
“resident”, “a resident within the meaning of s 6”, “a resident of Australia” and “a 
resident of Australia within the meaning of s 6” if and only if:
• the partnership was formed in Australia; or either:
• the partnership carries on business in Australia or
• the partnership's central management and control is in Australia.114
106 Michael Butler, ‘Partnerships -  Easier than you think?’ (2004) 10 Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 287, 
288.
107 As defined in 1997 Act s 118-405(2).
108 As defined in 1997 Act s 118-410(3).
109 As defined in 1936 Act s 94D(3).
110 1936 Act s 94D(2). These entities are taxed as flow through entities under 1936 Act, Div 5. The 
term “tax-exempt non-resident” entity is used to limit the scope of the concession. Thus, under s 
118-420(2) of the 1997 Act an entity is “tax-exempt non-resident” entity if it is a foreign resident; 
that is a resident of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, the United States or any 
other foreign country prescribed by the regulations and the entity’s income is exempt, or 
effectively exempt, from taxation in the entity’s country of residence.
111 As defined in 1997 Act ss 830-5, 830-10 and 830-15.
112 As defined in 1997 Act ss 830-20 to 830-40. See Taxation Determination TD 2004/31, Income 
Tax: Which Country is for the Purposes o f Part X  o f the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (the 
Act) the Country o f Residence o f a UK Limited Partnership (LP), a US LP, a UK Limited Liability 
Partnership (LLP) and a US LLP Being a Non-resident Corporate Limited Partnership Within 
Part III Division 5A o f the Act? for the treatment of non-resident limited partnerships prior to the 
introduction of 1997 Act Div 830 by Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 1) 2004 (Cth).
113 1997 Act ss s 830-10 (l)(d) and 830-15( 1 )(c).
114 1936 Act s94T.
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The words “a resident within the meaning of s 6” and” a resident of Australia within the 
meaning of s 6” were incorporated into the definition11:1 to align the treatment of 
corporate limited partnerships under the foreign tax credit, foreign loss, CFC and FIF 
provisions with the treatment of companies under those provisions.116
Thus, there are three elements to the test: formation in Australia, carries on business in 
Australia, or central management and control is in Australia. As limited partnerships are 
creatures of statute they can only be formed in states (discussed above) that provide for 
formation. In fact, a corporate limited partnership is deemed to be incorporated in the 
place where it was formed and under a law in force in that place. The two remaining 
tests (carries on business test and central management and control test) are fact and 
circumstance tests that draw upon the concepts of the second company residency test in 
s 6(1) of the 1936 Act. Given that the tests have been examined above in the company 
context it is not necessary to reexamine their scope in this context.
(b) Special rules for “corporate unit trusts” and “public trading trusts”
The second deemed company specific residency definition relates to “corporate unit 
trusts” and “public trading trusts”. The rules governing “corporate unit trusts” in 
Division 6B of the 1936 Act were introduced from 11 July 1980 to discourage 
companies transferring income-earning assets to unit trusts to avoid the then double 
taxation of company profits. Division 6B treats such trusts as companies for tax 
purposes.119 Public Trading Trusts provisions in Division 6C of the 1936 Act were 
introduced on 19 September 1985 to apply similar measures to public unit trusts 
which operate a trade or business. It taxes these trusts as companies.
As the rules governing “corporate unit trusts” and “public trading trusts” are similar, the 
law applicable to these two deemed companies will be considered together. Prior to 
discussing the residency rules for “corporate unit trusts” and “public trading trusts”
115 By Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 3) 1994 (Cth).
116 Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 3) 1994 (Cth), 43.
117 1936 Act s94U.
118 Income Tax Laws Amendment Act (No 3) 1981 (Cth).
119 1936 Acts 102L.
120 Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 4) 1985 (Cth).
121 1936 Acts 102T.
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under the 1997 Act, a preliminary issue is to determine what is a “corporate unit trust” 
and “public trading trust” for the purposes of the 1997 Act.
(i) What is a “corporate unit trust” and a "public trading trust”?
A "unit trust" will be a “corporate unit trust” if it is:122
(a) a public unit trust (ie, a trust with listed units, offered to the public and held
1 2Tby 50 or more persons );
(b) an eligible unit trust;124 and
1 'y c
either (i) a ‘resident unit trust’; or
(ii) a ‘corporate unit trust’ in a prior year.
1 J  s
However, a public trading trust is:
127(a) a public unit trust;
1 28(b) a trading trust; and
either (i) a resident unit trust;129 or
(ii) a public trading trust in a prior year which is not a corporate 
unit trust.
(ii) Definition o f “resident unit trust”
The “resident unit trust” definitions for both “corporate unit trusts” and “public trading 
trusts” are identical. A unit trust will be a “resident unit trust” for an income year if, at 
any time during the income year either:
• any property of the trust is situated in Australia or
• the trust carries on a *business in Australia;
and either:
• the central management and control of the trust is in Australia; or
• Australian residents held more than 50% of the beneficial interests in the 
income or property of the trust.
122 1936 Acts 102 J.
123 Defined in 1936 Act s 102G.
124 Defined in 1936 Act s 102F.
125 Defined in 1936 Act s 102H.
126 1936 Acts 102R.
127 Defined in 1936 Act s 102P.
128 Defined in 1936 Act s 102N.
129 Defined in 1936 Act s 102Q.
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Thus, there are four possible combinations that will give rise to residency. Although 
property is defined widely in s 102D of the 1936 Act (to include a chose in action and 
“any estate, interest, right or power, whether at law or in equity, in or over property”), 
beneficial interests are not defined. As a related section expressly provides for tracing, it 
can be assumed that the interests measured in s 102D of the 1936 Act are only direct 
interests.131 Further, given that the carries on business test has been explored in the 
context of company residency under s 6(1) of the 1936 Act, as has the central 
management and control test, is not necessary to reexamine the scope of these rules 
again in this context.
2 Specific tax policy residency rules
The second category of specialised residency tests are those that relate to specific tax 
measures such as the FSI rules, the dividend imputation system, thin capitalisation and 
dual resident companies (“prescribed dual resident” and a “dual resident investment 
company”133). The scope of these specific residency definitions is set out in the 
following, except for the rules relating to dual resident companies which are explored in 
the context of DTAs.
(a) FSI rules - “Australian entity” and “Part X  Australian resident” definitions
The first area where specific residency definitions are used is in the FSI rules (ie, in 
Parts X (the CFC rules) and XI (the FIF rules) of the 1936 Act). The rules tax residents 
on an accrual basis in respect of lowly taxed or untaxed foreign income (usually 
passive) earned by non resident companies in which the residents hold shares. It is 
argued that these rules enforce the worldwide taxation of income of residents.134
The “Part X Australian resident” definition was introduced to provide an enhanced 
jurisdictional basis for the operation of Part X. Part X of the 1936 Act operates by 
taxing Australian residents on an accrual basis on their share of certain income earned
130 Defined in 1936 Act s 102H and 102Q respectively.
131 1936 Acts 102G(9).
132 1936 Acts 6(1).
133 1936 Act s6F.
134 Vann (1988), above n 22, ixxviii.
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by controlled foreign companies. The income subject to attribution is both the 
company's tainted income135 and income which is not subjected to comparable taxation.
Under Part X a company is defined to be an “Australian entity” if it is an entity (other 
than a partnership or trust) that is a “Part X Australian resident”.136 A “Part X 
Australian resident” is defined to be a resident in terms of s 6, but does not include an 
entity where there is a double tax agreement in force, the entity is a resident in both 
contracting states under the agreement and it is deemed, for the purposes of that 
agreement, to be resident in the foreign state.137 The concept of “Australian entity” is 
crucial as only Australian entities can be attributed with foreign income, and is crucial 
in determining the control test,139 and the definition140 of an “Australian 1% entity”.141
Similarly, under Part XI a resident company is defined in terms of a "Part XI Australian 
resident". A “Part XI Australian resident” is defined to be a resident in terms of s 6, but 
does not include an entity where there is a double tax agreement in force, the entity is a 
resident in both contracting states under the agreement and it is deemed, for the 
purposes of that agreement, to be resident in the foreign state.142 Part XI operates by 
taxing Australian residents on an accrual basis on their share of certain income earned 
by non-resident entities that are not Australian controlled and fall outside the scope of 
the CFC and transferor trust measures.
Thus, if a dual resident company is a resident under the s 6(1) of 1936 but is deemed to 
be a non-resident under the DTA tie breaker tests, it cannot be a “Part X Australian 
resident” or “Part XI Australian resident”. As the resident definitions in s 6(1) of 1936 
Act have already been discussed and the DTA tie-breaker test is to be analysed below, 
further discussion of these tests would duplicate those examinations.
135 Tainted income is passive income (such as dividends, interest and royalties), and certain related 
party income.
136 1936 Acts 336.
137 1936 Acts 317.
138 1936 Acts 361(1).
139 1936 Act ss 340 and 349.
140 1936 Acts 317.
141 Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment (Foreign Income) Bill 1990 (Cth), 223.
142 1936 Acts 470.
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(b) Imputation rules - "Residency requirement" definition
The second area of specific residency definition is under the dividend imputation 
system. The rules exist to reinforce the object of the dividend imputation system, ie to 
allow Australian resident companies, corporate limited partnerships, corporate unit 
trusts, and public trading trusts to pass tax credits for income tax paid (franking credits) 
with profit distributions to Australian members, such that they can offset those credits 
against tax liabilities (a tax offset) or in some circumstances, seek a refund of any 
unutilised tax credit.143 Thus, in order for a distribution to carry an associated tax credit 
the entity must satisfy the “residency requirement” when making a distribution.144 The 
residency criteria are contained in the “sufficiently resident” test, which was introduced 
into the 1997 Act in 2002,145 having been carried over from the then existing law.146
The definition of “residency requirement” in s 995-1 of the 1997 Act specifies four 
specific rules aimed at limiting the availability of the credits to Australian entities and 
Australian owners. Under the first rule an entity satisfies the “residency requirement” if 
the entity satisfies the specific residency rules of the entity at the time of making the 
distribution.147 The other three “residency requirement” tests are defined in relation to 
events that give rise to a franking credit and a franking debit,148 a tax offset149 and a
143 1997 Act s 200-5 and Explanatory Memorandum, New Business Tax System (Imputation) Bill
2002 (Cth), the New Business Tax System (Over-Franking Tax) Bill 2002 (Cth) and the New
Business Tax System (Franking Deficit Tax) Bill 2002 (Cth), para 1.19.
144 1997 Acts 202-5(a).
145 Introduced by New Business Tax System (Imputation) Act 2002 (Cth).
146 Explanatory Memorandum, New Business Tax System (Imputation) Bill 2002 (Cth), the New 
Business Tax System (Over-Franking Tax) Bill 2002 (Cth) and the New Business Tax System 
(Franking Deficit Tax) Bill 2002 (Cth), para 4.4. “Sufficiently resident” was defined in 1936 Act s 
160APG.
147 The “residency requirement” when making a distribution for a company or corporate limited 
partnership is that they must be resident at the time of the event, while a corporate unit trust and a 
public trading trust must be resident for the income year (1997 Act s 202-20).
148 The payment of a PAYG installment or income tax will give rise to a franking credit. The amount
of the franking credit is reduced if the entity does not satisfy the residency requirement for the
income year in relation to which the PAYG installment or income tax is paid. Thus, where the 
event gives rise to a franking credit or franking debit the "residency requirement for a company or 
a corporate limited partnership is that they must be resident for more than one half of the year, or at 
all times during a year in which it exists (1997 Act s 205-25(a) and (b)). The "residency 
requirement" remains the same for corporate unit trusts and public trading trusts.
149 Where a tax offset is received, the “residency requirements” is the same as those for making a 
distribution, with the addition of a residency requirement for an individual (ie resident at time of 
the event) (1997 Act s 207-75). An individual or a corporate tax entity that receives a franked 
distribution directly must be resident at the time the distribution is paid to be eligible for a franking 
offset. If the taxpayer was not a resident, the distribution would be exempt from withholding tax 
because it is franked and therefore exempt from income tax, removing the need for a tax offset. 
The taxpayer’s assessable income is not grossed-up in this case. In the case of indirect 
distributions, adjustments are made to the taxpayer’s assessable income to ensure that the entity's
216
refund of franking credits.150 Distributions from sources in a prescribed territory are 
expressly excluded.151 Each of these “residency requirement” tests varies depending 
upon the event.
Thus, the residency requirement definitions utilise the principal company residency rules 
in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act. Again no further analysis of the scope of the rules is required.
(c) Thin capitalisation rules - “Resident TC group" definition
The third area of specific residency definition is under the thin capitalisation rules. The 
object of the thin capitalisation rules (contained in Div 820 of the 1997 Act) is to 
impose limits on debt/equity ratios on both non-residents with investments in Australia 
and residents with out bound investments. The thin capitalisation rules apply to 
taxpayers on an individual basis.
However, if groups of taxpayers were required to apply the rules on an individual entity 
basis this could lead to inequitable results as well as greater compliance costs due to 
each entity being required to carry out a separate calculation. In order to limit these costs 
grouping is permitted for certain corporate groups. Such groups only need to undertake 
one calculation for determining the maximum allowable debt deduction. Section 820- 
500 of the 1997 Act contains the conditions that must be met to enable entities to form a 
group for thin capitalisation purposes (ie form a “resident TC group”). Thus, a “resident 
TC group” can only consist of wholly-owned resident companies, certain limited 
partnerships, trusts and Australian branches of foreign banks. The group members
i
cannot be a prescribed dual resident.
Thus, the residency concept is linked to specialised definitions used to limit the type of 
entities able to group for thin capitalisation purposes.
share of the franking credit is not included in the entity's assessable income - See Explanatory 
Memorandum, New Business Tax System (Imputation) Bill 2002 (Cth), the New Business Tax 
System (Over-Franking Tax) Bill 2002 (Cth) and the New Business Tax System (Franking Deficit 
Tax) Bill 2002 (Cth), para 5.4.
150 For a refund of franking credits, the “residency requirement” is specified for an exempt institution, 
which is required to have a physical presence in Australia and pursue its objectives principally in 
Australia at all times during the income year (1997 Act s 207-135). This rule again restricts 
refunds to these entities.
151 1997 Acts 202-45(b).
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3 Summary
Thus, there are two classes of specific company “residency” definitions: those applying 
in respect of deemed companies (“corporate limited partnerships” and “resident unit 
trusts”) and those that operate for specific tax policy purposes such as the FSI rules, the 
dividend imputation system, and thin capitalisation. These definitions either rely on the 
s 6(1) of the 1936 Act company residency definitions or on common concepts such as 
central management and control. There are some specifically related elements such as 
“formation”, “location of property in Australia” and “50% of beneficial interest in the 
income or property in Australia” and the FSI and thin capitalisation residency tests that 
exclude entities that are dual residents. The scope of specific dual resident company 
tests (“prescribed dual resident” and a “dual resident investment company”) are 
explored in the following examination.
D. Specific dual residency tests
As with the residency of individuals, a consequence of the operation of the statutory and 
specific residency tests and similar tests in other jurisdictions, a company can have more 
than one residence (ie dual residency). As a result, either double taxation may 
occur154 or in some cases the dual resident may double-dip. The double dipping occurs 
through the dual resident either accessing concessions in the domestic tax law in both 
jurisdictions or through obtaining deductions for a single item of expenditure in both 
jurisdictions.
Double taxation is dealt with through the use of tie breaker tests in DTAs. Article 4(5) 
of most of Australia’s modern DTAs, (except the United States and Japan DTAs) 
contains a tie-breaker test for entities. The approach to countering double dipping,
152 1997 A cts 820-500(4).
153 Gregory v Deputy Commissioner o f Taxation (WA) (1937) 57 CLR 774, 778; 1 AITR 201; 4 ATD 
397 and Swedish Cental Railway Co v Thompson [1925] AC 482. Dual resident entities should not 
be confused with “dual listed companies” which are entities with merged businesses, but maintain 
separate corporate identities in their countries of origin. Such company structures avoid many 
adverse tax impacts including the risk change of residency or dual residency. As at July 2002 there 
were only six “dual listed companies” world wide -  see David Stevens and Julian Sheezel 
(KPMG), Issues in Australia’s International Tax Regime - An International Comparative Review 
(Business Council of Australia Information Paper, 24 July 2002).
154 The 2003 OECD Commentary on art 4, para 21 notes that it would be “rare in practice for a 
company, etc to be subject to tax as a resident in more than one State”. It will only be possible if 
one State attaches importance to the registration and the other State to the place of effective 
management.
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however, is to restrict domestic tax concessions to dual resident entities that are found to 
be resident in Australia under the tie-breaker tests. The following discussion first 
examines the scope of the tie breaker tests under DTAs before exploring Australia’s 
approach to limiting double dipping by dual residents.
1 Impact o f treaties
(a) Tie breaker tests
As noted in Chapter 3, as each treaty comes into existence through negotiation, the 
language of every treaty differs.1:0 The variation in many cases, however, is minor. This 
is due to the fact that all Australian treaties since 1963 have been based upon Article 
4(3) of OECD Model Convention existing at that time. Thus, although the language of 
the tie breaker tests varies slightly, the tie breaker test in Article 4(3) of the 2003 OECD 
Model Convention is represented in Australian treaties. Article 4(3) states:
[w]here. . . a person other than an individual is a resident of both 
Contracting States, then it shall be deemed to be a resident only of the State 
in which its place of effective management is situated. 156
A number of states have made reservations in respect of the test, as they prefer other tie- 
breaker tests (such as the place of incorporation or place of the head, main or 
registered office).158 Although Australia has not made a formal reservation there are two 
primary tests used in Australia’s DTAs to determine the residency of a person other than 
an individual: the company’s “place of effective management”159 or its “place of 
incorporation”.160 The tests are used either solely or in combination.161
155 Chapter 3, Part II C 2 (a).
156 The OECD believes “[i]t would not be an adequate solution to attach importance to a purely 
formal criterion like registration” -  see 2003 OECD Commentary on art 4, para 22.
157 Canada, Mexico and United States.
158 Japan, Korea and Turkey.
159 Place of effective management criterion is used in art 4(4) (unless otherwise indicated) of 
Australian DTAs with Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic art 4(5), France art 3(3), 
Germany art 4(3), Hungary, India art 4(3), Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Malta art 
4(5), Mexico art 4(5), Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak 
Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland art 4(3), 2003 United Kingdom 
and Vietnam.
160 Place of incorporation in Taipei art 4(4) and as an alternate test in Finland art 4(4), Philippines art 
4(5), and Thailand art 4(5).
161 The combinations are:
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Other tie-breaker tests have been used to a lesser extent. The term “place where 
managed and controlled” has been used as a tie breaker test in the Singapore DTA 
instead of “effective place of management”,162 while tests such as “the location of a 
company’s head office”,163 “place of creation”,164 and “place of organisation”166 are 
used instead of, or in conjunction with, incorporation.
The 2003 revised United Kingdom DTA also has a tie-breaker test for dual listed 
company arrangements. Where a dual listed company is a resident of both states it is 
deemed to be resident in the state it is incorporated, provided it has its primary stock 
exchange listing in that State.166
As mentioned above, no tie breaker tests exist for dual resident entities in the United 
States and Japanese DTAs.
(b) Defining effective management
As the term “place of effective management” is used as a tie-breaker test in 29 of 
Australia’s DTAs it is important to determine its scope. The “place of effective 
management” test in the DTA context applies to companies and other bodies of persons, 
irrespective of whether they are or not legal persons, provided they are treated as a body 
corporate for tax purposes.167
• the state of incorporation or otherwise constituted; if not incorporated or otherwise 
constituted in either jurisdiction then place of effective management (Canada art 4(4), Fiji 
art 4(5), and Kiribati art 4(4)); and
• for companies -  central management and control, if central management and control not in 
either place of incorporation (Papua New Guinea Art a(4)).
162 Singapore art 3(3)).
163 China art 4(4) uses the place of effective management or head office. Where place of effective 
management in one state, head office in other, head office takes precedence.
164 Place of creation is used as an alternative test in Finland art 4(4), Philippines art 4(5), and Thailand 
art 4(5), but as a sole test in Denmark art 4(4).
165 Place of organisation is used as an alternative test in the Finland art 4(4), Philippines art 4(5), and 
Thailand art 4(5)).
166 2003 United Kingdom art 4(5).
167 2003 OECD Commentary on art 3, para 2. A similar test (ie “effective management of an 
enterprise”) is used for source allocation rules in connection with the taxation of income from 
shipping, inland waterways transport and air transport in art 8 of the OECD Convention, and in arts 
13(3), 15(3) and 22(3). It is argued that test is subtly different as a enterprise can exist in a number 
of places while the place of effective management exists in only one place — see J David B Oliver 
(JDBO), ‘Current Notes: Effective Management’ [2001] British Tax Review 289, 291.
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Despite the widespread use of the test and its importance to treaties it has only been 
subjected to limited formal review.16* In Trustees o f Wensleydale’s Settlement v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue the Special Commissioner noted that the place of 
effective management is the centre of top management, “[t]he place . . . where the shots 
are called, to adopt a vivid transatlantic colloquialism” . 169 It is the place where
1 7 0management directives are given, not where they take effect.
The OECD defines the place of effective management to ordinarily be the place where 
the key management and commercial decisions are determined, ie the place where the 
most senior person or group of persons (eg, the board of directors) makes decisions. 
Although the term is similar to the United Kingdom’s concept of “central management 
and control” it is subtly different as effective management can only exist in one 
place. Thus, the “place of effective management” test is “. . . a factual test based on 
the situs of management.” 174
(c) Summary
Thus, Australia in its residency tie-breaker tests in its DTAs uses two key tests, either 
solely or in combination: the place of effective management test or the place of 
incorporation test.
168 In fact in Trustees o f Wensleydale’s Settlement v Commissioner for Inland Revenue (1996) SpC 
73; [1996] STC (SCD) 241 the Special Commissioner noted that there were on reported decisions 
in which the term had been considered - see JDBO (1996), above n 53, 528. However, Vogel 
argues that the case law in relation to the term “place of management” (Ort der Geschaftsleitung) 
in Abgabenordnung § 10 (the German Fiscal Code), which refers to the centre of top management, 
is useful in determining the scope of the test -  see Klaus Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation 
Conventions (3rd ed, 1997), 262.
169 Trustees o f Wensleydale’s Settlement v Commissioner for Inland Revenue (1996) SpC 73, 78 and 
79; [1996] STC (SCD) 241, 250b and 250j -  cited in JBDO (1996), ibid, 529.
170 Vogel, above n 168. This approach is consistent with the concept of corporate control under the 
Corporations Law 2001 (Cth). In contrast, until 29 April 2000 New Zealand's reported 
interpretation of the term “effective management” was practical day to day management, 
irrespective of where the overriding control is exercised.
171 2003 OECD Commentary on art 4, para 24.
172 The OECD in fact suggests the words “central management and control” can offer guidance in 
determining the meaning of “place of effective management” -  see OECD, Impact o f the 
Communications Revolution on the Application o f ‘Place o f Effective Management’ as a Tie 
Breaker Rule: Discussion Draft (February 2001). Also see Hamilton, above n 15, para 6.140, and 
Tom W Magney Australia’s Double Tax Agreements: A Critical Appraisal o f Key Issues (1994), 
12.
173 Philip Owen, ‘Can effective management be distinguished from central management and control?’ 
[2003] British Tax Review 296, 305 and 2003 OECD Commentary on art 4, para 24. However, it is 
substantially similar -  JDBO (2001), above n 167, 203
174 JDBO (2001), ibid, 290 and 2003 OECD Commentary on art 4, ibid.
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2 Special domestic rules fo r  dual resident companies and deemed companies
As a consequence of the operation of the DTA tie breaker test a company can be deemed 
to be resident of another contracting state (and taxable in that state) while still being 
resident under Australia’s domestic law and taking advantage of its resident status to 
access specific tax concessions (double dipping).175 As mentioned above, to counter this 
risk the tax law contains special concession limiting rules that apply to dual residents. 
The following discussion explores the scope of these anti-avoidance rules: that is, the 
two specific definitions of dual residents, a “prescribed dual resident” and “dual resident 
investment company.”
(a) “Dual resident investment company” test
The “dual resident investment company” definition, which is found in s 6F of the 1936 
Act (and incorporated in the 1997 Act via s 995-1), was introduced in 1990.176 It was 
specifically inserted as part of measures aimed at denying dual resident investment 
companies (usually a group financing vehicle) the ability to transfer its income and net 
capital losses to Australian group members,17 thereby stopping “double dipping” in 
Australian losses and foreign losses being offset against domestic gains or income.
Section 6F defines a “dual resident investment company” in a year of income to be an 
Australian resident company (other than in the capacity of a trustee) which is liable to 
tax in a foreign country in respect of some or all of the income or profits because:
• the company was either treated as a resident or domiciled in that county under its 
domestic law or its management and control is treated as being located in that 
country for the purposes of the relevant law of that country; and
• the company was either not carrying on business with a reasonable view to profit 
or a substantial purpose of the company was to directly or indirectly acquire or 
hold shares, securities or other investments in related companies.
175 The savings of the “prescribed dual resident” measures was estimated at $50 to $100 million per 
year - Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No2) 1997 (Cth), 3. Further 
changes to deny intercorporate dividend rebate in respect of unfranked dividends paid to by a dual 
resident company and to deny dual resident companies a deduction, which offsets the effect of 
removal of the rebate, allowed from 1 July 2000 for certain non-resident owned companies were 
introduced on 14 March 2002 in Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 2) 2002 (Cth).
176 Introduced by Taxation Laws Amendment Act 1990 (Cth).
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(b) “Prescribed dual resident” test
The “prescribed dual resident” test is in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act (and incorporated in the 
1997 Act via s 995-1).178 A “prescribed dual resident” in a year of income is either a 
non-resident company deemed to be an Australian resident under the “central 
management and control” test or a so-called “DTA dual resident company”. A “DTA 
dual resident company” is an Australian resident under s 6(1) of the 1936 Act, which is 
deemed by the DTA tie breaker test to be resident in another country. The definition 
includes companies and deemed companies (corporate limited partnerships, corporate 
unit trusts and public trading trusts179). The term “central management and control” used 
in this context is the common law concept.180
Again the test was inserted to deny such dual residents, who are not fully subject to 
Australian tax, entitlement to domestic tax benefits such as dividend rebates, capital 
gains rollover relief, and the transfer of capital and revenue losses, making them subject 
to the thin capitalisation and debt equity rules and restricting dual residents access to 
deductions arising from accrued liabilities on securities held by offshore associates.181
(c) Summary
In summary, the dual resident definitions, being part of anti avoidance measures, do 
limit the scope of the residency definition.
E. Summing up the scope of the residency tests for companies
The definition of residency for a company in the 1997 Act (s 6(1) of the 1936 Act via 
s 995-1) consists of the incorporation test and two fact and circumstance tests. As a 
result of the fact and circumstance nature of these rules, a large body of common law 
has been adopted through the use of common terminology and further developed
177 Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 1990 (Cth), 17-18.
178 Introduced by Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 2) 1997 (Cth).
179 1936 Act ss 94J, 102L(2) and 102T(2) respectively.
180 The words are intended “. . . to cover high level (as opposed to day-to-day) management and 
control” - Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 2) 1997 (Cth), 33.
181 Michael Morley, ‘International Taxation Measures in the 1996-1997 Budget’ (1996) 25 Australian 
Tax Review 202, 204.
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through litigation. Added to this matrix are a number of specific residency definitions, 
which in the main, incorporate many of the same or similar terminology.
Having reviewed the scope of the residency rules applying to companies, the next step is 
to explore the main thesis, ie “are the rules equitable, efficient, and simple” and “do the 
rules prevent tax avoidance”?
III. Evaluating the effectiveness of the residency rules for companies
The purpose of this Part is to explore whether these rules fail, in their practical 
application, to satisfy the “essential objectives” of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the 
prevention of tax avoidance. As discussed in Chapter 2, the evaluation will be 
undertaken by illustrating circumstances where the law struggles to satisfy each of the 
evaluative criteria. The evaluative criteria are addressed in the following order: equity; 
efficiency; simplicity; and the prevention of tax avoidance.
Also as indicated previously, where some examples illustrate that a number of the 
evaluative criteria are not satisfied, to avoid duplication in text and analysis, it is 
proposed to discuss them in the context of the more relevant evaluative criteria only, 
with a passing reference being made to the other shortcomings.
A. Equity
Consistent with the definition in Chapter 2, in determining compliance with the equity 
objective, the following discussion will highlight where companies in similar 
circumstances are not being taxed similarly (horizontal inequity). Vertical inequity, that 
is, the tax burdens does not fall upon those with the greatest ability to pay, does not arise 
in this context. The approach to be adopted is to examine the residency rules more 
broadly, before focusing on specific equity issues in relation to the DTA tiebreaker tests.
1 “Facts and circumstance” tests (the “central management and control”, voting 
power control, and the specific residency tests)
Under the “central management and control”, voting power control, and the specific 
residency tests (through the utiltisation of the s 6(1) “central management and control”
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and “voting power control” tests) a company (or deemed company) must determine, in 
light of its factual circumstances, where central management and control lies, whether a 
business is being carried on in Australia, or whether beneficial control by shareholders 
exists.
Thus, in common with other factual tests, a finding of residency could turn on a minor 
variation in circumstances or, hypothetically, even on a difference in a single fact. For 
example, a company with two Australian resident directors and one non-resident 
director could change its residency merely through one of the Australian directors 
becoming non-resident resulting the central management and control shifting off shore.
Given that minor variations in a company’s circumstances may determine residency it is 
possible that companies in similar circumstances could have different residency status. 
As horizontal equity is found where companies in similar circumstances are taxed 
similarly, the individual factual nature of these tests means that in application they fail 
to deliver horizontal equity.
2 Problems caused by interrelationship ofDTAs
As discussed in Chapter 3, the primary circumstance where horizontal inequity occurs 
relates to the fact that DTAs only provide relief to companies covered by the bilateral 
agreement. Thus, where a dual resident taxpayer’s second country of residence is a 
country which does not have a DTA with Australia, then that company can be subjected 
to double taxation, while single taxation will apply to a company whose second country 
of residence is in a country with a DTA. As a result some dual resident companies in a 
DTA country will be treated differently to those dual resident companies from non-DTA 
countries.
Horizontal inequity can also arise where a company is treated as a resident for tax under 
the domestic law of each contracting state to the DTA, but the place of effective 
management is in a third state. In these circumstances the company will not be granted 
double taxation relief under the DTA, resulting in the company being more heavily 
taxed.
225
Both of these scenarios are a natural consequence of the DTA process as the inequity only 
arises from obtaining equity for other taxpayers covered by DTAs. Further, as mentioned 
previously, this inequity should be reduced in the short term as the Government in 2003 
agreed to escalate Australia's future treaty negotiation program.182
3 Summary
From the above discussion, it is evident that the residency tests for companies fail the 
horizontal equity evaluative criterion (ie companies in similar circumstances are not 
being taxed similarly). The rules fail to deliver horizontal equity as the:
• facts and circumstances tests can result in persons in similar circumstances having 
different residency status; and
• dual resident companies covered by a DTA are treated differently to dual resident 
companies who are not covered by a DTA.
B. Efficiency (Neutrality)
In light of the discussion in Chapter 2, the efficiency (neutrality) objective is satisfied if 
the rules relating to residency of companies give rise to distortions such as a taxpayer 
being taxed differently due to the market in which the taxpayer operates (eg physical or 
electronic) or if distortions arise from tax avoidance. As with the residency rules for 
individuals, the residency rules for companies apply the same tests to companies 
regardless of their mode of conducting business. However, as discussed in Part III D, 
these rules are able to be manipulated to minimise or avoid tax. Therefore, there is a lack 
of neutrality as a result of the distortion caused by or flowing from tax avoidance. Thus, 
they are not efficient as distortions arise from tax avoidance through manipulation of the 
rules.
C Simplicity
In determining whether the residency rules for companies meet the simplicity objective, 
the following discussion will highlight the extent to which the residency rules in
182 Treasurer ‘Review of International Taxation Arrangements’ (Press Release No 32, 13 May 2003), 
Attachment E.
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application do not satisfy the indicators of simplicity. In other words it will evaluate if 
the rules are predictable, proportional, consistent, do not impose high compliance 
burdens, easy to administer, co-ordinated with other tax rules, and clear.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, as a number of these elements overlap, a single rule may be 
found to satisfy a number of the individual elements of the simplicity objective. Thus, 
the following discussion will seek to address the problems arising under the most 
relevant evaluative element. The extent to which these elements exist will determine the 
extent to which the rules will be considered to have failed the simplicity objective in 
that circumstance. The evaluation will follow the order of evaluative elements as set out 
above, but will only address those elements that are relevant.
1 Predictability
The first element for judging simplicity is to determine whether in applying the 
residency rules for companies, the results are predictable (ie, it is easy to understand a 
rule’s intended and actual scope).
The principal factor that influences predictability of the residency rules for companies is 
that a company's residency depends upon its individual factual circumstances. As 
mentioned above, in considering the equity evaluative criterion under the central 
management and control test and the voting power control test in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act 
and by the adoption of these tests in the specific residency tests, a company must 
determine, in light of its individual circumstances, whether it has "central management 
and control" in Australia, “carries on business in Australia”, “voting power”, “control”, 
“formation”, “location of property in Australia” and has “50% of beneficial interest in 
the income or property in Australia”.
Despite the wide spread usage of the “place of effective management” tie breaker test, 
the OECD notes that there is little guidance in the OECD Commentary on what 
constitutes “the place of effective management”. The lack of definitional certainty has 
raised questions about the effectiveness of the "place of effective management" test in 
the environment of advanced communications (such as videoconferencing or electronic
183 OECD Place of Effective Management Discussion Draft (2001), above n 172.
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discussion group applications184), dual listings and mobility of companies.18̂ Where a 
remote meeting occurs, a place of management might be regarded as existing in each 
jurisdiction where a manager is located at the time decisions are made or where the 
board meets from time to time, but it may be difficult (if not impossible) to point to a 
particular location as being the one place of effective management. Thus, a company 
may have a mobile place of effective management.
On balance, as the outcome under the residency tests and the DTA tie breaker tests can 
turn on a single fact, the outcome in many circumstances is difficult to predict.
2 Proportional
The second element forjudging simplicity is to determine whether the complexity of the 
residency rules is proportional to the complexity of the policy. If the law is more 
complex than the policy, then the law will fail this element of the simplicity criterion.
The policy underlying the residency rules, as articulated previously, is conceptually 
simple. For example, the broad purpose of the s 6(1) “central management and control” 
test is to ensure that a . . number of companies incorporated outside Australia whose 
sole or principal business is located in Australia” were taxable as residents.186 Similarly, 
the purpose of the “voting power control” test is to ensure that “. . . companies . . . 
whose shareholders controlling the voting power of the company are residents of 
Australia”.187
184 OECD Place of Effective Management Discussion Draft (2001), ibid, 8, 9. The OECD notes that 
“[t]he availability of advanced and evolving communications technology such as 
videoconferencing or electronic discussion group applications via the Internet means that it is no 
longer necessary for a group of persons to be physically located or meet in one place to hold 
discussions and make decisions. In a modem environment, application of the traditional approach 
can produce results which do not reflect the intention of the tie-breaker rule . . . Increasing 
numbers of enterprises conducting transnational businesses, combined with rapid improvement in 
global transportation systems, are also likely to have an impact on the place of effective 
management concept.”
185 OECD, Place of Effective Management Discussion Draft (2001), ibid, paras 35-45; Ward, David 
A, et al, ‘A Resident of a Contracting State for Tax Treaty Purposes: A Case Comment on Crown 
Forest Industries' (1996) 44 Canadian Tax Journal 408, 423 and OECD, International Tax 
Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies (1987) para 35.
186 Note on Clause 2 in Explanatory Notes, Bill to Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 
(Cth), 11.
187 Ibid.
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However, despite these fairly simple policy objectives the facts and circumstances 
approach adopted in the central management and control test, and to a lesser extent in 
the voting power control tests makes these rules more complex in application than the 
simple underlying policy. Thus, complexity arising from the fact and circumstances 
approach adopted in the tests is disproportional in general to the underlying policy and 
in these circumstances fails this element of the simplicity criterion.
The use of specialist definitions, which in turn may have simple policy intents, can also 
complicate the law. For example, although the “Part X Australian resident” and “Part XI 
Australian resident” definitions operate within specific provisions, they can lead to 
anomalies in application of the law. Thus, a company may be deemed to be a resident 
for CFC purposes, but not for the general purposes of the tax law. Similarly, the 
definition of resident corporate limited partnership in s 94T of the 1936 Act had to be 
modified two years after introduction in order to align the treatment of corporate 
limited partnerships under the foreign tax credit, foreign loss, CFC and FIF provisions
1 O Q
with the treatment of companies under those provisions.
Thus, complexity arising from the use of specific tests is often disproportional in general 
to the policy underlying their introduction and in these circumstances fails this element 
of the simplicity criterion.
3 Compliance burdens
The third element used for judging simplicity of the company residency tests is to 
determine qualitatively the level of cost (the burden) imposed upon the company in 
complying with the law. If examples indicate that the compliance costs are high, the 
rules fail this element of simplicity criterion.
As noted above, a company, in a self assessment environment must determine, in light 
of its individual factual circumstances, whether it is a resident under the various tests 
contained in the 1936 Act. However, this process is complicated as the origins of the 
non-incorporation tests lie in the common law and their scope has been defined by a 
long line of often conflicting United Kingdom and Australian judicial decisions. Added
188 Amended by Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 3) 1994 (Cth).
189 Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 3) 1994 (Cth), 43.
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to this a number of specific residency definitions (ie “corporate limited partnerships”, 
“resident unit trusts”, the foreign source income rules, the dividend imputation system 
and dual resident companies) and the impact of DTAs, a complex matrix of imprecise 
and often subtly different rules emerge. The uncertainty is magnified with factual 
application and technology changes that allow remote management.
Thus, the determination of residency is an expensive exercise as under the 
non-incorporation tests of residence in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act, offshore subsidiaries of 
Australian companies, multinationals, regional holding companies and dual listed 
companies can be treated as resident companies. The 2002 RITA consultation paper notes 
this cost and the costs associated in avoiding the application of the rules. The paper 
suggests that this planning can be costly and inconvenient and is unnecessary on policy 
grounds.190
In summary, the requirement in most of the residency tests to determine a company’s 
residency status by its facts and circumstances is a major contributor to compliance costs 
for affected companies.
4 Difficulty in administration
The fourth element for judging simplicity is to determine whether there are any 
administrative difficulties in applying the residency rules for companies. If the rules are 
difficult to administer then the rules will fail this element of the simplicity criterion.
There are administrative difficulties arising from the fact and circumstance basis of the 
central management and control test. As a company's residency depends upon its 
circumstances, the ATO is required to make individual, subjective determinations in 
respect of issues such as whether the company has the requisite “central management 
and control”. This uncertainty and the case by case nature of the test mean that the ATO 
is unable to give simple broad pronouncements on how the law operates. As the self 
assessment system is dependent on taxpayers having the necessary information to 
determine their tax position, the inability to provide that information impacts adversely 
on the ability to self assess and the extent to which the ATO can treat as reliable self-
190 RITA Consultation Paper, above n 28, 53.
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assessed residency determinations. 191 If reliability is low, risk is high and the ATO
192under its compliance model is required to devote additional resources to areas of risk. 
Thus, it is obvious that the uncertain and subjective “central management and control” 
test would have difficulty satisfying the simplicity criterion.
Similarly, the fact and circumstance basis of the “voting power control” test also makes 
administration difficult. Under the test, the ATO is required to make individual, 
subjective determinations in respect of issues such as whether the company "carries on 
business”, the location of the business, or whether the shareholders have the requisite 
“control”. This difficulty is compounded where the trading activities are conducted by 
mail order or electronic means (Internet). As a result it is impossible for the ATO to give 
simple broad pronouncements on how the law operates and it is equally difficult for 
taxpayers to determine their residency status. Again, this test becomes impossible to 
effectively administer in the self-assessment environment. It too obviously fails the 
simplicity criterion.
However, on the surface the “incorporation” test satisfies the criteria of simplicity and 
certainty, and is easy to administer. In fact the United States Department of Treasury 
sees that in light of the growth in Internet commerce that this test will assume greater 
importance. 193 The Department of Treasury notes that “[i]n the world of cyberspace, it is 
often difficult, if not impossible, to apply traditional source concepts to link an item of 
income with a specified geographic location” . 194
Arnold and McIntyre argue that “[t]he place-of-incorporation test provides simplicity 
and certainty to the government and the taxpayer.” 195 Similarly, the RITA Consultation 
Paper recognised that the test is simple for tax administrators and would lower 
compliance costs. 196 These reasons were relied upon by the Board of Taxation in
191 A search of the word “resident” on the ATOIDs section of the ATO website (URL at 
http://www.ato.gov.au located on 28 April 2004) reveals that only 19 of the over 500 ATOIDS 
issued between 2002 and 2004 related to companies and only one ATOID rules on a company’s 
residency.
192 Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Compliance Plan 2004-05 (2004).
193 Department of the Treasury (US), Office of Tax Policy, Selected Tax Policy Implications o f Global 
Electronic Commerce (1996), para 7.1.5 at URL: http://www.fedworld.gov/tel/intemet.txt as at 31 
December 2003. Jinyan Li, ‘E-commerce Policy in Australia, Canada and the United States’ (2000) 
6 University o f New South Wales Law Journal 40, 42 suggests that this view maybe based upon the 
fact that the United States is the largest exporter in e-commerce.
194 Department of the Treasury (US), ibid.
195 Brian Arnold and Michael McIntyre, International Tax Primer (1995) 22.
196 RITA Consultation Paper, above n 28, 54.
231
recommending that the basis for residency of a company should be on whether it is 
incorporated in Australia.197 Thus, the incorporation test does not impose high 
administrative costs.
In summary, although the incorporation test is easy to administer, the requirement in 
non-incorporation residency tests to determine a company’s residency status via its 
factual circumstances remains a major contributor to tax administration difficulties for 
the Commissioner.
5 Co-ordinated with other tax rules
The fifth element for judging simplicity is to determine whether residency rules for 
companies are co-ordinated with other tax rules. If the law operates independently of 
other tax rules, the rules will fail this element of simplicity.
The main area of divergence is the variations in the form of residency tests in each 
DTA, resulting from a failure to adopt the OECD model residency article. As discussed 
in Part II D 1 (a), the term “place where managed and controlled" has been used as a tie 
breaker in the Singapore DTA instead of “effective place of management”, while tests 
such as “the location of a company’s head office”, “place of creation”, and “place of 
organisation” are used instead of in place of, or in conjunction with, incorporation. 
Although these differences may have arisen due to the preferences of negotiating 
countries, the adoption of such variations also tend to slow the DTA 
negotiation/renegotiation process. As a result such arbitrary departures tend to counter 
the simplicity objective.
In summary, the DTA rules diverge from the terms adopted in the OECD model. This 
divergence is a further erosion of simplicity.
6 Clarity
The final element for judging simplicity is to determine whether the law is expressed 
clearly. If the law is expressed unclearly, it will fail this element of simplicity.
197 Board of Taxation RITA Report, above n 29, 106-9 - Recommendation 3.12.
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A lack of clarity arises where a taxpayer is resident for only part of the year. This occurs 
where a non-resident company becomes a resident or a foreign incorporated company 
becomes a non-resident due to changes in its ownership or movements in its central 
management and control. Although there has been a view that once a company was 
resident it was assessable on all its income earned during the income year, including 
income earned prior to residency198 the Federal Court in BHP-Utah Coal Limited v 
Federal Commissioner o f Taxation found that a company which “. . . comes to Australia 
during a part of a year of income is not subject to tax in Australia on the earnings 
derived from sources out of Australia whilst he was a non-resident.” 199
Further, it is argued that the concept “sufficiently resident" for companies under 
imputation rules reinforces the conclusion that part year residency is possible under any 
of the residency tests.200 However, on the plain operation of the “sufficiently resident" 
concept this seems to do the opposite, denying the existence of a franking credit and/or a 
franking debit unless a company is “sufficiently resident”. Further, where provisions 
(such as the former ss 128S and 128T of the 1936 Act) do not specifically provide for 
apportionment then no apportionment lies. Thus, in certain circumstances inequity 
can arise where part year residency occurs. Thus, without clear start and end dates for 
residency, the company residency test also fails the simplicity (certainty) criterion.
7 Summary
From the discussion above, the company residency rules fail the elements that gauge 
simplicity. Specifically, as the outcome under the central management and control, the 
voting power control and the DTA tie breaker tests can turn on a single fact (the facts 
and circumstances), the outcome in many circumstances is not predictable. The 
complexity arising from the facts and circumstances approach is disproportional in 
general to the underlying policy, is a major contributor to compliance costs for affected 
companies and remains a major contributor to tax administration difficulties for the
198 BHP-Utah Coal Limited v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1992) 23 ATR 258, 262; 92 ATC 
4266, 4269 (Davies J) referring to the theoretical basis for the view expressed in 11 CTBR[OS] 
Case 78. However, it was recognised in July 2000, in the context of consultation with Treasury in 
respect of entity taxation, that there was a need to ensure that the law was clear that entities can be 
resident for part only of an income year.
199 Ibid.
200 Hamilton, above n 15, para 2.150.
201 1997 Act s 205-25(a) and (b).
202 BHP-Utah Coal Limited v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1992) 23 ATR 258; 92 ATC 4266.
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Commissioner. Further, the tie-breaker residency rules for companies diverge from 
terms adopted in the OECD model creating inconsistency and a lack of clarity exists in 
respect of part year residence.
In conclusion, most of the residency rules relating to companies fail the elements that 
gauge simplicity (ie they are not predictable, not proportional, are associated with the 
imposition of high compliance burdens, are difficult to administer, are not co-ordinated 
with other tax rules and are expressed unclearly).
D. Tax Avoidance
In determining compliance with the prevention of tax avoidance objective, the following 
discussion will identify the circumstances where in the application of the law there 
appear to be evasion or avoidance opportunities. It will first explore weaknesses in the 
three company residency tests in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act, before examining the DTA tie 
breaker test and the specific dual residency definitions.
1 Incorporation test
The incorporation test in s 6(1) of the 1936 fails to satisfy the specific criterion of 
prevention of tax avoidance, as it is easy to evade. Lord Lorebum LC De Beers 
Consolidated Mines v Howe in 1906, in finding that incorporation was not an 
appropriate test for company residence, noted that if incorporation was used, a company:
. . . might have its chief seat of management and its centre of trading in 
England, under the protection of English law, and yet escape the appropriate 
taxation by the simple expedient of being registered abroad . . .
This concern was echoed in the debates in the House of Representatives when the 
Australian residency definitions were first introduced in 193 0.204 The then Leader of the 
Opposition Sir John Greig Latham noted . . that large companies which have the 
prospects of extending their operation beyond Australia will be driven to incorporate
90Sthemselves outside Australia.”
203 De Beers Consolidated Mines v Howe (1906) 5 TC 198, 213 (Lord Lorebum LC)
204 Commonwealth, Parliamentary’ Debates, House of Representatives, 29 July 1930, 4859 (Sir John 
Greig Latham, Opposition Leader).
205 Ibid. Also see Hamilton, above n 15, para 2.180, Vann (1995), above n 16, 6 and Li, above n 193.
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When the prevalence of on-line offshore incorporations206 is combined with inexpensive 
incorporation in tax havens it is clear that the incorporation test is highly vulnerable to 
manipulation.207 This vulnerability to manipulation flows from the test’s reliance on 
form. It is argued that the visible attributes (the physical presence) of the company in the 
form of permanent establishments and subsidiaries are “dissolving in cyberspace”, 
particularly where the company offers services totally on line such as software, news, 
recorded music, art, electronic books, gambling and travel. Thus, it is argued that 
companies through an incorporation test can choose to pay tax on a source or residence 
basis.
However, despite these problems Arnold and McIntyre argue that “...the place-of- 
incorporation test places some limits on the ability of corporations to shift their country 
of residence for tax avoidance purposes” since “[i]n general, a corporation cannot freely 
change its place of incorporation without triggering a tax on the accrued gains in respect 
of its property.” 209
Similarly, the RITA Consultation Paper210 identified that some features of Australia’s 
tax system would reduce the risk to Australia of relying on place of incorporation as the 
sole test of residency. The RITA Consultation Paper identified the dividend imputation 
system, which is only available to resident companies and Australia’s taxation of the 
foreign source income of resident companies, which is arguably less aggressive than the 
United States. As in the United States, changing residence could also trigger CGT 
liabilities for the company as well as for shareholders.
However, the RITA Consultation Paper noted that there is a trend in the United States to 
minimise their United States’ company tax by changing the location of the parent 
company (without any substantive changes in their operations) and the use of start up
206 Kohl, above n 26, 443.
207 Li, above n 193, 41. Also see Bjorn Westberg, Cross-boarder Taxation o f E-Commerce (2002), 
36.
208 Kohl, above n 26, 444. However, the ATO has not found this to be the case - see Australian 
Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Taxation and the Internet: Second Report (1999) (ATO’s 
second Internet Report) and John Davidson, ‘ATO Figuring the Best Way to Tax the Web’ 
Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 11-12 December 1999, 20.
209 Arnold, above n 195, 22.
210 RITA Consultation paper, above n 28, 54-5.
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companies in tax havens. The RITA Consultation Paper concludes that the United States 
experience still justifies caution in adopting an incorporation only test.211
Many submissions to the Board of Taxation on the issue argue that the existence of 
Australia’s tax rules (eg the dividend imputation requirements, capital gains tax on any 
disposal, transfer pricing rules, CFC rules and the thin capitalisation laws) reduce the 
risk of “corporate inversions”. This view was accepted by the Board of Taxation, 
which recommended that the basis for residency of a company should be on whether it 
is incorporated in Australia. Despite this recommendation, the Government deferred 
consideration of changes to the domestic tests of company residence pending the release 
of a Taxation Ruling by the ATO to clarify its view on the operation of the current 
tests.214
2 Central management and control test
The “central management and control” test also fails to satisfy the anti avoidance 
criterion. Concerns about the effectiveness of the test were also raised as early as 1930 
when the residency definitions were first introduced." ‘ The then Leader of the 
Opposition, Sir John Greig Latham, in the House of Representatives noted that the 
central management and control test would be avoided by “. . . encouraging companies 
to remove their central management and control from Australia and arrange to be 
controlled by persons abroad.” The place of management style test is easily exploited 
“because a change in the place of management generally can be accomplished without 
triggering any tax".
In its first report on the Internet, however, the ATO concludes that there is sufficient 
authority to indicate that the courts are open to modifying the application of the “central 
management and control” test to the electronic communication environment (eg
211 Ibid 55-Option 3.12.
212 For example the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Review o f International Taxation 
Arrangements - Submission to the Board o f Taxation on the Commonwealth Department o f 
Treasury’s Consultation Paper o f August 2002, 31 October 2002, 33 and Business Council of 
Australia and the Corporate Tax Association, Joint Submission to the Board o f Taxation - Review 
o f International Taxation Arrangements, 12 November 2002, 73-4.
213 Board of Taxation RITA Report, above n 29, 106-9 - Recommendation 3.12.
214 Treasurer “Review of International Taxation Arrangements” (Press Release No 32, 13 May 2003).
215 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 July 1930, 4859 (Sir John 
Greig Latham, Opposition Leader).
216 Ibid.
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Internet, videoconferences, etc) . 218 Despite this optimistic view the ATO concedes that 
applying a factual test will prove difficult.
This is not a new problem as in the past the courts have struggled to determine the place
220of management and control where directors live in different parts of the world. 
Although, it is now accepted that dual residency can exist where central management 
and control of a company is divided,221 it will be often difficult to establish this on the 
facts.222
This problem is compounded by the instantaneous and global facilities, available 
currently, which render physical meeting otiose.223 The Corporations Act permits 
directors’ meetings to use any technology consented to by all the directors, but there 
must be some evidence of participation by the directors.224 Even where physical 
meetings take place, its location may be determined by taxpayer manipulation. This 
view is confirmed by the Business Council of Australia who noted the:
217 Arnold, above n 195, 23.
218 Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Tax and the Internet: Discussion Report (1997) para 
7.2.20 (ATO’s first Internet Report).
219 Ibid para 7.2.21.
220 Kohl, above n 26, 446. The slow acceptance of the “dual residence” concept is highlighted by 
comparing A Farnsworth’s 1939 published doctoral thesis (The Residence and Domicil of 
Corporations (1939)) with the 1975 work of Tom Magney (above n 26). While Farnsworth (at 
196) concluded that Swedish Central Railway Co v Thompson (1925] AC 495 (the case that first 
mooted dual residency) was an exception to a long series of court decisions, Magney is able to 
conclude (at 106) that dual residency occurs where there is a division of central management and 
control due to Lord Radcliffe’s qualification of the Swedish Central Railway case’s principle in 
Bullock (Inspector o f Taxes) v The Unit Construction Co Ltd (1959) 38 TC 712; [ 1960] AC 351 
and other post 1939 cases such as Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (1941) 64 CLR 241; 2 AITR 167; 6 ATD 42 and Union Corporation Ltd v Inland 
Revenue Commissioner (1952) 34 TC 207.
221 Ian Gzell, ‘Concepts of Residence and Source into the 21st Century’ (1996) Taxation Institute of 
Australia’s International Tax into the 21st Century Red Series Intensive Retreat, 10-12, and Ian 
Gzell, ‘Residency and Permanent Establishments’ (1997) Taxation Institute o f Australia 1997-98 
Convention Papers, 20, 25-6.
222 Lord Radcliffe (Bullock (Inspector o f Taxes) v The Unit Construction Co Ltd (1959) 38 TC 712, 
739; 11960] AC 351, 366) noted that “. . . individual cases have not always so arranged themselves 
as to make it possible to identify any one country as the seat of central management and control at 
all. Though such instances must be rare, the management and control may be divided or even, at 
any rate in theory, peripatetic.”
223 Li, above n 193, 41; Kohl, above n 26, 445 and OECD, Electronic Commerce: The Challenges to 
Tax Authorities and Taxpayer (November 1997) para 114.
224 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 248D.
225 Li, ibid, 4L The problem is compounded by the fact that internet business transactions are 
unverifiable making evidentiary collection impossible. However, work is currently being carried on 
by the OECD’s Technology Technical Advisory Group (TAG) on developing electronic “finger 
prints” which would give revenue authorities the mechanism for tracing the origins of electronic 
transactions, principally for GST/VAT purposes. Further details on the OECD’s Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs TAGs can be found at URL: http://www.oecd.org/subiect/e-commerce/ as at 31 
December 2003. Also see Gary Sprague and Michael Boyle, ‘General Report’ in International
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. . . test causes Australian companies with foreign subsidiaries or joint 
venture companies to ensure that the subsidiary’s management is out of 
Australia, and thereby minimises Australian involvement. To do otherwise 
would expose the foreign subsidiary's earnings (as well as actual or 
deemed capital gains) to tax in Australia.226
The RITA Consultation Paper also confirms that the test is avoidable by careful 
planning. However, the paper concedes that the planning can be costly, inconvenient 
and unnecessary (on policy grounds). The Consultation Paper also acknowledges that 
more uncertainty arises in a technological age (eg video conferencing, internet, etc) as 
the ascertainment of the residence under both non-incorporation tests is broadly based 
upon geographic ties determined as a question of fact.228
Given these potential avoidance problems, the “central management and control” test 
fails the specific criterion of prevention of tax avoidance.
3 Voting power control test
The third of the company residency tests in s 6(1) of 1936 Act, the voting power control 
test, is also easy to avoid. This fact was also recognised by Sir John Greig Latham who 
noted that the control test . . will be easily evaded. In order to escape the tax, a 
company will merely require that a bare majority of its shareholders are resident outside 
the Commonwealth.” " Also in 1930, Edward McTieman, the then member for Parkes, 
noted that “[f]or the purposes of avoiding taxation, shareholders who are residents of 
Australia might agree to transfer their shares to persons who are residents outside 
Australia, who would hold the shares as trustee.” 230
Further, given that the judicial interpretation of the test has determined that “control” of 
voting power requires an actual use of power, companies can avoid Australian residency
Fiscal Association, LXXXVIa Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International -  Taxation o f Income 
Derived from Electronic Commerce (2001), 21.
226 Michael Wachtel and Alf Capito (Andersen), Removing Tax Barriers to International Growth 
(Business Council of Australia Discussion Paper, 11 December 2001), para 2.8.5. See also Chapter 
6 of the Report.
227 RITA Consultation paper, above n 28, 54-5.
228 Ibid 54.
229 Commonwealth, Parliamentary’ Debates, House of Representatives, 29 July 1930, 4859 (Sir John 
Greig Latham, Opposition Leader).
230 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 July 1930, 4862 (Edward 
Aloysius McTeiman).
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by simply refraining from voting.231 Alternatively, the voting power could be granted to 
a non-resident proxy, a nominee or trustee, and the same result achieved (as the 
beneficial control is not actual control). Although, Kohl argues that although these gaps 
are theoretical there is the potential for avoidance through international share trading via 
the Internet.232
On balance, given the ease of avoidance, the test also fails the specific criterion of 
prevention of tax avoidance.
4 Effective management
The “effective management” tie breaker test in DTAs can also be manipulated. The 
OECD argues that the application of the test may not result in a clear determination of 
which country should be given preference as the country of residence, or may result in 
an outcome which does not appear to accord with the policy intentions of the
• • 233provision.
The OECD has released two discussion papers which explore a number of options to 
overcome the defects in the “place of effective management” tie breaker tests.234 The 
second paper, released on 27 May 2003 recommends two changes:
• the refinement of the place of effective management concept by expanding the 
Commentary explanations as to how the concept should be interpreted; and
9 T S• the adoption of a hierarchy of tests.
231 Hamilton, above n 15, para 2.200.
232 Kohl, above n 26, 449.
233 Ibid, 8.
234 The first paper, OECD Place o f Effective Management Discussion Draft (2001), above n 172,
examined five solutions:
(A) Replace the place of effective management concept;
(B) Refine the place of effective management test;
(C) Establish a hierarchy of tests, as in the individual tie-breaker so that if one test does not provide 
an outcome, the next test will apply. The hierarchy suggested was place of effective 
management, place of incorporation, economic nexus, or mutual agreement;
(D) A combination of B and C above; or
(E) Deny dual resident companies the benefits under the Convention. Although this option does not 
address the issue of residence-residence conflicts resulting in double taxation, it does act as a 
deterrent to treaty abuse by dual resident companies.
235 OECD, Place o f Effective Management Concept: Suggestions for Changes to the OECD Model
Tax Convention: Discussion Draft (27 May 2003), 1.
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The proposed hierarchy of tests is:
• the place of effective management is situated;
• if the country in which its place of effective management is situated cannot be 
determined or if its place of effective management is in neither country, it shall 
be deemed to be a resident only of the country with which its has either its 
economic relations are closer or in which its business activities are primarily 
carried on or in which its senior executive decisions are primarily taken;.
• if the country cannot be determined under the test above, it shall be deemed to be 
a resident of the country from the laws of which it derives its legal status;
• if it derives its legal status from neither country or from both countries, or if the 
country from the laws of which it derives its legal status cannot be determined, 
the question is settled by mutual agreement.236
The second paper puts forward three alternatives for the second tier test being, the place 
where:
• economic relations are closer; or
• in which its business activities are primarily carried on; or
• in which its senior executive decisions are primarily taken.
Although a hierarchy approach does attract broad support, such an approach does tend 
to favour source taxation over residency as it focuses on management rather than legal 
form. Further, there is no universal agreement that replacement of the “place of effective 
management” test with tests that are vaguer or more formalistic is necessary, merely 
because difficulties arise in determining the place of effective management due to the
238communication revolution.
5 Dual resident definitions
As discussed previously, a consequence of the operation of the DTA tie breaker test is 
that a company can be deemed to be resident of another contracting state (and taxable in
236 Ibid, 3.
237 See, eg, Chartered Institute of Taxation (UK) Place o f Effective Management Concept, 3 
September 2003.
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that state) while still being resident under Australia’s domestic law and taking advantage 
of its resident status to access specific tax concessions (double dipping). To counter this 
risk the tax law contains special concession limiting rules that apply to dual residents 
which include two specific definitions of dual residents, a “prescribed dual resident” and 
“dual resident investment company”.
However, the measures do not address all forms of double dipping. To overcome the 
difficulties associated with dual residents, the RITA Consultation Paper flagged the 
possibility of avoiding this complication through the adoption of the United Kingdom 
and Canadian230 approaches of amending the domestic definition of residency so that it 
is overridden where a company was taken to be a non-resident as a consequence of 
applying a treaty tie-breaker.240 That is, a company resident under Australia’s domestic 
tax law that is resident of a treaty partner under the relevant treaty tie-breaker would be 
treated as non-resident for all income tax purposes.241
The Board of Taxation recommended adoption of the deemed non-residency 
approach.242 The Treasurer accepted that recommendation, announcing that the 
company residence Riles will be amended so that companies that are residents under 
domestic income tax law, but are non-residents for the purposes of a tax treaty, are 
treated as non-resident for all purposes of the income tax law.243
6 Other residency rules
As discussed above (in Part II C) there are two classes of specific “residency” 
definitions: those applying in respect of deemed companies and those that operate for 
specific tax policy purposes such as the FSI rules, the dividend imputation system, and
238 JDBO(2001), above n 167, 295.
239 Finance Act 1994 (UK) s 249 and Income Tax Act (Can) RSC 1985 s 250(5).
240 The OECD has gone further suggesting, as one of the solutions to defects in the effective 
management test, that a more stringent test of denying use of the convention to dual residents. The 
OECD notes that although this approach does not address the issue of residence-residence conflicts 
resulting in double taxation, it does act as a deterrent to treaty abuse by dual resident companies -  
see OECD Place of Effective Management Discussion Draft (2001), above n 172, 10. However 
such a test ignores the realities of dual resident companies. Although one solution to abuse in many 
jurisdictions is to domestically remove many of the concessions available to domestic companies, 
which can be double dipped by the dual resident, such provisions may fall foul of the 
discrimination articles in DTAs.
241 Option 3.13 RITA Consultation Paper, above n 28, 56.
242 Board of Taxation RITA Report, above n 29, 110 - Recommendation 3.13.
243 Press Release 32/03, above n 32.
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thin capitalisation. These definitions either rely on the s 6(1) of the 1936 Act company 
residency definitions or on common concepts such as central management and control. 
As these tests, in the main, rely on concepts already examined, in order to avoid 
duplication it is not proposed to repeat that analysis.
7 Summary
From the discussion above, it is apparent that three company residency tests in s 6(1) of 
the 1936 Act, the dual residency definitions and the effective management test under 
DTAs fail to counter tax avoidance where it is carried out by companies who have 
mobile income sources.
E. Summary o f Part III
From the above it is clear that the existing law for determining the residency of a 
company is inadequate. Overall it fails in identified ways to satisfy the equity, efficiency, 
simplicity and prevention of tax avoidance evaluative criteria. The major weakness in 
the non-incorporation residence tests is the factual element of the tests, which in certain 
situations:
• results in horizontal inequity;
• gives rise the lack of simplicity; and
• leaves the rules open to manipulation.
Given that the rules fail all the criteria, there is no need to address any potential conflicts 
in the evaluative criteria. Thus, to ensure that the company residency rules do better 
meet the evaluative criteria it is clear that the rules need to be reformed.244 The potential 
reform options are the focus of following discussion in Parts IV and V.
244 In fact as far back as 1975 the Asprey Committee (Asprey Report, above n 17, 260) found that 
there was " . . .  a case for extending the exercise of jurisdiction to tax on the basis of residence so 
that all foreign income is subject to Australian tax and credit so far as administratively feasible".
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IV. Exploring the sub-thesis - Models for reform of company residency
rules
A. Overview
The sub-thesis is that the domestic law can be modified within the jurisdictional 
framework to more closely meet the evaluative criteria (ie alternative approaches to the 
current rules that may better satisfy the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, 
simplicity and the prevention tax avoidance). In order to establish the sub-thesis, as in 
Chapter 3, a two-step approach will be adopted.
First, in this Part a review of the residency rules adopted domestically in a number of 
jurisdictions will be undertaken in conjunction with a selective examination of specific 
residency tests against the evaluative criteria. As the Australian DTAs are based upon 
the OECD Model Convention, and the variations away from the OCED model are 
identified in the analysis of DTAs in Part II, the comparative study will not encompass 
DTAs.
The comparative study, which focuses on domestic approaches to company residency 
adopted in foreign jurisdictions, will only compare and evaluate the individual residency 
test within the two broad approaches adopted world wide (that is, individual “fact and 
circumstances” and specific criteria).24̂  Although many jurisdictions combine these 
approaches, the focus will only be on the individual tests and will not involve a 
contextual examination of the residency rule (unlike Chapter 3).
This process will assist in identifying alternative models and potential solutions to the 
problems encountered in Australia's domestic law.246 Thus, in Part V, in light of the 
comparative analysis, a number of reform options (that are within the jurisdictional
245 An alternative classification is to divide the tests between those that focus upon formal legal 
connections (eg, incorporation or registry in the commercial register) and those that focus on 
economic or commercial connections (eg, the place of management, principal business location or 
less frequently, the residence of shareholders) -  see Hugh Ault, Comparative Income Taxation: A 
Structural Analysis (1997), 371.
246 As noted by Review of Business Taxation, Commonwealth, An International Prospective: An 
Information Paper Commissioned from Arthur Andersen Examining how other Countries 
approach Business Taxation (1998) iii and 3 a review of other jurisdictions will not give a 
blueprint for reform as they are often struggling with the same tax issues. However, it does give 
some guidance in developing the best approach to resolving jurisdictional problems.
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limitations) are reviewed against the evaluative criteria in order to determine whether 
the proposed rules are more equitable, efficient, simple and more able to prevent tax 
avoidance.
B. Comparing specific residency rules applicable in other jurisdictions
The following evaluation of the residency rules adopted in other jurisdictions will 
consider the residency tests in two categories, being:
• individual facts and circumstances tests (such as effective management, central 
management and control, and residence of directors or shareholders); and
• specific criteria (incorporation, seat, location of head office and voting power 
control).247
Given that a number of the foreign residency tests that have been adopted in Australia 
have already been extensively evaluated in the context of the Australian rules, I will not 
be evaluating all the approaches adopted. Such an examination would merely duplicate 
this earlier analysis. Therefore, the testing of specific residency tests adopted in other 
jurisdictions against the evaluative criteria will be limited to more unique foreign tests 
that have not been the subject of, or subsumed in, the previous analysis of Australia’s 
rules.248 Observation will be made where the form of the common residency rule 
adopted in another jurisdiction overcomes some of the weaknesses identified in respect 
of the Australian rule.
1 Facts and circumstance tests
As mentioned above there a number of fact and circumstance tests. They can be broken 
up into tests that focus upon where key decisions are made (the pinnacle of 
management), tests focused upon the place where the business is managed and those 
tests focused upon the residency of the shareholder or director. The tests will be 
explored under these three broad headings.
247 Arnold and McIntyre note that there is a uniform approach adopted world wide, ie "[t]he residence 
of a corporation is generally determined either by reference to its place of incorporation or its 
place of management" - Arnold, above n 195, 23.
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(a) Pinnacle o f  management tests
The first category of fact and circumstances tests is based upon the pinnacle of 
management tests. These tests exist in most jurisdictions, either expressly or through 
the operation of commercial codes. The terminology “central management and contror 
is used in a number of Commonwealth countries as the basis for a pinnacle of 
management test. As mentioned above (Part II B 3(a)) the concept of “central 
management and control” arose in the common law of the United Kingdom. It has been 
adopted through the common law (eg Canada249) and expressly by statute (Australia250).
The term “management and control” is also used to describe the pinnacle of 
management in Malaysia, Singapore and India." Although the term seems wider 
than “central management and control”, the case law defining “central management and 
control” is use used by commentators to define the scope of the “management and 
control” test.254 In Norway, although there is no definition of residency for companies, 
companies that are managed and controlled from Norway are treated as having their
9 S Sfiscal residence in Norway, regardless of where they are incorporated.
Similarly, New Zealand has not adopted the “central management and control” form of 
words in formulating its pinnacle of management test, but through its “control by 
directors” test it is argued that New Zealand has adopted a statutory formulation of
248 For example, the place of management test can be used formally if the focus is on the place the 
directors meet, rather than economic test focused upon the stitus of day-to-day management 
decisions- see Ault, above n 245, 371.
249 Edwin Kroft, 'Jurisdiction to Tax: An Update' (1993) Canadian Tax Foundation Corporate 
Management Tax Conference papers 1:6, 1:25 and Jack Bernstein, ‘Residence of corporations for 
Canadian tax’ (1988) 52 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 159, 160.
250 1936 Acts 6(1).
251 Income Tax Act 1967 (Malaysia) s 8(1 )(b). Company will be deemed to be a resident if trading in 
Malaysia and management and control of any one of its businesses is exercised in Malaysia.
252 Income Tax Act (Cap 134, 2001 Ed) (Singapore) s 2.
253 The company must be controlled and management of its affairs situated wholly in India under 
Income Tax Act 1961 (India) s 6. This is the second test of a two tier test. Also see Aliff Fazelbhoy 
and Porus Kaka, ‘India’ in Timothy J Lyons and Ramon J Jeffery (eds), IBFD: The International 
Guide to the Taxation o f Trusts (5 August 2003).
254 See eg, CCH Tax editors, Veerinderjeet Singh, and Teoh Boon Kee, Malaysian Master Tax Guide 
(21st ed, 2004), 51 and Angela Tan and Tan How Teck, Singapore Master Tax Guide Handbook 
(23rd ed, 2003), 31-2.
255 Confirmed in a Supreme Court (Hoyesterett) landmark ruling on 20 September 2002 - Ed, 
‘Supreme Court decides on fiscal residence of companies under domestic tax law’ IBFD Tax News 
Service - Headlines (27 November 2002). A company is normally deemed to be a resident if it is 
incorporated under Norwegian law - see Juhani Kesti (ed), European Tax Handbook 2004 (2004), 
489.
256 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE2(l)(a), fourth test of a four tier test.
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that common law test.257 However, the “control by directors” test is a narrower test than 
the “central management and control” test as it is focused on ascertaining control of the 
company being exercised in New Zealand by its directors, acting in their capacity as 
directors, whether or not decision making by directors is confined to New Zealand. 
Therefore, the test fails to pick up the management aspects of the common law “central 
management and control” test.
An “effective management” test is used in many countries including Austria,258 
Netherlands,2'"9 Portugal,260 Romania261 and South Africa.262 As discussed above (Part II 
D 1(b)) although the term is similar to the United Kingdom’s concept of “central 
management and control”  ̂ ' it is subtly different as effective management can only exist 
in one place.264
(b) Place where the business is managed tests
A second category of fact and circumstances test is based upon the place of day-to-day 
management. A “place of management” test ' is used in Albania, Croatia, Denmark and 
Germany.266 Similarly, a “centre of management” test is used in New Zealand.267 
Although it is argued that the test was intended to cover the “place of executive
257 Garth Harris, New Zealand's International Taxation (1990) 17.
258 Corporate Income Tax Regulations (Korperschaftateuer-Richtlinien (KStR)), s 6. The alternative 
tests company is the place which is designated its resident if has its legal seat - Hans Zochling et al, 
‘Taxation of companies in Austria’ (2004)58 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 399, 
400.
259 Kesti, above n 255, 471. There is no definition of “residence” in Netherlands corporate income tax 
law. Where a company incorporated under foreign law, the place of residence of a company is 
determined according to the circumstances. The crucial factor is the place in which the company is 
effectively managed. Where incorporated under Netherlands law companies are generally deemed 
to be resident in the Netherlands.
260 Corporate Income Tax Code (Portugal), Article 2(3) cited in William Cunningham ‘Portugal: The 
concept of corporate residence in tax law and in practice’ (1995) 35 European Taxation 85. The 
other test is a head office test.
261 Kesti, above n 255, 541. The alternative test is creation under the laws of Romania.
262 David Clegg, ‘South Africa’ in Lyons, above n 253.
263 See above n 172.
264 Owen, above n 173,305 and Sol Picciotto, International Business Taxation (1992), 9. However, it 
is substantially similar -  JDBO (2001), above n 167, 203
265 For the place of management test the location of the day-to-day management is normally decisive -  
see Kesti, above n 255, 167 and Ault, above n 245, 372.
266 It is the “center of management control” - see Kesti, above n 255, 43, 125, 167 and 243 
respectively. The alternative test in each country is “legal seat” except for Denmark which uses 
incorporation.
267 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE2(l)(c), third test of a four tier test.
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management” the test focuses on the administrative rather than the policy or strategic 
decisions.268
(c) “Residency o f the shareholder or director ” tests
The third category of fact and circumstance test is the residency of directors or 
shareholders.269 For example, in the Netherlands residency of the directors is a factor 
that can determine residency270 and in Australia and the United Kingdom control of a 
company by resident shareholders can determine residency.271 This style of test is not
272widely used.
(d) Evaluation
The foreign fact and circumstances tests offer a narrow range of possible test criteria in 
order to determine whether a company has established sufficient connection with a 
country through to its management or by the residence of its manager or its owners. 
Their commonality lies in the fact that they require case by case application. As 
discussed above (in Part III), the individual factual nature of these tests means that in 
application the tests fail to deliver horizontal equity and are not simple.
Most importantly, they fail to prevent tax avoidance. The place the Board meets, which 
is usually the place where the pinnacle of management is exercised, is subject to 
manipulation (eg by splitting the board with the majority of directors resident in the 
desired location) . 273 This has become more problematic with the adoption of the 
European Company (,Societas Europaea) Statute, which allows a European company to
268 New Zealand, Consultative Committee on International Tax Reform and Full Imputation, Second 
Report (July 1988) para 2.5.6 cited in Garth Harris, above n 257, 19.
269 The use of the residence of a company’s managers or officers in order to determine a company’s 
residence is hard to justify -  see Graetz, above n 1, 1425 and Sadiq, above n 2, 13.
270 Ault, above n 245, 372.
271 However, the mere holding of shares does not give rise to residency, there must be intermeddling 
in the affairs of the company as if the resident is a director - Denis Sheridan, 'Residence of 
companies for taxation purposes’ [1990] British Tax Review 78, 94 relying upon Kodak Limited v 
Clark (1901) 4 TC 549; Pierre J Bourgeois and Luc Blanchette, Tncome_taxes.ca.com: The 
Internet, electronic commerce, and taxes -  Some reflections: Part 2’ (1997) 45 Canadian Tax 
Journal 1378, 1396 and Gzell (1997), above n 221, 25.
272 As the purpose of corporate tax is to impose burdens on corporate shareholders, in theory, the ideal 
test for determining residency should be the residency of the shareholders -  see Arnold, above n 
195, 23 and below, Part V B 3(a).
273 Li, above n 193, 41. Another reason is that a change in the place of management can be achieved 
without triggering a tax liability -  Arnold, above n 195, 23.
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opt for a two-tier board structure. This means any pinnacle of management test will 
have to be applied across both a supervisory and a management board.274
Similarly, the place where the directors/shareholders reside also has a number of 
problems due to internationalisation of company boards, the adoption of two tier boards 
and the use of bearer shares in a number of jurisdictions.275
Thus, the foreign facts and circumstance tests, other than offering a range of possible 
test criteria, provide little guidance for reform as they too do not satisfy the evaluative 
criteria.
2 Specific criteria tests
There are two categories of specific criteria tests. They are place of creation (which 
includes incorporation, formation, domicile and seat), and place of head office or 
registered office. The following explores the scope of each of the tests before making 
some observations on the effectiveness of the tests.
(a) Creation tests
Incorporation is used as a sole test in the United States and Ireland276 and as an 
alternative test in Canada,277 Greece,278 India,279 Indonesia,280 New Zealand,281
274 Ed ‘UK implementation of European Company Statute’ IBFD Tax News Service - Headlines (29 
September 2004).
275 The test is also difficult to apply where the shares are held by residents of more than one country -  
Arnold, above n 195, 23.
276 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE) s 23A. Incorporation replaced a common law “central 
management and control” test from 11 February 1999 - see William Cunningham, ‘Irish- 
incorporated companies -  New Residence rules’ (1999) 53 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 476 and John Kilcullen, ‘Irish non resident companies -  The end?’ (1999) 12 Irish 
Tax Review 385.
277 Income Tax Act (Can) RSC 1985 (5th Supp) (as amended) s 250(4) deems a corporation to have 
been resident in Canada throughout a taxation year if it was incorporated in Canada after 26 April 
1965. It is an alternative to a common law central management and control test. Special rules apply 
(Income Tax Act (Can) s 250(4)(b) and (c)) apply special rules for companies formed prior 27 
April 1965 (based upon incorporation and was resident in or carried on business in Canada) and 
for foreign business corporation formed before 9 April 1959 and controlled by a corporation 
resident in Canada (based on similar incorporation, resident and business tests combined with 
dividend receipts).
278 Kesti, above n 255, 271.
279 The company is required to be formed and registered under Companies Act 1956 (India) under 
Income Tax Act 1961 (India) s 6. This is the first test of a two tier test. Also see Aliff Fazelbhoy 
and Porus Kaka, ‘India’ in Lyons, above n 253.
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Norway,282 and the United Kingdom.283 Other tests used in other jurisdictions are 
“formation” ,284 “registration” ,285 “created” ,286 and “domicile” .287
The “seat” {sitz, siege) of the corporation is used as a residency test in a number of civil 
law countries including Albania,288 Austria, 286 Croatia,290 and Germany.291 The seat of 
a company is a test similar to incorporation but is wider based upon the place where the 
company was first incorporated, the jurisdiction where the memorandum has been
292lodged and where the company has its head office.
280 Law Number 10 Year 1994 (Indonesia) Article 2 (3)(b): the first test of a two tier test. A 
corporation is a limited liability company, limited partnership, other partnerships and state owned 
corporations, an alliance, a society, a firm, a kongsi, a cooperative, a foundation, an institute or a 
pension fund -  Explanatory notes, Law of the Republic of Indonesia (No 10 of 1994) reproduced 
in S Sutanto, 2B(II) Taxation Laws o f Indonesia (loose leaf service).
281 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE2(l)(a): the first test of a four tier test.
282 Although there is no definition of residency companies, in practice they are residents if 
incorporated in Norway - Kesti, above n 255, 489.
283 A company is "resident" if incorporated in the United Kingdom after 15 March 1988 - Finance Act 
1988 (UK) s 66. Also see Geoffrey Pink, ‘A commentary on the United Kingdom Budget 1988’ 
(1988) 28 European Taxation 139, Robert Walters, ‘A guide to trading in the United Kingdom’ 
(1992) 32 European Taxation 270 and Denzil Davies, Booth: Residence, Domicile and UK 
Taxation (1995), 135-9.
284 Formation is used in South Africa (Ernest Mazansky, 'South Africa changes to a worldwide system' 
(2001) 55 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 138, 140), while in France, although 
residency is not defined, formation under French law and having a registered office in France is 
sufficient (Ault, above n 245, 373).
285 In Sweden registration with the Swedish Patent and Registration Board is required - Ault, above n 
245,371.
286 Hungary - see Kesti, above n 255, 299.
287 Law Number 10 Year 1994 (Indonesia) Article 2 (3)(b): the second test of a two tier test. It is a 
place of creation test. The domicile of company under common law is in the jurisdiction of the 
state in which it was created (its “. . . domicile of origin, or the domicile of birth”) -  see Gasque v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners (1940) 23 TC 210, 215 (Macnaghten J) and Bergner and Engel 
Brewing Company v Dreyfus 70 American State Reports 251. Also see Baldwin, above n 26, 172, 
A Farnsworth, The Residence and Domicil o f Corporations (1939), 273-4 and United Kingdom, 
Report o f the Income Tax Codification Committee Cmd 5131 (1936), 41-2.
288 Kesti, above n 255, 43. The alternative test is “place of management”.
289 Corporate Income Tax Regulations (Korperschaftateuer-Richtlinien (KStR)), s 6. The legal seat is 
the place which is designated as such under the Commercial Code. The alternative test is “place of 
management” -  see Hans Zochling et al, ‘Taxation of companies in Austria’ (2004) 58 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 399, 400.
290 Kesti, above n 255, 125. The alternative test is “place of management”.
291 In order to be properly constituted a German Company must have its sitz in Germany (ie where a 
company’s statutory records and accounts are kept) The Commercial Code also requires that there 
must be a company director (Geschäftsführer) who must be an individual competent and able 
manage the company at that site - Owen, above n 173, 304.
292 Couzin, above n 1, 3,4 and Peter E Nygh and Peter Butt (eds), Butterworths Australian Legal 
Dictionary (1997), 1053.
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(b) Location o f head office or registered office
A second objective criterion is the location of the head office or registered office. These 
tests are used as a sole or alternate test in a number of countries including Korea,293 
Japan,294 New Zealand,29'̂ Slovenia296 and Portugal.297 A company’s head office is 
generally the place where its business is carried on.298
(c) Evaluation
The use of the “creation” and “registered office” tests to determine residency and a 
world wide tax liability results in a lack of horizontal equity (ie taxpayers in similar 
economic circumstances are not treated similarly) through double taxation of dual 
residents arising from one state using incorporation while another state uses a pinnacle 
of management test to determine residency. Double taxation will occur for the dual 
resident in the absence of double tax relief under DTAs and if the country of citizenship 
does not fully credit or exclude income taxed in country of residence.
On the other hand, the “creation” and “registered office” tests generally satisfy the 
simplicity criterion (as the rules apply in a predictable way), they are not complex 
(resulting in low compliance costs), and are expressed clearly.
However, the tests tend to fail the prevention of tax avoidance objective. The 
incorporation test fails the tax avoidance criterion as it “. . . basically allows taxpayers to 
decide whether they want to pay tax on a residence basis or source basis.” 299 Even the 
“seat” concept can be used to manipulate residency,300 while the “location of head
293 Korea, Ministry of Finance and Economy, Korean Taxation (2002): sole test.
294 Corporation Tax Law (JPN), s 2 - see Hideaki Sato, ‘Japan’ in Lyons, above n 253. The Japanese 
corporate residency test arises not from tax law but from the Civil Code and the Commercial Code. 
Under the Commercial Code all companies incorporated in Japan must have registered 
headquarters in Japan - Ault, above n 245, 371.
295 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE2(l)(b): the second test of a four tier test.
296 Kesti, above n 255, 591.
297 Corporate Income Tax Code (Portugal), Article 2(3). The head office is the company’s statutory 
seat (sede) which implicitly includes in corporation - cited in Cunningham, above n 260, 86. The 
alternative test is an “effective management” test.
298 American Thread Co v Joyce (1913) 6 TC 163.
299 Li, above n 193,41.
300 Owen, above n 173, 304 notes that a United Kingdom effectively managed German incorporated 
company would be found to satisfy the Germany residency test by ensuring that at the board 
meeting held in the United Kingdom the one German resident Geschäftsführer attends, but is out 
numbered by his/her United Kingdom colleagues.
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office” test also can fail the prevention of avoidance criterion due to the availability of 
instantaneous and global facilities, which in turn allows manipulation of the place where 
business is being carried on.301 Thus, the “specific criteria” tests fail to satisfy the
302specific criterion of prevention of tax avoidance, as they are easy to evade.
3 Other residency rules
For completeness, it is important to note that there exists a number of special purpose 
residency tests designed to overcome specific problems or to assist in the establishment 
of country specific entities. For example, to stop double dipping a number of countries 
(including United Kingdom303 and Canada'04) have adopted tests that treat a resident 
company, that is deemed under a under a treaty tie-breaker test to be a non-resident, as a 
non-resident for the purposes of the tax law. As discussed above these tests do promote 
horizontal equity and prevent tax avoidance.
Similarly, New Zealand also has special residency definitions under its CFC regime that 
override the general residency definition,305 while Canada has special residency rules for
i n /  t  i n n
continued corporations ’ and international shipping corporations.
As with the Australian specific purpose tests (see Part II C), these tests rely on concepts 
already examined in the context of fact and circumstances and specific criteria tests (eg
301 ATO’s first Internet Report, above n218, para 7.2.21.
302 Hamilton, above n 15, para 2.180 and Vann (1995), above n 16, 6.
303 Finance Act 1994 (UK) s 249.
304 Income Tax Act RSC C 1985 (Can) s 250(5).
305 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s CG 13(1 )(a). Under the CFC test a CFC is resident in grey list 
country only if it is liable to income tax in the country because the CFC has any of the following in 
the country: its domicile: its residence: its place of incorporation: or its place of management.
306 Income Tax Act RSC C 1985 (Can) s 250(5.1). Where a corporation, not incorporate in Canada is 
at any time granted articles of continuance (or similar constitutional documents) in a particular 
jurisdiction, the corporation shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to have been incorporated 
in the particular jurisdiction and not to have been incorporated in any other jurisdiction. Where a 
corporation is incorporated in Canada and is granted in a different jurisdiction will be deemed to 
have been incorporated in the particular jurisdiction at the time of continuation and not to have 
been incorporated in any other jurisdiction.
307 Income Tax Act RSC C 1985 (Can) s 250(6). A corporation that was incorporated or otherwise 
formed under the laws of a country other than Canada shall be deemed to be resident in that 
country throughout a taxation year and not to be resident in Canada at any time in the year, where 
the corporation, or its wholly owned, deemed non-resident subsidary/ies has/have as its principal 
business in the year the operation of ships that are used primarily in transporting passengers or 
goods in “international traffic” (as defined in s 248(1)) and all the corporation's gross revenue for 
the year consists of gross revenue from the operation of ships or dividends from other wholly 
owned, deemed non-resident corporations.
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incorporation, place of management, etc). Therefore, in order to avoid duplication it is 
not proposed to repeat that analysis.
4 Balancing the rules
In examining the company residency rules operating in Australia and other jurisdictions, 
both the “fact and circumstance” and the “specific criteria” tests have been examined in 
isolation. This approach tends to emphasise the weaknesses inherent in each of the rules. 
However, most countries use a combination of tests, usually an incorporation test 
combined with a pinnacle of management test.308 The use of multiple tests tends to 
overcome some of the avoidance concerns but increases the scope for horizontal 
inequity due to increasing the potential for double taxation. Simplicity is also reduced in 
these circumstances.
C. Summary
The models of corporate residency in use elsewhere in the world are merely variants of 
the tests adopted in Australia. Thus, they incorporate the defects identified in the 
analysis of the Australian tests and contravene the good tax law criteria. Therefore, the 
company residency rules that operate in other jurisdictions offer no clear solutions and 
little guidance for reform.
V. Reform options for corporate residency
A. Overview
In Part III of the thesis it was established that Australia’s current rules for determining 
the residency of a company fail the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, simplicity
308 The number of the tests vary, with New Zealand using four tests, while the United States uses only 
one, the incorporation test. There has been academic support for the use of multiple factors 
(including the source/location of capital (intellectual capital, the factors of production and the 
source of capital), technology and management skills) in order to assign residence to the 
jurisdiction which gives the corporation economic life. A multi-tier approach overcomes the risk 
associated with one dominant factor determining residency, which, as seen above, will not 
necessary give rise to a correct finding of residency and could be manipulated. However, this 
approach is more conceptually robust than it may be in practice. See David R Tillinghast, ‘A 
matter of definitions: “Foreign” and “domestic” Taxpayers’ (1984) 2 International Tax and
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and the prevention tax avoidance. In order to explore the sub thesis, that the law can be 
modified within the jurisdictional framework to more closely meet the evaluative 
criteria, a review of residency models adopted in other jurisdictions was conducted in 
Part IV.
Although it was established that no individual country’s model or particular residency 
test satisfied all the evaluative criteria, the process did reveal a number of refinements 
which, with further analysis, may provide the basis for modification of Australia’s 
domestic law so that it more closely meets the evaluative criteria.309 Thus, the purpose of 
this Part is to explore the approaches for modifying the existing rules such that they 
better meet the evaluative criteria.
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Part V A), as the policy objectives do conflict any 
modification to existing laws can result in one evaluative criterion being favoured over 
another. Therefore, as stated in Chapter 2, where the tax policy objectives are in conflict, 
in seeking to evaluate the adequacy of a reform option the principal focus will be on 
ensuring equity. However, where equity objective leads to negative outcome in terms of 
complexity (simplicity) and tax avoidance, the reform option that provides a balance 
between the equity tax policy objective and the simplicity and anti-avoidance tax policy 
objectives will prevail.
Therefore, the approach adopted for reform involves changing some of the existing tests 
from the facts and circumstance model to arbitrary number of days or specific criteria 
models (ie trading-off equity for simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance).
B. Reform options
Having clarified the evaluative methodology, the next step is to consider each of the 
residency rules and determine whether the rules can be modified, within the 
jurisdictional framework to better meet the evaluative criteria. The process will be to 
consider the various reform options in respect of each of the residency rules before
Business Law Journal 239, 252-72, cited in Michael J Graetz, Foundations o f International 
Income Taxation (2003), 110.
309 The Board of Taxation indicated that the definitions can be rewritten based upon the existing rules 
-  see The Board of Taxation, Commonwealth, Tax Value Method Demonstration Legislation 
Prototype 4, (6 March 2002), ss 4-15 and 995-1 at URL: http//:www.taxboard.gov.au as at 31 
December 2002.
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settling on the preferred approach. This analysis will be undertaken in addressing the 
jurisdictional rules currently adopted, which are:
• incorporation in Australia;
• control by directors of a non-resident company carrying on business in 
Australia; and
• control by Australian shareholders of a non-resident company carrying on 
business in Australia.
1 Incorporation in Australia
(a) Evaluating options for reform
As discussed above (Part III D) both the RITA Consultation Paper310 and the Board of 
Taxation explored the suggestion of moving to a test of company residence based solely 
on place of incorporation, as in the United States.' Both papers argued that the 
avoidance risks, in particular from “company inversion”, are unlikely to occur as 
features such as a developed transfer pricing regime, the FSI rules and dividend 
imputation would reduce the risk to Australia of relying on place of incorporation as the 
sole test of residency. However, neither paper discussed whether the incorporation test 
could be reformed to ensure that it better meets the evaluative criteria.
Based upon the previous analysis, the incorporation test is simple and efficient, and 
internationally it is used as the primary residency test in many jurisdictions (eg the 
United States and the United Kingdom). However, horizontal equity suffers under the 
test as companies with no attachment to Australia other than incorporation are taxed on 
their world wide income while companies who conduct significant business in Australia 
and benefit from its infrastructure are able to evade tax on offshore operations. Also, 
the anti-avoidance object is not well served, as often form over substance will prevail.
310 RITA Consultation Paper, above n 28, 54-5.
311 Board of Taxation RITA Report, above n 29, 106-9 - Recommendation 3.12. There also exists 
both academic and business support for this approach -  eg, see Vann (1995), above n 16, 1 and 
various industry submissions, above n 212, respectively.
312 However, the use of DTAs can moderate or remove the potential inequity where the operation is a 
permanent establishment.
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Despite these failing the other tests identified internationally (the “creation" and 
“registered office” tests) also have similar failings.
(b) Finding the balance
In order to maintain the jurisdictional claim an incorporation test needs to be retained. 
There are no changes that can be recommended that ensure the test more closely meets 
the tax policy objectives.
2 Control by resident directors o f a non-resident company carrying on business in 
Australia
(a) Evaluating options for reform
Given the similarity between all the “pinnacle of management” tests reviewed, there is 
not one test which offers a clear alternative to the “central management and control” test 
that better meets the evaluative criteria. For example, it has been suggested that an 
approach would be to replace the “central management and control” test with the civil 
law derived “effective management” test. ' However, although the test conceptually 
may increase certainty (simplicity) (as under the “effective management" test there can 
only be one place of effective management) and it would also be consistent with tie­
breaker test in DTAs, simplicity is not improved as the term lacks definitional certainty 
(see Part III C 1). Also, the test still can be manipulated through the use of special 
purpose subsidiaries (see Part III D 4) and thereby fails the prevention of avoidance 
criterion.
A second approach is to make the test more objective by capturing in statute the key 
elements of the “central management and control” test. This could either be by including 
more objective criteria in the hierarchy test (similar to the New Zealand approach which 
includes the place of day-to-day management) or by a check list approach which 
determines residency according to where the majority of elements on a list (such as 
location of head office, residency of directors, residency of Chief Executive Officer, etc) 
indicate residency lies.314 Although the introduction of more objective criteria would
313 Vann (1995), above n 16, 7.
314 The location of head office was used as a basis for taxation in Australia’s first income tax Act, the 
Real and Personal Estates Duty Act 1880 (Tas) s XXXIX. Cf Sheridan, above n 271, 106, who
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enhance simplicity (by providing certainty and lowering administrative and taxpayer 
compliance costs), they may impact adversely on horizontal equity (by increasing 
potential for double taxation) and would still be subject to manipulation.
A third approach is to restore the original jurisdictional scope of the “central 
management and control” test315 by amending the law to ensure that exercising “central 
management and control” alone does not constitute the carrying on of a business (ie 
reversing Malaysian Shipping ). This change would reduce horizontal inequity and 
minimise compliance costs by narrowing the range of non-resident companies caught 
under the current judicial interpretation of the “central management and control” test.
(b) Finding the balance
As with the incorporation test there is no clear alternative to the “central management 
and control test”. The inclusion of more objective criteria under a hierarchy or check list 
approach does offer a practical alternative. The level of manipulation would be 
moderated by the existence of FSI, and transfer pricing rules. However, both the 
hierarchy and check list approach could result in a narrowing (expansion) of the 
jurisdictional claim when compared to a finding in similar circumstances using the 
current judicial interpretation of the test. Therefore, inclusion of discrete determinative 
objective criteria to the test cannot be supported in the context of the sub-thesis as it 
would be a variation of the jurisdictional claim.
However, statutorily overruling Malaysian Shipping (by amending the law to require a 
carrying on of a business to be first established, before looking at central management 
and control) would restore the original jurisdictional claim. This change would reduce
recommends that in any reform of residency rules practical indicators, such as a registered office, 
should be disregarded as criteria for determining residence.
315 The inclusion of the “carries on business in Australia” element in the test and the creation of 
specific provisions to deal with shareholder control seems to suggest that the test was intended 
only apply to those non-resident companies trading in Australia, where the pinnacle of 
management was also located in Australia -  see Note on Clause 2 in Explanatory Notes, Bill to 
Amend the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1929 (Cth), 11. Also see Ratcliffe, above n 27, 105- 
6, which in 1938 suggests that the phrase could mean “. . . ‘carries on its trade or other operations 
in Australia’ as distinct from the management and control of those operations.”
316 Malayan Shipping Co v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1946) 71 CLR 156; 8 ATD 75, 3 
AITR 258.
317 The RITA Consultation Paper suggests that reform should be focused on an option to clarify the 
test of company residency so that exercising “central management and control” alone does not 
constitute the carrying on of a business -  see RITA Consultation Paper, above n 28, 54-5.
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horizontal inequity and improve simplicity through the reduction in compliance costs of 
companies, seeking to avoid attracting residency under this test (see Part III C 3).
Thus, by changing the “central management and control” test by statutorily overruling 
Malaysian Shipping will result in the test more closely meeting the tax policy objectives 
of horizontal equity and simplicity.
3 Control by Australian shareholders o f a non-resident company carrying on business 
in Australia
(a) Evaluating options for reform
As noted above, the “voting power control" test fails the prevention of tax avoidance 
(Part III D 3) and the simplicity evaluative criterion (Part III C). Due to a need for actual 
control by share holders it is easily avoided. There are also difficulties in determining 
the residency of the shareholders. However, there are a number of ways the control test 
could be reformed.
First, the “control” test in the “voting power control” test could be replaced by a 
“beneficial ownership” test. However, such a test would require extensive tracing rules, 
which would add enormous complexity, thereby reducing simplicity. Further, as tracing 
rules have not worked domestically in the tax context and internationally in the 
company law context,318 and the linkage of corporate residency to its owners is not 
practical in the context of multi-tiered multinationals, such a change is unlikely to 
prevent tax evasion. Further, by expanding the scope of the test the opportunity for 
double taxation increases and a reduction in horizontal equity is the result.
An alternative approach is to expand the control test to foreign subsidiaries controlled 
by Australian shareholders (ie a parent company). This could be achieved by
318 Vann (1995), above n 16, 7. A further extension of the “beneficial ownership” test is a full 
integration model, where corporate veil is lifted such that the income of the company (distributed 
and retained) is allocated, like a partnership, to each individual share holder who is personally 
liable for tax. It is based on the premise that companies exist for the benefit of shareholders. 
However, the full integration model merely exaggerates the same weaknesses of the beneficial 
ownership test (as discussed above) - see Patrick Sedgley, ‘The role of the residence concept in tax 
policy’ (Paper presented at the A TO Advanced Workshop on Residency, Sydney, 30 August 1995).
319 Graetz, above n 1, 1425.
320 This approach is based on the argument that a foreign subsidiary of an Australian resident 
company should be taxed in Australia as this is where it is subjected to the overall control of the
257
removing the “carries on business” element of the test, leaving the voting power control 
test as the sole test. To prevent avoidance, the control test could be expanded to 
include alternative indications of control, such as control over dividends or entitlement 
to share in distributions on wind up and effective control acquired through association 
of shareholders (ie akin to the CFC control mechanisms in s 340 of the 1936 Act). 
Further, it is argued that if the test were expanded in this way, then simplicity would be 
increased as there would be no need for the comprehensive CFC legislation as all CFCs 
would be Australian residents, taxable in Australia.322
This approach would increase the jurisdictional scope of the tax law to tax all income of 
non-resident companies resident in non-DTA countries, but would increase non- 
compliance by allowing income derived in DTA countries (that is currently caught 
under the CFC rules), to escape. This later problem occurs as Australia under its DTAs 
has conceded that subsidiaries will be treated as residents of the foreign contracting state 
and are principally taxable in that state. As a result, the timing for recognition of income 
would shift back to a deferred basis and Australia would not be able to tax income 
concessionally taxed in the other DTA state.
Thus, although this approach appears to improve simplicity, horizontal inequity is 
increased for companies resident in non-DTA countries and tax deferral would be 
increased through the removal of the CFC rules.
It is argued that rather than modify the test it should be repealed. The CFC rules offer a 
good proxy as they balance the horizontal inequity arising from full accrual and do focus 
upon areas where tax avoidance is more likely to occur. " However, such CFC regimes 
in turn can create horizontal inequity where more than one country seeks to tax the same 
concessionally taxed income.324
Australian parent -  see Robert Deutsch, ‘An Overview of the International Tax Legislation’ (1992) 
(Cross-Border Chaos) (Paper Presented at Taxation Institute of Australia, New South Wales 
Intensive Seminar, 1992) 4.
321 Ibid.
322 Ibid 5. Deutsch asserts that there are no constitutional or jurisdictional limitations to such an 
expansion.
323 Vann (1988), above n 22, lxxvi.
324 Ibid, lxxvii.
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(b) Finding the balance
[M]any commentators argue, [as] the purpose of the corporate tax is to 
impose tax burdens on the corporation’s shareholders, then the test of 
residence of a corporation might be determined, at least in theory, by 
reference to the residence of its shareholders.
However, given the “voting control” test has little practical operation and that the other 
suggested reforms result in expansion of the jurisdictional claim, the only practical way 
of simplifying the law is to repeal the test.
In summary, within the strict criteria of the sub-thesis the repeal of the “voting control” 
test would amount to a minor variation in the jurisdictional claim. However, its removal 
will ensure that the domestic law of company residency more closely meets the 
“essential objectives” of simplicity, be it within a slightly narrower jurisdictional 
framework.
4 Specific residency tests
As discussed in Part III, the specific company “residency” definitions in respect of 
deemed companies and those that operate for specific tax policy puiposes either rely on 
the s 6(1) of the 1936 Act company residency definitions or on common concepts such 
as “central management and control”. There are some specifically related elements such 
as “formation”, “location of property in Australia” and “50% of beneficial interest in the 
income or property in Australia”. Therefore, as reform principally lies in modification of 
those other tests, it is not proposed to review reform options in detail. However, simple 
changes such as using a common “resident unit trust” definition (instead of two identical 
definitions in ss 102H and 102Q of the 1936 Act) ensures that the domestic law of 
company residency more closely meets the “essential objectives” of simplicity.
325 Arnold, above n 195, 23.
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5 DTAs
(a) Evaluating options for reform
As noted above (Part III A 2 and C 1 and 5), Australia’s DTAs have been developed 
through country by country negotiation, the tie breaker tests adopted and the order in 
which they appear varies from DTA to DTA. This variation creates inconsistency and 
complexity. Also, a lack of horizontal equity inherently arises from the existence of 
DTAs, as only residents of the States that are parties to the treaty can avail themselves of 
the DTA tie breaker test. As a result some dual resident companies in a DTA country 
will be treated differently to those dual resident companies from non-DTA countries.
(b) Finding the balance
As noted in Chapter 3 (Part V B 6), the horizontal inequity issue should be short term, 
as the government in 2003 agreed to escalate Australia's future DTA negotiation 
program. Also, Australia, in DTA negotiations, should generally follow the tie breaker 
test in Article 4 of the OECD Model Convention. The effect over time, as treaties are 
renegotiated, will be that the law of company residency, within the jurisdictional 
framework, will more closely meet the “essential objective” of simplicity.
6 Miscellaneous changes
Finally, there is one minor change, which if adopted may improve simplicity without 
adversely impacting upon the other policy objectives. There is a need for clear start and 
end dates for companies which are resident for only part of an income year (see Part III 
C 6). Such a change would ensure that the law of company residency, within the 
jurisdictional framework, will more closely meet the “essential objective” of simplicity.
C. Summary
In the above analysis each of the company residency rules was examined to determine 
whether the rules can be modified, within the jurisdictional framework to better meet the 
evaluative criteria. It has been recommended to repeal the “voting power test and to 
amend the “central management and control” test to restore the “carries on business”
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element of the test. In main the changes recommended are only those minor changes 
which do not extensively modify the jurisdictional claim. These changes, combined with 
some technical alterations will result in the company residency rules in a minor way 
better meeting the evaluative criteria. However, greater improvement could be achieved 
through more major variations to the jurisdictional claim.
VI. Trusts - Exploring the Main Thesis
Having completed the evaluation of the company residency rules, the next step is to 
repeat the process for trusts, with Part VI exploring the operation of the residency rules 
relating to trusts. This first involves exploring the principal residency tests contained in 
s 95(2) of the 1936 Act before exploring the scope of other residency definitions. For 
completeness it is important to explore the impact of DTAs, if any, on the scope of the 
domestic trust residency rules.
The examination in this Part will provide the necessary basis to enable evaluation of 
those rules against the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, simplicity and prevention 
of tax avoidance (in Part VII). As mentioned in the introduction, where the residency 
tests for trusts have common features, discussion will not be repeated; rather the 
discussion will focus on the specific features of the test in that context.
In Part VIII a comparative analysis in respect of trusts will be undertaken in light of this 
analysis, before evaluating (in Part IX) against the evaluative criteria in order to 
determine whether the proposed trust rule reforms are more equitable, efficient, simple 
and more able to prevent tax avoidance.
However, prior to exploring the scope principal residency rules applicable to trusts, the 
preliminary step is to define what a trust is in this context.
A. Defining a trust
In Australia a trust is described as an arrangement enforceable in equity where one 
person (the trustee) holds property (the trust property or corpus) for the benefits of
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another (the beneficiary) or for the advancement of certain purposes permitted by law.326 
Thus, it is not a separate legal entity. As “[ejquity fashions a trust with flexible 
adaptation to the call of the occasion” over many centuries it is difficult to define a trust 
more accurately than the above description of its major features.327
There are broadly three types of trusts: express, implied (resulting) and constructive 
trusts. Express trusts arise where there is an express declaration on the part of the 
settlor. This can arise through deed or by will (inter vivos). Forms of express trusts are 
discretionary, fixed, hybrid, unit, trading (cash management, property, mortgage and 
equity) and blind trusts, and many superannuation funds.
An implied trust arises from the words or conduct of the parties in circumstances that 
the law presumes that a trust was intended. Finally, a constructive trust arises when 
courts impose a trust, even where no trust was intended, on a person for the benefit of 
another, where the person has control of property obtained through unconscionable 
conduct. An example is the case of Zorby v Federal Commissioner of Taxation329 where 
misappropriated funds in the embezzler’s bank account were held by the Federal Court 
to be held on trust for the benefit of the employer.
In essence, the existence of a trust imposes obligations on a trustee, who can only deal 
with that trust property for the benefit of the beneficiary or for the specified purpose. 
Outside any express powers and obligations in the instrument creating a trust, each 
Australian state and territory has acts, based upon nineteenth century English legislation, 
which impose certain obligations and confer certain powers on trustees.
326 HAJ Ford and WA Lee, Principles o f  the Laws o f Trusts (September 2004), para 1000, RP 
Meagher and WMC Gummow, Jacobs’ Law o f Trusts in Australia (5th, 1986), 7 and Lehmann, 
above n 86, 1052. Underhill, Law o f Trusts and Trustees (12th ed, 1970), 3 defines a trust as “an 
equitable obligation, binding a person to deal with property, over which he has control, for the 
benefit of persons to whom he may himself be one, and any one of who may enforce the 
obligation.”
327 Adams v Champion (1935) 249 US 231, 237 (Cardozo J) cited by Sir Laurence Street in 
‘Foreword to the fourth edition’, in Meagher, ibid, v. Also see Mark Leibler, ‘Pitfalls of operating 
businesses through trusts’ (1978) 7 Australian Tax Review 17
328 See generally Ford, above n 326, Meagher, ibid, 57-58 and Lehmann, above n 86, 1053-4.
329 (1995) 30 ATR412; 95 ATC4251.
330 See Trustees Act 1957 (ACT), Trustee Act 1925 (NSW), Trustee Act 1979 (NT), Trusts Act 1973 
(Qld), Trustee Act 1936 (SA), Trustees Act 1898 (Tas), Trustee Act 1958 (Vic), and Trustees Act 
1962 (WA). See generally Ford, above n 326, Ch 12, Meagher, above n 326, Ch 17 and Lehmann, 
above n 86, 1053.
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As a trust is not defined under the 1997 Act, the equity concept of a trust operates for 
the purposes of Act.
B. Taxation of trusts
The starting point for determining the income of the trust is to deem, for the purposes of 
the calculation of net income in s 95(1) of the 1936 Act, that the trustee is a resident. 
However, as a trust is not a separate legal entity (it is a flow-through “structure”), the 
basic scheme of trust provisions is to attach the taxation liability for net income derived 
by the trust on the beneficiary, to the extent that the beneficiary is presently entitled to 
that income. Such a distribution is statutory income assessable under s 6-10 (via s 10- 
5). There are also special rules to tax Australian resident beneficiaries of non-resident 
trusts.332
Where there is a possible impediment to collection of tax (eg the beneficiary is under 
age, insolvent or a non-resident), or the income is retained by the trustee, the taxation 
liability is attached to the trustee by ss 98, 99 and 99A to 99D of 1936 Act. In these
T O O
circumstances the trustee is the entity subject to tax under the 1997 Act.
C. Defining the scope of the residency rules for trusts
The exploration of the scope of the principal residency rules applicable to trusts 
contained in s 95(2) of the 1936 Act will be undertaken by first providing an overview 
of the rules and their interrelationship before exploring the scope of each of the rules in 
detail.
1 Overview of the principal residency rules
The residency status of a trust, for the purposes of Division 6 of Part III of the 1936 Act, 
is determined by the application of the definition of a "resident trust estate" in s 95(2) of
331 Division 6 of Part III of 1936 Act is the main provision that taxes trusts. It and other provisions set 
out in the 1936 Act are adopted directly into the 1997 Act and operate as if they were part of the 
1997 Act (see Schedule 1, item 2 of the Income Tax (Consequential Amendments) Act 1997 (Cth) 
that alters the definitions of "this Act", "taxable income", income tax" and "assessable income" in s 
6(1) of the 1936 Act).
332 1936 Act ss 96A to 96C, 99D, Div 6AAA of Part III (transferor trust) and Part XI (FIF).
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the 1936 Act. This test was only enacted in 197 9334 following recommendations from 
the Asprey Committee. The Asprey Committee found that in light of the decision of 
the High Court in Union Fidelity Trustee Co of Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation'36 that the former Division 6 of the 1936 Act did not have a jurisdictional 
basis, resulting in the foreign source income earned by a trust not being assessable.337 
A trust will be a "resident trust estate" in a year of income under s 95(2) if:
• a trustee of the estate was a resident at any time during the year or
• the central management and control of the trust estate was in Australia at 
any time during the year.
Thus, the definition contains two alternative statutory tests for determining residency: 
“the residency of the trustee” test and a “central management and control” test. The 
scope of those tests is explored briefly in the following.
2 Scope of the residency o f the trustee test
The test is wider than that suggested by Asprey, as residency will be found if one trustee 
is a resident. Asprey suggested that where there was more than a sole trustee, that
• . . .  "X t oresidency would be found if a majority of the trustees were resident. There are two 
elements to the “residency of the trustee” test: that is, there must be a “trustee” and the 
trustee must be a resident.
Who is a “trustee” is defined in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act (via s 995-1) to cover a wide
t  t  q
range of persons. A trustee includes an executor, administrator, guardian, committee,
333 Although a “trust’ is an “entity” under the 1997 Act (s 960-100 (l)(f)), it is the trustee who is 
deemed to be the entity (1997 Act s 960-100(2)) and responsible for the tax (1997 Act s 9-1).
334 A definition of "resident trust estate” was introduced by the Income Tax Assessment Amendment 
Act 1979 (Cth) - originally introduced as the Income Tax Assessment Amendment Bill (No 5) 1978 
(Cth).
335 Asprey Report, above n 17. The recommendations were set out in paras 15.54-15.62. The 
residency test recommendation is contained in para 15.59.
336 (1969) 119 CLR 177; 1 ATR 200; 69 ATC 4084.
337 See Commonwealth, Second Reading Speech, Income Tax Assessment Amendment Bill (No 5) 
1978 (Cth) House of Representatives, 23 November 1978 (John Howard, Treasurer) reproduced in 
Butterworths, 8 Taxation Laws o f Australia: Legislation and Official Explanations (1977-1978), 
1051, 1052 and Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax Assessment Amendment Bill (No 5) 1978 
(Cth), 16.
338 Asprey Report, above n 17, para 15.59.
339 Broadly, trustees can be appointed, or constituted to be trustees by the actions of parties, by order 
or declaration of a court, or by operation of law.
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receiver, liquidator, and every person having the administration of an estate, control of 
income affected by any express or implied trust, acting in any fiduciary capacity, or 
having the possession, control and management of the income of a person under any 
legal or other disability.
The rules for determining the residency of a trustee will be determined by the nature of 
the trustee: that is, whether the trustee is an individual or a company. As the residency 
rules for individuals have been explored in Chapter 3 and the residency rules for 
companies in Parts II and III, there is little need to duplicate that analysis. Thus, the 
residency status of a trustee will be determined according to the rules in s 6(1) of the 
1936 Act and those specialised definitions (as discussed above in Part II B and C).
3 Scope o f the central management and control o f the trust test
The second trust residency test is the “central management and control of the trust”. 
Unlike the central management and control test for companies, there is not a carries on 
business in Australia element to the test. However, as the High Court decision in 
Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation2140 has been used in the 
company context to clarify the meaning of the term “central management and control”, 
it is likely that the words “central management and control” in the trust context have a 
meaning similar to that in the company context. Again, as the scope of this test has been 
explored above (Part II B 3), it is not proposed to restate that examination. However, 
there are some conceptual problems in applying the test to trusts, as “the central 
management and control of a trust” does not sit easily with the essence of a trust (that is, 
being a set of obligations in respect of property).341
4 Summary
The rules that determine residency of trusts are drawn from concepts used in the 
company residency rules and the residency rules applicable to individuals.
340 (1972) 129 CLR 177; 72 ATC 4076; 3 ATR 105. The case determined that “control” in the context 
of “central management and control” had to be actual control - see above Part II B 3(d).
341 Hamilton, above n 15, para 2.240. Hamilton notes that a pragmatic approach to interpretation over 
comes these conceptual difficulties.
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D. The scope of the specific trust residency tests
As well as the two tests in s 95(1) of the 1936 Act there are also two areas where 
specific “residency” definitions are found: in respect of capital gains and in respect of 
the FSI rules. The scope of these specific residency definitions is set out in the 
following.
1 Resident trust for CGT purposes
The definition of "resident trust for CGT purposes" in s 995-1 was introduced as part of 
the Tax law Improvement Project’s rewrite of the capital gains tax provisions342 and 
replaced the former definitions “resident trust estate” and “resident unit trust” in s 160H 
of the 1936 Act.343 The definition is important in the context of capital gains as a change 
in the residency of a trust can trigger the realisation of a capital gain or bring assets 
within the capital gain tax net.344
The “resident trust for CGT purposes” in s 995-1 of the 1997 Act (and adopted via 
s 6(1) of the 1936 Act) is merely a restatement of the tests contained in the former 
s 160H and adopts the same form of words of the “resident trust estate” definition in 
s 95(2)) of the 1936 Act. Thus, under this definition a trust, that is not a unit trust, is a 
resident trust for CGT purposes for an income year if, at any time during the income 
year the trustee is an Australian resident or the central management and control of the 
trust is in Australia.
A unit trust is a “resident trust for CGT purposes” for an income year if, at any time 
during the income year either:
342 The definition was introduced by Tax Law Improvement Act (NoI) 1998 (Cth).
343 These two definitions were introduced to define for the purposes of the capital gain provisions 
(Part IIIA of the 1936 Act) to define the scope of Division 2 of Part IIIA (which set out the general 
rules for determining acquisition and disposals of assets). The definitions ensured that the rules 
applied to assets, wherever situated, owned by residents and to “taxable Australian assets” owned 
by non-residents -  see Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax Assessment (Capital Gains) Bill 
1986 (Cth), 28. The former definition of “taxable Australian assets” contained in s 160T 
encompassed major asset such as land, buildings, and in particular interest in a resident trust estate 
or 10 percent or more of the beneficial ownership of a resident unit trust.
344 1997 Act s 104-170 (CGT Event 12 -  a trust ceases to be a resident) and 136-45 (a trust becomes a 
resident).
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• any property of the trust is situated in Australia or the trust carries on a business 
in Australia; and either the central management and control of the trust is in 
Australia or
• Australian residents held more than 50% of the beneficial interests in the income 
or property of the trust.
This test is similar to the “‘resident unit trust” definitions in Divisions 6B and 6C of Part 
III of the 1936 Act (discussed previously in Part II C l(B)(ii)). The term “property” is 
not defined in relation to this definition, but its sense can be obtained from the 
numerous division/part specific definitions through the 1936 Act.345 For example, as 
mentioned previously, s 102D of the 1936 Act defines the term widely to include a 
chose in action and “any estate, interest, right or power, whether at law or in equity, in 
or over property”. The term “beneficial interests” is also not defined. In the absence of 
any provision for tracing the term may be restricted to direct interests (entitlement) to 
the income or property of the trust.
This definition is also used in venture capital provisions for the purposes of the 
definition of a “resident investment vehicle” in the 1997 Act s 1 18-510.346 The venture 
capital provision in Sub-division 118G of the 1997 Act were aimed at excluding from 
income capital gains derived by non-resident venture capital entities (eg United States 
pension fund) where the gain arose from the disposal of venture capital equity in a 
resident investment vehicle in Australia.347 Although not expressly stated, the “resident 
investment vehicle” definition is used to confine the scope of the exemption to specific 
venture capital investments.
A “resident investment vehicle” is a “resident trust for CGT purposes” with fixed 
entitlements to all of the income and capital or a company that is an Australian 
resident. However, the total value of the investment, and the assets of the trust or 
company (including value of associated entities assets) must not be more than 
$50,000,000 just before the venture capital is acquired and the primary activity of the 
company or trust is not property development or land ownership.
345 See, eg, 1936 Act ss 27A(1), 47A(21), 82KH(1), 100A(13), 102A(1), 102AA(1), 102AAB, 
102D(1), 102M, 12IF, 136AA(1) and 343.
346 The definition in s 118-510 of the 1997 Act was inserted by New Business Tax System (Capital 
Gains Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) with effect from 10 December 1999.
347 Explanatory Memorandum, New Business Tax System (Capital Gains Tax) Bill 1999 (Cth), 67.
348 1997 Acts 118-510.
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In summary, the “resident trust for CGT purposes” definition for trusts other than unit 
trusts is the same as the principal definition in s 95(2) of the 1936 Act. For unit trusts 
the definition involves specific elements such as “50% of the beneficial interests in the 
income or property of the trust”.
2 FSIrules - “resident trust” and “Australian trust” definitions
The second area where specific residency definitions are used is in the FSI rules (ie, in 
transferor trust, CFC and FIF rules) in the 1936 Act. As mentioned previously, these 
rules tax residents on an accrual basis in respect of lowly taxed or untaxed foreign 
income (usually passive) earned by non resident trusts in which the residents are 
beneficiaries or have transferred value.
For the purposes of the transferor trust rules in Division 6AAA of Part III of the 1936 
Act a trust is a “resident trust estate” if a resident trust under Division 6 of Part III of the 
1936 Act, a corporate unit or public trading trust, or a “Part IX eligible entity” (ie, an 
eligible approved deposit fund (ADF), an eligible superannuation fund or a pooled 
superannuation trust349 (PST)).350 An “Australian trust” is for the purpose of the 
transferor trust measures in s 102 A AB of the 1936 Act treated as having the same 
meaning as in Part X of the 1936.
Thus, in respect of the CFC rules, a trust is defined to be an “Australian trust” at test 
time if at any time in the 12 months preceding the test time the trustee of the trust was a 
“Part X Australian resident” or the central management and control of the trust was in 
Australia. As discussed previously (in Part II C 2(a)) a “Part X Australian resident” is 
defined to be an entity that is a resident in terms of s 6 of the 1936 Act.352 As the 
residency of a trust is not determined directly under s 6 of the 1936 Act a trust cannot be 
a “Part X Australian resident.” Alternatively the trust will be an “Australian trust” if it is 
a “corporate unit trust” or is a “public trading trust” under Divisions 6B and 6C of Part 
III of the 1936 Act, respectively.
349 1936 Acts 267.
350 1936 Acts 102AAB.
351 1936 Act s 338. Generally an “Australian trust” is defined in s 995-1 of 1997 as having the same 
meaning as in Part X of the 1936.
352 1936 Act s 317. An entity cannot be a “Part X Australian resident” if it is an entity that is a resident 
in both contracting states under a DTA (in force), and it is deemed for the purposes of that DTA to 
be resident in the foreign state.
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Under the FIF rules, a trust will be an “Australian trust” at test time, if at any time in the 
12 months preceding the test time the trustee of the trust was a resident or the central
i r i  • .
management and control of the trust was in Australia. Alternatively the trust will be 
an “Australian trust” if it is a “corporate unit trust” and a “resident unit trust” in 
Division 6B of Part III of the 1936 Act or is a “public trading trust” and a “resident unit 
trust” in Division 6C of Part III of the 1936 Act. As a “Part XI Australian resident” is 
similarly defined to be a resident in terms of s 6 of the 1936 Act, 354 a trust cannot be a 
“Part XI Australian resident” as residency is determined under s 95(2) of the 1936 Act.
In summary, the scope of FSI specific residency rules is determined by the scope of the 
residency rules upon which they rely (ie the trust residency definitions in s 95(2) and in 
Divisions 6B and 6C of Part III of the 1936 Act).
3 Summary
Thus, specialised residency rules for trusts exist in two specific policy areas: in respect 
of the capital gains tax rules and in respect of the FSI rules. The “resident trust for CGT 
purposes” definition for trusts other than unit trusts is the same as the principal 
definition in s 95(2) of the 1936 Act. For unit trusts the capital gains definition involves 
specific elements such as “50% of the beneficial interests in the income or property of 
the trust”. The FSI rules rely on definitions in s 95(2) and in Divisions 6B and 6C of 
Part III of the 1936 Act. The final step is to determine the extent to which the trust 
residency definitions are impacted by DTAs.
E. Application of DTAs
Although double taxation can occur where trusts are found to be resident in two 
jurisdictions,3̂  the impact on DTAs appears to be negligible as Australia’s DTAs 
generally do not contain express residency tie breaker tests for trusts and there is no
353 1936 Acts 473.
354 1936 Act s 470. An entity cannot be a “Part XI Australian resident” if it is an entity that is a 
resident in both contracting states under a DTA (in force), and it is deemed for the purposes of that 
DTA to be resident in the foreign state.
355 Arnold, above n 195, 23, notes that “. . . problems also can arise under the laws of some countries 
in determining the residence of trusts . . . especially . . . when the country of organisation, the 
country of management, the country where the grantor or settlor is located, and the country where 
the beneficiaries are located are all different.”
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specific tie-breaker clause in the 2003 OECD Model Convention. In fact the only DTAs 
that mention trusts are the Papua New Guinea, Canadian and the United States DTAs.
The Papua New Guinea DTA merely states that if a trust is resident in both states it is
t r /■
deemed not to be resident in either state. ' The Canadian and the United States DTAs 
extend the meaning of person to include “an estate” and “a trust”.357 As the residency of
O CO
a trust in Canada is determined by the residence of the trustee * the tie breaker tests in 
Article 4 of the DTA appear to apply to resolve double tax issues.
The United States DTA, however, does not provide a tie-breaker test. Instead, Articles 
4(a)(iv) and (b)(iii) of the DTA defines the limited extent to which “an estate of a 
deceased individual or a trust” (other than a charitable fund or superannuation trust) will 
be a resident of Australia or will be a resident of the United States for the purposes of 
the DTA, respectively. An estate or trust is not generally a resident, but will be to the 
extent the income is subject to tax in Australia or the United States as the income of a 
resident estate or trust.359 Given this limited recognition there is little scope for double 
taxation and no need for a tie-breaker test under the DTA.
There are two possible reasons for the general absence of a residency tie-breaker test for 
trusts in the OECD Model Convention.' First, as many countries do not have a 
domestic regime for taxing trusts, there is little reason for determining the allocation of 
taxing rights. Secondly, although trusts are created in circumstances of inheritance and
356 Papua New Guinea DTA, art 4(5).
357 Articles 3(1 )(d) and 3(1 )(a) respectively. The United States limits the estates to “an estate of a 
deceased individual”, which is consistent with the United States Model Convention - see Vogel, 
above n 168, 170 and 234.
358 McLeod v Minister o f Customs and Excise (1926) 1 DTC 85 cited in Kroft, above n 249, 1:35.
359 The estate or trust will also be treated as an Australian or United States resident in respect of 
exempt provided, (i) in the case of Australia, the income exemption solely arose it was subject to 
United States tax; or (ii) in the case of the United States, the income was not so exempt because the 
beneficiary was not a United States person -  art 4(l)(a)(iv) and (b)(iiii).
Also, to overcome an argument that under art 7(1) non-resident beneficiaries of a trust deriving 
business profits through a trust could escape liability in Australia as the beneficiary did not have a 
permanent establishment, s 3(11) of the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth) was inserted 
in 1984 to deem the beneficiaries to have a permanent establishment and all post 1994 DTAs 
included an specific sub article to serve a similar purpose- see Treasurer, ‘Taxation of foreign 
beneficiaries of Australian business trusts’ (Press Release, 19 August 1984) and Magney (1994), 
above n 172, 75. The deeming provision appears in arts 5(7) (Singapore), 7(7) (1995 New 
Zealand), 7(8) (Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Kiribati, Poland, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Spain, Czech, Taipei, South Africa, Slovak, Argentine, Romanian, 2002 
Canada), 7(9) (Austria, China, Hungary, India, 2002 United States), and via note in most recent 
DTAs (2003 United Kingdom, Mexico, and Russia).
360 However, at the OECD’s 2001 Global Forum on Taxation dealing with Trusts at least one delegate 
suggested that the trust could be the relevant ‘person’ for treaty purposes rather than the trustee.
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charitable bequests, the OECD Model Convention does not deal with double taxation 
arising from inheritance or gift taxes.361
As trustees can be companies or individuals, it is possible that the tie breaker tests in 
Article 4 could apply to trustees, particularly as some states have thought it necessary to 
expressly exclude or limit the extent to which the income of trusts are covered by the 
DTAs. J°2 Conversely, it is argued that the Model Convention does not apply to trustees 
as the tie breaker test can only determine the primary residency of the trustee in the 
trustee’s own right, not in terms of the trust.'
On balance, the prevailing view is that residency of a trustee is not generally within the 
scope of the DTA tie-breaker tests.364
F. Summary
Unlike companies, the residency tests for trusts are restricted in operation to the specific 
Division or Part of the Act in which they are used. Thus, the s 95(2) of the 1936 Act 
trust residency definitions operate for the purposes of Division 6 of the 1936 Act, the 
capital gain definitions operate within for the purposes of ss 104-170 and 138-45 of the 
1997 Act, while the FSI definitions operate within Division 6AA of Part III, Part X and 
Part XI of the 1936 Act. All these definitions draw upon company residency tests (eg
361 Timothy J Lyons, ‘Introduction’, Lyons above n 253, Introduction - 30.
362 John Prebble, ‘Accumulation trusts and double tax conventions’ [2001] British Tax Review 69, 71. 
It is argued at a number of levels. First, where the definition of a “person” does not expressly 
nominate trusts, a trust with multiple trustees could be “a body of persons” in that context. Second, 
as the trustee is “liable to tax” in respect of income accumulated, and in respect of income of 
beneficiaries that have a legal disability or are non-resident, then under Article 4(1) of the breaker 
test prima facie a trustee is a resident as they are liable to tax on income from all sources. 
However, where the resident beneficiary is presently entitled and not subject to a legal disability, 
the trust is a transparent entity (like a partnership) and excluded from the scope of Article 4 (see 
2003 OECD Commentary on Article 4(1), para 8.4).
363 Robert Venables, Non-resident trusts (51'1 ed, 1993), 6.1.2 cited in Prebble (2001), ibid. There are a 
number of reasons. First, the tie-breaker criteria for individuals (“availability of a permanent 
home”, “personal and economic relations”, “habitual abode” and “nationality” tests) set out in 
Article 4(2) cannot be applied to a person in their capacity of a trustee as a trustee in that capacity 
does cannot satisfy any of the tests (John Avery Jones, et al, ‘The treatment of trusts under the 
OECD Model Convention - IF [1989] British Tax Review 65, 67). Second, Article 3 of the OECD 
Model Convention only defines persons and companies in their own right, not in the role of a 
trustee (Kroft, above n 249, 1:38).
364 There have been attempts to ensure recognition of trusts in civil jurisdictions through the Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and Their Regulation (1984), which applies trusts 
created voluntarily and evidenced in writing. The Convention seeks to introduce conflict of laws 
principles and requires states to recognise foreign trusts -  see further Amanda Hardy, ‘United 
Kingdom’ in Lyons, above n 253, United Kingdom 13 and 14 and Ross Fraser and John Wood, 
Tolley’s Taxation o f Offshore Trusts and Funds (2ed, 1996), 4.
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“central management and control'’) or utilise some of the specific company residency 
tests (eg, the definition of an “Australian trust” adopts the definitions operative under 
Divisions 6B and 6C of Part III of the 1936 Act). However, unlike companies and 
individuals, the residency of dual resident trusts is not resolved under the DTA tie­
breaker tests.
Having reviewed the scope of the residency rules applying to trusts, the next step is to 
explore the main thesis, ie "are the rules equitable, efficient, and simple" and "do the 
rules prevent tax avoidance”?
VII. Evaluating the effectiveness of the residency rules for trusts
The purpose of this Part is to explore whether the trust residency rules fail, in their 
practical application, to satisfy the "essential objectives” of equity, efficiency, simplicity 
and the prevention of tax avoidance. The evaluation will be undertaken by illustrating 
circumstances where the law struggles to satisfy each of the evaluative criteria. As in 
respect of individual and company residency rules, the evaluative criteria is addressed 
by first exploring the equity objective before examining (in order) the efficiency, 
simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance criteria. As many of the tests used have 
already been evaluated against these criteria in the company context, to avoid 
duplication in text and analysis it is proposed to discuss them in the context of the more 
relevant evaluative criteria only, with a passing reference being made to the other 
shortcomings.
A. Equity
In determining compliance with the equity objective, the following discussion will 
highlight where trustees in similar circumstances are not being taxed similarly 
(horizontal inequity). The horizontal inequity principally arises as a result of the vast 
number of “fact and circumstance” trust residency tests being used, for example:
• Division 6 trust residency definition in s 95(2) of the 1936 Act (the “central 
management and control” and residency of trustee tests);
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• non-unit trust capital gains residency definition of “resident trust for CGT 
purposes” (the above s 95(2) tests);
• unit trust capital gains residency definition of “resident trust for CGT purposes” 
(the “carries on business in Australia”, “central management and control” and 
“beneficial interests” tests);
• transferor trust residency definition of “resident trust estate” (the above s 95(2) 
definitions);
• CFC trust residency definition of “Australian trust” (the “central management 
and control” and residency of trustee elements and the “carries on business”, 
“central management and control” and “beneficial interest” elements in the 
Divisions 6B and 6C of Part III of the 1936 Act tests); and
• FIF trust residency definition of “Australian trust” (the same elements as CFC 
test).
As under all these tests a trustee, in light of their factual circumstances, determines 
whether they satisfy one of these tests. As discussed previously (eg see Part III A 1), in 
common with other factual tests, a finding of residency could turn on a minor variation 
in a trustee’s circumstances or the management and control of the trust or, 
hypothetically, even on a difference in a single fact. As horizontal equity is found where 
trusts in similar circumstances are taxed similarly, the individual factual nature of these 
tests means that in application they fail to deliver horizontal equity.
B. Efficiency (Neutrality)
In light of the discussion in Chapter 2, the efficiency (neutrality) objective is satisfied if 
the rules relating to residency of trusts do give rise to distortions such as a trustee being 
taxed differently due to the market in which the taxpayer operates (eg physical or 
electronic). As with the residency rules for individuals, the residency rules for trusts 
apply the same tests to persons regardless of their mode of conducting business. 
However, as discussed in Part VII D, these rules are able to be manipulated to minimise 
or avoid tax. Therefore, there is a lack of neutrality as a result of the distortion caused by 
or flowing from tax avoidance. Thus, they are not efficient as distortions arise from tax 
avoidance through manipulation of the rules.
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C Simplicity
In determining whether the residency rules for trusts meet the simplicity objective, the 
following discussion will highlight the extent to which the residency rules in application 
do not satisfy the indicators of simplicity, that is, they are predictable, proportional, 
consistent, do not impose high compliance burdens, are easy to administer, and clear. 
The extent to which problems are identified as arising under the various evaluative 
elements, will determine the extent to which the rules will be considered to have failed 
the simplicity objective in that circumstance. The evaluation will follow the order of 
evaluative elements as set out above, but will only address those elements that are 
relevant.
1 Predictability
The first element for judging simplicity is to determine whether in applying the 
residency rules for trusts, the results are predictable (ie it is easy to understand a rule’s 
intended and actual scope). As discussed in the context of the company residency rules 
(Part III C 1), the principal factor that influences predictability of the residency rules for 
trusts is that a trust's residency depends upon its individual factual circumstances. As 
listed above under the equity evaluative criterion (Part V A) there exists a wide range of 
fact and circumstances tests. As the outcome under the residency tests can turn on a 
single fact, the outcome in many circumstances is difficult to predict.
2 Proportional
The second element for judging simplicity of the trust residency rules is to determine 
whether the complexity of the residency rules is proportional to the complexity of the 
policy. If the law is more complex than the policy, then the law will fail this element of 
the simplicity criterion.
The policy underlying the trust residency rules in s 95(2) of the 1936 Act is to ensure
z  c  #
that trusts are taxable on foreign source income. However, despite these fairly simple 
policy objectives the facts and circumstances approach adopted in the “central 
management and control” test, and to a lesser extent in the “voting power control” test
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makes these rules more complex in application than the simple underlying policy. Thus, 
complexity arising from the fact and circumstances approach adopted in the tests is 
disproportional in general to the underlying policy and, in these circumstances, fails this 
element of the simplicity criterion.
3 Compliance burdens
The third element used forjudging simplicity of the trust residency tests is to determine 
qualitatively the level of cost (the burden) imposed upon the company in complying 
with the law. If examples indicate that the compliance costs are high, the rules fail this 
element of the simplicity criterion.
As noted above in respect of the company residency rules, a trustee, in a self assessment 
environment must determine, in light of the factual circumstances of the trust or the 
trustee, whether it is a resident under the various tests contained in the 1936 Act. 
However, this process is complicated as the origins of the “central management and 
control'’ test lies in the common law, and its scope has been defined by a long line of 
often conflicting United Kingdom and Australian judicial decisions. Added to this a 
number of specific residency definitions (ie “resident trust for CGT purposes”, “resident 
trust estate” and “Australian trust”) and an array of interrelating rules arise. As the 
definitions interrelate the cost of making determinations of residency is probably less 
than under the company residency rules. However, given that most of the tests used to 
determine a trust’s residency status are fact and circumstances based, this approach is a 
major contributor to compliance costs for affected trusts.
4 Difficulty in administration
The fourth element for judging simplicity is to determine whether there are any 
administrative difficulties in applying the residency rules for trusts. As discussed above, 
there are administrative difficulties arising from the fact and circumstance basis of the 
central management and control test, due to the ATO making individual, subjective 
determinations in respect of issues such as whether the company has the requisite 
"central management and control". This uncertainty and the case by case nature of the 
test mean that the ATO is unable to give simple broad pronouncements on how the law
365 See Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax Assessment Amendment Bill (No 5) 1978 (Cth), 16.
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operates. As discussed in Part III C 4, this uncertainty can impact adversely upon the 
necessary level of compliance in a self-assessing environment.366 Thus, it is obvious 
that the uncertain and subjective “central management and control” test would have 
difficulty satisfying the simplicity criterion. Similar difficulties arise in respect of all the 
fact and circumstance trust residency tests.
In summary, the requirement in trust residency tests to determine residency status by 
factual circumstances remains a major contributor to tax administration difficulties for 
the Commissioner.
5 Clarity
The final element for judging simplicity is to determine whether the law is expressed 
clearly. If the law is expressed unclearly, it will fail this element of simplicity.
As with the individual and company residency tests a lack of clarity arises where a 
trustee or a trust is resident for only part of the income year. This occurs where a non­
resident trust becomes a resident or a trust with foreign trustees becomes a non-resident 
due to changes in its ownership or movements in its central management and control. In 
such circumstances it is uncertain whether all the foreign source income of the trust is 
assessed for the whole year or just the foreign source income earned after obtaining 
Australian residency. Thus, without clear start and end dates for residency, the trust 
residency test also fails the certainty criterion.
There are also conceptual problems in applying the “central management and control'’ 
test in respect of trusts, as trusts are not separate legal entities, but a set of obligations 
imposed in respect of specific property. A pragmatic approach to interpretation is the 
only way to over come these conceptual difficulties.367 Thus, again a residency rule fails 
the certainty criterion.
366 A search of the word “resident” on the ATOIDs section of the ATO website (URL at 
http://www.ato.gov.au located on 28 April 2004) reveals that only 15 of the over 500 ATOIDS, 
issued between 2002 and 2004, related to trusts and only one dealt with the residency of a trust.
367 Hamilton, above n 15, para 2.240.
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6 Summary
From the discussion above, the trust residency rules fail the elements that gauge 
simplicity. Specifically, as the outcome of most of the tests is determined by the 
individual facts and circumstances, the outcome in many circumstances is not 
predictable. Further the complexity arising from the facts and circumstances approach is 
disproportional in general to the underlying policy, is a major contributor to compliance 
costs for affected individuals and remains a major contributor to tax administration 
difficulties for the Commissioner. Thus, the residency rules relating to trusts fail the 
elements that gauge simplicity (ie they are not predictable, not proportional, are 
associated with the imposition of high compliance burdens, are difficult to administer, 
and are expressed unclearly).
D. Tax Avoidance
In determining compliance with the prevention of tax avoidance objective, the following 
discussion will identify the circumstances where in the application of the law there 
appear to be evasion or avoidance opportunities. It will first explore weaknesses in the 
two trust residency tests in s 95(2) of the 1936 Act, before examining the specific 
residency definitions.
1 The residency o f the trustee test
As the rules for determining the residency of a trustee are determined by the residence 
of the trustee (that is, where the trustee is an individual or a company) then the rules 
import all the opportunities for avoidance already discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. It is 
not proposed to repeat that analysis, but it is evident that by importing the “residency” 
element (that is easy to manipulate) into the test, then the test in turn is easy to 
manipulate and fails the prevention of tax avoidance criterion.
2 Central management and control test
Similarly, as this is the same test used for companies then the test imports all the 
complexity and problems already discussed above. Again it is not proposed to repeat
368 Don Green and Mark Friezer, ‘Taxation of the Income of non-resident trusts: The Consultative 
Document proposals’ (1989) 6 Australian Tax Forum 41, 55.
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that analysis, but it is evident that by importing rules that are easy to manipulate, then 
the test in turn is easy to manipulate and fails the prevention of tax avoidance criterion.
A further complication in the trust context is that it is more difficult to prove indirect 
control of the central management and control where the controller is the beneficiary 
and the control is exercised through informal arrangements, rather than through the 
control of shares of the corporate trustee. In these circumstances, the difficulty in being 
able to establish control further illustrates the weakness of this test in preventing tax 
avoidance.
3 Specific residency tests
The use of alternative trust residency definitions in the Act does not reduce the 
opportunities for tax avoidance. For example, as the non-unit trust capital gains 
residency definition of “resident trust for CGT purposes” and the transferor trust 
residency definition of “resident trust estate”369 adopts the “s 95(2) of 1936 Act” trust 
residency tests, the definitions are in turn as equally subject to manipulation.
Similarly, the “carries on business in Australia” and “central management and control” 
tests are adopted in the unit trust, capital gains, residency definition (a “resident trust for 
CGT purposes”) and in the CFC and FIF trust residency definitions of “Australian 
trust”. As a result of the import of these two tests (that are easy to manipulate) both the 
“resident trust for CGT purposes” and the “Australian trust” definitions are in turn easy 
to manipulate and fail the prevention of tax avoidance criterion.
4 Summary
From the discussion above, it is apparent that the two trust residency tests in s 95(2) of 
the 1936 Act and the specialised trust residency definitions fail to counter tax avoidance. 
The risk of avoidance can be traced to the importation of residency concepts (ie, 
“residence” of trustee and the “central management and control” tests) from both the 
individual and company residency rules.
369 1936 Act Division 6AAA of Part III.
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E. Summary of Part VII
From the above it is clear that the existing law for determining the residency of a trust is 
inadequate. The major weakness with the trust residency rules is the importation of the 
factual elements of the company and individual residency tests, which in certain 
situations, results in the tests in identified ways failing to satisfy the equity, efficiency 
simplicity and prevention of tax avoidance evaluative criteria. Given that the rules fail 
all of the criteria, there is no need to address any potential conflicts in the evaluative 
criteria.
Thus, to ensure that the trust residency rules do better meet the evaluative criteria it is 
clear that the rules need to be reformed. The potential reform options are the focus of the 
following Parts VIII and IX.
VIII. Exploring the sub-thesis - Models for reform of trust residency
rules
A. Overview
In order to establish the sub-thesis that the domestic law can be modified within the 
jurisdictional framework to more closely meet the evaluative criteria, a two-step 
approach will be adopted. First, in Part VIII a review of the residency rules adopted 
domestically in a number of jurisdictions will be undertaken. As the “trust” is essentially 
a common law concept it does not exist in civil law countries such as France and 
Switzerland.370 Therefore, the range of comparative models is in the main limited to 
common law jurisdictions. Secondly, in Part IX, in light of the comparative analysis, a 
number of reforms options (that are within the jurisdictional limitations) are reviewed 
against the evaluative criteria in order to determine whether the proposed rules are more 
equitable, efficient, simple and more able to prevent tax avoidance.
370 See Jean-Marc Tirard, ‘France’, in Lyons, above n 253, France 1 and Ryser, ‘Switzerland’, in Lyon 
above n 253, Switzerland 16. In France, the Civil Code (FRA), Art 544 requires absolute disposals 
of property and forbidding the utilisation of uses. However, French law does recognise trust like 
structure as charitable foundations and Swiss law recognises foundations, fiduciary arrangements 
(fiducia).
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B. Comparing specific residency rules applicable in other jurisdictions
There are two ways trusts appear to be taxed, either:
• the trust is taxed on all its income, with a deduction allowed for amounts paid to
T71beneficiaries, or
• the beneficiary is taxed on amounts vesting or applied for the beneficiaries’ 
benefit and the trustee is only taxed either on income accumulated in the 
trust, or where the trustee has responsibility for tax (ie the beneficiary is under 
a legal disability,374 or the trustee is the assignee of the beneficiary.)37̂
The method of taxation often determines whether the residency test relates to the trust or 
the trustee.
There is a range of criteria used in other jurisdictions to determine the residency of a 
trust. These include:
• the residency of the trustee;376
371 The trust is the taxable entity in:
United States - Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC §641-645. Under these sections trusts are 
taxed as individuals and tax is paid by the fiduciary (s) on the income, but a deduction is allowed 
for “distributable net income”. Also see eg, Joseph Isenbergh, International Taxation (2000), 25-6 
and Charles M Bruce, United States Taxation o f Foreign Trusts (2000), 1, 21-42;
Canada - Income Tax Act RSC C 1985 ss 104(2) and 248(1). A trust is generally taxed as an 
individual, but where income accumulated taxable in hands of trustee it is “designated income” and 
subjected to a different rate of tax; and
Indonesia - Law Number 10 Year 1994 (Indonesia) Article 2 (3)(c) treats an undivided estate as a 
unit, in lieu of those entitled to it.
372 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE) s 59. See John H Hickson, ‘Ireland’ in Lyons, above n 253.
373 Eg, Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) ss HH 1 to HH 8. The trustee only pays tax on trustee income, ie 
any income not “beneficiary income”. “Beneficiary income” is trust income which vests absolutely 
or is paid or applied during the year or within 6 months after the end of that year. Also in Ireland a 
surcharge is imposed on amounts not distributed - Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE) s 805.
374 Eg, Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s HH 3A.
375 As the trustee is principally liable (Income Tax Act 1961 (India) ss 160 and 161) residency is 
determined either as individual (182 days in 12 months, in current year was in India for more than 
60 days and spent 365 days or more in India in the preceding 4 years -  Income Tax Act 1961 
(India) s 6), a Hindu undivided family (management and control in India -  s 6(2)) or company 
(formed and registered under Companies Act 1956 (India) or controlled and management of its 
affairs is situated wholly in India) -  see Aliff Fazelbhoy and Porus Kaka, ‘India’ in Lyons, above 
n 253.
In Japan the income of a trust can also be taxed in hands of the grantor - see Hideaki Sato, ‘Japan’ 
in Lyons, above n 253.
376 The residence of the trustee is used in:
Canada, at common law - McLeod v Minister o f Customs and Excise (1926) 1 DTC 85 cited in 
Kroft, above n 249, 1:35;
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• the residency of the settlor;3 7
• the residency of the beneficiary;378
0 7 g
• the location of property; '
380• the place where the trust carries on business; or
381 382• where the trust is administered (managed) or controlled.
As residency under all these tests (except the location of real property) is determined 
according to the individual fact and circumstances, the tests tend to fail the evaluative 
criteria in respect of simplicity and prevention of tax avoidance. It is not proposed to
Malaysia - Income Tax Act 1967 (Malaysia) s 61(3). A trust is a non-resident if created by a person 
who is non-resident, income derived from foreign sources, administration outside Malaysia and 
half or more of the trustees are not residents of Malaysia and is a non-resident - see Malaysian 
Master Tax Guide, above n 254,108-9;
South Africa - see David Clegg, ‘South Africa’ in Lyons, above n 253;
United Kingdom - for capital gains, trustees are deemed to be resident or ordinarily resident unless 
the general administration of the trust is ordinarily carried on outside the United Kingdom, the 
majority of trustees are not resident or ordinarily resident in Ireland - Taxation o f Chargeable 
Gains Act 1992 (UK) s 69(1); and
United States - A trust is a “United States person” (Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 
7701(a)(30)) and hence subject to US worldwide tax if the trust is subject to the authority of the 
Court in the United States and the fiduciaries in control (ie power to make all substantial decisions 
of the trust (Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC §301.7701 -7(d)( 1 )(ii))) of the trusts are United 
States persons See eg, Isenbergh (2000), above n 371, 25-6 and Bruce, above n 371, 1, 21-42.
377 The basis for determining residency of a trust in New Zealand is the residence of the settlor. For 
example, a non-resident trustee in receipt of non-New Zealand income may be treated as a resident 
if the settlor is a New Zealand resident. In these circumstances the resident settlor, is liable as an 
agent of the trusts for any income payable by the trustee - Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s HH 4(3) 
and (4). Under s OB 1 and HH 1(1) a settlor is the person who directly or indirectly contributes 
value, provides services or makes property available, not the person who contributes a nominal 
amount.
Contrast this with Canada, where at common law residency of the settlor was irrelevant in 
determining residency of the trust - Thibodeau Family Trust v The Queen 78 DTC 6376.
However, in the United Kingdom trustees of testamentary trusts are deemed resident unless the 
settlor was not resident, ordinarily resident nor domiciled in United Kingdom at time of their death 
- Finance Act 1989 (UK) s 110(2)(3). For income tax purposes, where there are resident and non­
resident trustees, provided a trustee is resident, all the trustees are treated as resident if the settlor 
was resident, ordinarily resident or domicile in the United Kingdom at the time the trust was 
created or at a later time provided funds for the trust - Finance Act 1989 (UK) s 110. This 
provision over rules Dawson v IRC [1988] STI 445, which found that if all the trustees are not 
residents, foreign income of the trust is not assessable. Also see Amanda Hardy, ‘United Kingdom’ 
in Lyons, above n 253.
378 Under Canadian common law residency of beneficiary was irrelevant in determining residency of 
the trust - Thibodeau Family Trust v The Queen 78 DTC 6376.
379 In Canada the place of business and location of property may be relevant in determining residency 
of the trust - Jack Bernstein, ‘Residence of trusts for Canadian tax purposes’ (1998) 52 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 122, 124.
380 Ibid.
381 Ireland -  Trustees are deemed to be resident or ordinarily resident unless the general 
administration is ordinarily carried on outside Ireland, and the majority of trustees are not resident 
or ordinarily resident in Ireland - Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (IRE), s 574. Similarly in the 
United Kingdom
382 Under Canadian common law “central management and control” was irrelevant in determining 
residency of the trust - Thibodeau Family Trust v The Queen 78 DTC 6376.
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reexamine each against the evaluative criteria as the manner in which such tests fail the 
objective criteria has been discussed in detail previously.383
As well as these primary residency tests countries have adopted special purpose 
definitions/‘ Therefore, as with the Australian specific purpose tests (see Part VI D), 
most of these tests rely on concepts already examined and it is not proposed to repeat 
that analysis.
C. Summary
The models of trust residency in use elsewhere in the world are merely variants of the 
tests adopted in Australia. Thus, they incorporate the defects identified in the analysis of 
the Australian tests and contravene the good tax law criteria. Therefore, the trust 
residency rules, which operate in other jurisdictions, offer no clear solutions and little 
guidance for reform.
IX. Reform options for trusts
A. Overview
In Part VII of the thesis it was established that Australia’s current rules for determining 
the residency of a trust failed the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, simplicity and 
the prevention of tax avoidance. In order to explore the sub thesis, that the law can be 
modified within the jurisdictional framework to more closely meet the evaluative 
criteria, a review of residency models adopted in other jurisdictions was conducted in 
Part VIII. As the tests used internationally are modifications of concepts used in 
Australia no particular residency test satisfied all the evaluative criteria. Thus, the
383 The residency of the trustee (which has application to the residence of the settlor and beneficiary) 
was discussed in Part IV C 2, the “carries on business” was evaluated in Part III and where the 
trust is managed and controlled in Part IV C 3.
384 For example, Canada defines the residence of a qualifying environmental trust (Income Tax Act 
RSC C 1985 (Can) s 250 (7)), deems residency for part-year resident inter vivos trusts (Income 
Tax Act RSC C 1985(Can) s 250 (6.1)) and imposes a residency requirement for the registration of 
certain mutual trusts and education trusts (Income Tax Act RSC C 1985 s 132(6)(b)). In the United 
States, as trusts are established under state laws a necessary requirement of residency in Internal 
Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 7701(a)(30)) is that the trust must be subject to the authority of the 
Court in the United States.
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purpose of this Part is to explore the approaches for modifying the existing rules such 
that they better meet the evaluative criteria.
As discussed adopted in Part V, the approach adopted for reform involves changing 
some of the existing tests from the facts and circumstance model to arbitrary number of 
day or specific criteria models (ie trading-off equity for simplicity and the prevention of 
tax avoidance).
B. Reform options
In the following, each of the trust residency rules will be reviewed to determine whether 
the rules can be modified, within the jurisdictional framework to better meet the 
evaluative criteria.
1 The residency o f the trustee test
(a) Evaluating options for reform
As noted in Part VII, the rules for determining the residency of a trustee are determined 
by the residence of the trustee (that is, where the trustee is an individual or a company) 
and consequently the rules import all the failings already discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
It has been suggested that the test should be the residence of the settlor (as in New 
Zealand) as it is the true settlor who transfers value to the estate, not the manager (the 
trustee). The true settlor is the person on whose behalf the trustees operates. It is 
claimed that the use of a settlor overcomes problems of avoidance where the trustee is 
not a resident of Australia as the settlor or associates will tend to reside within the 
jurisdiction.386
However, despite the claims that the proposal reduces the scope for avoidance, the test 
merely substitutes a “settlor” for a “trustee” and thereby incorporates all the same
385 John Prebble, ‘Taxation of trusts with Australian resident trustees’ [2000] British Tax Review 653, 
659.
386 Ibid, 660. This is similar to the “transferor” (ie an “attributable taxpayer”) under the Australian 
transferor trust measures -  see 1936 Act s 102AAT.
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problems associated with determining residency. It will also result in the jurisdictional 
scope being widened.
Another alternative to determining the residence a trustee was suggested in the context 
of the consultation on the entity tax proposals.387 In order to align the taxation of 
companies and trusts it was proposed that a test akin to incorporation could be 
introduced for trusts. The test was based upon the place the trust was “created”. 
Although formation would appear to be determined by objective tests, the “relationship” 
nature of trusts and the fact they are generally not registered would mean that formation 
would be determined on a factual basis.388
(b) Finding the balance
Both the substitution of a settlor and the adoption of a creation test do little to ensure 
that the domestic law of trust residency more closely meets the tax policy objectives. 
However, if the recommended reforms in respect of the individual residency tests (in 
Chapter III, Part V) and in respect of the company residency tests (in Part V of this 
Chapter) are adopted then the “residency of trustee” test will more closely meet the tax 
policy objectives, within the existing jurisdictional framework.
387 On the 13 August 1998 the Federal Government made an election proposal to tax trusts as 
companies (Australian Government, Tax Reform, Not a New tax, a New Tax System (1998)). This 
proposal was adopted by the Review of Business Taxation, which recommended the adoption of an 
entity tax regime whereby trusts, life insurers, co-operatives and limited partnerships were taxed as 
companies (A Tax System Redesigned, above n 42, sections 11, 12, 13, 16 and recommendations 
6.7, 6.20, 6.21, 6.22, 6.23 and 18.6). The Government accepted these recommendations 
(Treasurer, - ‘The New Business Tax System’ (Press Release No 58, 21 September 1999) 
Attachment K and Treasurer, -  ‘The New Business Tax System: Stage 2 Response’ (Press Release 
No 74, 11 November 1999)) and on 11 October 2000 Exposure Draft: New Business Tax System 
(Entity Taxation) Bill 2000 a much modified proposal which only applied entity taxation to non- 
fixed trusts.
388 The creation of a trust has two elements: an agreement to the terms and conditions and the 
conveyance of legal title to the trust’s property. It is only valid if it complies with the law of where 
the act of declaring the trust took place (lex loci actus) or the proper law regulating the agreement 
(including formal requirements, capacity, validity and place of administration). The place of 
general administration is usually where the bulk of the assets are located (Permanent Trustee Co 
(Canberra) Ltd v Permanent Trustee Co o f New South Wales Ltd (1969) 14 FLR 24) but for a 
single asset it is the jurisdiction of location [lex situs) of that asset {Re Tyndall [1913] SALR 39). 
Given these variants the place of formation can be difficult to determine. An example is the facts in 
Lindsay v Miller [1949] VLR 13. In this case the settlor was domiciled in Scotland, the deed 
drafted in Scotland, with one trustee living in China, another Melbourne and a third in Western 
Australia. The deed was executed in Scotland by a settlor and two of the trustees, with the third 
trustee executing it in Melbourne. The assets (shares in Victorian companies) were located in 
Melbourne as was the administration. The place of formation was Victoria. See Peter E Nygh, 
Conflicts o f Laws in Australia (3rd ed, 1976), Ch 27 and JHC Morris (ed), Dicey and Morris on the 
Conflict o f  Laws (9th ed, 1973) 651-662.
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2 Central management and control
As the “central management and control” test has been evaluated above (Part V B 2 (b)) 
the observations in this context are similar, that is, it is only by substituting the common 
law test with more objective statutory criteria that the test can be improved to better 
meet the tax policy objectives. However, this cannot be supported in the context of the 
sub-thesis as it would be a variation to the jurisdictional claim. Therefore, in this 
context the “central management and control” test cannot be reformed to better meet the 
tax policy objectives.
3 Specific residency tests
As discussed in Part VI D 1, the capital gain residency definitions (which operate for the 
purposes of ss 104-170 and 138-45 of the 1997 Act), and the FSI residency definitions 
(which operate within Division 6AA of Part III, Part X and Part XI of the 1936 Act) all 
draw upon company residency tests (eg “central management and control”) or utilise 
some of the specific company residency tests (eg, the definition of an “Australian trust” 
adopts the definitions operative under Divisions 6B and 6C of Part III of the 1936 Act). 
Therefore, if the recommended reforms in respect of the company residency tests (in 
Part V of this Chapter) are adopted then the specialised residency tests will more closely 
meet the essential tax policy objectives, within the existing jurisdictional framework.
C. Summary
In the above analysis each of the trust residency rules was examined to determine 
whether the rules can be modified, within the jurisdictional framework to better meet the 
evaluative criteria. As the trust rules rely heavily on the rules relating to individuals and 
companies it is through the improvement in these underlying concepts that the residency 
rules for trusts can be improved to better meet the essential tax policy objectives. 
Without change to the jurisdictional claim the trust rules cannot be directly altered to 
better meet the essential criteria.
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X. Conclusion
A. The main thesis
The purpose of the analysis in Parts II, III, VI and VII of this Chapter was to establish 
the main thesis in respect of the residency rules applicable to companies and trusts, that 
is:
The law, as applying in the 1997 Act, is inadequate as the law fails in its practical 
application to satisfy the "essential objectives” o f equity, efficiency, simplicity and the 
prevention o f tax avoidance.
In Part II of the Chapter, the scope of the residency rules for company residency was 
explored, and it was found that the existing law for determining the residency of a 
company is inadequate. Overall the rules fail in identified ways to satisfy the equity, 
efficiency, simplicity and prevention of tax avoidance evaluative criteria. The major 
weakness in the non-incorporation residence tests is the factual element of the tests, 
which in certain situations:
• results in horizontal inequity;
• gives rise the lack of simplicity; and
• leaves the rules open to manipulation.
Similarly, in Part VII it was established that existing law for determining the residency 
of a trust is inadequate. The major weakness with the trust residency rules is the 
importation of the factual elements of the company and individual residency tests, 
which in certain situations, results in the tests in identified ways failing to satisfy the 
equity, efficiency simplicity and prevention of tax avoidance evaluative criteria.
Thus, it has been established that residency rules applicable to companies and trusts in 
the 1997 Act are inadequate as the law embodying those rules fails in its practical 
application to satisfy the "essential objectives” of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the 
prevention of tax avoidance.
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B. The sub-thesis
The purpose of the analysis in Parts IV, V, VIII and IX of this Chapter was to establish 
the sub-thesis in respect of the residency rules applicable to companies and trusts, that 
is:
The domestic law can be modified within the jurisdictional framework to more closely 
meet the "essential objectives” o f equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention o f tax 
avoidance.
In the above Part V, each of the company residency rules was examined to determine 
whether the rules can be modified, within the jurisdictional framework to better meet the 
evaluative criteria. It has been recommended to repeal the “voting power test” and that 
the “central management and control” test be amended by restoring the “carries on 
business” element of the test. In main the changes recommended are only those minor 
changes which do not extensively modify the jurisdictional claim. These changes, 
combined with some technical alterations will result in the company residency rules in a 
minor way better meeting the evaluative criteria.
Similarly, in Part IX, each of the trust residency rules was examined to determine 
whether the rules can be modified, within the jurisdictional framework to better meet the 
evaluative criteria. As the trust rules rely heavily on the rules relating to individuals and 
companies it is only through the improvement in these underlying concepts can the 
residency rules for trusts be improved to better meet the essential tax policy objectives.
Thus, although not every company residency test is able to be amended, and any changes 
to the trust residency rules are reliant on changes to the individual and company 
residency rules, overall it has been established that residency rules applicable to 
companies in the 1997 Act, if modified within the jurisdictional framework as 
recommended, do more closely meet the "essential objectives” of equity, efficiency, 
simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance.
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Chapter 5
Source
I. Purpose of this Chapter
As noted in Chapter 1, among the primary objectives of this thesis is the examination 
and assessment of the adequacy of the rules of attachment. This Chapter focuses on the 
second means of attachment, source. The Chapter first evaluates whether the current 
approach to determining source of income for the purposes of the 1997 Act satisfies the 
"essential criteria" of a good tax law (equity, efficiency, simplicity and prevention of tax 
avoidance).
Integral to this analysis is the initial examination in Part II of the operation of the 
statutory source rules and the guiding principles emerging from the common law. Part II 
focuses on an overview of what is source, before exploring the scope of the law and 
principles of source in the context of personal exertion, income from business (including 
the taxation of capital gains), and income from property. The impact of DTAs will also 
be examined in the context of each income category. The Part II examination provides 
the necessary basis to enable the law of source to be reviewed against the evaluative 
criteria in Part III.
In addressing the sub-thesis Part IV explores the various options for reform through a 
review and evaluation of the domestic statutory source approaches adopted in New 
Zealand and the United States. However, as in Chapters 3 and 4, this latter analysis will 
be restricted to the domestic statutory source rules.
In light of this comparative study, Part V explores whether the current domestic 
approach to source can be reformed within current jurisdictional limitations, such that 
the law is more equitable, efficient, simple and more able to prevent tax avoidance. 
Finally, Part VI will draw together the conclusions and recommendations.
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II. Exploring the main thesis -  Scope of the law of source
Integral to the process of exploring the main thesis, it is first necessary to examine what 
is meant by the term “source” before exploring the scope of the law and principle 
underlying a finding of source.
A. What is meant by source?
As mentioned in Chapter 1 (Part I) there are at least three circumstances where the term 
“source” is used under Australia’s tax laws. First, the term “source” is used sometimes 
to describe the process of taxing income as it arises (usually through withholding), 
before it is paid over to the “person” who has derived the income (ie “taxation at the 
source”).1 23Thus, where a receipt is paid by Australian residents (or by non-residents who 
are carrying on business in Australia) to non-residents, the receipts are deemed to have 
an Australian origin regardless of the actual territorial source of the income. These 
withholding taxes override territorial source and focus on the status of the payer.
Secondly, the concept of “source” is more commonly used to refer to the “character” of 
the receipt (ie its characterisation). The characterisation of the receipt is the 
classification of receipts according to the nature of the activity that gave rise to the 
receipt, for example “income from business”, “income from property”, “income from 
personal service” (personal exertion) or “capital receipts”. Although the abolition of the 
income classification definitions in the 1997 Act may initially appear to have lessened 
the importance of such characterisation, the process is still important in a number of 
areas of domestic law (including the alienation of personal services income measures4 
and income/capital detenninations) and is crucial in determining the nature of a receipt 
(such as employment income, a royalty, interest, etc) for the purposes of the taxing 
rights allocated under Australia’s DTA’s. Thus, characterisation issues remain an
1 Piroska E Soos, ‘Taxation at the source and withholding in England, 1512 to 1640’ [1995] British 
Tax Review 49 and Piroska E Soos, The Origins o f  Taxation at the Source in England (1997).
2 FA Rollo, ‘Commentary: Source of income’ (Paper presented at the 10th Taxation Institute o f  
Australia’s New South Wales State Convention, Sydney, 26-28 May 1978) 43, 52.
3 Roger Hamilton, Robert Deutsch and John Raneri, Australian International Taxation (October 
2002), para 2.690.
4 1997 A cts 84-5(1).
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essential element in determining “territorial” (geographic) origin of the income; its 
“source”.5 6
“Territorial” source is the third usage of the term “source” and refers to the place at 
which the income arises. The applicability of a particular territorial source rule can only 
be determined when the nature of the receipt is determined.0 For example, a different 
source rule will apply when a receipt is deemed to be a capital gain rather than when it is 
deemed to be a royalty.7 Unlike residency, source is not purely a matter of geography as 
the source of income depends upon how it is produced, where it is produced and who 
pays it.8
Although characterisation is an important issue, this Chapter will concentrate on the 
statutory law and judicial principles that underlie a determination of the territorial 
source of income. Thus, characterisation issues are outside the direct scope of the thesis 
as they are a preliminary classification step in the determination of source. However, as 
the source of income is dependent on classification issues they will be highlighted, but 
not necessarily resolved. Similarly, where issues associated with the withholding 
(origin) rules arise, they will be addressed only briefly. As origin rules merely compel 
the withholding of tax due to the location of the payer, they do not determine source 
and, therefore are also outside the direct scope of the thesis.
B. Overview o f  the law o f  source
As discussed in Chapter 1, Australia used a territorial (source) tax system as the primary 
method for determining liability for income tax until the introduction of the residency 
concept in 1930. Subsequently, source taxation applied to non-residents that derive
5 The most common usage of the term ‘source” is in respect of characterisation and territorial source 
- see Jinyan Li, ‘Rethinking Canada’s source rules in the age of electronic commerce: Part V 
(1999) 47 Canadian Tax Journal 1077, 1080.
6 Bill Cannon, ‘A practical look at e-commerce and source rules’ (Paper presented at the 4th World 
Tax Conference, Sydney, 27 February 2004), 7 and Bill Cannon and Peter Edmundson, ‘A 
practical look at source rules issues’ (Paper presented at the Taxation Institute of Australia’s 
International Masterclass, Sydney, 22 September 2004), 1.
7 The importance of characterisation is recognised by the ATO (Australian Taxation Office, 
Commonwealth, Taxation and the Internet: Second Report (1999), 113-26 (ATO’s second Internet 
Report)) and the OECD (by establishing a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) on Treaty 
Characterization of E-Commerce Payments).
8 Robert Couzin, Corporate Residence and International Taxation (2002), 6.
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ordinary or statutory income from sources in Australia.9 The Asprey Committee noted 
that:
[t]he justification for imposing income tax on non-residents on the basis of 
origin in Australia rests on the ‘benefit’ principle, [that is,] the non­
resident’s income has been generated by economic activity conducted under 
the protection of the country of origin and relying on facilities provided, at 
least in part, at public expense. 10
Section 995-1 of the 1997 Act defines “Australian source” in terms of:
*ordinary income or * statutory income has an Australian source if, and only 
if, it is *derived from a source in Australia for the purposes of the 1936 Act.
However, the word "source" is not defined in the 1936 Act. What the s 995-1 definition 
incorporates into the 1997 Act is a number of statutory rules in the 1936 Act and the 
common law principles that have been used by the courts in determining the source of 
income under the 1936 Act.
The statutory rules in the 1936 Act are ad hoc rules, not governed by any general 
principles. The rules deem an Australian source for dividends,* 11 interest payments 
(where the monies are secured by mortgage on an Australian property),12 certain royalty 
payments,13 certain natural resource payments,14 business income where business is 
carried on partly in and partly out of Australia,15 overseas shipping payments16 and
. • . 17certain insurance premiums. There are also a series of exempt income rules relating to 
income sourced in a specified Territory. The genesis of many of these rules is the 1936 
Act and, in some cases, the 1915 Act and earlier State Acts.19
9 1997 Act ss 6-5 (3) and 6-10(5).
10 Taxation Review Committee, Commonwealth, Full Report (1975) (Asprey Report), 264. Asprey 
concludes “[t]his is equally true whether the income has been produced by the activity of the non­
resident himself, as by manufacturing operations in Australia conducted by him through a branch, 
or by resident who pays what would otherwise have been his profit to the non-resident, by way of 
interest or royalties.”
11 1936 Acts 44(1 )(b).
12 1936 Acts 25(2).
13 1936 Act s6C.
14 1936 Act s6CA.
15 1936 Act Division 2, Subdivision C of Part III.
16 1936 Act Division 12 of Part III.
17 1936 Act Division 15 of Part III.
18 1936 Act ss 24F, 24G and s 24J to 24M in Div 1A of Part III. Division 1A exempts Norfolk Island 
residents from tax on income derived from sources in and outside of the Territory (including
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As well as the statutory source rules there are statutory withholding tax rules that impose 
tax on payments (interest, dividends and royalties) that have an Australian origin rather 
than source.20 In fact, many of Australia’s statutory source rules have an “origin” flavour 
as they deem a fixed percentage of the receipts to have an Australian source.21
As these statutory provisions do not cover all situations, the common law provides the 
basis for determining source in other situations. Essentially, at common law, the word
“source” refers to the origins of the income. Issacs J in the High Court decision in
22Nathan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation“ stated that:
The legislature in using the word ‘source’ meant, not a legal concept, but 
something which a practical man would regard as a real source of income. 
Legal concepts must, of course, enter into the question when we have to 
consider to whom a given source belongs. But the ascertainment of the 
actual source of a given income is a practical hard matter of fact.
I'XThis view has wide acceptance. Further:
[t]he cases demonstrate that there is no universal or absolute rule which can 
be applied to determine the source of income. It is a matter of judgment and 
relative weight in each case to determine the various factors to be taken into 
account in reaching the conclusion as to source of income.24
Australia). The purpose of the Division 1A is to safeguard against exploitation of the tax exempt 
status of Territory residents by persons not resident in the Territory - Explanatory Memorandum, 
Income Tax Assessment Act (No 4) 1973 (Cth), 7.
19 For example the ship charterer source rules were introduced into New South Wales in 1895 by The 
Land and Income Taxation Assessment Act 1895 (NSW) s 24 and in Victoria in 1896 by the 
Income Tax Act 1896 (Vic) s 18. The rules in NSW were adopted from the The Land and Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1891 (NZ) Schedule C (1) -  FH Salusbury and W Newberry, Salusbury and 
Newberry ’s Land and Income Tax Assessment Act o f 1895 (1896), 86.
20 1936 Act Part III, Div 11 A.
21 Asprey Report, above n 10, 262. For example 1936 Act Division 12 of Part III.
22 (1918) 25 CLR 183, 189; R & McG 14, 15. Also Higgins J in Dickson (as Public Officer of 
Adelong Gold estates, No Liability) The Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) (1925) 36 CLR 489, 
501; R & McG 168,169 noted “[n]ow the word ‘source’ is not technical; it has to be interpreted 
according to its ordinary use in common language. The original idea, I suppose, is that of a stream 
issuing from a mountain; but the metaphorical use of the word is very frequent.”
23 Cliffs International Incorporated v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1985) 16 ATR 601, 620; 
85 ATC 4374, 4390. In Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Mitchum (1965) 113 CLR 401, 407; 
13 ATD 497, 501; 9 AITR 559, 567 (Barwick CJ) noted “[t]he conclusion as to the source of 
income for the purposes of the Act is a conclusion of fact. There is no statutory definition of 
"source" to be applied, the matter being judged as one of practical reality. In each case, the relative 
weight to be given to the various factors which can be taken into consideration is to be determined 
by the tribunal entitled draw the ultimate conclusion as to source. In my opinion, there are no 
presumptions and no rules of law which require that question be resolved in any particular sense.”
24 Spotless Services Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1993) 25 ATR 344, 359; 93 ATC 
4397, 4410 (Lockhart J).
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Thus, the source of income may consist of several factors, and a determination of source 
for tax purposes may depend on which of the factors is dominant.2> As a result the 
outcome of many cases in this area will turn on their particular facts, appearing in some 
circumstances to give rise to conflicting results. In summary, it is a misnomer to use the 
words “rule” or “law” in respect of determinations of source at common law; rather the 
cases lay down principles that can be used to ascertain where source lies as a matter of 
fact. 26
Finally, in the source context the impact of DTAs is crucial. The allocation of taxing 
rights under all Australian DTAs overrides the source of income as determined under 
Australia’s domestic law. To ensure that the income “allocated” by the DTA is taxable 
in Australia most of Australia’s DTAs contain a unique “Source of Income” Article.27 It 
deems income, for which taxing rights have been allocated under a DTA, to be sourced 
in the country allocated the taxing right regardless of its territorial source under the
? o
domestic law.
In light of the above, in order to evaluate source against the evaluative criteria, it is 
important to fully explore the scope of key statutory source and origin rules, the 
principles at common law and most importantly, the impact of DTAs. The examination 
will explore the scope of these “rules” under the following three headings: income from
25 Commissioner o f  Taxation (NSW) v Cam & Sons Ltd (1936) (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 544; 4 ATD 32.
26 Tom Magney, ‘Some aspects of source of income’ (1997) Taxation Institute o f Australia 1997-98 
Convention Papers 1, 17 that often judges, having paid lip service to Nathan tend to search for 
legal concepts and rules to determine the matter. In Tariff Reinsurance Ltd v Commissioner o f 
Taxation (Vic) (1938) 59 CLR 194, 208; 1 AITR 281, 286; 4 ATD 498, 503, Rich J noted . . a 
hard practical matter of fact . . . means, I suppose, that a case must be decided on its own 
circumstances, and that services, pretexts, devices and other unrealities, however fair . . .  are not to 
stand in the way of the court charged with the duty of deciding theses questions. But it does n o t. . . 
mean that the court is to treat contracts agreements and other acts, matters and things existing in the 
law as having no significance.”
27 To deal with source limitations under the 1936 and 1997 Acts (ie 1936 Act s 23(r)), all but two of 
Australia’s DTAs (being Japan and Germany) contain a “Source of Income” Article. The Article 
deems income, profits or gains derived by a non-resident which, under any one or more of Articles 
6 to 8 and 10 to 19 and 21, taxed in Australia shall for the purposes of Australian law (and Article 
24) to be income from sources in Australia -  see Tom Magney, Australia’s Double Tax 
Agreements: A Critical Appraisal o f Key Issues (1994), 42. The deemed source rule is sometimes 
inserted indirectly, either in the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth) (eg ss 11 S(5) and 
11ZF(3) for China and Taiwan respectively) or in the notes to the protocol (eg Netherlands and 
Russia).
28 John Avery Jones, et al, ‘Tax treaty problems relating to source’ [1998] British Tax Review 222, 
224 and 232; and Magney (1994), ibid, 42-3.
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personal exertion, income from business (including the taxation of capital gains), and 
income from property.29
C. Income from personal exertion
1 Overview
There are no statutory source rules in relation to income from personal service under the 
1936 or 1997 Acts. Therefore, the principles applicable are derived from the common 
law. There are several factors that determine the source of personal exertion income, 
being the places of . . negotiating and obtaining the contract of employment, in 
performing the stipulated services, and in obtaining payment.”' If there is nothing 
special about the contract or in the payment, then the all important factor is where the 
work is done.31
However, it appears from the case law that different weightings of facts are applied in 
determining the source of income from employment (dependent personal services) 
under the common law to those applied in determining the source of income from a 
personal service business or profession (independent personal services). Given this 
apparent difference, the scope of each category of personal service will be examined 
separately, starting with dependent personal services.
29 Magney (1994), ibid, 3 notes that the DTA distributive rules can be similarly classified into rules 
referring to:
• income from certain activities (business (art 7), employment (art 15), government services 
(19) and agriculture and mining (art 6));
• income from certain assets (dividends (art 10), interest (art 11), royalties (art 12) and 
income from immovable property (art 6));
• capital gains (arts 13 and 22);
• status of the taxpayer (directors (art 16), artistes and sportsmen (art 17), pensions (art 18) 
and students (art 20); and
• income not dealt with under other categories (art 21).
30 Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) v Cam & Sons Ltd (Jordon CJ) (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 544, 548; 4 
ATD 32, 33.
31 In Cam the men were employed at shipside on the morning of sailing, spent the days fishing outside 
territorial waters and they were paid off immediately after the ship berthed after the voyage.
32 See Asprey Report, above n 10, 275-6.
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2 Dependent Personal Services (Income from employment)
The process for determining the source of employment income is explored by first 
looking at common law before looking at the impact of DTAs.
(a) The common law factors which determine source
The source of income from dependent personal service is either the place where services 
are rendered or the place where payment for services is made. A number of pre 1950's 
court decisions found that the source of the income was a jurisdiction other than the one 
in which the employee performed the services. In these cases the place of payment was 
crucial (due to the nature of the payments34 or the terms of the contract35).36
33 Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v French (1957) 98 CLR 398, 405; 7 AITR 76, 82; 11 ATD 
288, 293 (Williams J). However, as noted above, place of negotiating and obtaining the contract is 
another factor not in question in French.
34 Richard Teece v Commissioner o f  Taxation [1914] R & McG, NSW Court of Review Decisions 
(1927), 19 (Murray DCJ) found that salary received while the taxpayer was on leave of absence for 
nine months in London was from sources in New South Wales as it “. . . is paid in consideration of 
services which the officer has rendered and will render in the future . . . and . . .  he is still receiving 
. . . income because it was the reward or the price of services rendered in the taxing country.” Cf 
Robertson v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1937) 57 CLR 147; 1 AITR 152; 4 ATD 355, 
where a governing director of a Victorian company, who abroad for two years, had his salary 
treated as arising from sources outside Australia (due to the Commissioner incorrectly conceding 
its source was outside Australia) - see Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v French (1957) 98 CLR 
398, 405; 7 AITR 76, 79; 11 ATD 288, 290 (Dixon CJ)) and Case 40 (1928) 2 DITBR 43, where a 
director on a trip to America, England and the Continent was able to show he was actively engaged 
in the day to day business affairs of the company, thus a proportional part of his salary was found to 
have a source outside Australia.
35 In Hall v Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation (1950) 5 AITR 450; 9 ATD 161, Herron J, in 
distinguishing the similar fact case of Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Miller (1946) 73 CLR 
93; 8 ATD 146; 3 AITR 333 on the basis that it involved residency, found that a taxpayer 
employed as a fourth engineer by the United States Army and serving 5 months in Milne Bay in 
1944-5 was taxable on the income as it was sourced in Australia. “The source of the appellant’s 
income was the contract under which the work was performed . . .  It was the contract which entitled 
him to be paid the moneys, and not the place where the work was actually performed” Herron J 
relied upon the English decisions of Bennett v Marshall (1938) 1 KB 591; 22 TC 73, Colquhoun v 
Brooks (1889) 14 AC 493 and Foulsham v Pickles (1925) AC 458. He concluded that the test for 
ascertaining the source of income is to look at the place where the income comes into the 
employee. Thus, the source was the place the contract was entered into, his home port, the place 
where his money was paid to his wife, the place where he was to be returned.
36 One case was decided due to limitations on the scope of the taxing jurisdiction -  see Kingsford- 
Smith v Commissioner o f Taxation [1924] R & McG NSW Court o f Review Decisions (1927), 111. 
The Court found that salary earned by an Australian naval officer on Commonwealth naval vessel 
in New South Wales waters was not found to be sourced in New South Wales as the vessel was a 
“public vessel belonging to a friendly power” and therefore does not fall within the local 
jurisdiction (applying the principles in Exchange v McFaddon [1812] 7 Cranch 116).
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Despite these early cases, the courts have since found that the place where personal 
services are rendered (where the personal service takes place) is the determinative factor
37 38in finding source (eg Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v Cam & Sons Ltd, Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation v French39 and Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v 
Efstathakis40). This approach to determining the source of dependent personal service 
income has traditionally been adopted by the Commonwealth Attorney General,41 the 
ATO42 and tax commentators.43
However, there are some exceptions. For example, a bonus (made outside the contract 
of employment) may have a different source to the usual salary paid to a general
37 In Diamond v Commissioner o f Taxes (Qld) [1941] Qld SR 218, 2 AITR 190, 6 ATD 111 the 
Supreme Court of Queensland held, implicitly (as the issue involved power to tax in Territorial 
waters), that part of income derived by a NSW resident ships pilot, who piloted foreign vessels 
down Australia’s east coast, (spending 16.9 percent of the distance within three miles of the 
Queensland coast) was derived in Queensland as that was where the services were performed.
38 (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 544; 4 ATD 32.
39 (1957) 98 CLR 398; 11 ATD 288; 7 AITR 76. The taxpayer, who was employed as an engineer by 
an Australian company in New Zealand, with his salary paid into a Sydney bank, unsuccessfully 
claimed the income was exempt under former s 23q as it was derived from sources outside 
Australia.
40 (1979) 9 ATR 867, 871; 79 ATC 4256, 4260 (Bowen J) noted “[t]he payment of remuneration 
depended upon actual performance of the services. That Australia was the place of employment 
was not merely incidental but central to the earning of the income, to the personal circumstances of 
the taxpayer and to the nature of the employment.”
41 In opinion 660 issued by RR Garran Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department on 20 
October 1915, Garran stated that source salary income was where the services were preformed. 
Thus, an Australian marine superintendent supervising the construction of a steamship in England 
on behalf of his Australian company was found to have income source outside Australia, while 
employee of an English company in Australia has his income source in Australia. Patrick Brazil 
and Bevan Mitchell (eds), Opinions o f Attorneys-General o f the Commonwealth o f Australia 
Volume 2: 1914-23 (1988), 133.
42 This view has existed from the time the 1936 Act was introduced (see John Vincent Ratcliffe, John 
York McGrath and JWR Hughes, The Law o f Income Tax (The Commonwealth) (1938), 169. They 
cite the example of Robertson v Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation (1937) 57 CLR 147, 150; 1 
AITR 152, 155; 4 ATD 355, 356 (Dixon J) who noted “. . . It does not appear to me to be 
altogether clear that the source of his remuneration during his absence was outside Australia, but 
for some reason it was admitted on behalf of the Commissioner that in respect of the income in 
question this condition of the Commonwealth exemption was satisfied”) and currently (ATO’s 
second Internet Report, above n 7, para 5.3.42, states that “[e]mployment is considered to be 
exercised in the place where the employee is physically present when performing the activities for 
which the employment income is paid”).
43 JP Hannan, A Treatise on the Principles o f Income Taxation (1946), 272 refers to the judgment of 
Evatt J in Hillsdon Watts Ltd v Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) (1937) 57 CLR 36, 54; 1 AITR 
42, 53; 4 ATD 199, 210, who stated obiter u[i]n ascertaining the territorial sources of income 
derived from personal exertion, it is necessary to ascertain where the material efforts of the 
taxpayer were in fact exerted.” Similarly, Norman Bede Rydge, Federal Income Tax Law (1921), 
89 cites In re Gunter (1895) reported in D’Arcy-Irvine Land and Income Tax Law o f New South 
Wales (1905), 429, where the Court of Review held the income was earned where the taxpayer 
worked, not where he was paid.
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manager as it is voluntary in nature.44 The place or places where past personal services 
are rendered can also be a factor in determining the source of a pension45 as can the 
place where it is granted or the place in which the contract was made which gave rise to 
the pension.46 Also, “[i]n the case of an appointment to a sinecure the engagement and 
the payment may be the only significant factors.” 47 A “sinecure” is an office of profits or 
honour without duties, eg an appointment as company director.
On balance, the place where services are performed is a good starting point in 
determining source, but the place where services are performed is not a rule of law and 
not always determinative.48
(b) Impact o f treaties
Under Australia’s DTAs there are a number of Articles that modify the approach 
adopted domestically. There is a principal Article that deals with income from 
employment and specific articles that allocate taxing rights in respect of specific 
categories of personal income, such as directors’ fees, entertainers (artistes and
44 In In re Taxpayer (1929) 24 Tas LR 14; R & McG (1928-1930) 356 the Supreme Court of 
Tasmania found that although the salary was derived in Tasmania, the bonus paid had a Victorian 
source as it was a voluntary payment by a Victorian company and it did not arise or accrue and was 
not derived or received in Tasmania.
45 In opinion 778 issued by RR Garran Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department on 23 March 
1917, Garran stated that since the pensioner was employed practically for his whole 41 year 
working life in Australia, the source was Australia. This was despite the fact that taxpayer had his 
salary paid half yearly from the London Office of his employer bank and that the pension was paid 
from the guarantee and provident funds of the London employer - Brazil, above n 41, 266.
46 For example, in Fletcher Dixon v Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) (1913) R & McG, NSW Court 
of Review Decisions (1927), 8, the taxpayer purchased two annuities which were signed and issued 
in New York, but were lodged in the New South Wales office’s of the insurance company. As 
under the contract the payments were to be made where the annuitant lived, Murray DCJ found that 
the source was where income was received, New South Wales.
The place in which the assets of the pension fund are located, terms of the deed, residence of 
trustees or the place of management are other factors that may assist in determining the source of 
pension income. Similarly, the source of an annuity payment is the place where the contract or will 
was made or the jurisdiction in which the laws can interpret or determine the validity of the contract 
or will -  see Hamilton, above n 3, para 2.550.
47 Commissioner o f  Taxation (NSW) v Cam & Sons Ltd (Jordon CJ) (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 544, 548; 4 
ATD 32, 34. Also in Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v French (1957) 98 CLR 398, 405; 7 
AITR 76, 79; 11 ATD 288, 290 (Dixon CJ)) noted that as the taxpayer did not occupy an office, 
was not a professional (as in Watson), and was not an artisan, the criteria for determining source in 
those circumstances cannot be used.
48 In Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Mitchum (1965) 113 CLR 401, 408; 13 ATD 497, 502; 9 
AITR 559, 568 (Taylor J) noted “I do not feel compelled or persuaded by the decision of the Court 
in French’s case to hold that in ever case where work forms the consideration for wages or salary 
paid the source of the income constituted by the wages or salary is in the place where the work is 
done.”
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sportsmen), pensions, government services, students, diplomats, teachers, alimony and 
fringe benefits.
(i) Income from employment Article
The principal Article under the OECD Model Convention is Article 15, the Income from 
Employment Article (formerly the Dependent Personal Services Article).49 This 
Employment Article has been adopted in all Australian DTAs, but varies in form 
depending upon the date at when treaties were negotiated.
Article 15(1) provides that generally salary and wages and similar remuneration50 of 
employees are taxable in the country where the employment is exercised, except where 
the income is dealt with under Articles (ie, directors’ fees, pensions and government 
service).51 The categories of income dealt with outside the employment Articles are 
wider in some Australian DTAs.
Article 15(2) states that the person’s country of residence can only tax employment 
income derived in the other country if:
• the recipient is present in the other country for a period or periods not exceeding 
the aggregate 183 days53 in any 12 month period;54
49 The name changed with the deletion of the Independent Services Article (Article 14) from the 
OECD Model Convention on 29 April 2000.
50 Share options are treated as “similar remuneration” - see 2003 United Kingdom Convention Notes, 
note 8(a).
51 Generally, the overriding Articles in 2003 OECD Model Tax Convention are arts 16 (directors’ 
fees), 18 (pensions) and 19 (government service).
52 Eg encompassing a Fringe benefits Article and a Teachers Article. Where a Students Article exists 
in a DTA, Australia does not generally specify it as an override Article.
53 The number of days in the Australian DTAs is not always 183 days. A period of 90 days is used in 
the DTAs with Papua New Guinea art 15(2)(a), Fiji art 15(2)(a), and Kiribati art 15(2)(a), while a 
120 days is used in the DTA with Indonesia art 15(2)(a). The 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 
15, paras 5-8 discusses the process for calculating the number of days and other conditions. The 
Article was altered in light of recommendations contained in OECD, The 183 Day Rule: Some 
Problems o f Application and Interpretation (1991).
54 In most Australian DTAs, the “ 12 month” test is limited to the tax (fiscal) year or year of 
assessment. The OECD “any 12 month” test period, which effectively measures the 183 days over 
two tax years, is used in 12 of Australia’s DTAs in art 15(2)(a) (unless indicated otherwise), ie, 
with the United Kingdom art 14(2)(a), Canada, New Zealand, Indonesia, Czech Republic, Taiwan, 
South Africa, Slovak Republic, Argentina, Romania, Russia and Mexico. The test period is 
different in the DTAs with Norway art 15(2)(a) and China art 15(2)(a) (which expressly states the
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• the remuneration is paid by, or on behalf of, an employer who is not a resident of 
that other country;66 and
• the remuneration is not deductible in determining taxable profits of a permanent 
establishment or a fixed base which the employer has in that other country.56
Remuneration derived in respect of an employment exercised aboard a ship or aircraft 
operated in international traffic or from inland waterway transport may be taxed by the 
State in which the “place of effective management’' of the employing enterprise is 
situated under Article 15(3). The Australian DTAs do not contain references to inland 
waterways and in most DTAs the taxing rights in respect of the employment income are 
allocated to the country where the operator of the ship or airline is “resident”, not the 
“place of effective management” (as specified in the OECD Model).57
(ii) Director ’s fees
Article 16 of the OECD Model Convention allocates the taxing rights in respect of fees 
and similar payments, derived by a non-resident director (in the capacity as a member of
r  o
the board of directors), to the country in which the paying company is a resident. 
Although traditionally Australia has adopted this approach, in some DTAs the director’s
measurement period to be two years), and the DTA with Malta art 15(2)(a) (which treats the 
exemption satisfied if less than 183 days were spent in the country in the preceding 12 months).
55 For the ATO’s view on meaning of the word “employer” see Taxation Ruling TR 2003/11, Income 
Tax: The Interpretation o f the General Exclusion Provision o f the Dependent Services Article, or 
its Equivalent, o f Australia’s Double Tax Agreements.
56 The DTA with Fiji does not contain the art 15(2)(b) and (c). Also, a fourth requirement (that the 
income must be subject to tax in country of residence) is contained in the DTAs in art 15(2)(d) 
(unless indicated otherwise) with New Zealand, Sweden, Malta, Finland, Austria, Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji, Kiribati, Indonesia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Slovak Republic. Similarly, the Norway 
DTA art 15(2) reserves the right to tax income to the extent it is exempt in country of residence.
57 There are exceptions in art 15(3) (unless indicated otherwise) of the DTAs with: Singapore art 
11(3), Netherlands, and Italy (which allocates taxing rights based upon the employee’s residence), 
Denmark and Romania (which allocates on place of effective management), Denmark and Norway 
(which override general allocations where person is a SAS employee by allocating rights to 
Denmark/Norway), Taiwan (which allocates to the territory of operation) and South Africa, 
Argentina, Russia and Mexico (which allocate to the state in which the enterprise is “resident”).
58 The words “derived in the capacity of as a member of the board of directors” emphasise that this 
clause only assigns taxing rights to income derived from that office and does not cover 
remuneration earned by a board member who also has day-to-day management functions -  see 
different wording in DTAs with Singapore art 11(2), Belgium art 16 and Philippines art 16, which 
stresses this differential treatment. Cf with the Netherlands DTA, which assigns the taxing rights to 
any income received from the company by a director.
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remuneration has been subsumed into the Employment Article, with the remuneration 
treated in the same way as if it was derived by an employee.59
(iii) Entertainers and sportspeople
Article 17(1) of the OECD Model Convention overrides the Business Profits (Article 
7)60 and Employment (Article 14) Articles to allocate the taxing rights in respect of 
income derived from the personal activities of non-resident entertainers (such as 
theatrical, motion picture, radio or television artistes and musicians) or sportspersons61 
to the country in which the activities occurred. Article 17(2) provides that where that 
income . . accrues not to that entertainer but to another person, that income may, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 7, and 15, be taxed in the” country in which 
the activities of the entertainer are exercised.63
This article has been incorporated into all Australian DTAs.64 However, in some 
Australian DTAs the Article varies from the OECD Model by allocating residency 
taxation in respect of state sponsored entertainers6'1 and members of any league teams
59 Eg, DTAs with United Kingdom art 14(4), United States art 15(1), and Japan art 11(4).
60 In DTAs with Independent Service Articles (art 14) is used rather than the Business Profits Article 
(art 7).
61 In older DTAs the terms “athletes” or “sportsmen” are substituted.
62 “Article 17 is merely a pragmatic recognition that the standard rules applying to personal services 
income do not adequately cover this type of taxpayer . . . [it] is a ‘tax grab’.” Daniel Sandler, The 
Taxation o f International Entertainers and Athletes -  All the World’s a Stage (1995) cited in Mark 
Keating, ‘That’s entertainment -  Taxation of entertainers and athletes in New Zealand’ (1998) 4 
New Zealand Journal o f Taxation Law and Policy 3, 8. The justification for the Article has been 
questioned -  see Joel Nitikman, ‘Article 17 of OECD Model Income tax Treaty -  An 
anachronism?’ (2001) 22 Tax Notes International 2637.
63 Article 17(2) is aimed at capturing payments under “loan-out” arrangements where the entertainer 
or sportsperson has an interest in the contracting entity -  see Dick Molenaar and Harald Grams, 
‘Rent-A-Star -  The purpose of Article 17(2) of the OECD Model’ (2002) 56 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 500. The approach in the Japan DTA (art 12(2)) is more 
restrictive with source base taxation (via a deemed permanent establishment) only arising where the 
entertainer or sports person “controls, directly or indirectly” the enterprise.
64 See generally Thomas Delany, ‘International entertainers: A comparison of the taxing rules’ (1996) 
7(6) The CCH Journal o f Australian Taxation, 52. Also note Australia has introduced specific 
withholding obligations under the PAYG rules in respect of payments made to performing artists or 
sportspersons, as well as payments to support staff such as choreographers, coaches, directors of 
photography, musical directors, and sports psychologists - see Minister for Revenue and Assistant 
Treasurer, ‘Maintaining the Momentum of Business Tax Reform’ (Press Release C57/02, 14 May 
2002), Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 12-315 and 12-317 and Taxation Administration 
Amendment Regulations 2004 (No 1).
65 The DTAs with residency taxation of public sponsored entertainers in art 17 (unless indicated 
otherwise) are Singapore art 12(3), Philippines, Malaysia art 16, Norway, China (cultural 
exchanges), Thailand, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Hungarian (includes non-profit organisations), Poland
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playing in a trans-Tasman competition,66 and providing exceptions to the anti avoidance 
rule in Article 17(2).67
(iv) Pensions and annuities
Article 18 of the OECD Model Convention allocates taxing rights in respect of non­
government pensions or similar remuneration to the country where the recipient is 
resident. This sole taxing Article appears in all Australian DTAs.68 However, the 
Australian Article varies from the OECD model in that it encompasses all pensions,69 
including Government pensions,70 and seeks to tax annuities.71 Despite the existence of
(cultural exchanges), India, Indonesia, Spain, and Argentina Art 17(3). The United States DTA 
retains residence taxation under art 17(1) for amounts less than US$10,000.
66 New Zealand art 18. However, the residency test is limited to sporting competitions involving only 
trans-Tasman teams and does not cover competitions such as Rugby Union’s Super 12’s, which 
involves South African teams -  see J McCormack and A Archer, ‘The New Australia/New Zealand 
Double Tax Agreement: A Review of the Critical Issues’ (Paper presented at the ATAX Second 
Annual International Tax Weekend Workshop, Sydney, 26-28 May 1995), 24. However, Murray 
McClennan, ‘Tax implications of the growth of professional sport’ (1996) 2 New Zealand Journal 
o f Taxation Law and Policy 40, 48 mistakenly limits the scope of the clause to the “rugby” league 
competition.
67 United States art 17(2), Canada art 17(3) and Switzerland art 17(3) allows residence taxation under 
art 17(2) of third party income if entertainer does not benefit under the arrangement.
68 Despite Australia’s position the DTAs contain a number of exceptions where pensions are taxable 
in the country of payment. These exceptions are
• South Africa art 18(2) - where annuities are purchased by former residents;
• Philippines art 18(1) - payment from unregistered private pension plan;
• Indonesia art 18(2) - country of payment can also levy a 15 per cent tax;
• Canada art 18(2) - country of payment can also levy a 15 per cent tax, and, in respect of income 
averaging annuities, this limitation does not apply;
• Singapore art 13(3), Japan art 13(3), Netherlands art 19(1), Malaysia art 18(2), and Fiji art 
19(1) -  where government pensions arise from discharging government functions;
• France art 18(3), Belgium art 19(2), Korea art 19(2), Austria art 19(2), China art 19(2), 
Thailand art 19(2), Sri Lanka art 19(2), India art 19(2), and Spain art 19(2) -  where government 
pensions arising from discharging government functions/services are rendered provided the 
retiree is not a citizen and is not a resident of Australia;
• Russia art 19(2) and South Africa art 19(2) -  where government pensions arising from services 
rendered to government are provided retiree who is not a citizen and is not a resident of 
Australia and the pension relates to services in Australia;
• United States art 18 - government pensions and social security pensions; and
• Sweden art 18(3), Denmark art 18(3), and Finland art 18(3) -  where government pensions 
arising from discharging government functions and social security payments to citizens.
69 Australia reserves the right to depart from Article 18 and solely tax all pensions in country of 
residence of recipient -  see 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 18, para 39. As a result exempt 
Government pensions in one country can be taxable in the country of receipt - see Enoch v Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation (2002) 51 ATR 1014; 2002 ATC 2201.
70 An illustration of Australia’s approach is the ATO’s Practice Statement PS 2002/1, Pensions Paid 
to Australian Residents by the Netherlands Government for Government Services in the Former 
Netherlands East Indies.
71 Other minor variations in wording also exist. For example, the absence of the word “only” in art 
18(2) of the Malaysian DTA has meant that both countries had the right to tax - see AAT Case 
12772: Re Chong and Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1998) 38 ATR 1109; 98 ATC 2069.
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such clauses some countries have sought to also tax such pensions in contravention of 
the DTA.72
(v) Government services
Article 19(1) of the OECD Model Convention allocates the taxing rights, in respect of 
government (federal, state and local) service payments made to individuals, to the 
country making the payments (provided the employee is a national of the country and 
did not become a resident of that country solely for the purposes of rendering 
services). This Article, which is used in all Australia’s DTAs, varies from the OECD 
Model in terminology74 and does not generally deal with government pensions (as they 
are normally dealt with under the Pension Article).75
Under 19(3) of the OECD Model, payments that relate to services in connection with 
trade or business carried on by Governments are allocated in accordance with the 
Articles (where existing) that expressly deal with employment income, entertainers, 
pensions and directors’ fees. Some Australian DTAs also vary from the OECD Model in 
respect of non-cash benefits, which are dealt with under a Fringe Benefits Article.76
The taxpayer was an Australian resident in receipt of a Malaysian civil service pension in respect of 
his employment with the Malaysian Inland Revenue Department.
72 For example, in response Italy’s insistence on taxing these pensions the Commissioner issued 
Taxation Ruling IT 2554, Income Tax: Australia/'Italy Double Taxation Agreement: Italian 
Pensions Derived by Australian Residents, which set out the means by which Australian resident 
may be entitled to a refund from the Italian revenue authorities of any Italian tax that has been 
deducted from an Italian pension (derived on or after 1 July 1987) contrary to the provisions of Art 
18 of the Convention (para 27). In the event that a refund of tax is not obtained, the Commissioner 
will grant a credit in respect of the tax paid would not be available in Australia under the foreign 
tax credit system, as the Italian tax would have been imposed in contravention of the Convention, 
(para 28).
73 The proviso was inserted to prevent a state taxing remuneration of locally engaged embassy staff - 
Jevena O’Brien, ‘Double tax agreements’ in KDCM Wilde and W Rafiqul Islam (eds), 
International Transactions: Trade and Investment, Law and Finance (1993) 298, 306.
74 It uses the words “services rendered in discharges governmental functions” rather than “services 
rendered to that state.”
75 As a result, Australian DTAs do not include Article 19(2) of the OECD Model Convention. A list 
of the DTAs in which Australia has departed from its taxation of all pensions on a residence basis 
by agreeing that country of source can tax government pension are listed above, n 68.
76 For example the United States consists of Art 19(1 )(a) only.
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(vi) Students
Article 20 of the OECD Model Agreement provides that payments received by the 
student or business apprentices from sources outside the country, where made for the 
purpose of the student's maintenance or education, are exempt in the country where the 
student is temporarily present.77 This Article, which is adopted in all of Australia’s 
DTAs, modifies Australia’s domestic law. Without this Article the students, as 
residents, would be taxable in Australia on income from all sources.78 As with other 
OECD Articles, Australian DTAs use slightly different terminology79 and in some 
DTAs the scope of the article has been varied.
(vii) Diplomats
Article 28 of the OECD Model Convention provides that “nothing in the Convention 
shall affect the fiscal privileges of members of diplomatic missions and consular posts 
under the general rules of international law or under the provisions of special 
international agreements.” Although this exemption also appears in most of Australian 
DTAs, the phrasing of the Article in some earlier Australian DTAs departs from the 
language of the OECD Model.83
77 Australia reserves the right to depart from Article 20 and restrict its operation to students -  see 
2003 OECD Commentary on Article 20, para 3.
78 Taxation Ruling IT 2268, Residency Status o f Overseas Students Studying in Australia 
concessionally deems overseas students to be residents if their course of study extends beyond six 
months.
79 The term “business apprentices” is not used in Australian DTAs, but the term “trainee” is included 
in the following 11 Australian DTAs: Singapore art 15, Malaysia art 20, Korea art 21, China art 21, 
Thailand art 21, Fiji art 22, Hungary art 21, Kiribati art 20, Indian art 21, Czech Republic art 20 
and Slovak Republic art 20.
80 In some DTAs the presence is more than “temporary” being unlimited in some DTAs (Singapore 
art 15, Japan art 16, South Africa art 20 and Mexico art 20) and limited to seven years under the 
Romania DTA (art 20). The China DTA extends the art 21(1) exemption to all grants, scholarships 
and remuneration for a students maintenance, education or training (art 21(2)), while the Malta 
DTA limits to eligible education to studies at a college, university or school or like (art 20).
81 Diplomatic and consular representatives in Australia are exempt from all income tax under s
23(a)(ii) of the 1936 Act, except on their private income having its source in Australia and capital
taxes on investments made in commercial undertakings in Australia. This exemption is done by 
reference to exemptions in s 7(4) of the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1967 (Cth) and s 
5(4) of the Consular Privileges and Immunities Act 1972 (Cth).
82 The Diplomatic and Consular Article does not appear in the Singapore, Japan and Taiwan DTAs.
83 The DTA which varies the scope of the Article is the DTAs with Canada art 26(2), French art
26(2), Swiss art 26(2) and (3), and Malta art 26(2) and (3) expressly excluding international
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(viii) Teachers and academics
The OECD Model Convention generally makes no special provision for teachers and 
professors, treating them under the Employment Article.84 However, 19 of Australia’s 
DTAs contain a Teacher Article,8̂  which allocates the taxing right to the country of 
residence in respect of any income received by a professor or teacher visiting the other 
country for a period not exceeding two years for the purpose of teaching or carrying out 
advanced study or research at a university, college, school or other educational 
institution.86
A number of the Articles expressly exclude remuneration which a professor or teacher 
receives for conducting research if the research is undertaken primarily for the private 
benefit of a specific person or specific persons.87 Due to the combination of an 
exemption under the Teacher Articles and an exemption arising from the operation of 
domestic law of the country of residence, teachers can be tax free in both countries. To 
avoid this risk, Teacher Articles are not generally adopted in Australian DTAs.
organisations and their staff and reserves the right, as sending country, to tax diplomatic staff of a 
third State.
84 For example under the United States DTA, exchange teachers paid by the country of residence do 
not discharge Government functions -  Taxation Ruling IT 2574, Income Tax: Australia/United 
States Double Taxation Convention: Exchange Teachers.
85 The Teacher Article appears in art 20(1) (unless otherwise indicated) in the following 19 Australian 
DTAs: Japan art 15, German art 19(1), Netherlands, France art 19(1), Belgium art 20(2), 
Philippines, Malaysia art 19(1), Sweden art 20, Ireland art 21(1), Italy art 20, Korea art 20, China, 
Thailand, Fiji, Hungary, India, Poland, Indonesia, and Argentina.
86 The requirements are that the person must have been:
• a teacher in their home country;
• a resident of that country; and
• visiting Australia for a period less than two years;
the purpose of the visit is to teach in the university, school, etc; and the remuneration is received 
for those teaching activities. See Taxation Determination TD 2001/21, Income Tax: Is Salary Paid 
to a French Resident Employed as an Assistant Teacher in an Australian School Exempt Income?, 
Taxation Determination TD 2001/22, Income Tax: Is Salary Paid to a German Resident Employed 
as an Assistant Teacher in an Australian School Exempt Income?, Taxation Determination TD 
2001/23, Income Tax: Is Salary Paid to an Italian Resident Employed as an Assistant Teacher in 
an Australian School Exempt Income?, and Taxation Determination TD 2001/24, Income Tax: Is 
Salary Paid to a Japanese Resident Employed as an Assistant Teacher in an Australian School 
Exempt Income?.
87 The 14 DTAs, which include in art 20(2) (unless otherwise indicated) this express restriction, are 
the: Netherlands, France art 19(2), Belgium, Philippines, Malaysia art 19(2), Ireland art 21(2), 
China, Thailand, Fiji, Hungary, India, Poland, Indonesia, and Argentina. A further restriction (that 
the remuneration must be subject to tax in state of residence) is found in art 20(1) (unless indicated 
otherwise) of the nine DTAs with: Malaysia art 19(1), Sweden art 20, Italy art 20, China, Hungary, 
India, Poland, Indonesia, and Argentina.
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(ix) Alimony
Although the OECD Model Convention does not address alimony or maintenance 
payments, some of Australia’s more recent tax agreements allocate taxing rights under 
the Pensions and Annuities Article.88 However, unlike pensions, the taxing rights in 
respect of alimony and other maintenance payments are allocated to the country of 
payment.89
(x) Fringe benefits
Two Australian DTAs adopt an Article, not in the OECD Model Convention, that 
allocates taxing rights in respect of fringe benefits.90 The Article allocates the right to 
tax fringe benefits (where a fringe benefit is taxable in both countries) to the country 
with the sole or primary right to tax the remuneration from employment, to which the 
benefit relates. The “primary taxing right” is defined to lie with the country that has the 
right to tax employment income under this agreement. The other country is required to 
provide relief for tax paid on the employee's remuneration.91
(c) In summary
In summary, at common law, personal service income is generally sourced where the 
services are performed, ~ while DTAs allocate taxing rights to either the country where 
the income was received or generated or to the country of residence or payment. Taxing 
rights will be allocated to the country of payment where the income arises from that
88 The Alimony Article is art 18(3) (unless indicated otherwise) in 21 Australian DTAs: United States 
art 18(6), Canada, New Zealand art 19(3), Malaysia art 17(3), Sweden art 18(4), Ireland art 19(3), 
Italy, Norway, Finland art 18(4), Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Kiribati, Indonesia art 18(4), 
Spain, Vietnam, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Argentina, Romania and Mexico.
89 Alimony or maintenance payments are not assessable in Australia -  see 1997 Act s 53-30.
90 The fringe benefit Article appears in the United Kingdom art 15 and the New Zealand art 16.
91 The fringe benefit article was introduced in the 1995 New Zealand DTA, principally due to the high 
degree of similarity in the systems for taxing fringe benefits (both the Australian and New Zealand 
tax employers on the value of certain fringe benefits provided to employees) and in recognition of 
developments in trans-Tasman labour markets -  see Treasurer, ‘Double Taxation Agreement with 
New Zealand’ (Press Release No 6, 27 January 1995), 2.
92 ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 7, 105 notes that “[ejmployment is considered to be 
exercised in the place where the employee is physically present when performing the activities for 
which the employment income is paid. It follows that an individual who performs those activities 
outside Australia will not be regarded as exercising their employment in Australia, even where the
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country’s government93 or where a resident company makes payments to office holders 
resident in the other country,94 and to the country of residence where residents visit the 
other jurisdiction for short periods.95
3 Independent Personal Service
As mentioned above, the next step is to explore the process for determining the source 
of independent personal service income by first looking at common law before looking 
at the impact of DTAs.
(a) The common law factors which determine source
In respect of income from a personal service business or profession (independent 
personal services), where payment is based on a result, the common law weightings 
appear to focus less on the place of work.96 As trades and professions are based upon 
activities, not attached to any specific contract, a doctor or trader is carrying on one 
business, regardless of where performed.9. It is said “an ordinary artisan does not earn 
his pay where he does his work”. Thus, where services are provided through a 
contract, then the place of contracting rather than where the services were performed
results of those employment activities are provided directly to an Australian employer via the 
Internet and are utilised solely in Australia.”
93 Eg, income earned by diplomats, persons engaged in Government service, some pension (usually 
governmental service or social security pensions), and students.
94 Eg, company directors.
95 Eg, persons working in the second country for less than 183 days and teachers.
96 Watson v Commission o f Taxation (WA) (1930) 44 CLR 94; 1 ATD 61. The Board of Review in 
Case M49 (1961) 12 TBRD 260, 265-6; Case 38 (1961) 10 CTBR (NS) 248, 253-4 (JL Burke, RC 
Smith QC and RE O’Neill) (Mitchum 's case at first instance) found (similar to Watson's case) that 
the place of shooting was an element of little importance as Mitchum, a film actor resident in 
California, was available for creative consultation and rehearsal before shooting and for a period 
after shooting. Further, the contract for his services with a Swiss company also allowed for 
exploitation of his name. Therefore, “. . . the circumstances of this case invest the locus of the 
contract for his services and the place where payment was to be made thereunder with such added 
weight as to transform them into deciding factors; as both there factors were outside Australia we 
conclude that the taxpayer did no t ..  . derive income from sources in Australia.”
97 Bennett v Marshall (1938) 1 KB 591 and Watson v Commission o f Taxation (WA) (1930) 44 CLR 
94; 1 ATD 61. Watson, a public accountant ceased business in Western Australia for 13 months to 
pursue a single client’s matter. The full High Court agreed with the earlier findings of fact that he 
carrying on business as an accountant in Perth. “Because he journeyed into another jurisdiction in 
the course of his exertions to do so it did not follow that any part of the source of the remuneration 
was there located.”
98 Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v French (1957) 98 CLR 398, 405-6; 7 AITR 76, 79; 11 ATD 
288,290-1 (Dixon CJ).
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may determine the source of personal exertion income." If an activity is to be carried 
out in a particular place, then location may be determinative.100
Thus, in respect of independent personal services, the place of business or the place of 
contract may be weighted more heavily in determining source than the place where the 
work is carried out.
(b) Impact o f treaties
The Independent Personal Service Article was deleted from the OECD Model 
Convention on 29 April 2000, with the income being dealt with under the Business 
Profits Article (Article 7).101 However, as the Independent Personal Services Article still 
exists in a number of Australian DTAs and has been included in post April 2000
i  n j
Australian DTAs, its scope needs to be briefly examined.
99 In Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation v Mitchum (1965) 113 CLR 401; 13 ATD 497; 9 AITR 559, 
the High Court did not determine the source of the income, merely finding that there had been no 
error of law by the Board of Review. Taylor J concluded [408, 502, 568] “. . . a real question 
arises as to whether this is a case, as French’s Case was treated, of wages and salary for work. I 
have called to attention to the terms of the agreement between the Swiss company and the 
respondent under which he received the sum of $50,000.”
100 Richard Dukes, ‘Taxation of non-resident entertainers, artistes, performers, sportsmen and athletes 
in Australia’ (Paper presented in Sydney, 1 September 1995), 10.
101 The deletion was based on a report (OECD, Issues Related to Article 14 o f the OECD Model Tax 
Convention (27 January 2000)) which noted that as there was no intended difference between the 
concept of “permanent establishment” in art 7 and “fixed base” in art 14, the continued use of 
Article 14 could not be justified. Prior to this decision the usefulness of the fixed based concept 
was widely questioned, eg, see John Huston, ‘The case against ‘fixed base” (1988) 10 Intertax 
282.
102 The only DTA without an Independent Personal Services Article is the 2003 DTA with the United 
Kingdom. An example of a recent Australian DTAs with a Independent Personal Services Article is 
the following Article 14 of the Mexican DTA (which was concluded on 9 September 2002):
1 Income derived by an individual who is a resident of a Contracting State in respect of 
professional services or other activities of an independent character shall be taxable only in that 
State. However, if that individual:
(a) has a fixed base regularly available in the other Contracting State for the purpose of 
performing the individual's activities; or
(b) is present in the other State for a period or periods exceeding in the aggregate 183 days in any 
12 month period commencing or ending in the fiscal period or year of income concerned, as 
the case may be of that other State,
the income may also be taxed in that other State, but only so much of the income as is attributable 
to services performed from that fixed base or in the other State during such period or periods.
2 The term "professional services" includes services performed in the exercise of independent 
scientific, literary, artistic, educational or teaching activities as well as in the exercise of the 
independent activities of physicians, lawyers, engineers, architects, dentists and accountants.
308
Under the former Article 14 of the 1997 OECD Model Convention, income derived by a 
resident from independent professional services will generally be taxed only in the 
country of residence, unless there is a “fixed base” in the other state. Although the 
“fixed base” has been adopted as a sole test in 22 of Australia’s DTAs,104 other DTAs 
use a 183 day presence test, adopted from the United Nations Model.105 The 183 day 
presence test is generally used as an alternative to the “fixed base” attachment 
requirement.106 There are also a number of other minor variations from the OECD 
Model.107
Thus, the Independent Personal Services Article generally provides sole taxing rights to 
the country of residence of the service provider. However, the country of source will 
have taxing rights if the individual derives income from activities exercised in a fixed 
base in the source country or, in some cases, the individual spends more than a specified 
number of days in that source country.108
103 It is argued that in order to have a fixed base the non-resident needs to do more than attend to the 
requirements of a client and the use of the client’s premise will not be a fixed base regardless of 
time -  see Nathan Boidman, ‘Does time alone create a permanent establishment? The courts and 
Revenue Canada go their separate ways’ (2000) 54 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 339, 342.
104 The fixed base is the sole test in 22 Australian DTAs. It is Article 14 (unless indicated) of the 
DTAs with Canada, Japan art 10, German art 13, Netherlands, France art 13, Belgium, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Denmark, Ireland art 15, Italy, Korea, Finland, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Vietnam, Spain, 
Taiwan, Slovak Republic, Romania, and Russia.
105 A number of developing countries use a 183 day test to widen the right to tax such income (as a 
fixed base need not be established to tax independent service income). The use of the alternative 
tests in some Australian DTAs increases the source countries taxing rights. Thus, a source country 
has the right to tax income from independent personal services that arise from a fixed base where 
the stay is less than 183 days.
106 In 12 of Australia’s DTAs the two tests are used as alternatives in art 14. These DTAs are those 
with the United States, New Zealand, Norway (183 days in 2 years and must be taxed in other 
state), China, Thailand (tests are expressed in the negative), Sri Lanka, Indonesia (time period is 
120 days in any 12 months), India, Czech Republic, South Africa, Argentina and Mexico. The 183 
days is measured (unless specified) for a period or an aggregate of periods exceeding 183 in any 12 
month. This is wider than the fiscal year limitation.
An additional monetary limit test is used in conjunction with the two alternate tests in further 5 
DTAs. These DTAs are those with Philippines (fiscal year and $A10,000 as varied), Malta (183 
days but time period is measured by preceding 12 months, and income must exceed $A 12,500 as 
varied), Papua New Guinea (time period is 90 days in any 12 months, and income must exceed 
$A8,000), Fiji (year of income and gross remuneration must exceed $A8,000 (or as varied) and 
Kirbati (but time period is 90 days in any 12 months, and income must exceed $A8,000 or as 
varied).
107 The term “individual” is used in the Australian DTAs rather than the term “resident” and Singapore 
DTA (art 11(1)) allocates taxing rights based on the country of activity, while the Malaysia DTA 
(art 14) combines its dependent and independent service Articles, resulting in the test for 
independent services being the OECD art 15(2) 183 day test.
108 ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 7, 104.
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(c) In summary
In summary, at common law, independent personal service income is generally sourced 
where the business is conducted as illustrated by the contracts or payments. Similarly 
under DTAs the taxing right is always the country of residence unless the independent 
contractor has established a fixed base in the other country.
4 Observations
Under the common law the weighting in determining the source of employment income 
is different in determining the source of income from independent personal service. The 
place of service often gives weight to the determination of the source of employment 
income, while the place of business often gives weight to the determination of the 
source of income from personal services.
Although DTAs seem to mirror the broad weightings in respect of independent service 
income (taxing where a fixed base exists), the taxing rights in respect of employment 
income are not always allocated to where services are performed. The DTAs allocate 
taxing rights to the country of residence or payment where:
• the income arises from that country’s government;109
• that country’s residents visit the other jurisdiction for short periods;110 and
• the payments are made by a resident company to office holders resident in the 
other country.111
D. Income from business
Having outlined the scope of the statutory source and origin rules and the principles at 
common law in relation to income from personal exertion, the next step is to explore the 
statutory source rules and the principles at common law in relation to income from 
business.
109 Eg, income earned by diplomats, persons engaged in Government service, some pension (usually 
governmental service or social security pensions), and students.
110 Eg, persons working in the second country for less than 183 days and teachers.
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Income from business from all sources is assessed under s 6-5(2) of the 1997 Act for 
residents, while under s 6-5(3) of the 1997 Act non-residents are only assessable where 
it arises from Australian sources. Included in income from business is the gain on the 
disposal of an asset disposed of in the ordinary course of carrying on a business or as 
part of an isolated profit making scheme.113 A gain from the mere realisation of an asset 
is not “ordinary” income.
However, under the comprehensive capital gains regime (CGT),114 that has had 
operation since September 1985, the gains arising from a CGT Event113 (eg the disposal 
of a CGT asset)116 are included in assessable income.117 The CGT provisions will not 
apply to assess a gain if the amount is assessable or is exempt income under another 
taxing provision. Although the CGT provisions have a wide operation outside the 
business context, it is appropriate to examine them in this context as the operation of the 
source rules in respect of disposal of assets are impacted.
Therefore, the structure of Part II D is to first explore the statutory source rules in 
relation to business income before examining the process for determining the source of 
income at common law. Next, the impact of DTAs on these statutory rules and common 
law processes is explored. Finally, the impact of the CGT rules and DTAs is examined.
1 Statutory source rules
There are two specific statutory source rules relating to business income (rules related to 
shipping and insurance income), and two specific income allocation rules (rules where 
business is carried on partly in and partly out of Australia and specific deeming rules
111 Eg, company directors.
112 London Australian Investment v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1977) 138 CLR 106; 7 ATR 
757; 77 ATC 4398.
113 Fairway Estates v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1970) 123 CLR 153; 1 ATR 72; 70 ATC 
4061, Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Whitfords Beach (1980) 150 CLR 355; 12 ATR 692; 
82 ATC 4031 and Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Myer Emporium (1987) 18 ATR 693; 87 
ATC 4363.
114 1997 Act Parts 3-1 to 3-3.
115 1997 Act s 104-5 lists the CGT Events. An example of an Event is CGT Event 1, which requires 
calculation of a gain or loss upon the disposal of a CGT asset.
116 1997 Act ss 108-5.
117 1997 Act ss 102-5 and 6-10.
118 1997 Act s 118-20. It overrides the presumption in s 6-25(2) of the 1997 Act that specific 
provisions prevail over the general.
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where a business is controlled off shore).110 The scope of these rules will be explored by 
first looking at the specific rules before exploring the income allocation rules.120
(a) Shipping
Division 12 of the 1936 Act deals with source rules relating to shipping income derived
• 1 9 1by a ship owner or charterer whose principal place of business is out of Australia. 
Where a ship belonging to or chartered by such a person is used to carry passengers, 
livestock, mails or goods shipped in Australia, five percent of the amount paid or 
payable for that carriage is deemed to have an Australian source, regardless of whether 
that amount is payable in or out of Australia. Thus, the shipping rules have the flavour 
of an “origin” (withholding) rule rather than a “source” rule.
(b) Insurance with Non-Residents
Division 15 of the 1936 Act sets out the statutory source rules for insurance with non­
residents, where the contract is not made with a principal office or branch established by 
the insurer in Australia. Where a person enters into an insurance contract to insure
119 The exempt income rules relating to business income sourced in a specified Norfolk Island (1936 
Act ss 24F and 24g) will not be examined.
120 This examination will not include a review of the former “businesses controlled abroad” source 
rules contained in the former Division 13 of the 1936 Act. The former s 136 was adapted from the 
1922 Act s 28, which in turn was based on 1915 United Kingdom legislation. However, the former 
s 136 was ineffective as it was easy to avoid. Despite recommendations for reform in 1975 
(contained in the Asprey Report, above n 10, 267-9) it took the loss in Federal Commissioner o f  
Taxation v Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd (1980) 143 CLR 646; 11 ATR 42; 80 ATC 
4371 before the Government responded, by repealing it in 1982.
It was replaced by the current Division 13 of Part III of the 1936 Act, which, since 27 May 1981, 
has dealt with the shifting of profits from Australia to other jurisdictions via transfer pricing 
arrangements. Under ss 136AE(1) to (3) the Commissioner can determine the source of a payment 
and, where there is an “international arrangement” (eg a branch operating through a permanent 
establishment) ss 136AE(4) to (6) allow the Commission to allocate income and interests between 
the countries. It is not intended to further discuss these transfer pricing provisions. See generally 
Kerrie Chalmers, ‘International transfer pricing: The Australian approach and lessons for Canada’ 
(1998) 46 Canadian Tax Journal 303 and Borkowski, Susan C, ‘Electronic commerce, 
transnational taxation and transfer pricing: Issues and practices’ (2002) 28(2) International Tax 
Journal 1.
121 1936 Act ss 129 to 135A. As mentioned above n 19, these were originally 1891 New Zealand rules, 
which were incorporated in the Commonwealth law by 1915 Act s 22 and 1922 Act s 27.
122 1936 Act s 129. The Commissioner believes some charter arrangements, outside these measures, 
are in a nature of a royalty and should be taxed accordingly -  see Draft Tax Ruling TR 2002/D 11, 
Income Tax: The Royalty Withholding Tax Implications o f  Chartering and Similar Arrangements.
123 These source rules can be traced to the insertion of s 17A in the Income Tax Assessment Act (No 2) 
1915 (Cth), which assessed non-resident fire insurance premiums. This rule was extended in 1916 
to include marine insurance (Income Tax Assessment Act (No 2) 1916 (Cth), before being repealed
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property situated in Australia against an event occurring only in Australia with a non­
resident insurer, the premium is deemed to be derived by the non-resident insurer from 
sources in Australia and is assessable in Australia.124 Similarly, the premiums will also 
have an Australian source, regardless of where the property is situated or where the 
event may happen if an agent or representative in Australia of the insurer was in any way 
instrumental in inducing the entry into that contract.12'̂ In both cases the non-resident 
insurer is deemed to have a taxable income equal to 10 percent of the total amount of
such premiums. However, if the taxpayer can calculate the actual profit or loss, the profit
126is assessed through the normal operation of the Act.
Where a person, carrying on the business of insurance in Australia, reinsures out of 
Australia the whole or part of any risk with a non-resident, the transaction is ignored 
under the Act,127 unless the resident insurer elects to be taxed as agent for all non­
residents reinsurers.128
These origin provisions do have commonality with withholding tax rules, as a fixed 
percentage is deemed to have an Australian source and the expenses incurred in earning 
that income are denied.
(c) Income allocation where business is carried on partly in and partly out o f Australia
The final statutory source rule applies to income derived where goods are manufactured 
offshore by a non-resident, or goods are purchased off-shore, imported into Australia 
and sold. Subdivision C of Division 2 of Part III of the 1936 Act assigns an Australian
by Income Tax Assessment Act 1918 (Cth). It was reintroduced into the 1922 Act ss 23(1 )(a)(ii) 
and 28B (via Income Tax Assessment Act 1930 (Cth)) and subsequently incorporated into the 1936 
Act ss 141 to 148 (with ss 143(1) and (2) introduced to stop non-residents circumventing the 
operation of the division by dealing directly with clients through a branch in Australia).
124 1936 Acts 142(1).
125 1936 Acts 142(2).
126 1936 Acts 143.
127 The premiums in respect of the reinsurance shall not be an allowable deduction to the resident 
insurer or be included in the assessable income of the non-resident, and the income of the resident 
insurer shall not include sums recovered from that non-resident, in respect of a loss on any risk so 
reinsured - 1936 Act s 148(1).
128 The amount taxed is an amount equal to 10 percent of the sum of the gross amounts of the 
premiums in the year of income in respect of all such reinsurances - 1936 Act ss 148(2) and (3).
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1 ? Qsource to any profit " arising on sale from activities conducted in Australia by the non­
resident, agent or representative, 130 which were instrumental131 in bringing about the 
sale. 132 The goods must be in Australia or brought into Australia for the purpose of such 
sale. If these conditions are satisfied, the income arising is deemed to have an Australian 
source.
Thus, a transaction will be taxable even where the contract, payment and the delivery is 
organised from outside Australia. The wide scope of the Division means that profit 
from a casual sale may be held to have a source in Australia134 and that it may be wide 
enough to encompass sales through websites located on a server in Australia.
Where manufacturing operations are carried on (fully or partially) in Australia by a non­
resident using materials or components imported into Australia, or where the purchase 
of goods is by the making of contracts in one country and their performance in another, 
the determination of the amount of profit from the sale of the goods having a source in
129 The profit in respect of manufacturer goods imported and sold is ascertained under 1936 Act s 38 
by deducting from their sale price: (a) the amount for which, at the date the goods were shipped to 
Australia, goods of the same nature and quality could be purchased by a wholesale buyer in the 
country of manufacture or their purchase price (if not a manufacturer); (b) the expenses incurred in 
transporting them to and selling them in Australia; and (c) if the sale is a taxable supply - an 
amount equal to the net GST payable on the supply.
Asprey Report, above n 10, 273 notes that although s 38 allows reconstruction of the Australian- 
source profit where the manufacturer’s costs have been inflated by prices he has paid to related 
persons, the calculation of the selling profit under 1936 Act s 39 (where goods have been bought by 
the non-resident and then imported into Australia) does not allow of any reconstruction.
Finally, the High Court in American Thread Co v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1946) 73 
CLR 643; 3 AITR 484; 8 ATD 228 notes that if there is no profit the subdivision has no operation 
and the income is subject to the ordinary operation of the 1936 Act.
130 Under 1936 Acts 41.
131 Section 41 was introduced in 1936 Act as a consequence of the 1934 Royal Commission 
recommendations. It codifies Commonwealth practice, drawn from English Court decisions, during 
World War One. The practice depended upon two of the three following factors occurring in 
Australia: place of contract, place of delivery or place of payment. This test was easily avoided see 
Commonwealth of Australia Income Tax: Explanatory Handbook Showing the Differences 
Between the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922-1934 
(1936), 60-1.
132 Sections 38-40 were introduced in the 1936 Act to ensure consistency with the income tax laws in 
the States and to codify the common law principles operative under the 1922 Act - Explanatory 
Handbook, ib id , 60.
133 ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 7, 88.
134 Asprey Report, above n 10, 273.
135 ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 7, 88 and Niv Tadmore, ‘Aspects of electronic commerce 
taxation in Australia’ (2003) 57 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 422, 425-6. 
However, the ATO’s second Internet Report notes (ibid, 89) that digit products may not be “goods” 
and their transfer may not be “sales”. Also see Duncan Bentley, ‘The ATO, Tax and the Internet: 
The Emperor’s New Clothes?’ (1999) 9 Revenue Law Journal 98, 131-2.
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1 7A • • 177Australia will be made either under regulation ~ or by the Commissioner. ' Thus, s 42 
of the 1936 Act is a profit allocation rule for a transaction not expressly caught in the 
preceding sections.138
139Any profits deemed to be derived in Australia by Division 12 are assessable income. 
However, no amount taken into account in ascertaining any such profit, and no 
expenditure incurred directly or indirectly, or in relation to any such sale, shall be an 
allowable deduction.140
2 The common law factors which determine source
From the above it is clear that the statutory source rules apply in only limited 
circumstances (ie in respect shipping, insurance and income derived from activities 
conducted partially in Australia). In order to determine the source of business income 
outside these statutory criteria, the common law processes for determining source must 
be explored.
There are a number of factors that will determine source of business income at common 
law and which factors determine source in any circumstance will depend on which of 
the factors are dominant141 (ie determines the location of the “essence” of the business 
that derives the income).142 These factors include the:
136 As no regulations have been proclaimed the Commissioner has to allocate income, presumably in 
accordance with the process set out in the common law - see and Michael Littlewood, The 
uncertain geographical scope of Hong Kong profits tax and the possibility of reform’ (1999) 19 Tax 
Notes International 1441, 1454.
137 1936 Act s 42. Section 42 was an adoption of the former s 16C in the 1922 Act. Asprey Report, 
above n 10, 274 notes that under s 42 the Commissioner must accept the profit: his function is only 
to determine how much of the profit has an Australian source.
138 Section 42 was an adoption of the former s 16C in the 1922 Act. Magney, Tom, ‘Source of 
Income’ (Paper presented at the 10th Taxation Institute o f Australia’s New South Wales State 
Convention, Sydney, 26-28 May 1978) 1, 15 notes that s 42 gives statutory effect the 
apportionment and dissention processed used by the courts in Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) v 
Kirk [1900] AC 588; R & MG 139, Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) v Meeks (1915) 19 CLR 
568; R & MG 159, Mount Morgan Gold Mining Company Limited v Commissioner o f Income 
Taxation (Qld) (1923) 33 CLR 76; R & MG 288, Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v W. Angliss 
& Co Pty Ltd (1932) 46 CLR 417; 1 ATD 542 and Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) v Hillsdon 
Watts Limited (1937) 57 CLR 36; 1 AITR 42; 4 ATD 199. Also see WP Martin and Co Ltd v 
Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) (1917) R & MG 160 and Commissioner o f Taxation (NZ) v The 
Kauri Timber Company (1904) NZIR 18; R & MG 365.
139 1936 Act s 43(1). Section 43 was inserted as a drafting provision to bring profits within the term 
“assessable income” - Explanatory Handbook, above n 131, 62.
140 1936 Acts 43(2).
141 Spotless Services Ltd v FCT (1993) 25 ATR 344, 359; 93 ATC 4397, 4409-4410 (Lockhart J) 
relying on Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Efstathakis (1979) 9 ATR 867, 870:79 ATC 4256,
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• location of economic activity;
• importance of contracts; and
• location of real property.
The following examination of the process for determining the source of business income 
will be conducted in the context of the three criteria (above).
(a) Location of economic activity
Where there are a series of operations leading to sale and income arises from each stage, 
then the essence of the business is not the final sale contract. 143 The place at where that 
business is conducted can be the source of all or some of the income. 144 This applies 
equally to sale of goods, 143 provision of services, 146 or where an operation consists of 
manufacturing or mining. 147
However, the income can only have a source at a particular stage of an operation if there 
is value added at that stage. If there is no value added at earlier stages then the place 
of sale may be the determinative factor. 149 The following factors have been seen as 
important in determining the place where business activities are conducted:
4259 (Bowen CJ), who noted that “. . . the answer is not to be found in the cases, but in the 
weighing of the relative importance of the various factors which the cases have shown to be 
relevant.”
142 Commissioner o f Taxation v Meeks (1915) 19 CLR 568, 587 R & McG 158, 159 (Isaacs J); also 
Lovell & Christmas Limited v Commissioner o f Taxes [1908] AC 46, and Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation v W Angliss & Co Pty Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 417; 1 ATD 542 and ATO’s second Internet 
Report, above n 7, 79.
143 Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) v Kirk [1900] AC 588; R & McG 139.
144 Commissioner o f Taxation v Meeks (1915) 19 CLR 568, 586; R & McG 158, 159 (Issacs J). 
Rydge, above n 43, 84 notes that “. . . ‘sources’ must be interpreted to mean the business, capital or 
service from which the income arises.”
145 Eg, wool and skins purchased in Australia sold overseas (Michell v Commissioner o f Taxation 
(1927) 46 CLR 413; R & McG 128) and goods manufactured in Australia and sold in New Zealand 
{Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Lewis Berger and Sons (Australia) Limited (1927) 39 CLR 
468; R&  McG 96).
146 Eg, where salvage was essence of business - Commissioner o f Inland Revenue v The Hong Kong & 
Whampoa Dock Co Ltd HKTC 85.
147 Eg, Morgan Dickson v Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) (1925) 36 CLR 489.
148 Eg,Commissioner o f Taxation (WA) v D & W Murray Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 332; R & McG 479. The 
source of income for a United Kingdom company, which purchased goods for sale in Australia, was 
the place of sale (Australia) as no value was added in place of purchase.
149 Eg,Commissioner o f Taxation (WA) v D & W Murray Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 332; R & McG 479 and 
Commissioner o f Inland Revenue (HK) v HK-TVB International Ltd [1992] STC 723; BTC 524. 
Also in Australian Machinery and Investment Co v Deputy Federal Commissioner o f Taxation 
(1946) 180 CLR 9; 8 ATD 81; 3 AITR 359 the High Court found that a large profit on shares and
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• who controls the entity;
• the location of sales staff;
• the place of negotiation of sales; 150
• the location of technical information/ research and development; and
• the nature of the negotiation process. 151
The place where the income is received has also been held to be of considerable 
significance. 152
(b) Place o f contract
Where the whole of the operation is not the essence of the business, the place of 
contract153may become a significant factor. 154 If the contract forms the “essence of the 
business” there is no need to look farther than the place where the contract is made. 155
options sold for cash in England were found not to have an Australian source as there was no 
Australian element in the production of this apparent profit. The fact that that a foreign company 
owns shares in Australian companies is not sufficient to make it proper to declare that any of the 
profit arose from an Australian source. Similarly, the disposal a Victorian company’s options 
bought and then sold (in England) were not assessable in Australia as the transaction had an 
English source.
150 Cf Australian Machinery and Investment Co v Deputy Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1946) 
180 CLR 9; 8 ATD 81; 3 AITR 359 where the High Court took a different approach was taken in 
respect of shares sold in subsidiary mining companies to seven English companies in exchange for 
approximately £ 2.8 million paid in cash, shares and options. Although the reason of the various 
judges is mixed, the majority held that the shares had both an Australian and English source. 
Latham CJ noted (at 16; 89; 372) that he felt “. . . no doubt that if a person, trading in shares which 
are locally situated in one country, makes a profit by selling them in another country, the source of 
his profit is in part the wares and in part the contracts of sale, and the locality of the source is in 
part the locus of the wares and in part the locus of the contracts: cf. Maclaine & Co v Eccott 
(Inspector of Taxes), [1926] AC 424 at p 431-2; Commissioner o f  Taxation (NSW) v Hillsdon 
Watts Ltd (1937) 57 CLR 36.”
151 Cliffs International Incorporated v Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation (1985) 16 ATR 601, 620; 
85 ATC 4374, 4390. Kenndy J concluded that the place of contract was not relevant since “the 
negotiations were concluded overseas the execution of the contracts in Australia was it seems to 
me, on the evidence, to have been very much a formality”.
152 Tariff Reinsurances Ltd v Commissioner o f  Taxation (Vic) (1938) 59 CLR 194, 217; 1 AITR 280, 
292; 4 ATD 498, 510 (Dixon J). Also see generally Magney (1978), above n 138, 17-18 and 
Littlewood, above n 136, 1447-52.
153 This includes where any relevant contracts are negotiated or concluded; where they are performed; 
the governing law of such contracts; the currency in which the transaction is carried out; and the 
place where payment is made etc -  see ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 7, 79.
154 Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v W. Angliss & Co Pty Ltd (1932) 46 CLR 417; 1 ATD 542. 
Also see Premier Automatic Ticket Issuers Ltd v Commissioner o f  Taxation (NSW) (1933) 50 CLR 
268; 2 ATD 378 and Tariff Reinsurances Ltd v Commissioner o f Taxation (Vic) (1938) 59 CLR 
194; 1 AITR 280; 4 ATD 498 (profits as arose out of where contract accepted). However, in other 
cases the place where a contract made is of no particular significance (see Commissioner o f 
Taxation (NSW) v Meeks (1915) 19 CLR 568 and Cliffs International Inc v Federal Commissioner 
o f Taxation (1985) 16 ATR 601; 85 ATC 4374).
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Where a contract (formed by a separate offer and a separate acceptance) is concluded is 
determined by the common law. Generally, the contract is formed at the place where the 
acceptance is communicated directly to the offeror. 156 For items posted, the courts have 
held that the acceptance is on postage, 157 provided it can be “inferred that the offeror 
contemplated and intended that his offer might be accepted by the doing of that Act” (ie 
posting). To assist in determining where a simple offer and acceptance is 
communicated via electronic media the Commonwealth and each state have enacted 
legislation. 159
(c) Location o f real property
Finally, the location of real property can be a factor in determining the source of 
income. 160 The location of real property subject to an option, may determine the source 
of income arising from the disposal of the option. 161
155 Lovell & Christmas Limited v the Commissioner o f Taxes [1908] AC 46. Cf, Spotless Services v 
Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation (1993) 25 ATR 344, 359-60; 93 ATC 4397, 4410. Lockhart J 
noted that “[i]n my opinion where the source of interest payable under a contract of loan lies at the 
heart of the judicial inquiry the place or places where the contract was made and the money lent are 
of considerable importance; but it goes too far to say that the source of the interest in the present 
case is necessarily determined solely by reference to the place where the contract of loan was made 
and the money in fact lent.” See generally Magney (1978), above n 138, 2-9 and Wallace Cameron, 
‘Hong Kong corporation profits tax and source of income’ (1976) 5 Australian Tax Review 113.
156 Entores Limited v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 and Hampstead Meats Pty Ltd v 
Emerson & Yates Pty Ltd [1967] SASR 109. This is seen as artificial in a modem world - see NC 
Seddon and MP Ellinghaus Cheshire & Fifoot’s Law o f Contract (7th Australian ed, 1997), 80.
157 Adams v Linds ell i 1818) 106 ER 250.
158 Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1956) 98 CLR 93, 111 
(Dixon CJ and Fulllagar J).
159 Eg Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) s 14(5). The legislation confirms that contracts formed 
electronically are valid and in absence to agreement between the parties, deems the time and the 
place where an electronic offer and acceptance are made -  see Bill Cannon, ‘A practical look at e- 
commerce and source rules’ (Paper presented at the 4th World Tax Conference, Sydney, 27 
February 2004), 10. Also a Convention of Electronic Contracting is being developed by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group on Electronic 
Commerce - see Bjom Westberg, Cross-boarder Taxation o f E-Commerce (2002), 206-8.
160 Eg, Liquidator, Rhodesia Metals Limited (in liquidation) v Commissioner o f Taxes [1940] AC 774 
where the profits on the sale of land in Rhodesia were held to be sourced in Rhodesia despite 
contracts for purchase and sale being completed in London. However, Asprey Report, above n 10, 
17.A6 notes there is no definitive decision on the source of a profit from the sale of Australian real 
property.
161 In Thorp Nominees v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1988) 19 ATR 1834, 1843; 88 ATC 
4886, 4894 the profit on the sale of an option to buy land (received at an under valued price) was 
found to have an Australian source despite the written agreements being signed in Switzerland. 
Lockhart J in the full Federal Court decision noted: “[v]iewed as a matter of substance rather than 
form it is plain, in my opinion, that the source of the income in question is Australia not 
Switzerland. The activities in Switzerland were obviously part of a pre-arranged plan . . .  It would 
give undue weight to matters of form to regard Switzerland as the source of the income in 
question.”
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(d) Summary
The source of business income at common law and which factors determine source in 
any circumstance will depend on which of the factors are dominant (ie those which 
indicate the true source of the income, be it the location of the business or assets, or the 
place of contract).
3 Impact o f treaties on business income source
The OECD Model Convention contains a number of Articles that allocate the taxing 
rights in respect of business income, including the income from real property, business 
profits, ships and aircraft, the associated enterprises, alienation of property income, and 
other income Articles. The impact of the shipping Article will be explored first before 
exploring the scope of the Business Profits Article (Article 7) under both the OECD 
Model Convention and under Australia’s DTAs.
(a) Impact o f treaties on shipping rules
The rules governing shipping and airline payments are found at Article 8 of the OECD 
Model Convention. Article 8(1) allocates the taxing rights in respect of profits arising162 
from the operation of ships and aircraft to the state in which the “effective management” 
of the enterprise is located.163 Most Australia’s DTAs differ from the OECD Model 
Convention as Australia reserves the right to tax profits (under Division 12 of 1936 Act) 
from internal traffic and from coastal and continental shelf activities.164 There are also,
162 Under art 8(4) profits include profits arising from participation in a pool service or other profit 
sharing arrangements. Some Australian DTAs (eg Argentina art 8(4)) include in profits “interest 
earned on funds held in one of the Contracting States by a resident of the other Contracting State in 
connection with the operation of ships or aircraft . . . and any other income incidental to such 
operation.” Other DTAs (eg United Kingdom and United States) include in profits, bareboat rental 
and profits from use, maintenance and rental of shipping containers, provided both activities are 
incidental to shipping or aircraft operation.
163 If effective management is on the vessel, art 8(3) then the place of home harbour has the taxing 
right, or if no home harbour, the country in which the operator is resident.
164 See Australia’s reservation and observation on the OECD Commentary in paras 8(d) and 9 -  2003 
OECD Commentary on Article 8, paras 38 and 30.1 respectively. This approach is adopted in art 8 
of most of Australia’s DTAs (including United States, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore art 7(5), 
Japan art 6(4), German, Netherlands, Italy, China, Argentina and Mexico). Some DTAs specify a 
five percent limitation on art 8(5) (including Belgium, German, French and Netherlands). Article 
8(5)(b) of the United Kingdom DTA also allocates profits from the use of ship or aircraft for
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terminology differences, with Australian DTAs preferring not to use the place of 
“effective management”16'̂ to assign taxing rights under Article 8(3), but to use either 
the country of residence166 of the operator or the country in which the operator has an 
“enterprise of a state”.167
(b) Business Profits -  Article 7 of the OECD Model Convention
Article 7(1) of the OECD Model Convention allocates the taxing rights to the country of 
residency unless the non-resident enterprise carries on business in the country of source 
through a permanent establishment. If the enterprise carries on such a business the 
country of source can tax the profits to the extent they are attributable to the permanent 
establishment.168 Where income is dealt with in a specific Article of the Convention 
(such as shipping income), it falls outside the scope of Article 7.
In order for Article 7 to apply to tax business profits in the country of source the 
threshold elements are that there must be a “permanent establishment” and there must 
be an “enterprise”. The term enterprise is defined in Article 3(1 )(c) to be “the carrying 
on of any business.” The meaning of the words "permanent establishment" is found at 
Article 5 of the OECD Convention. It encompasses two types of permanent 
establishments, a fixed place of business permanent establishment and an agency 
permanent establishment.169
haulage, survey, dredging or in relation to exploration or extraction of natural resources to the state 
in which the activities are undertaken.
165 Effective management is used only in a small number of DTAs (including Romania).
166 Includes DTAs with the United States, Canada, German, French Belgium, Italy and China.
167 Includes DTAs with United Kingdom, South Africa, Russia and Mexico.
168 Article 7(1) provides: “The profits of an enterprise of one of the Contracting States shall be taxable 
only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a 
permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the 
profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State, but only so much of the profit that is 
attributable to that permanent establishment.”
169 The test, developed in the 1920’s, was meant to impose a high threshold of presence in the source 
country - Dale Pinto, E-Commerce and Source-Based Income Taxation (2003) 79. See generally 
Klaus Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (3rd ed, 1997), 271-356, Pinto, ibid, 
69-84 and Frances M Homer and Jeffrey Owens, ‘Tax and the web: New technology, old 
problems’ (1996) 50 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 516, 517-18.
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Thus, a permanent establishment is a fixed place of business170 through which an 
enterprise is partially or wholly carried on,171 including: a place of management, a 
branch, an office, a factory, a workshop and a mine, oil or gas well, a quarry or other 
place of extraction of natural minerals.172 It includes a construction site being used for 
more than 12 months.173 However it does not include preliminary or auxiliary activities 
(such as a storage facility, the holding of stock for storage, display, delivery, purchase, 
or on behalf of another enterprise, or collection of information).174
A permanent establishment also includes an agent who has the power to conclude 
contracts on behalf of the enterprise.17̂  However, it does not include a broker or general 
commission agent of an independent nature.176
The 2003 OECD Model Tax Convention Commentary notes that a web site and the 
hosting arrangement will not give rise to a permanent establishment and generally the
1 n n
Internet service provider will not create an agency permanent establishment. 
However, the place a server is located can be a permanent establishment.
170 It is seen by some as “an artificial proxy for residency” - Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Jurisdiction to tax and the 
case for threshold reform' (Paper presented at the 16th Australasian Tax Teachers Association 
Conference, Adelaide, 30 January 2004) 6. “Fixed” implies geographical attachment (a spatial 
location) and temporal duration (ie a degree of permanency) -  Pinto, ibid, 73. It is argued that a 
fixed place of business will not be found if the non-resident merely uses a client’s premise -  see 
Boidman, above n 103 and Edwin van der Brüggen, ‘PE implications when furnishing consulting 
services under OECD and UN Model treaties’ (2001) 22 Tax Notes International 2623.
171 OECD Model Convention art 5(1) -  see 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5(1), paras 2 to 11.
172 OECD Model Convention art 5(2) -  see 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5(2), paras 12 to 15
173 OECD Model Convention art 5(3) -  see 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5(3), paras 15 to 20.
The 12 month period for construction projects is at odds with the general thrust of Article 5 as 
express time limits are not used (eg a PE merely must not be temporary) -  see Richard Vann, ‘Tax 
Treaties in the 1990s’ (Paper presented at the Taxation Institute of Australia’s 3rd National Tax 
Retreat, Coolum, 24-26 August 1995), 21-22.
174 OECD Model Convention art 5(4) -  see 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5(4), paras 21 to 30.
175 OECD Model Convention art 5(5) -  see 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5(5), paras 31 to 35.
The permanence under agency permanent establishment is established through the authority being 
habitually exercised -  Pinto (2003), above n 169, 74.
176 OECD Model Convention art 5(6) -  see 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5(6), paras 36 to 39.
177 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5, paras 42.1, 42.2 and 42.10. For background on the e- 
commerce aspects of the OECD Commentary see Tadmore (2003), above n 135 and OECD, Are 
the Current Treaty Rules for Taxing Business Profits Appropriate for E-Commerce?: Public 
Discussion Draft (26 November 2003). Also see Wright Schickli, ‘Characterization of e-commerce 
revenue -  The final OECD Report revealed’ (2001) 22 Tax Notes International 1671 and Richard 
A Westin, International Taxation o f Electronic Commerce (2000), 549-65.
178 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5, paras 42.3-42.9. For case study illustrating the issues see 
Pinto, above n 169, 88-126. Rather than “stretching” the definition by interpretation in the 
Commentary changes to the actual OECD Model Convention was preferred by some -  see, eg, Niv 
Tadmore, ‘Clicks vs bricks: The Interaction between the OECD PE concept and Websites’ (2001) 
22 Tax Notes International 1821, 1831 and Bill Cannon, ‘E-commerce and source of income’
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. . . 170Further, mere control of an entity will not deem a permanent establishment. Although 
each permanent establishment is treated separately, an arms-length standard is applied to 
the allocation of income to a permanent establishment via the Associated Enterprise 
Article (Article 9).
Being a key rule of attachment under DTAs there is much written on what constitutes a 
permanent establishment, and how income under Article 7 should be allocated to a
1o 1 i 0 7permanent establishment, particularly now due to the growth of e-commerce.
(c) Differences between Australian Article 7 and the OECD Model
The Business Profits Article 7 in most Australian DTAs, although similar to Article 7 of 
the OECD Model Convention, varies from the OECD Model in respect of profits from 
insurance and reinsurance and contains a special provision that deems non-resident
(Presentation at the Taxation Institute of Australia’s 2nd National Tax Symposium, Werribee Park, 
22 November 2002).
179 OECD Model Convention art 5(7) -  see 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5(7), paras 40 to 42 
Jerome B Libin and Timothy H Gillis, ‘It’s a small world after all: The intersection of the tax 
jurisdiction at international, national, and subnational levels’ (2003) 38 Georgia Law Review 197, 
224-34.
180 Sadiq, above n 170. A focus of OECD work has been whether electronic presence through a server 
is sufficient to establish a permanent establishment -  see eg OECD, ‘Application of tax treaty 
concepts to electronic commerce’ in OECD, Taxation and Electronic Commerce: Implementing the 
Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions (2001), 79.
181 The OECD has continued to review the process of income allocation under Article 7. This started 
in the early 1990’s — see OECD, Attribution o f Income to Permanent Establishments (1993) and IJJ 
Burgers, ‘The OECD report “Attribution of income to permanent establishments”: A commentary’ 
(1995) 49 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 137. The issue has been revised over 
the last five years - see OECD, Attribution o f Profits to a Permanent Establishment: Revised 
Discussion Draft for Public Comment -  Part l (General Considerations) (August 2004).
Also see Brian J Arnold, ‘Threshold requirements for taxing business profits under tax treaties’ 
(2003) 57 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 476, Raffaele Russo, ‘Tax treatment of 
“dealings” between different parts of the same enterprise under Article 7 of the OECD Model: 
Almost a century of uncertainty’ (2004) 58 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 472, 
and Gary Sprague and Rachel Hersey, ‘Attribution of profits to permanent establishments’ (2002) 
25 Tax Notes International 629.
182 Eg, see OECD, Draft: The Impact o f the Communications Revolution on the Application o f ‘Place 
o f Effective Management’ as a Tie Breaker Rule (30 June 2001), and OECD 26 November 2003 
Public discussion draft, above n 177.
183 The taxing rights for profits from insurance and reinsurance payments are allocated under the 
‘business profits’ article (Article 7) of the OECD Model Convention. Article 7 allocates taxing 
rights in respect of profits of an enterprise to the country of residence. Australia reserves the right 
to apply domestic law to tax profits or gains derived from any form of insurance - 2003 OECD 
Commentary on Article 7, para 41. This reservation is reflected in all Australian DTAs (eg 
Argentina art 7(7)) and preserves the application of Division 15 of Part III of the 1936 Act - see
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beneficiaries of a trust, which carries on business in Australia through a permanent 
establishment, to have a permanent establishment in respect of the share of net 
income.184 This latter clause was inserted to overcome an argument that under Article 
7(1) non-resident beneficiaries of a trust deriving business profits through a trust could 
escape liability in Australia as the beneficiary did not have a permanent 
establishment. However, the article does override the statutory “income allocation 
rules” (where business is carried on partly in and partly out of Australia) for DTA 
countries.186
In respect of some developing nations, source taxation under Article 7(1) is extended to 
related sales and other business activities187 and there are also terminology 
differences.188
Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax (International Agreements) Amendment Bill 1995 (Cth), 
26.
184 Many DTAs give Australia the right to tax certain receipts that are not taxable under the 1997 Act.
For example, the 1997 Act does not tax exempt income, although such income could fall within the
business profits article. Thus, the existence of a right to tax does not result in the amount being 
taxed - see Commissioner o f Taxation v Latnesa Holdings BV (1997) 36 ATR 589, 592; 97 ATC 
4752, 4755.
185 International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth) s 3(11) was inserted in 1984 to deem the
beneficiaries to have a permanent establishment and all post 1994 DTAs included a specific 
subarticle to serve a similar purpose -  see Chapter 4 , n 359. The deeming provision appears in arts 
5(7) (Singapore), 7(7) (New Zealand), 7(8) (Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Sri Lanka, 
Fiji, Kiribati, Poland, Indonesia, Vietnam, Spain, Czech, Taipei, South Africa, Slovak, Argentine, 
Romanian, 2002 Canada), 7(9) (Austria, China, Hungary, India, 2002 United States), and via note 
in most recent DTAs (2003 United Kingdom, Mexico, and Russia).
186 1936 Act Part III, Subdivision C of Division 2.
187 Eg art 7(l)(b) of DTAs with Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Kiribati, 
India, Indonesia art 7(1 )(b) and (c), Argentina and Mexico.
188 In art 7(2) of most Australian DTAs the words “. . . or with other enterprise with which it deals” are 
included at the end of the paragraph to ensure that the “arms-length dealings” test applies between 
permanent establishments and in art 7(3), in relation to expenses the additional words “of the 
enterprise” are inserted (for clarity) as are the words “. . . and which would be deductible if the 
permanent establishment were an independent entity which paid those expenses” (to restrict 
deductions to those allowed under Australian law).
The meaning of the word "enterprise" in the business profits article was considered in Thiel v 
Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1990) 21 ATR 531, 544; 90 ATC 4717, 4729 Me Hugh J that 
noted that: “profits derived from an isolated activity may constitute the profits of “an enterprise” 
within the meaning of Art 7. . . .  To come within Art 7, however, it is not enough that the carrying 
on of an enterprise has produced “profits” . . .  the profits of the enterprise must be profits from an 
adventure in the nature of trade: cf Minister o f National Revenue v Tara Exploration and 
Development Co Ltd (1972) 28 DLR (3d) 135.” The effect of Thiel is that where a non-resident 
does not have a permanent establishment, then capital gains made in respect of assets held in 
Australia will not be taxable under the business profits article.
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1 OQ
The definition of “permanent establishment” in Article 5 of Australian DTAs varies 
from the OECD Model Convention190 in that Australia reserves the right to deem a 
permanent establishment if:
• designated supervisory activity is conducted for more than 12 months;191 and
. 1  Q9• “substantial equipment” is being used in association with a project.
A number of variations also exist such as the inclusion of additional attachment rules 
that deem a permanent establishment where there is “an installation, a drilling rig or 
ship used for exploitation of natural resources”.
(d) Summary
From the above examination it is evident that where a DTA exists, the domestic law is 
overridden (by allocation of taxing rights) with the deemed source of business income 
being generally with the country in which the non-resident resides. The major exceptions 
are where the enterprise is carried on through a permanent establishment, or it is
189 The meaning of the words “branch”, “agency”, “management”, “fixed place of business” and 
“factory” see Case 110 5 CTBR(NS) 656, 667-70; Case F 85 (1955) 6 TBRD 483, 494-496. Also 
see AAT Case 8775 (1993) 26 ATR 1056; Case 23/93 93 ATC 288 where a share broker used by a 
non-resident for trading was a permanent establishment in terms of art 4(5) of New Zealand DTA.
190 A permanent establishment is more widely defined under s 6(1) of the 1936 Act (eg the permanent 
establishment need not be fixed). The definition operates for the purposes of the 1936 Act in 
respect of s 23 AH (foreign branch profits exemption), s 6C (source of royalty income), Div 11A of 
Part III (withholding tax), Div 13 of Part III (transfer pricing) and s 432 (re CFC active income 
test).
For the Commissioner’s view of the phrase “a place at or through which the person carries on any 
business” in s 6(1) see Taxation Ruling TR 2002/5, Income Tax: Permanent Establishment -  What 
is ‘a place at or through which [a] person carries on any business ’ in the Definition o f Permanent 
Establishment in Subsection 6(1) o f the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936?
191 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5, para 46. However in many DTAs the period is 6 months (eg 
art 5(4)(a) of DTAs with Canada and Argentina). Consultancy and management services will also 
constitute a permanent establishment in some DTAs if connected with a project for more than 183 
days in any 12 months (eg DTAs with Argentina art 5(4)(b)). The Commissioner has ruled that a 
non-resident head contractor of a building project, despite not undertaking any direct work, has a 
permanent establishment as the supervisory role, as illustrated by legal obligation and risk of the 
project, lay with the company -  see ATO Interpretative Decision ATO ID 2002/850, Permanent 
Establishment.
192 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5, para 46. A permanent establishment will exist if 
‘substantial equipment” is being used by or under a contract (eg art 5(4)(c) in DTAs with New 
Zealand and Argentina).
193 Eg, DTAs with China, Spain, and Indonesia. Also under art 5(3)(ii) DTA with India a permanent 
establishment is deemed to exist on the provision of services through an employee to an associated 
entity. For a fuller explanation of the differences see Tan How Teck, ‘Some aspects of a permanent 
establishment in Australia’ (1998) 1 Journal o f Australian Taxation 151 and Sadiq, above n 170, 
14-21.
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shipping or insurance income. In these circumstances Australia preserves its source 
taxing rights under its DTAs.
4 Capital receipts
The final category of source principles to be reviewed is the process that determines the 
source of income from disposals of capital assets.
(a) Domestic law
The CGT rules do not contain specific source rules. However, by prescribing the assets 
(ie, those assets that that have "necessary connection with Australia"), owned by non­
residents for which Australia retains taxing rights, these “sufficient connection” rules act 
as a source rule.194 The assets included in the list are land (interests in land), a building, 
structure or stratum unit, assets used in carrying on a business through a permanent 
establishment, a share in a resident private company, an interest in a resident trust, a ten 
percent by value share or unit in a public company/resident trust owned (directly or 
indirectly) at any time during the last five years before the CGT event happens, and an 
option to acquire the above assets.195
194 1997 Act Div 136, in particular s 136-25. Australia also reserves the right to tax persons on capital 
gains either when they become non-resident or upon later disposal of assets “necessary connection 
with Australia” (see 1997 Act ss 104-160(3), 104-165(2)) and 104-165(3)). The Treasurer 
announced (Treasurer, ‘Review of International Tax Arrangements’ (Press Release No 32, 13 May 
2003), Attachment F) that the Government would not proceed with the Review of Business 
Taxation recommendation (Review of Business Taxation, Commonwealth, A Tax System 
Redesigned (1999), Recommendations 22.20) that if departing residents defer CGT until actual 
disposal of the assets, they should provide a security against payment of the future gains tax 
liability. The Government accepted that to proceed with this measure would involve considerable 
compliance, complexity and enforcement burdens for little revenue gain, and would be inconsistent 
with the thrust of the facilitative expatriate measures and inconsistent with the direction the 
Government is moving in tax treaty negotiations. It is noted that under the recent protocol to the 
United States DTA (arts 13(5) and (6)) deferred capital gains tax liabilities will not arise for 
Australian residents who become residents of the United States, thus removing the need for a 
security -  see Michael Rigby, ‘The Protocol to the Australia-United States tax treaty: Part 2’ 
(2003) Australian Tax Review 206, 212-15.
195 It is argued that the ‘sufficient connection” is a de facto territorial source rule that limits the range 
of taxable gains in respect of Australian sourced assets -  Hamilton, above n 3, para 2.670.
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(b) Impact o f  DTAs
Article 13 of the OECD Model Convention provides that gains arising from the 
alienation of immovable property (as defined in Article 6) will be taxed by the laws of 
the country in which it is situated196 as will gains on shares, where 50 percent of their 
value is in immovable property in that country.197 Gains from the alienation of moveable 
property that is a business asset of a permanent establishment (and the alienation of the 
permanent establishment), will be taxed in the country where the permanent 
establishment is situated. However, gains arising from alienation of ships and aircraft 
used for international traffic will be taxed in the country where the effective 
management of the operator is situated.199 All other gains are taxable in the country of 
residence.200
All Australian DTAs entered into since 1985 differ from the OECD Model in that they 
recognise primacy of source country taxation in respect of gains arising from the 
disposal of assets. Thus, Article 13 in Australian DTAs ensures that the domestic 
capital gains laws of each country will have precedence where the income is not 
expressly dealt with under the DTA. The purpose of the clause is to ensure that 
Australia's right to tax capital gains (not the subject of Article 13) is not indirectly 
overridden by the operation of the Business Profits or Other Income Articles making 
such gains tax free. Also, the DTAs preserve Australia’s right to tax assets connected 
with Australia owned by former residents.203 There are also terminology differences.204
196 OECD Model Convention, art 13(1).
197 Ibid, art 13(4).
198 Ibid, art 13(2). This is consistent with the rules taxing business profits contained in Article 7.
199 Ibid, art 13(3). This is consistent with the rules taxing profits from operating ships and aircraft in 
art 8.
200 Ibid, art 13(5).
201 Eg see art 13(5) (unless otherwise specified) in DTAs with United Kingdom art 13(6), United 
States art 13(7), Canada, New Zealand, South African art 13(4), Romania, Russia and Mexico. 
Also, Australia specifically reserves the right to tax gains from a wider range of property then 
specified in the first three paragraphs of Article 13 of the OECD Model -  see 2003 OECD 
Commentary on Article 13, para 33. Similarly, The Government in 2000 introduced s 3A of the 
International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth) to ensure indirect disposals of property after 27 April 
1998 will not escape the operation of Article 13 in older DTAs.
202 It has argued since 1990 following the decisions in Theil v Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation 
(1990) 171 CLR 338; 21 ATR 531; 90 ATC 4717 (see Tim Flahvin, ‘Non-residents, capital gains 
tax and double tax agreements’ (1991) 3(1) The CCH Journal o f Australian Taxation, 48) and with 
more vigour with the 1997 decision in FCT v Lamesa Holdings BV (1997) 36 ATR 589; 97 ATC 
4752 that many older DTAs appear to be limited to “direct” interests in the real property, allowing 
capital gains made through indirect holding to escape Australian taxation.
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(c) Summary
Where a CGT asset connected with Australia is disposed of by a non-resident, Australia 
seeks to tax that gain. This is reflected in Article 13 of Australia’s DTAs which ensures 
that Australia's right to tax capital gains is not indirectly overridden by the operation of 
the Business Profits or Other Income Articles making such gains tax free.
5 Observations
From the exhaustive study above, all that can be deduced is that at common law the 
factors, which determine the source of business income in any circumstance, will 
depend on which of the factors are dominant, ie those which indicate the true source of 
the income (eg location of business or assets or the place of contract). These rules are 
modified by two statutory source rules which deem an Australian source for shipping 
and insurance income and the CGT rules which reserve a taxing right in respect of assets 
connected with Australia. There are also two specific income allocation rules which
The Full High Court in Theil held that where a non-resident does not have a permanent 
establishment, then capital gains made in respect of assets held in Australia would not be taxable 
under the “business profits” DTA article. Similarly, the Full Federal Court in Lamesa Holdings 
held that under the Netherlands-Australia DTA the capital gains tax rules apply to “direct” interests 
in the real property only, allowing capital gains made through indirect holding to escape Australian 
taxation.
Thus, for pre-CGT DTAs it is argued that the taxing rights over a non-resident's capital gains are 
allocated exclusively to the country of residence thereby eliminating liability to Australian tax ( see 
See John Abrahamson, ‘Going Dutch’ (1998) 32 Taxation in Australia 432, Robert Deutsch and 
Nolan Sharkey, ‘Australia’s capital gains tax and double taxation agreements’ (2002) 56 Bulletin 
for International Fiscal Documentation 228, Ian Gzell, ‘Treaty-shopping’ (1998) 27 Australian 
Tax Review 65, Ian Gzell, ‘Treaty protection from capital gains tax’ (2000) 29 Australian Tax 
Review 25, Hamilton, above n 3, paras 6.682-6.688, Dianna Lane, ‘Australia’s double tax 
agreements: Gains from the sale of shares by non-residents’ (1999) 2 Journal o f Australian 
Taxation 3).
Further, the s 3A amendments to the International Tax Agreements Act (ibid) may be ineffective as 
the legislative changes are inconsistent with wording of many older DTAs, many of which do not 
deal with capital gains. Further, the changes may not be enforceable, as not all treaty partners have 
agreed with this unilateral alteration to terms of their existing DTAs (see para 180 of the Taxation 
Ruling TR 2001/12, Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax: Capital Gains in Pre-CGT Tax Treaties 
in which the Commissioner acknowledges “Norway's preliminary position is that taxes on capital 
gains are not covered by its treaty with Australia”). The Commissioner’s view on the effectiveness 
of these amendments (in TR 2001/12) is not widely accepted (see eg, Gzell (2000), ibid).
203 Eg see art 13(5) (unless otherwise specified) in DTAs with United Kingdom art 13(6), United 
States art 13(7), Canada, New Zealand, Romania, Russia and Mexico.
204 As with Article 6 the terms "property" and "real property" are used in preference to "movable 
property" and "immovable property" as per Australia’s reservation -  see 2003 OECD Commentary 
on Article 13, para 33.
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deem an Australian source where business is carried on partly in and partly out of 
Australia or where a business is controlled off shore.
Where a DTA exists, the domestic law is overridden (by the allocation of taxing rights) 
with the deemed source of business income being generally with the country in which 
the non-resident resides, except where the enterprise is carried on through a permanent 
establishment, it is shipping or insurance income or it is an asset connected with 
Australia under the CGT provisions.
E. Income from property
1 What constitutes income from property?
Income from property is the receipts received for allowing a person to use another 
person’s property. Income from property is usually categorised as interest, dividends, 
royalties, and lease income. Income from property does not traditionally include 
business income, where the business involves active dealing with property assets 
(professional investor), or capital gains from the sale of property.
In this context characterisation is an important issue, as the classification of income as 
being in one income category rather than another will give rise to the application of 
different principles for determining territorial source. However, the implications of 
characterisation are less important in respect of the assessment of interest and dividends, 
as the tax treatment has been modified by the debt and equity rules in Division 974 of 
the 1997 Act.205
205 The rules, which have had application from 1 July 2001, were introduced by the New Business Tax 
System (Debt and Equity) Act 2001{Cth). This Act was the first tranche of comprehensive 
legislative scheme for the taxation of financial arrangements (Taxation of Financial Arrangements 
(TOFA)). This reform process has been on the Australian agenda since the 1992-93 Budget. The 
new debit/equity rules were introduced in conjunction with a new thin capitalisation regime (New 
Business Tax System (Thin Capitalisation) Act 2001{C\h)). Tranche two of TOFA, which consists 
of rules that remove the taxing point at conversion or exchange of certain financial instruments and, 
more importantly, measures dealing with foreign currency translation and the taxation of foreign 
exchange gains and losses, was contained in the New Business Tax System (Taxation o f Financial 
Arrangements) Act (No 1) 2003 (Cth). Tranches three and four of TOFA (which encompassed in 
these tranches are the reform of the taxation of commodity (eg gold and cotton) hedging and the 
final stage includes implementation of new tax-timing arrangements, including: a market-to-market 
election, an accruals/realisation framework, internal hedging rules, disposal rules, and synthetic 
arrangements) are scheduled for operation from 1 July 2005.
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These rules classify financial arrangements into “debt” interests, “equity” interests, 
“non-share equity” interests and “non-equity” shares based upon the substance of the 
arrangement, not its legal form.206 “Non-share” equity is an interest in a company which 
is not legally a share, but is classified as equity for tax purposes, while “non-equity” 
shares are shares that are classified as debt (eg a redeemable preference share). These 
classifications do not override the legal character of the arrangement for all purposes of 
the 1997 Act.207 Thus, if a financing transaction has the legal form of a lease, but is a 
“debt” interest under these rules, all the specific leasing provisions continue to apply (eg 
1936 Act Division 16D).
Therefore, in addressing the processes for determining the source of interest, dividends, 
royalties and real property income, a brief description of what is classified as income 
under each of the categories will be undertaken. Having characterised the “income”, an 
examination of the applicable domestic statutory source rules and the principles used to 
determine source under common law will be undertaken before exploring the extent to 
which these rules are overridden by Australia’s DTAs.
206 They are classified under a debt test (1997 act s 975-2) and equity test (1997 Act s 975-75). A 
transaction will be debt if it satisfies both the debt and equity tests (1997 Act ss 974-5(4) and 974- 
70(1)). A “debit” interest is defined in 1997 Act ss 974-15 to 974-65 and an “equity” interest is 
defined in ss 974-70 to 974-95. An “equity” interest only arises where there is an interest in a 
company or entity taxed as a company.
207 The debt and equity rules impact upon imputation, the assessment and deductibility of 
interest/dividend payments, the CGT mles, the withholding tax rules, foreign tax credits and the 
thin capitalisation mles. They stop the franking of payments arising from “non-equity” shares and 
permit franking of payments made in connection with “non-share” equity (1997 Act ss 202-45(d), 
208-30 and 215-10 to 215-25).
Companies are denied deductions of payments in respect of “non-equity” shares (1997 Act s 26- 
26), but allowed deductions for payments arising from “non-share” equity (1997 Act s 25-85 and 
1936 Act s 82LA). In respect of assessability see 1936 Act s 43B.
The mles ensure that the capital gains treatment mirrors the income tax treatment eg ensure that 
“non-share” equity and options over these is treated the same as shares and options over shares and 
introduce convertible interest mles.
The withholding tax rules treat payments of dividends on “non-equity” shares as interest and 
payments from “non-share” equity as dividends (1936 Act ss 128A(1), 128A(1AB), 128B(2D) and 
128B(3)).
The thin capitalisation rules disallow “debt deductions” (as classified under the debt equity rules) 
where the entities actual debt exceeds the maximum allowable debt (as calculated under the debt 
equity mles). For further details see Robert Deutsch et al, Australian Tax Handbook 2004 (2004), 
Ch 25.
208 The exempt income mles relating to interest, dividend and royalty income sourced in a specified 
Norfolk Island (1936 Act ss 24J and 24L) will not be examined.
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2 Interest
The first category of property income is interest which is generally assessable income 
according to ordinary concepts under the 1997 Act.209
(a) The definition o f interest
As the term “interest” is not generally defined in the income tax legislation, the common 
law definition is often used for characterisation. At common law “interest” is a payment 
for using another person's money. Interest may arise from voluntary agreements (such 
as a loan), as a component of compensation provided by the government for compulsory 
acquisition of property or part of a court’s award for damages.211 It will not include bill
919discounts and may not include guarantee payments.
However, as discussed above, payments arising from hybrid instruments, which are 
classified as debit under the debt/equity rules, will be assessed as if they are interest, 
although they are not generally legally characterised as “interest”. Under the broad 
statutory definition of interest for withholding tax purposes such payments are defined 
to be interest. This wider definition varies from the definition under Article 11(3) of 
the OECD model and the definitions adopted in a number of Australian DTAs.214
209 1997 Acts 6-5.
210 Lord Wright in Riches v Westminster Bank [1947] AC 390, 400 “[T]he essence of interest is that it 
is a payment which becomes due because the creditor has not had his money at the due date. It may 
be regarded either as representing the profit he might have made if he had had the use of the 
money, or conversely the loss he suffered because he had not that use. The general idea is that he is 
entitled to compensation for the deprivation.” It is “money paid for the use of money lent or for not 
exacting repayment of debt” -  JB Sykes (ed), The Concise Oxford Dictionary (6th ed 1976).
211 For example see Federal Wharf Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1930) 44 CLR 24; 1 
ATD 70 and Whitaker v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1998) 38 ATR 219: 98 ATC 4285.
212 Hamilton, above n 3, paras 4.60 and 4.70. However, such amounts are caught with the expanded 
withholding tax definitions in 1936 Act, Division 11A. Also excluded at common law are amounts 
received by lender under an “indemnification of tax” clause -  Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation v 
Century Yuasa Batteries (1998) 38 ATR 442; 98 ATC 4380.
213 “Interest” is defined in the 1936 Act s 128(1 AB) to include amounts (other than a prescribed 
security (1936 Act s 26C(1))) that are in the nature of interest, is a substitute for interest or subject 
to a wash arrangement and is a dividend in respect of non-share equity.
214 "Interest" is defined in art 11(3) of the OECD Model to “. . . mean income from debt-claims of 
every kind, whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate in 
the debtor’s profits, and in particular, income from government securities and income from bonds 
or debentures, including premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, bonds or debentures. 
Penalty charges for late payment shall not be regarded as interest for the purposes of this Article.” 
In many DTAs interest in the nature of dividend (under art 10) is expressly excluded from the
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(b) Statutory source of interest rule
Interest is deemed to have an Australian source where the monies are secured by
T  1 C
mortgage on an Australian property under s 25(2) of the 1936 Act. Excluded from 
this test is interest paid outside Australia to a non-resident on debentures issued outside 
Australia by a company. Also, the withholding tax rules give an Australian ongin to 
payments by Australian residents and, in the case of interest, by non-residents carrying 
on business in Australia.217
(c) Common law
Outside the narrow statutory origin and source rules, the process for determining source 
is set out in the common law. There are a number of factors that indicate the source of 
interest income, including the place:
• the contract was made;
• the money was lent;
• where a lender is incorporated; and
• where the lender’s business is carried on.
definition of interest (eg United States, and United Kingdom DTAs) as is interest arising from 
shipping or airline (art 8) enterprises (eg Argentina DTAs).
215 This rule is one of the older type of source rules deriving from the s 3 definition of “income” in the 
1915 Act. The 1915 Act s 3 definition of “income” was incorporated into the 1922 Act (s 4(a) and 
with the s 16(b) exception for non-resident debentures) before being incorporated into the 1936 Act 
s 25(2).
216 To satisfy the test it was sufficient that part of the security is in Australia and does not matter that, 
apart from 1936 Act s 25(2), the source of income would not have been Australia - see Broken Hill 
South Limited v Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 337; 1 AITR 106; 4 ATD 163. 
Also see Magney, above n 138, 37
217 Australia’s withholding tax rules are found in the 1936 Act Part III, Div 11A. Withholding tax is 
paid by the lender on behalf of a non-resident. The rules cover payments from resident to non­
resident (ss 128B(2)(B)(1) and 128B(6)) and payments to non-residents by a non-resident through 
a permanent establishment (ss 128B(2)(b)(l) and 128B(7)). It is a final tax (s 128D). Interest to 
which s 128B applies is liable to tax at the rate of 10% - see Income Tax (Dividends, Interest and 
Royalties Withholding tax) Act 1974 (Cth), s 7(b) and Taxation Administration Regulations 1976 
(Cth), reg 41. There are a series exemptions including under where the interest is exempt or it is 
assessable to trustee under ss 99, 99A or 102, being derived by non-resident conducting business 
through permanent establishment (s 128B(3)), is in respect of offshore banking units (s 128GB) or 
arises from widely distributed debentures (s 128F) -  see Emaneul Hiou, ‘Withholding tax 
developments are of real interest’ (1998) 1 Journal o f Australian Taxation 180.
218 Spotless Services v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1993) 25 ATR 344, 359-60; 93 ATC 4397, 
4410 (Lockhart J), above n 155. Also see Trevor Johnson, ‘UK Tax Update: Sauce for the goose is 
sauce for the gander’ (2004) 33 Tax Notes International 361, 363 who notes that other factors such
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9 1 Q • 9 7 0Factors such as the situs of the debt, residence of the debtor and the location of
991 999fund utlisation carry little weight. Where the loan is unsecured, the place of 
contract can be crucial223 as is the provision of credit.224
In the end, the source of interest is determined by weighing all the above factors, with
99  r
the factors surrounding the making of the loan carrying a heavier weighting.
(d) Impact o f DTAs
Under Article 11 of the OECD Model the right to tax interest is shared with the 
primary right assigned to the country of residence, with the country where the “interest 
arises” (ie origin) having a limited right to tax interest (usually 10 percent of the gross 
interest) of the non-resident “beneficial” ownerf Generally, interest is deemed to 
arise in a country where the payer is resident, except where a payer has a permanent 
establishment. The article does not include interest arising from a business 
conducted through a permanent establishment in the country of source (which is dealt 
with under Article 7). Where transfer pricing results in interest overpayment, only 
the “market” interest is subject to Article 11.229
as residence of the debtor, source from which interest was paid, place interest paid and the nature 
and location of security have been found to be important in other United Kingdom decisions.
219 However, if the loan arises from the conduct of a business the source of the loan may be the place 
of business - Commissioner o f Inland Revenue v Hang Seng Bank Limited [1991] 1 AC 306.
220 For a simple loan residence of the debtor was important -  ES & A Bank v Inland Revenue 
Commissioner [1932] AC 238.
221 Utilisation of funds was not important in Commissioner o f  Inland Revenue (NZ) v NV Philips 
Gloeilampenfabricken [1955] NZLR 868; (1954) 10 ATD 435.
222 Hamilton, above n 3, para 2.630, Magney (1997), above n 26, 16.
223 Webb v Campbell (1900) 25 VLR 506, Spotless Services v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation 
(1993) 25 ATR 344, 359-60; 93 ATC 4397, 4411; Studebaker Corporation o f Australia Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner (NSW) (1921) 1929 CLR 255; R & McG 165 and Commissioner o f Inland 
Revenue (NZ) v NV Philips Gloeilampenfabricken [1955] NZLR 868; (1954) 6 AITR 158; 10 ATD 
435. Also see Magney (1997), above n 26, 11 notes that source of derivative income is more likely 
to be at the place the master agreement is made.
224 Commissioner o f Inland Revenue (NZ) v NV Philips Gloeilampenfabricken [1955] NZLR 868; 
(1954) 6 AITR 158; 10 ATD 435; and Commissioner o f  Inland Revenue v Lever Bros and Unilever 
Ltd [1946] SAfPC 1. Also see Philip Crutchfield and Peter Willis, ‘Australian tax treatment of non­
residents’ (1991) 18(7) Tax Planning International Review 24, 25.
225 Magney (1997), above n 26, 16.
226 OECD Model arts 11 (1) and (2).
227 Ibid, art 11(5).
228 Ibid, art 11(4). DTAs with an Independent Services Article (art 14) also direct that interest arising 
in relation to those activities be dealt with under art 14.
229 Ibid, art 11(6).
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Article 11(1) is adopted in most Australian DTAs. However, the rate of withholding by
230the “source” country is not always 10 percent, varying between zero and 25 percent. 
The International Agreements Act 1953 (Cth), s 16 provides non-residents with a 
rebate for Australian tax levied in excess of the amount of tax payable in the DTA (ie 
in respect of any tax raised in excess of the 10 percent limit). There are also 
terminology differences between the Australian DTAs and the OECD Model." The 
interest withheld is deemed, in most DTAs under the “source of income” Article to 
have an Australian source.232
(e) Overview
In summary, the source of interest under Australia’s domestic law will be determined 
by weighing a number of factors with the factors surrounding the making of the loan 
(ie the place of contract) carrying a heavier weighting. However, where the lender is a 
non-resident an origin tax of 10 percent is levied regardless of source. This 
withholding is permissible under all Australian DTAs, and the interest has an 
Australian source.
3 Dividends
The second form of property income is a dividend. Under the 1936 Act, dividends 
derived from profits are assessable where paid to a shareholder.234 However, a non­
resident is only assessable on dividends paid by a company to the extent to which they 
are paid out of profits derived by the company from sources in Australia. Similar
230 The rate of withholding is generally 10 percent. A 12 percent withholding rate is provided for in 
DTAs with Argentina, a 15 percent withholding rate with India, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, and 
Mexico (on non-finance industry interest which is taxed at 15 percent), and Philippines, and a 10 to 
25 percent withholding rate with Thailand. In some cases Government reserves are only taxable in 
that country (eg United Kingdom, United States and Mexico DTAs).
231 Eg, the term “debt claims” is not used in Australia DTAs. See generally Magney (1994), above n 
27, 57-65.
232 See above n 27.
233 Asprey Report, above n 10, 278.
234 1936 s 44(1 )(a)(i).
235 1936 s 44(l)(b)(ii). This is also an older source rules deriving from ss 16(b)(i), 16B, and 16AA(1) 
of the 1922 Act, before incorporation in the 1936 Act. Also see Parke Davis & Co v Federal 
Commissioner o f Taxation (1959) 101 CLR 521; 7 AITR 421; 11 ATD 545.
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rules apply for non-share dividends, but these do not need to be paid from profits.236 The 
withholding tax rules give an Australian “origin” to dividend payments made by 
Australian residents to non-residents.237
(a) The definition of a dividend
A dividend is defined by a series of sections to include an amount (either money or 
property, including shares) that is distributed (made, paid, credited or issued) to a person 
(a shareholder) by a company in return for that person investing in the company via share 
capital. The “amount” distributed usually consists of profits, including profits 
capitalised by the company, but does not include returns of capital.239
There is also a specific definition for withholding tax purposes, which encompasses the 
debt/equity classifications,240 and under Article 10(3) of the OECD Model, which has 
been incorporated into Australia’s DTAs.241
This rule is wide, potential capturing dividends passing between two non-resident entities, where 
the paying entity has received an Australian dividend. This was a problem under the art 10(5)(c) of 
1982 United States DTA, which stated that Australia can impose tax on dividends paid by a United 
States resident company if the dividends are paid out of profits from a permanent establishment of 
the company in Australia, the gross income attributable to such permanent establishments 
constitutes at least 50 percent of the US company’s gross income and Australia does not impose 
branch profits tax as described in art 10(6). This problem continues for dividends paid to 
shareholders in non-DTA countries as International Tax Agreement Act 1953 (Cth) s 18 does not 
apply as it only operates where a DTA exists.
236 1936 s44(l)(a)(ii) and (b)(ii).
237 Australia’s withholding tax rules for dividends are found in the 1936 Act Part III, Div 11A. They
are not applicable to the extent to which a dividend that has been franked in accordance with s 204-
30(3)(c) of the 1997 Act (1936 Act s 128B(3)(ga)). The current withholding tax rate is 30% or 
15% - see Income Tax (Dividends, Interest and Royalties Withholding tax) Act 1974 (Cth), s 7(a) 
and Taxation Administration Regulations 1976 (Cth), reg 40. An exempt from dividend 
withholding tax exists to the extent that the dividend consists of an amount debited from the 
resident company's foreign dividend account (1936 Act s 128S to s 128TF).
238 1997 Act, s 995-1 defines a “dividend” as having the meaning given by 1936 Act ss 6(1 )(4) and (5) 
and 6BA(5) and 94L and 1997 Act s 375-872. Ratcliffe, above n 42, 181 notes that in absence of 
such provisions the source of a dividend would be determined by the contract between the company 
and the shareholder.
239 1936 Act, s 6(4). It also includes concessional capital issued by a “film licensed investment
company” (FLIC) in lieu of a dividend -  1997 Act s 375-872. Also see Thornett v Federal
Commissioner o f Taxation (1938) 59 CLR 787; 1 AITR 327; 4 ATD 551.
240 The definition in 1936 Act s 128A(1) incorporates the other definitions of dividends but expressly 
excludes dividends arising from non-share equity. The withholding tax rules also apply to non­
share equity, except under 1936 Act ss 128AE, 128F, 128J and 128K - see 1936 Act s 128AAA.
241 Under Article 10(3)) a dividend is defined to be “. . . income from shares, “jouissance” shares or 
“jouissance” rights, mining shares, founders shares or other rights, not being debt-claims, 
participating in profits, as well as income from other corporate rights which is subjected to the 
same taxation treatment as income from shares by the laws of the state of which the company 
making the distribution is a resident.”
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(b) Statutory source of dividends rule
Section 44(1) of the 1936 Act states that the source of a dividend paid to a non-resident 
is the source of the profits from which the dividend has been paid.242 The process for 
determining “source of profits” is determined under the common law (see below).
The other limited statutory source rule is found in the International Tax Agreements Act 
1953 (Cth). It provides that for all countries with which Australia has a DTA the 
dividend shall be deemed to be sourced in the country of residence of the non-resident 
company paying the dividend provided the dividend is taxed in that country and there is 
not an inconsistent provision in the relevant DTA.243
(c) Common law
With dividends there has always been the question of whether the source of a dividend 
is where the profits are derived which gives rise to the dividend paid, or where the share 
register is located.244 In Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation24' 
the full High Court found that prima facie the source of the income was dictated by the 
location of the share register.240
The Article 10(3) definition as adopted in Australian DTAs is less prescriptive, merely defining 
dividends to be “. . . income from shares and other income assimilated to income from shares by 
the law, relating to tax, of the Country of which the company making the payment is a resident.”
The definition of dividend is deemed, by s 3(2A) of the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 
(Cth), not to apply from 5 December 2003 to debt interests as defined in the debt and equity rules.
242 Parke Davis & Co v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1959) 101 CLR 521; 7 AITR 421; 11 
ATD 545. This reflects the outcome in Nathan v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1918) 25 
CLR 183; R & McG 14. However, the Act is silent in determining “. . . the source of a dividend, 
where it is part of the profits from which a dividend is paid to a non-resident -  see Asprey Report, 
above n 10, 278.
243 International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth) s 18(1) and (2).
244 The place profits were paid approach was developed in Nathan v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (1918) 25 CLR 183; R & McG 14.
245 Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1973) 129 CLR 177; 73 ATC 4114; 4 
ATR 75. It followed the earlier decision of Freeman v the Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) (1956) 
6 AITR 225; 11 ATD 21.
246 Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1973) 129 CLR 177, 211-12; 73 ATC 
4114, 4117; 4 ATR 75, 79, Barwick CJ noted “[p]rima facie it seems that the place where the 
distributed profits were made is the geographical source of the fund out of which the dividend itself 
is declared: therefore it may be said that place is the geographical source of the dividend.” 
However, before determining that source, Barwick CJ noted “. . . the location of the fund of profits 
which is distributed by means of the dividend is the place where they are made . . .  In some cases 
real difficulties may be met in deciding the point of geographical location, where the relevant 
profits of a company were made. But it is a question of fact to be determined on all the facts and 
circumstances in each particular case.”
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(d) Impact o f DTAs
Although under Article 10 of the OECD model247 both the country of shareholder 
residency and the country where the company resides have the right to tax dividends, 
the country of company residence has a limited right to tax (between five and 15 
percent) dividends received by a beneficial owner248 of the shares resident in the other 
country.249 As with Article 11, Article 10 does not include dividends arising from a 
business conducted through a permanent establishment in the country of source (which 
is dealt with under Article 7).250
Articles 10(1) and (2) are adopted in most Australian DTAs; however, the rate of 
withholding by “origin” country varies between zero and 25 percent.251 There are also 
terminology differences between the Australian DTAs and the OECD Model.2:12 The
247 For a history of Article 10 see Peter Harris, ‘Origins of the 1963 OECD Model Series: Working 
party twelve and Article 10’ (2000) 15 Australian Tax Forum 3.
248 For a discussion of the term “beneficial owner” see JDB Oliver et al, ‘Beneficial ownership and the 
OECD Model’ [2001] British Tax Review 27.
249 OECD Model Articles 10(1) and (2).
250 Ibid, Article 10(4). DTAs with an Independent Services Article (Article 14) also direct that interest 
arising in relation to those activities be dealt with under Article 14.
251 The most common rate in pre-1995 DTAs is 15 percent, with the rate varying depending upon level 
of economic development of the treaty partners (ie if a developing capital importing country the 
rate will be higher, eg 20% in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Thailand and 25% in Philippines). This 
was supported by a reservation by Australia permitting taxation of dividends at no-less than 15 
percent. These DTAs did not factor in the impact of dividend imputation -  see Richard Vann, 
‘Australia’s new treaty policy: Noise or music?’ (Paper presented at the Taxation Institute of 
Australia’s New South Wales Division’s International Masterclass, Sydney, 22 July 2003), 2.
In post 1995 DTAs (starting with the DTA with the Czech Republic) the rate of withholding does 
vary from 15 percent depending upon the:
• level of share ownership - the rate is lower for dividends arising from non-portfolio shares 
(eg in DTAs with the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Romania, and Russia (slightly 
different conditions - a rate of 5% applies where voting power exceed 10%; 10% tax under 
Argentina DTA) and where the non-resident shareholder, a publicly listed company, owns in 
excess of 80 percent of the paying company (eg in DTAs with the United Kingdom and 
United States (although slightly different criteria) dividends are exempt in country of 
company residence); and
• character of the income (eg under New Zealand DTA art 10(2) a dividend to arise from the 
business of life insurance is subject to a maximum rate of tax of five percent).
252 Eg, the term “beneficially entitled” is used in Australian DTAs in preference to the term “beneficial 
owner”. The term “beneficial owner” is used in DTAs with the United Kingdom. See generally 
Magney (1994), above n 27, 53-57; Michael Rigby, ‘The Protocol to the Australia-United States 
tax treaty: Part 1’ (2003) 32 Australian Tax Review 135, 147-159 and Anne O’Connell, ‘The Race 
for Tax Base: Allocation of Taxing Rights between Source and Residence Jurisdictions in 
Australia’ (2001) 24 Tax Notes International 1003, 1007. Australia also does not provide for 
mutual agreement to settle application of the taxing limitations under Article 10(2).
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amount withheld is deemed, in most DTAs under the “source of income” Article to
• 9 S 3have an Australian source.
(e) Overview
In summary, the source of a dividend under Australia’s domestic law will be 
determined by weighing a number of factors with the location of the share register 
carrying a heavier weighting. However, where the shareholder is a non-resident the 
level of franking will determine the level of origin tax. The withholding tax ranges 
from exemption for fully franked dividends being tax free to unfranked dividends 
being subject to an origin tax of 30 percent.254 This withholding is permissible under 
all Australian DTAs; however, the rate of origin tax is limited on unfranked/partial 
franked dividends to rates of tax ranging between zero to twenty-five percent 
(depending upon the particular DTA).
4 Royalties
The third category of property income is a royalty. A royalty is assessable under s 6-5 
of the 1997 Act where it is income under ordinary concepts. Where it is not income 
under ordinary concepts, it is assessed under s 6-10 (via s 15-20) of the 1997 Act. 
Section 15-20 of the 1997 Act includes anything that falls within the ordinary meaning 
of the term "royalty" (excluding royalties as defined in s 995-1 of the 1997 Act), but is 
not assessable under s 6-5 as ordinary income. Withholding tax rules give an
256Australian origin to royalty payments by Australian residents to non-residents.
253 See above n 27.
254 This withholding is not related to source -  Asprey Report, above n 10, 278.
255 As payments deemed to be royalties under s 995-1 of the 1997 Act are expressly excluded from the 
scope of s 15-20, it is argued that s 15-20 has a narrower scope than the former s 26(f) of the 1936 
Act as it does not assess deemed royalties that are not income in nature. Thus, as payments for 
"know how" (ie technical information) are not royalties at common law (Sherritt Gordon Mines v 
Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1977) 137 CLR 612; 7 ATR 726; 77 ATC 4365), they are not 
caught under s 6-5 or under s 15-20. This runs counter to the policy of the Tax Law Improvement 
Project whose task was to rewrite 1936 Act provisions in the 1997 Act. The changes were intended 
to be a rewrite, involving no major policy changes. However, the 1997 Act seeks to avoid such 
unintended changes by a direction in s 1-3 that the Courts should construe the legislation in the 
same way as the former provisions. Section s 1-3 of the 1997 Act is based upon s 15 AC of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901. It is not certain that s 1-3 will achieve this in these circumstances, as it is 
clear that s 1-3 will have no operation where a policy change is intended. The problem for 
legislators is that s 15-20 of the 1997 Act does contain a policy change in that amounts assessed
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(a) The definition of a royalty
A “royalty” is defined widely in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act as consideration for the use of, or 
the right to use a series of rights (of the forbearance to use) or for the supply of ancillary 
assistance in association with that use.2'̂ 7 A “royalty” at common law is a term applied 
indiscriminately to describe periodic payments for the right to use an intangible asset. 
The key characteristics of a royalty at common law are that the:
I C O
• payments are made in return for the use of a right or privilege;
• payments must be made to the owner or person able to confer a right;
• consideration is linked to the amount used ;259 and
• consideration is paid as and when the privilege acquired is exercised260 
(however, a lump sum will be a royalty where it is a pre estimate of the user's 
use),261
under common law, which were caught under the former s 26(f) of the 1936 Act, are expressly 
excluded from the scope of s 15-20.
256 Australia’s withholding tax rules for dividends are found in the 1936 Act Part III, Div 11 A. The 
current withholding tax rate is 30% - see Income Tax (Dividends, Interest and Royalties 
Withholding tax) Act 1974 (Cth), s 7(c) and Taxation Administration Regulations 1976 (Cth), reg 
42.
257 1997 Act s 995-1 incorporates the 1936 Act s 6(1) definition. A "royalty" or "royalties" is widely 
defined to include any amount paid or credited, however described or computed, as consideration 
for the use of, or the right to use series of rights or for the supply of ancillary assistance. These 
rights include:
• any copyright, patent, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, trade-mark, or other like 
property or right;
• any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment;
• some or all of the part of the spectrum (within the meaning of the Radiocommunications Act 
1992) specified in a spectrum licence issued under that Act; and
• motion picture films; films or video tapes for use in connexion with television; or tapes for use 
in connexion with radio broadcasting.
Also covered are similar amounts “paid” for the reception of, or the right to receive, visual images 
or sounds, or both, transmitted to the public by satellite; or cable, optic fibre or similar technology 
or use in connection with television broadcasting or radio broadcasting. However, micro-wave 
technology was left out.
The inclusive of ancillary assistance in the definition was to overcome the problems with the 
common law definition, which excludes "know how" (ie technical information) from the meaning 
of royalty (see Sherritt Gordon Mines v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1977) 137 CLR 612; 7 
ATR 726; 77 ATC 4365).
258 McCauley v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1944) 69 CLR 235; 3 AITR 67; 7 ATD 427.
259 In McCauley a dairy farmer sold the right to cut and remove timber from his farm at a price per 100 
superficial feet. High Court held that payment was by way of royalty and assessable. However, in 
Stanton v Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation (1955) 92 CLR 235; 6 AITR 216; 11 ATD 1 the 
High Court held that a similar right, sold for a fixed sum unrelated to quantity, was not a royalty.
260 Stanton v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1955) 92 CLR 235; 6 AITR 216; 11 ATD 1.
261 In Inland Revenue Commissioner v Longmans Green & Co (1932) 17 TC 272 where an amount 
was paid in terms of a right to sell a maximum number of books was a royalty, despite being 
received in a lump sum
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but does not include an amount unrelated to use. Payments that do not relate to use 
include payments for the acquisition of the right to use, " payments for an exclusive 
supply agreement (ie a percentage of estimated sales) and payments for “know 
how”.264 In many cases royalties are difficult to define because some royalties may 
involve a diminution of the capital asset.265
The term "royalties" is defined more narrowly in Article 12(2) of the OECD Model 
Convention.266 The 2003 OECD Model Tax Convention Commentary states that the 
term includes payments for the use of digital product (software, music, film and text) 
down-loaded electronically, but not payments to acquire the data.267 A broader 
definition, based upon the expanded categories in the 1936 Act definition,268 is
7 AOadopted in many Australian DTAs.
262 Stanton v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1955) 92 CLR 235; 6 AITR 216; 11 ATD 1.
263 Aktiebolaget Volvo v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1978) 8 ATR 747; 78 ATC 4316.
264 Sherritt Gordon Mines v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1977) 137 CLR 612; 7 ATR 726; 77 
ATC 4365.
265 For example, where royalties are given to a person for the use of a mine, the exercise of the mining 
rights generally involves a decrease in the value of the mine because of the extraction of minerals. 
In this situation, part of the royalty payment is to compensate the mine owner for the decrease in 
the value of the mine created by the extraction of minerals. In McCauley v Federal Commissioner 
o f Taxation (1944) 69 CLR 235, 240; 3 AITR 67, 70; 7 ATD 427, 429 Latham CJ noted that 
“The word royalty is most commonly used in connection with agreements for the use of patents or 
copyrights and in relation to minerals . . . [but] is not, however, limited to patents, copyrights and 
minerals. The term has been used to describe payment for removing furnace slag from land 
(Shingle v P Williams & Sons (1933) 17 TC 574) and to payments for flax cut (Akers v 
Commissioner o f Taxes (NZ) [1926] NZGLR 259), the person paying the royalties becoming the 
owner of the slag or of the flax. In Commissioner o f Taxes (NZ) v Kauri Company [1913] AC 771; 
31 NZLR 617, there is a reference to timber royalties calculated as in the present case, per 100 feet 
cut.”
266 “Royalties” are defined to be “payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or 
the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work, including cinematographic 
films, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information 
concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.”
267 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 12, paras 12.1 to 17. Also see generally Aldo Forgione, 
‘Clicks and mortar: Taxing multinational business profits in the digital age’ (2003) 26 Seattle 
University Law Review 719, 723-3 and Westberg, above n 159, 121-3. However not all countries 
agree with the OECD definition - see Paul Singleton, ‘Non-resident electronic commerce taxation: 
An international comparison’ (2002) 10 Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 162.
268 For the Commissioner’s view see Taxation Ruling IT 2660, Income Tax: Definition o f Royalties 
and Taxation Ruling TR 93/12, Income Tax: Computer Software. The ATO’s view on software in 
TR 93/12 is generally consistent with the OECD Commentary -  see Jinyan Li, ‘E-commerce Policy 
in Australia, Canada and the United States’ (2000) 6 University o f New South Wales Law Journal 
40, 43.
269 Unlike the OECD Model the Australian DTAs:
• spells out that the nature of the payments (ie payments or credits, whether periodical or not, or 
however described or computed; and
• expressly includes know-how (eg “the supply of scientific, technical, industrial or commercial 
knowledge or information.” This provision encompasses “know how” rather than payments in
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(b) Statutory rules
There are two source rules applicable to royalties, a general provision and a specific 
rule for certain “natural resource” royalties.
(i) Source of royalty income derived by a non-resident
The general source rule for royalties in s 6C of the 1936 Act operates to override the 
common law in ascribing in specific provisions of the tax law an Australian source to 
royalty income. Under these provisions a royalty will have an Australian source 
where it is paid or credited by a resident to a non-resident, unless it is an outgoing 
wholly incurred by a person in carrying on business in a country outside Australia.271 
Royalties will also be deemed to have an Australian source if paid or credited to a non­
resident by a person who is a non-resident provided its is an outgoing incurred by that 
payer in carrying on business in Australia through a permanent establishment.
respect of a contract for service, being based upon the test used by the German Supreme Court 
in Bundesfinanzhof (No IR 44/67 of 16 December 1970), Under that test, a contract will be for 
“know how” if it is “. . . one for the supply, for the use by the buyer of a ‘product’ which is 
already in existence (or substantially so)”, but will be a contract for personal services if it is “. .
. one which requires the contractor to apply special skills and knowledge for his own purposes 
in order to bring the 'product' into existence for the ‘buyer’” - Explanatory Memorandum, 
International Tax Agreements Amendment Bill 1995 (Cth), 34).
Australia’s more recent DTAs include a wider category of items in respect of which the payments 
will be royalties (similar to 1936 Act s 6(1) definition of royalty), including:
• films or tapes for television and tapes for radio; and
• visual images or sounds, or both, transmitted by satellite, cable optical fibre or similar 
technologies.
For example, the first category is solely used in DTAs between 1985 and 1995 (and in the recent 
DTAs with Mexico, United Kingdom and Spain), while both are used in most post 1995 DTAs 
with Canada, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Taiwan, South Africa, Slovak Republic, Argentina, 
Romania and Russia.
Ultimately, what is includes does vary from DTA to DTA (eg the DTA with United States excludes 
equipment rentals from the royalty Article).
270 For the purposes of Divisions 5 and 6 of Part III (1936 s 6C(1A)) and s 23(r) of the 1936 Act and 
ss 6-5 and 6-10 of the 1997 Act (1936 s 6C(1A)).
271 1936 Act s 6C(l)(a). Section 6C was inserted by the Income Tax Assessment Act 1968 (Cth) to 
ensure that an Australian source could not be avoided by executing contracts offshore or providing 
payments offshore (an issue highlighted in Aktiebolaget Volvo v Federal Commissioner o f  
Taxation (1978) 8 ATR 747; 78 ATC 4316) - Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax Assessment 
Bill 1968 (Cth), 62.
272 1936 Acts 6C(l)(b).
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(ii) Natural resource income royalties
A “natural resource income”273 royalty, under s 6CA of the 1936 Act, is deemed to 
have an Australian source for specific provisions of the tax law.274 Excluded from its 
scope are royalties derived by a non-resident (resident in a foreign country in respect of
275which a DTA was in force) pursuant to a continuing entitlement as at 7 April 1986.
(c) Common law
As the statutory rules apply for limited purposes (ie they do not deal with inbound 
royalties and in respect of foreign tax credits), a determination of source under the 
common law is still important. The crucial factors in determining the source of a royalty 
at common law are the location of the property277 and for know-how, the contract under 
which the rights give rise to the income.278
(d) Impact o f DTAs
Under Article 12 of the OECD Model Convention, royalties are taxed in the state in 
which the beneficial owner resides, unless the beneficial owner carries on a business in
273 “Natural resource income” is defined in 1936 s 6CA(1) to be income derived by a non-resident 
and is calculated, in whole or in part, by reference to the value or quantity of natural resources 
produced, recovered or produced and recovered, in Australia is after 7 April 1986.
274 For the purposes of Divisions 5 and 6 of Part III (1936 s 6CA(2)) and ss 23(r) and 255 of the 1936 
Act and ss 6-5 and 6-10 of the 1997 Act (1936 s 6CA(3)).
275 The income also must be in a class of income which the Commissioner, before 8 April 1986, had 
given a statement in writing to the effect that income tax would be levied on 50 per cent of income 
-  1936 Act s 6CA(1). The explanation for these later clauses (which were inserted by Taxation 
Laws Amendment Act (No 4) 1986 (Cth)) has never been clearly stated. Newspapers have 
speculated about special tax arrangement in respect of an “override” royalty on oil production from 
the Base Strait oil fields. The arrangement was put under the public spot light when Weeks 
Petroleum was purchased by Bell Resources in 1984. Weeks Petroleum (which retained a large 
percentage of the royalty), along with other owner, had a concessionary tax treatment in respect of 
the royalty until 2006. As Bell Resources was a corporate raider with an aggressive approach to 
taxation the Government sought to end the concession and s 6CA was introduced on 7 April 1986. 
It renders the entire royalty taxable when the beneficial interest changes.
276 Eg under 1936 Act s 160AF(l)(a).
277 Curtis Brown Ltd (as agent for Stella Brown) v Jarvis (1929) 14 TC 744 and International 
Combustion Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioner (1932) 16 TC 532.
278 James Fenwick & Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1921) 29 CLR 164; R & McG 28, 
George Kent Ltd v Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) (1943) 2 AITR 370; 7 ATD 243 and Premier 
Automatic Ticket Issuers Ltd v Commissioner o f Taxation (NSW) (1933) 50 CLR 268; 2 ATD 378. 
In absence to a property right the source was the place of contract in Federal Commissioner o f 
Taxation v United Aircraft Corporation (1943) 68 CLR 525; 2 AITR 458; 7 ATD 318. Also see
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the country where payment is made through a permanent establishment.279 However, 
as Australia has traditionally reserved the right to tax royalties on a source basis, 
Australian DTAs give both the country of source and the country of residence of the 
beneficial owners the taxing right, with a rate limitation applied to the country of 
source. The rate varies between five and 20 percent with a 10 percent rate applicable 
in most DTAs. The amount withheld is deemed, in most DTAs under the Source of 
Income Article to have an Australian source.
Australia also reserves the right to tax income derived from leasing of industrial and 
scientific equipment as royalties. The variations in the definition of royalty in the 
OECD Model and the Australian have been discussed above.
(e) Overview
In summary, the source of a royalty under Australia’s domestic law is be determined 
through the operation of two statutory source rule (ss 6C and 6CA of the 1936 Act), 
for the purposes of certain specific taxing provisions, and for the balance of the tax 
law, under the common law. The common law weights a number of factors (such as 
the nature of the contract, the location of property and the place of payment) in 
determining source of royalty income. The Australian DTAs share taxing rights, 
allowing limited taxing to the country of source.
5 Income from real property
The final form of property income is lease income. Lease income is the payment for the 
right to use real (immobile) and personal (movable) property. However, as lease income 
in respect of personal property may be caught under the extended definition of royalty in
Asprey Report, above n 10, para 17A.19, Dukes, above n 100, 11, and Hamilton, above n 3, para 
2.610 and Geoffrey Lehmann, and Cynthia Coleman, Taxation in Australia (5th ed, 1998), 1125.
279 OECD Model Convention arts 12(1) and (3).
280 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 12, para 36.
281 The tax rate is five percent in Australia DTAs with United Kingdom and United States, 12.5 
percent with Taiwan, 15 percent with Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Kiribati and Fiji, with split rates 
operative with Indonesia and Argentina (10 and 15 percent), Philippines (15 and 20 perecent) and 
India (10, 15 and 20 percent).
282 See above n 27.
283 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 12, para 39.
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s 6(1) of the 1936 Act, the source of that lease income is determined in terms of the 
royalty '‘rules’’.284 As the scope of the source rules in respect of royalties have been 
explored above, this examination of source will focus on lease income arising from real 
property.
(a) Domestic law
There are no statutory source rules for income in respect of real property. At common 
law, as it is income that derives from immovable property, its source is where the 
underlying property is located.28̂
(b) Impact o f treaties
Article 6 of the OECD Model Convention assigns the taxing rights in respect of income
derived from the direct use, letting or use in any other form of “immovable” property to
the country in which the property is located.286 Immovable property is defined to include
property ancillary to agriculture and forestry.287 The rules also apply to income from
immovable property of an enterprise and formerly applied to income from immovable
• 288property used for the performance of independent personal services.
The Australian DTAs vary from the OECD model in terminology289 and the Australian 
definition of “real property” does not generally include income from agriculture and 
forestry activities, but does include payments for the direct use, letting or any other use 
of mineral, oil or gas deposits or other natural resources (including rights to explore for 
or to exploit mineral, oil or gas deposits or other natural resources) and any payments in
284 Magney (1978), above n 138, 39 and Asprey Report, above n 10, 276) of the 1936 Act.
285 Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v United Aircraft Corporation (1943) 68 CLR 525, 536; 2 
AITR 458, 464; 7 ATD 318, 322 (Latham CJ). Also see Asprey Report, above n 10, 276.
286 OECD Model Convention, arts 6(1) and (3).
287 OECD Model Convention, art 6(2).
288 OECD Model Convention, art 6(4). See Raul-Angelo Papotti and Nicola Saccardo, ‘Interaction of 
Articles 6, 7 and 21 of the 2000 OECD Model Convention’ (2002) 56 Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation 516.
289 Eg, as the term "immovable property" is relatively unknown in Australian law DTAs use the term 
"real property".
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consideration for using those rights.290 These interests or rights are deemed to be 
sourced where the resources are situated or where the exploration may take place.291
F. DTA “catch-all”
Finally, for completeness it is important to mention that Article 21 of the OECD Model 
allocates the taxing rights where the treaty is silent. The Article in Australian DTAs varies 
from the OECD Model in that income derived by a resident of one country will be taxable 
in that country of residence, unless it is sourced in the other country. In these 
circumstances the country of source also has the right to tax. Relief from double tax 
would be provided by Article 24 that requires the country of residence to provide tax 
relief.292
G. Summing up the scope o f  source
In determining source of income, Australia has a number of ad hoc statutory source and 
origin rules and relies heavily on the guiding principles emerging from the common law 
to determine source. This determination of source turns on legal jurisdictional concepts, 
based on physical or territorial location, and on legal characterisations of income.293
Having extensively reviewed the scope of the operation of the statutory source rules, the 
guiding principles emerging from the common law and the extent to which Australia’s
290 Eg, art 6(2) of the DTA with Argentina states that “real property" . . . includes: (a) a lease of land 
and any other interest in or over land, whether improved or not, including a right to explore for 
mineral, oil or gas deposits or other natural resources, and a right to mine those deposits or 
resources; and (b) a right to receive variable or fixed payments either as consideration for or in 
respect of the exploitation of, or the right to explore for or exploit, mineral, oil or gas deposits, 
quarries or other places of extraction or exploitation of natural resources.”
291 Eg, art 6(3) of the DTA with Argentina.
292 Explanatory Memorandum, International Tax Agreements Amendment Bill 1995 (Cth), 49.
293 Asprey Report, above n 10, para 17.A24 notes that Australian judicial decisions tend to focus on 
the elements of “form” in determining source, rather than substance. Also see Pinto (2003), above 
n 169, 85, Tom Magney, ‘Australia’s Double Tax Agreements: Does the OECD Model serve 
Australia’s Interests?’ in Richard Krever and Yuri Grbich (eds), Australian International Tax: 
Recent Developments and Future Directions (1994) ATAX Research Series, 25, 46 and Li, above 
n 5, 1125. Similarly, Tillinghast observes that “[t]he existing body of international tax rules . . .  is 
based . . .  on the supposition that international trade consists of the physical shipment of tangible 
goods or physical movement of persons to perform services at different locations” - David R 
Tillinghast, ‘The impact of the Internet on the taxation of international transactions’ (1996) 50 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 524
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DTAs override those domestic determinations, the next step is to explore the main 
thesis.
III. Evaluating the effectiveness of the law of source
The purpose of this Part is to explore whether the “rules” for determining the source of 
income fail, in their practical application, to satisfy the "essential objectives” of equity, 
efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the evaluation will be undertaken by illustrating circumstances where the law struggles 
to satisfy each of the evaluative criteria. The evaluative criteria are addressed in the 
following order: equity; efficiency; simplicity; and the prevention of tax avoidance.
However, the analysis in Part II indicates that outside the statutory source rules and 
DTAs the source of income is determined as “a hard matter of fact” with a weighting 
applied to various factors. Part III, in both Chapters 3 and 4, highlights how such fact 
and circumstance determinations generally fail the evaluative criteria. Therefore, to 
avoid duplication, the analysis will focus on the simplicity and anti-avoidance 
evaluative criteria. Also, as indicated previously, where some examples illustrate that a 
number of the evaluative criteria are not satisfied, to avoid duplication in text and 
analysis, it is proposed to discuss them in the context of the more relevant evaluative 
criteria only, with a passing reference being made to the other shortcomings.
Finally, stated above in Part II, the purpose of this Chapter is to focus on the statutory 
law, judicial principles that underlie a determination of the territorial source of income 
and how those rules are modified by DTAs. Thus, characterisation issues are outside the 
direct scope of the thesis as they are a preliminary classification step in the 
determination of source. However, as the source of income is dependent on this 
classification, issues have been highlighted (eg the definitions of royalty). Again, for 
completeness these classification issues will be briefly discussed in the context of 
simplicity and tax avoidance.
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A. Equity
Consistent with the definition in Chapter 2, in determining compliance with the equity 
objective, the following discussion will highlight where the application of source results 
in taxpayers in similar circumstances not being taxed similarly (horizontal inequity). 
Vertical inequity does not arise in this context.294 The approach to be adopted is to 
examine source more broadly, before focusing on specific equity issues.
1 “Facts and circumstance ” tests
As discussed above, Australian has statutory source for dividends, interest payments 
(where the monies are secured by mortgage on an Australian property), certain royalty 
payments, certain natural resource payments, business income (where business is carried 
on partly in and partly out of Australia, overseas shipping payments and certain 
insurance premiums) and exempt income in Norfolk Island. There are also origin 
(withholding) tax rules in respect of dividends, interest and royalties. Outside these rules 
the source of income is determined by ascertaining the source by weighing up the 
individual facts and circumstances of the taxpayer. The focus is on legal form of a 
transaction rather than its substance.29:1
Thus, in common with other factual tests, a finding of source could turn on a minor 
variation in circumstances or, hypothetically, even on a difference in a single fact. For 
example, by having an agent personally conclude a loan agreement in the Cook Island 
with a Cook Island bank, rather than transmitting the signed documentation from 
Australia, was crucial in determining a Cook Island source of interest income in 
Spotless296
294 The Asprey Report, above n 10, para 17.65 in respect of tax on Australian origin income notes that 
“[mjore refined notions of equity’, deriving from the principle of ‘ability to pay’, have no obvious 
relevance in the present context. Australia taxes a non-resident on a base representing only part of 
his total income, and does not attempt to concern itself with the remainder of his income. Ensuring 
that the non-resident’s tax liability reflects his ability to pay must rest with his country of residence.
295 The Asprey Report, ibid, paras 17.A7 and 17.A24 notes that in respect of income from sale of 
shares and interest has judicial decisions tend to emphasise elements of form (eg in respect of a 
share source is generally situated in the place where the register of the share is kept and interest is 
source where the contract is made).
296 Spotless Services Ltd v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1993) 25 ATR 344; 93 ATC 4397.
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Similarly, the different weighting applied in determining the source of income for 
persons earning income as employees (or even between categories or employees, eg 
artisans and office holders) versus those earning income from independent personal 
services results in horizontal inequity as persons in similar circumstances are taxed 
differently as income may be found to be sourced in different jurisdictions.
Given that minor variation in those circumstances can determine a particular source it is 
possible that the income of taxpayers in similar circumstances could have different 
sources. As horizontal equity is found where taxpayers in similar circumstances are 
taxed similarly, the individual factual nature of the determination of source under the
297common law means that in application they fail to deliver horizontal equity.
2 Problems caused by interrelationship o f DTAs
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, horizontal inequity also arises as DTAs only vary 
taxing rights for taxpayers covered by the bilateral agreement. Thus, where a taxpayer is 
resident in a country which does not have a DTA with Australia then that taxpayer can 
be taxed greater than a taxpayer who is a residence in a country with a DTA.
Even between DTAs the variation in terms from treaty to treaty means that similar 
income can be treated differently from DTA to DTA and the rate of country of source 
taxation (applying to interest, dividend, and royalty income) varies.299 The result of such 
variations is that taxpayers resident in one DTA country are subject to a higher rate of 
tax than one in another DTA country.
Also, the fact and circumstance nature of DTAs can give rise to inequitable results in 
application. For example under Australia’s DTAs, Australia can only tax income from 
business where the non-resident has a permanent establishment (Article 7) or a presence 
measured by days or the existence of a fixed base (Article 14). Therefore, a one off sale
297 The existence of exemptions under the withholding tax rules, although not varying source also 
result in horizontal inequity as certain form of income are taxed at different rates - Asprey Report, 
above n 10, para 17.67.
298 Variations in DTA wording does result in different treatments of reinsurance payments -  see Tim 
Pentony, ‘Non-resident insurers: Is Division 15 of the ITAA 1936 still relevant?’ (2004) 8 Tax 
Specialist 124.
299 See above Parts E 2 (d), 3 (d) and 4 (d).
347
of a digital product through a server owned by the non-resident will provide sufficient 
presence while sales of digital products into Australia through a website will not 
normally give rise to such presence.300
Finally, a possible inequity can arise from characterisation differences between domestic 
laws and DTAs. For example an Article may deem an amount to be interest, while it is 
deemed by the domestic law of the country to be a "‘dividend”.301
3 Summary
From the above discussion, it is evident that the determination of source does satisfy the 
horizontal equity evaluative criterion (ie, taxpayers in similar circumstances are not being 
taxed similarly). Horizontal equity is not achieved as the:
• facts and circumstances tests can result in persons in similar circumstances having 
different sourced income; and
• taxpayers covered by a DTA are treated differently to taxpayers who are not 
covered by a DTA.
B. Efficiency (Neutrality)
In light of the discussion in Chapter 2, the efficiency (neutrality) objective is satisfied if 
the determination of source does not give rise to distortions such as a taxpayer being 
taxed differently due to the market in which the taxpayer operates (eg physical or 
electronic). As with the residency rules, in determining source the same statutory tests 
and common law principles apply regardless of the mode of conducting business. 
Differences may arise in the extent to which income arising in the electronic markets is 
taxed to that derived in the physical markets, but that is not due to a lack of neutrality.
300 2003 OECD Commentary on Article 5, paras 42.3-42.9.
301 See McCormack, above n 66, para 2.8.4 noted that debenture interest payments arising from 
floating rate debentures and debentures issue in substitution for shares in New Zealand are treated 
as dividends under New Zealand tax law, but are a dividend under art 10 of the New Zealand DTA, 
subject to a 15 per cent rather than a 10 per cent tax rate.
302 One of the key policy requirements of e-commerce taxation is the neutrality principle -  see OECD 
Implementing the Ottawa taxation framework, above n 180, 10.
303 Cf, Lisa Cox, ‘Permanent establishments -  The borderless world of electronic commerce’ (2001) 7 
New Zealand Journal o f Taxation Law and Policy 8, 9.
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Rather it is a result of the fact that source of income is determined by legal jurisdictional 
concepts, based on physical or territorial location, and the nature of the income being 
determined by malleable legal characterisations of income.304 However, as this 
malleability gives rise to the opportunity for tax avoidance (see Part III D) and evasion 
it leads to distortions which impact adversely on neutrality.
C. Simplicity
In evaluating whether the determination of source does meet the simplicity objective, 
the following discussion will highlight the extent to which the determination of source, 
in application, does not satisfy the indicators of simplicity. In other words it will 
evaluate if the determination of source is predictable, proportional, consistent, clear, 
easy to administer, does not impose high compliance burdens and is co-ordinated with 
other tax rules.
As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, as a number of these elements overlap, a single rule 
may be found to satisfy a number of the individual elements of the simplicity objective. 
Thus, the following discussion will seek to address the problems arising under the most 
relevant evaluative element. The extent to which these elements exist will determine the 
extent to which the rules will be considered to have failed the simplicity objective in 
that circumstance. The evaluation will address the evaluative elements in the order set 
out above.
1 Predictability
The first element for judging simplicity is to determine whether the determination of 
source is predictable (ie it is easy to understand the intended and actual scope of the 
“rules”). The principal factor that influences predictability of a determination of source 
is that a source depends upon individual factual circumstances of the transaction.
As discussed above, at common law the “. . . ascertainment of the actual source of a 
given income is a practical hard matter of fact.” The outcome in any circumstance can
304 Above, n 293.
305 Nathan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1918) 25 CLR 183, 189; R & McG 14, 15.
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be determined by a range of factors (such as, where a contract is made, the place of sale, 
location of property, the type of property, and the nature of the service provided 
(employment or independent)) that are weighted differently depending upon the 
characterisation of the income.306 However, even characterisation of income is not a 
precise exercise. The line between the classifications of income is uncertain under 
domestic law307 as it is under the various taxing rights in DTAs.308
Although the weighting of factors is more certain than the statutory source rules (ie the 
criteria are stated), the outcome is still dependent on the application of the law to a fact 
situation.309 Similarly, not only does the terminology in the various Articles vary from 
DTA to DTA but the outcome is still dependent on the application of the law to a fact.
On balance, as the outcome under the domestic law and the DTAs turns on the weighing 
of various factors, the outcome in many circumstances is difficult to predict.
2 Proportional
The second element forjudging simplicity is to determine whether the complexity of the 
determination of source is proportional to the complexity of the policy. If the law is 
more complex than the policy, then the law will fail this element of the simplicity 
criterion. In respect of the statutory source rules generally the law is proportional to the
306 See above, Part II C 4.
307 The uncertainty exists in classifying income as arising from the sale of goods or the provision of 
services and as royalty income or business income - see, eg, Forgione, above n 267, 732-3, Jinyan 
Li, ‘Rethinking Canada’s source rules in the age of electronic commerce: Part 2’ (1999) 47 
Canadian Tax Journal 1411, 1421-4, Charles E McLure, ‘Tax competition in a digital world’ 
(2003) 57 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 146, 154, Tadmore (2003), above n 
135, 424, Vito Tanzi, ‘Globalization, technological development, and the work of fiscal termites’ 
(2001) 26 Brooklyn Journal o f International Law 1261, 1266 and Aldrin De Zilva, ‘E-commerce’ 
(Paper presented at the Taxation Institute of Australia’s International Masterclass, 31 August 2000) 
10.
308 In response to concerns about the characterisation of sales of digital information the OECD has 
suggested 28 categories -  see OECD, Attribution o f Profits to a Permanent Establishment Involved 
in Electronic Commerce Transactions (February 2001) and Arthur J Cockfield, ‘The law and 
economics of digital taxation: Challenges to traditional tax laws and principles’ (2002) 56 Bulletin 
for International Fiscal Documentation 606, 613. Also see Andrew Halkyard and Steven Sieker, 
‘E-commerce_tax@HongKong: Part II’ (2003) 30(12) Tax Planning International Review 16, 20.
309 As discussed above, there are statutory source rules for dividends, interest payments (where the 
monies are secured by mortgage on an Australian property), certain royalties payments, certain 
natural resource payments, business income (where business carried partly in and partly out of 
Australia, overseas shipping payments and certain insurance premiums) and exempt income in 
Norfolk Island.
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policy (ie preserve Australian source in respect of shipping, insurance and income from 
business conducted partially within Australia). However, it is not possible to evaluate 
the determination of source in terms of proportionality as source under the common law 
is a matter of fact unrelated to tax policy.
3 Compliance burdens
The third element used for judging simplicity of the determination of source is to 
determine qualitatively the level of cost (the burden) imposed upon a taxpayer in 
complying with the law. If analysis indicates that the compliance costs are high, the 
rules fail this element of the simplicity criterion.
In a self assessment environment a taxpayer is required to determine the source of 
income, in light of its individual factual circumstances. However, this process is 
complicated as a determination of source under the common law requires a review of a 
long line of often apparently conflicting United Kingdom and Australian judicial 
decisions. Thus, it is broadly recognised that the lack of a common rule to determine 
source has created uncertainty, leading to unnecessary litigation^10 and cost.311
On the other hand, the origin (withholding) taxes in respect of interest, dividends and 
royalties have low compliance costs as tax is imposed on a gross amount and there is no
i n
need for further assessment. Similarly, the statutory business income source rules 
(shipping, insurance and where business is carried on partly in and partly out of 
Australia) are easier to comply with as the criteria for determining “source” are explicit. 
However, the application of each provision still is determined by the individual 
circumstances of the taxpayer. Further, the statutory shipping rules, being in essence an 
origin test (ie five percent of the amount paid is assessable), do not fall neatly within 
either the current assessment or standard withholding regimes. This individual 
processing can create additional compliance costs.
310 Taxation Investigation Committee, New South Wales, Report {1937), 44.
311 See, eg, ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 7, 89 and Daniel KC Cheung and Percy Wong, 
‘Hong Kong and the territorial source of business profits’ (2002) 29(12) Tax planning 
International Review 3, 11.
312 Asprey Report, above n 10, para 17.68.
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Finally, as the Australian DTAs do not strictly follow the OECD Model Convention and 
the individual articles vary in substance and terminology from DTA to DTA (eg the 
treatment of government pension under the Pension Article),313 each Article in each 
treaty has to be examined individually. This individual examination combined with 
application based upon individual facts adds to compliance costs.
In summary, this evaluative criterion is also not satisfied as the need to determine source 
by a taxpayer’s facts and circumstances is a major contributor to high compliance costs.
4 Difficulty in administration
The fourth element for judging simplicity is to determine whether there are any 
administrative difficulties in the determination of source. If the rules are difficult to 
administer then the rules will fail this element of the simplicity criterion. Difficulty in 
administration will sometimes mirror compliance costs.
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, there are administrative difficulties arising from the 
fact and circumstance basis of the determination of source, both under the domestic law 
and in applying the DTAs. As a determination of source depends upon a taxpayer’s 
circumstances, the ATO is required to make individual, subjective determinations. This 
uncertainty and the case by case nature of application mean that the ATO is unable to 
give simple broad pronouncements on how the law operates (as evidenced by the 
absence of public rulings on source and the issuing of specific rulings on individual 
DTAs).
As the self assessment system is dependent on taxpayers having the necessary 
information to determine their tax position, the inability to provide that information 
impacts adversely on the ability to self assess and the extent to which the ATO can treat 
as reliable, self-assessed determinations of source.314 If reliability is low, risk is high and 
the ATO under its compliance model is required to devote additional resources to areas 
of risk.315
313 Above, n 68.
314 This was also discussed in Chapter 4 in Part III C 4 and Part VII C 4.
315 Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Compliance Plan 2004-05 (2004).
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Further, the statutory shipping rules do not fall neatly within either the assessment or the 
withholding regimes, which does create variations to processing systems resulting in 
additional administrative costs.
In summary, this evaluative criterion is also not satisfied, as the need to determine 
source by a taxpayer’s facts and circumstances is a major contributor to tax 
administration difficulties for the Commissioner.
5 Co-ordinated with other tax rules
The fifth element for judging simplicity is whether the determination of source is co­
ordinated with other tax rules. If the law operates independently of other tax rules, the 
rules will fail this element of simplicity.
As with the company residency rules (see Chapter 4 Part III C 5), the main area of 
divergence from other tax rules are the variations in the terminology adopted in 
Australian DTAs from that adopted in the OECD model articles. For example, under the 
Employment Article in most Australian DTAs the taxing rights in respect of the 
employment income are allocated to the country where the operator or the ship or airline 
is “resident”, not the “place of effective management” (as specified in the OECD 
Model). Although some differences may have arisen due to the preferences of 
negotiating countries, the adoption of such variations also tend to slow the DTA 
negotiation/renegotiation process. As a result such arbitrary departures tend to counter 
the simplicity objective.
In summary, the DTA rules diverge from the terms adopted in the OECD model. This 
divergence is a further erosion of simplicity.
6 Clarity
The final element for judging simplicity is to determine whether law is expressed 
clearly. If the law is expressed unclearly, the law will fail this element of simplicity.
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The lack of statutory source rules and limitation on the precedence of common law 
results in uncertainty in the determination of source. The determination of geographical 
location of income creation by relying on physical presence of property, persons or 
assets, combined with the legal principles applied to income characterisation underlie 
this uncertainty.316 The impact of the growth in services combined with changes in 
communication technology (including the Internet) removes the need for physical 
presence and blurs income characterisation.
For example, given that with the sale of goods the place of contract if often crucial, it is 
extremely difficult to determine the place of offer or the place of acceptance in 
circumstances where there is a foreign currency dealer trading, employed by an 
Australian company (but resident in Hong Kong) carrying out multiple trades on 
screen.319 Even if elements of each contract can be isolated, the fact that the place of 
contract and the place of loan advance can be manipulated can create further 
uncertainty.320
The weighing of factors under the common law gives rise to uncertainty since no one 
fact is compelling. Clarity is further impeded by the variation in terminology between 
Australian DTAs and from the OECD model. Although the 2003 OECD Commentary 
seeks to provide clarity, the difficulties remain in respect of characterisation and
321interpretative issues.
Thus, the process for determining source is not clearly expressed, further reducing 
simplicity.
316 See ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 7, 92.
317 See Li (1999a), above n 5, 1125 and Dale Pinto, ‘Tax Issues in a world of electronic commerce’ 
(1999) (Paper Presented at the 11th Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Canberra, 
6 February 2003), 14.
318 See Neil Warren, ‘Tax and the Internet: An international perspective’ (Paper presented at 
Australian Taxation Office ‘Tax and the Internet’ conference, Melbourne, 11 November 1997), 15 
OECD commentary on art 5, OECD 26 November 2003 Public discussion draft, above n 177, 7 
and Stefan Bemutz and Christina Weinreich, ‘Germany: Server constitutes a permanent 
establishment’ (2002) 4(4) Tax planning International E-commerce 3.
319 Tom Magney, ‘Commentary: Our antiquated rules of source have been left behind by the electronic 
communications revolution’ (1995) 3 Taxation in Australia Red 175.
320 As illustrated in the facts in Spotless Services v Federal Commissioner o f  Taxation (1993) 25 ATR 
344; 93 ATC 4397. Also see ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 7, 82-9.
321 Eg, see, DA Albregtse, ‘The server as a permanent establishment and the revised commentary on 
Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Treaty: Are the e-commerce corporate tax problems solved?’ 
(2002) 30 Intertax 356.
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7 Summary
From the discussion above, the determination of source fails the elements that gauge 
simplicity. Specifically, as the outcome at common law turns on a weighing of facts the 
outcome in many circumstances is not predictable. The complexity arising from the 
facts and circumstances approach is a major contributor to compliance costs for affected 
taxpayers and remains a major contributor to tax administration difficulties for the 
Commissioner. Further, the terminology used in the income allocation Articles in 
Australia’s DTAs diverge from terms adopted in the OECD model affecting 
consistency. Overall there is a general lack of clarity.
In conclusion, the law and process for determining the source of income fails the 
elements that gauge simplicity (ie they are not predictable, are associated with the 
imposition of high compliance burdens, are difficult to administer, are not co-ordinated 
with other tax rules and are expressed unclearly).
D. Tax Avoidance
In determining compliance with the prevention of tax avoidance objective, the following 
discussion will identify the circumstances where in the application of the law there 
appear to be evasion or avoidance opportunities.
Generally the statutory business income source rules are not open to manipulation. In fact 
the statutory rule relating to business carried on partly in and partly out of Australia in fact 
reduces the scope for contract manipulation.322 However, there are concerns in respect of 
the CGT rules that techniques have been developed to avoid the application of the capital 
gains tax on assets connected with Australia. However, these concerns do not relate to 
source.
322 Richard Vann and Ross Parsons, ‘The foreign tax credit and reform of international taxation’ 
(1986) 3 Australian Tax Forum 131, 152.
323 Treasury, Commonwealth, Review o f International Taxation Arrangements: Consultation Paper 
(2002), 39. The technique is simply to avoid realisation of the asset by disposing on an interposed 
entity (which controls the entity owning the asset connected with Australia) rather than the asset.
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More generally, under the common law the same factors that impede simplicity (the 
reliance on legal jurisdictional concepts based on physical or territorial location) enable 
manipulation of the characterisation of the income324 or the manipulation source.325 
Therefore, as physical presence is diminished, the scope for avoidance increases as both 
domestic rules and DTAs rely on presence in a particular territorial location.326
The communication revolution (including Internet) has enabled both services and the 
delivery of digital product to be undertaken without persons actually being physically 
present in the country.327 Services, such as legal, accounting, engineering and even 
medical services, can be delivered remotely removing physical presence/28 Services 
associated with high value equipment can also escape presence:
• through mobility (such as off-shore hydro-carbon industry equipment);
• by requiring little physical supervision (eg telecommunication equipment); or
• by being beyond the jurisdictional claim (satellites).329
The ability to tax such service income is diminished by the shifting of revenue out of the 
territory where income from the services is currently being taxed. This mobility may
O T A
also provide tax arbitrage opportunities.
However, avoidance problems associated with a reliance on legal form to determine 
source is an issue which predates the Internet. As discussed in Part III C 6, the facts in 
the Spotless Services case illustrate how the reliance on legal factors, such as the place
324 Basic rules for characterising source of income are being undermined by readily manipulated 
distinctions between categories of income (eg, the distinction between sales/licences interest and 
rents) - see Michael J Graetz, ‘Taxing international income: Inadequate principles, outdated 
concepts, and unsatisfactory policies’ (2001) 26 Brooklyn Journal o f International Law 1357, 1418 
and Cockfield, above n 308, 612-15.
325 See Magney (1997), above n 26, 17.
326 As discussed above, the “employment”, “independent service” and “business profits” Articles in 
most Australian DTAs, the right to tax service income relies on a degree of physical presence 
(either in terms of days or through the existence of a fixed base or permanent establishment).
327 Alan Tyree et al, Computer Money Consulting Pty Ltd's INNET 97/2 Report on Electronic 
Commerce Banking and Finance Issues (1997) Australian Taxation Office at URL: 
http://www.ato.aov.au/content/Businesses/Downloads/cmc.rft, Part 2 as at 31 December 2002 
gives . The report has subsequently been removed from ATO site. Also see Chapter 3, above n 246 
and Graetz (2001), above n 324, 1419.
328 ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 7, 104.
329 Vann (1995), above n 173, 22.
330 ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 7, 104-5, Cockfield, above n 308, 609, and Julian JB 
Hickey, ‘The fiscal challenge of e-commerce’ [2000] British Tax Review 91.
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of contract, can result in avoidance.331 Even earlier, in the 1930s, the Second Royal 
Commission on Taxation noted in respect of the source of business income that:
. . . every one of the three specified factors, ie, contract, delivery and 
payment, can be varied at the will of the contracting parties without any 
alteration in the practical effect of the transaction. The non-resident trader 
can, therefore, please himself whether he makes himself liable for tax or
Although the level of avoidance is the subject of conjecture, it is clear that the existing 
statutory rules, common law principles and the DTAs do not satisfy the prevention of
TITtax avoidance criterion.
E. Summary o f  Part III
In summary, from the above it is clear that the existing approach for determining the 
source of income is inadequate. Overall the approach for determining source fails in 
identified ways to satisfy the equity, efficiency, simplicity and prevention of tax 
avoidance evaluative criterion. The major weakness is the factual element of the 
determinations, which in certain situations:
• results in horizontal inequity;
• gives rise the lack of simplicity; and
• leaves the rules open to manipulation.
331 (1993) 25 ATR 344; 93 ATC 4397. Also see ATO’s second Internet Report, above n 7, 82-9.
332 See Commonwealth, Royal Commission on Taxation, Reports (1933-34), 72. Similarly, the 
Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Tax and the Internet: Discussion Report (1997) 
(ATO’s first Internet Report), 47 notes that the reliance on legal jurisdictional concepts based on 
physical or territorial location would result in misallocation as digital product and services do not 
need physical presence.
333 See, eg, Gary Sprague and Rachel Hersey, ‘Permanent establishments and internet-enabled 
enterprises: The physical presence and contract concluding dependent agent tests’ (2003) 38 
Georgia Law Review 299, 315-17 argue that fears are overrated as remote vendors of consumer 
goods are not the predominant model in the economy, where there is no presence vendors to not 
achieve same levels of success and the tax arbitrage stimulates outsourcing to developing countries. 
Also Reuven S Avi-Yonah, ‘Tax competition and e-commerce’ (2001) 23 Tax Notes International 
1395, re multinational enterprises.
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Therefore, reform is necessary to ensure that the determination of the source of income 
better meets the evaluative criteria. The potential reform options are the focus of 
following discussion in Parts IV and V.
IV. Exploring the sub-thesis - Models for reforming source
A. Overview
Given the problems identified, reform is needed.334 The common global solutions33' 
discussed include:
T V
• the development of a virtual permanent establishment concept;
• an e-commerce bit tax;337
• formulary apportionment; and
' i  T Q
• an erosion (refundable withholding) tax.
334 See Tillinghast, above n 293, 526 and Jefferson VanderWolk, ‘Direct taxation in the Internet age: 
A fundamentalist approach (2000) 54 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 173.
335 In the transfer pricing context Vann has proposed an international tax institution -  see Richard J 
Vann, ‘A model tax treaty for the Asian Pacific region? (Part 1)’ (1991) 45 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 99 and Richard J Vann, ‘A model tax treaty for the Asian 
Pacific region? (Part II)’ (1991) 45 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 151. This has 
been further explored as a “virtual” international organisation -  see Pinto (1999), above n 317, 22- 
5, Prafula Fernandez and Lynne Oats, ‘Creation of a cyber-entity’ (1999) (Paper Presented at the 
11th Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Canberra, 6 February 2003), and Prafula 
Fernandez, Gitte Heij and Jeff Pope, ‘Tax policy and electronic commerce’ (2002) 56 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 30, 35-6.
336 A virtual or impermanent establishment arises where gross sales into a jurisdiction exceed a 
specified amount -  Sprague, above n 333, 307 and Pinto (2003) above n 169, 191-206.
337 This proposal arose from a 1994 paper by Arthur Cordell and Thomas Ran Ide (see Paul Me Nab, 
‘International Reaction to electronic commerce developments’ (1998) 27 Australian Tax Review 
219, 225) and is an excise on bits transmitted over the internet (Sprague (2003), ibid).
338 A method for allocating the profits of a permanent establishment between countries of source and 
residence -  see Forgione, above n 267, 767-8, Li (1999b), above n 308, 1469-72, Michael J Graetz, 
Foundations o f International Income Taxation (2003), 67-75, Charles E McLure, ‘Globalization, 
tax rules and national sovereignty’ (2001) 55 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 328, 
337, Charles Plambeck, ‘The taxation Implications of global trading’ (1990) 48 Tax Notes 1143, 
1155-1156, and Kerrie Sadiq, Interjurisdictional Allocation o f Multinational Banking Income: 
Aligning Taxation Principles with Economic Activity (Phd Thesis, Deakin University School of 
Law, 2003).
339 Proposed by Doemberg, the system works on the payer deducting tax from a payment to a non­
resident -  see Richard Doernberg, ‘Electronic commerce and international tax sharing’ (1998) 16 
Tax Notes International 1013, 1013-17, Richard Doemberg and Luc Hinnekens, Electronic 
Commerce and International Taxation (1999), 315-22 and Pinto (2003), above n 169, 173-90 and 
207-32. Erosion taxation is intended to supplement, not replace traditional permanent establishment 
nexus -  Sprague (2003), above n 333, 308. In India, Report o f the High-Powered Committee on 
Electronic Commerce and Taxation, (2001) the Committee recommended that erosion taxes are a
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, at a domestic level a series of reforms have also been 
recommended by various Inquiries.340
However, despite the merits of these proposals the sub-thesis is that the domestic law 
can be modified within the jurisdictional framework to more closely meet the 
evaluative criteria (ie alternative approaches to the current rules that may better satisfy 
the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of tax 
avoidance). In order to establish the sub-thesis, as in Chapters 3 and 4, a two-step 
approach will be adopted. First, in this Part a review of the domestic law of source in 
other jurisdictions will be undertaken. The exploration of the sub-thesis, in light of 
these changes will be undertaken in Part V.
In light of the fact that, . . the concept of source is poorly developed . . .  in domestic 
tax legislation” worldwide, with most countries having “only sketchy rules for 
determining the source of income,”341 viable alternatives to Australia’s approach for 
determining source will not be highlighted by carrying out a comparative study with 
countries with poorly developed source rules. As Australia’s and Canada’s approaches 
to determining source at common law originates from the United Kingdom, an 
exploration of the rules operative in the United Kingdom and Canada is unlikely to offer 
dramatically different reform models and the analysis is likely to mirror the examination 
already undertaken in Part III in respect of the Australian law.342 Therefore, the focus of
substitute to the permanent establishment concept -  Daksha Baxi,’ Indian Committee’s E-com tax 
recommendations’ (2002) 4(2) Tax Planning International: E-commerce 8.
340 See Chapter 1 Part II A. The recommendation were contained in Asprey Report, above n 10, 
Chapter 17A and A Tax System Redesigned, above n 194, Chapters 21-23. For a contrary view on 
the adoption of statutory source rules -  see Richard Shaddick, ‘Australian tax reform: International 
issues’ (Paper presented at a Corporate Tax Association Discussion Group, Melbourne, 2 August 
2000) 10 and Elizabeth Tromans, Are Australia ’s Common Law Source Rules for Income Sufficient 
to Meet Challenges o f E-commerce? (JD paper, University of Melbourne Faculty of Law, 2000), 
24. Tromans argues that uncertainty does not justify statutory source rules. It is common to live 
with uncertainty (eg the meaning of “income”) and much complexity can be attributed to the 
increasingly complex way business is transacted.
341 See Brian Arnold and Michael McIntyre, International Tax Primer (1995), 25.
342 For an introduction to United Kingdom’s rules see Gary Richards, ‘United Kingdom’ in Cahiers de 
Droit Fiscal International: Taxation o f Income Derived from Electronic Commerce, Vol 
LXXXVIa (2001), 711; and for Canada’s rules see Robert Couzin and Mark Novak, ‘Business 
Operations in Canada’ Tax Management Foreign Income Portfolios 995TM (3rd, 2003), A 28-31, 
Li (1999a), above n 5, Li (1999b), above n 308 and Nathan Boidman, ‘E-commerce taxation in 
Canada: The long shadow of the decision in Saint John Shipbuilding’ (2003) 57 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 249.
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the comparative study will be on two countries that have adopted statutory source rule 
regimes: the United States and New Zealand.343
B. New Zealand
1 Overview
New Zealand adopted an extensive statutory source regime in 19 1 6.344 The current rules 
are principally contained in s OE 4 of the Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ).343 The classes of 
income covered by the source rules are extensive. However, they are not exhaustive346 
with resort to the common law necessary if the income in question is not expressly 
caught by the rules.347 Given the scope of these rules, the determination of source under 
the common law rules can only have a minor role. The scope rules will be briefly 
examined under three headings (income from personal exertion, income from business, 
and income from property), before evaluating the effectiveness of the rules.348
2 Income from personal services
All salary, wages, allowances and emoluments of any kind earned in New Zealand in the 
service of either a resident or non-resident are deemed to have a New Zealand source.349 
Also deemed to have a New Zealand source are any Government pensions or annuities, 
specific superannuation payments or any ex gratia payment which is a pension.130
343 Evaluation of each country’s DTA models will not be undertaken as the criticisms expressed in Part 
III in respect of Australian DTAs will equally apply to United States and New Zealand DTAs. 
DTAs in these countries also depart from the OECD model and there are textual variations between 
DTAs (as they are also negotiated individually). Further, the United States DTAs are not a good 
practice model as the DTA source rules does not always override the United States domestic source 
rules (ie there is treaty override) -  see Michael McIntyre, The International Income Tax Rules o f  
the United States (2nd ed, 1992) 3-3.
344 Introduced by the Income Tax Act 1916 (NZ) -  see Garth A Harris, New Zealand's International 
Taxation (1990), 3.
345 Other source rules are in Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) ss OE 5 and OE 6 and apportionment rule 
(similar to the Australian rules in ss 38-43 of the 1936 Act) in s FB2.
346 Garth Harris, above n 344, 3.
347 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE 4(l)(u).
348 There are some miscellaneous source rules that do not fit neatly under these classifications. They 
include payments of compensation or allowances (as defined in Tax Act 1994 (NZ) ss CC 1(1 )(a) 
and (b)), income derived from money invested by the Public Trust Office or the Maori Trust Office 
and New Zealand derived income derived by a beneficiary under any trust - see Income Tax Act 
1994 (NZ) s OE 4(1 )(d), (k) and (p) (respectively).
349 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE 4(1 )(c).
350 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE 4(1 )(h) and (j).
360
Where a contract for employment or independent services is made wholly or partially in 
New Zealand, that income also has a New Zealand source.351 However, if the service is 
under a contract entered into outside New Zealand the source of income is determined in
352accordance with the common law (see discussion in Part II C 3(a)).
As in Australia, these source rules are modified by the treaty provisions relating to 
employment, independent services, directors, entertainers, sportspersons, students, 
teachers, academics, pensions, alimony, employee benefits and diplomats.
3 Income from business
In common with Australia, New Zealand has statutory source rules related to shipping334 
and insurance income355 and an income allocation rule where either a business is carried 
on partly in and partly out of New Zealand or there is whole or partial performance of a 
contract.356 More generally, income derived from any business wholly or partly carried 
on in New Zealand will have a New Zealand source, including its interest, dividend and 
royalty.337 The meaning of business and the determination o f where it is being carried on
351 Under Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE 4(l)(q) -  see Garth Harris, above n 344, 26. This was 
illustrated in Ayson v Commissioner o f Tax [1938] NZLR 282 where salaries three public servants, 
stationed in the Cook Islands and paid from the Cook Island Treasury, were deemed to have a New 
Zealand source as the contracts were made in New Zealand. As the source of payment was New 
Zealand Parliament, no apportionment was allowed. The Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s FB2 permits 
apportionment.
352 Mark Keating, above n 62, 4. Regardless of source New Zealand does operates non-resident 
contractors withholding tax regime (NRCWT) which withhold either 15 or 30 percent of payments 
made to non-resident contractors in respect of services in New Zealand or the right to use property.
353 See, eg art 19 of the New Zealand DTA deals with pension, annuities, alimony and other 
maintenance payments. However, unlike pensions, which are assessed on the basis of residency, 
alimony and other maintenance payments are taxable in country of source. For a further analysis of 
the DTA with Australia see Michael Dirkis, "Australia: Australia-New Zealand Tax Treaty" (1995) 
49 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 583.
354 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE 4(1 )(t). It deems income derived from the carriage by sea or by air 
of merchandise, goods, livestock, mails, or passengers shipped or embarked in New Zealand to 
have a New Zealand source.
355 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE 4(l)(o). It applies any premium derived from or in respect of any 
contract of insurance, offered or entered into in New Zealand or where the insured person is 
resident in New Zealand. It applies to premiums where the insured person is resident outside New 
Zealand and the contract is entered into for the purposes of a business carried on by the person in 
New Zealand through a fixed establishment in New Zealand, but will not apply if all the risk is 
located outside New Zealand and the insurer is not associated with the insured person.
356 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s FB 2(1).
357 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) ss OE 4(1 )(a) and (b).
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will depend upon the individual facts and is determined according to common law 
principles.358
Business income arising from contracts made or wholly or partly performed in New
T C Q  ,  #
Zealand also have a New Zealand source as do commission agency contracts
T / A
performed out of New Zealand. Although New Zealand does not have a capital gains
tax, a New Zealand source is applied to any income derived from the sale or other
■3 r  1
disposition of any property, corporeal or incorporeal, situated in New Zealand. Again 
these rules are modified by New Zealand DTAs.
4 Income from property
A New Zealand source arises in respect of interest on monies lent in New Zealand, in 
respect of mortgaged land,364 debentures or securities issued by Government, local 
authorities or a New Zealand resident company365 and in limited circumstances to 
interest lent outside New Zealand to a New Zealand resident or a non-resident who uses 
the money in a New Zealand permanent establishment.366
Dividends derived from a company resident in New Zealand367 have a New Zealand
T r  o
source, as does rental income/ Royalties and payments for the use of or the right to 
use any personal property in New Zealand paid to New Zealand residents or paid to non-
358 See Jan James, Neil A Russ and Marie Pallot, ‘New Zealand’ in Cahiers, Vol LXXXVIa, above n 
342, 579, 583-7.
359 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE 4(l)(q).
360 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE 5.
361 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE 4(1 )(1).
362 The source rules are modified by the business income, shipping and independent service articles. 
New Zealand, like Australia, does not fully adopt the OECD Model Convention and has reservation 
in respect of insurance (2003 OECD Commentary on Article 7, para 41) and shipping (2003 OECD 
Commentary on Article 8, para 31) income. Also, in respect dividends, interest and royalties paid 
to non-residents New Zealand does operate a non-resident withholding tax (NRWT) regime.
363 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE4(l)(m), but is subject to the application provisions of s CZ 2.
364 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE4(l)(f).
365 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE4(l)(g) and (h).
366 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE4(l)(n) but is subject to the application provisions of s CZ 2.
367 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) ss OE4(l)(g) and s OE 6 deems a foreign source for certain dividends 
paid by non-resident companies purposes of DTAs.
368 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE4(l)(e). This source rules also applies fines and premiums, which 
are income under s CE 1(1 )(e).
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residents out of New Zealand income have a New Zealand source.369 Again, these rules 
are modified by New Zealand DTAs.370
5 Evaluating the New Zealand source rules
In briefly evaluating the New Zealand rules against the evaluative criteria, the focus will 
be on the whether the New Zealand source rules appear broadly to better satisfy the 
simplicity and tax avoidance criteria.
Spelling out a series of defined tests against which the source of income can be 
determined assists in predicting outcomes and enhances clarity. It thereby, arguably, 
reduces compliance and administrative costs. In particular, specifying that all salary, 
wages, allowances and emoluments of any kind earned from service in New Zealand 
have a New Zealand source overcomes the uncertainty in Australia arising from 
Mitchum’s case. Similarly, by specifying the complete list of source rules, and the 
requirements of each, certainty is improved dramatically.
However, despite these improvements a determination of source still turns on the 
existence individual facts and circumstances that satisfy the conditions of the test (eg, 
under the business source rule there must be a “business” and the “business must be 
carried on”).372 Further, as discussed above, where a transaction falls outside the 
specific rules source is then determined by a factual determination at common law. This 
continued reliance on facts and circumstances (be it more diminished) does potentially 
give rise to horizontal inequity (as taxpayers in similar circumstances are treated 
differently) and fails the simplicity requirement (by reducing predictability and certainty, 
possibly giving rise the compliance costs and administrative difficulties).
369 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s 0E4(l)(r) and (s), respectively.
370 The source rules are modified by the dividend, interest, royalty and real property articles.
371 Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Mitcham (1965) 113 CLR 401; 13 ATD 497; 9 AITR 559, 
which found that the place the place of service was not always the determinative factor in 
determining source of personal service income.
372 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE 4(1 )(a).
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The statutory rules do counter aspects of avoidance. For example, the rules stop some 
contractual manipulation, such as in ,Spotless,313 as the source of income under a 
contract is where any element of the contract is carried out.374 Thus, the contract rule 
could encompass internet transactions (even an isolated sale) where acceptance or offer 
occurs in New Zealand.' However, the provision of services by the Internet, where a 
contract is conducted entirely offshore and payment is offshore may be more difficult to 
capture under the business rule. In these circumstances it would be hard to establish that 
part of a business is being carried on in New Zealand. Thus, although a source rule 
based upon the existence of elements of a contract can reduce avoidance, this reliance 
on legal form still enables avoidance. All taxpayers need to do is to ensure that all 
elements of a contract occur outside New Zealand.
On balance, although the New Zealand source rules in some limited circumstances 
depend upon determinations of source at common law (based upon facts and 
circumstances) they do still better meet the evaluative criteria of simplicity and the 
prevention of tax avoidance than the Australian approach. A major weakness is that 
New Zealand still relies on legal concepts (such as the elements of a contract) to 
determine source, despite such rules being subject to manipulation.
C. United States
1 Overview
Under the United States tax system the source rules serve a number of purposes.377 The 
primary purposes are to enable residents to obtain foreign tax credits where taxes are 
paid in respect of income with a foreign source and to determine which income of non-
373 In Spotless Services Ltd v FCT (1993) 25 ATR 344; 93 ATC 4397, the source interest was the 
Cook Islands where only the final act of accepting the offer was performed. All the early 
negotiation was conducted in Australia.
374 Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s OE4 (l)(q).
375 James, above n 358, 582. Internet transactions are potentially caught under four rules: contracts 
wholly and partially in New Zealand; income from business, wholly or partially in New Zealand; 
other income; and royalty.
376 James, ibid, 587. However, the Inland Revenue disagrees in its publication ‘Guidelines to taxation 
and the Internet’ (2001) -  cited in James, ibid.
377 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC Reg § 1.861-8(f) lists the operative provisions requiring 
source determinations -  see McIntyre, above n 343, 3-lb.
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residents is taxable in the United States.378 Like New Zealand, the statutory source rules 
in the United States have longevity, being introduced in 1921. Unlike New Zealand 
the United States source rules apply to deductions, usually mirroring the income source 
rules. Although the 1921 frame work and language has survived, there has been
i o n  m
significant modification with the provisions. Given the extensive nature of the rules, 
the following examination will focus on examining the principal rules under three 
headings (income from personal exertion, income from business, and income from 
property), before evaluating the effectiveness of the rules.381
2 Income from personal services
The gross income from labor or personal services performed in the United States will 
generally have a United States source.382 However, the income will not have a United 
States source where the services are preformed by a nonresident alien individual and the 
individual:
• is employed by a foreign employer (not engaged in trade or business within the 
United States), 383 is a United States citizen (if services are performed off-shore), 
or is a regular member of the crew of a foreign vessel engaged in transportation 
between the United States and a foreign country;
• is temporarily present in the United States for a period or periods not exceeding 
a total of 90 days; and
• earns less than $3,000.384
378 Klaus Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs source of income - A review and revaluation of arguments (Part I)’ 
(1988) 9 Interfax 216, 223. The distinction between non-resident income effectively connected 
with trade and non-resident income taxed on a gross basis is also seen as important -  see Hermann 
B Bouma, ‘The US Tax Code and reality: Improving the connection’ (1999) 19 Tax Notes 
International 1647, 1651.
379 An Act To Reduce and Equalize Taxation, to Provide Revenue, and for Other Purposes, Public 
Law No 98, 42 Stat 224, s 217 (1921) cited in Vogel, ibid. It followed the adoption of the concept 
of “source” in the United States’ tax law in 1916.
380 Joseph Isenbergh, International Taxation (2003) (electronic), P I0.2.
381 For a more exhaustive review -  see Graetz (2003), above n 338, Ch 2, Joseph Isenbergh, 
International Taxation (2000), Ch 3, and McIntyre, above n 343, Ch 3.
382 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 861(a)(3).
383 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 864(b)(1) includes personal service performed in the United
States, but not in these circumstances.
384 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 861 (a)(3)(A),(B), and (C). As the $3,000 threshold was
introduced in 1954 it has become a meaningless threshold -  see Richard L Doemberg,
International Taxation in a Nutshell (5th ed, 2001), 72. There is also a commercial traveler’s
exemption - Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 864(b)(1) and Reg § 1.861-4(a) (3).
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Where the gross income is derived from services performed in more than one country it
• • • ^ o cis apportioned, usually on the basis of number of days. The income (compensation) 
includes fringe benefits, pension payments, sales commissions and even advertising 
income.386 However, the Internal Revenue Code does not define “labor or personal 
service”, which can lead to income characterisation problems. 387 Further, there are no 
explicit source rules for alimony and unemployment compensation.388
3 Income from business
There is not a single source rule for income from business. The gross income from the 
purchase and sale of inventory389 is at the place the sale takes place,390 while sales of 
personal property (inventory, personal depreciable property, intangibles and goodwill) 
through an office or fixed place of business, in the United States, will also have a United 
States source.391 Similarly, amounts received as underwriting income derived from the 
issuing (or reinsuring) of any insurance or annuity contract (including reinsurance) in 
respect of risk in the United States will have a United States source393 as will income 
from certain railroad rolling stock.394
Gains, profits, and income from the disposal of a United States real property interest395 
is treated as income from sources within the United States.396
4 Income from property
A United States source is applied to gross interest on bonds, notes, or other interest
TQ7bearing obligations of non-corporate residents or domestic corporations' and to gross
385 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 863(b)(1) and Reg § 1.861-4(b).
386 Doemberg, above n 384, 72. Social security benefits (as defined in § 86(d)) are expressly deemed 
to have a United States source - Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 861(a)(8).
387 McIntyre, above n 343, 3-29a.
388 Isenbergh (2003), above n 380, P I0.4.
389 As defined in Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 865(i)(l).
390 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC §§ 861(a)(6) and 865(b).
391 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 865(e).
392 As defined in Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 832(b)(3).
393 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC §§ 861(a)(7).
394 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC §§ 861(e).
395 As defined in Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC § 897(c).
396 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC §§ 861(a)(5).
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amounts received as dividends from a domestic corporation and from most foreign 
corporations.39s Rental income from property (including any interest in property) located 
in the United States and royalties for the use of United States patents, copyrights, secret 
processes and formulas, good will, trade-marks, trade brands, franchises, and other like 
property will also have a United States source.399
5 Evaluating the United States source rules
In briefly evaluating the United States rules against the evaluative criteria, the focus, as 
with the New Zealand evaluation, will be on the whether the United States source rules 
appear broadly to better satisfy the simplicity and tax avoidance criteria.
Again, spelling out a series of defined tests against which source can be judged prima 
facie assists in predicting outcomes and enhances clarity. Although the United States 
source rules initially appear clear, they are elaborate (complex) and accommodate a 
number of purposes (in particular the source rules not only deal with non-residents but 
domestic source rules for residents).400 This complexity gives rise to uncertainty and 
cause additional compliance costs through dispute and litigation.401 The uncertainty 
associated with characterisation of some categories of income402 has been further 
compounded by developments in e-commerce.403 Further, despite the complexity the 
rules are not comprehensive with some categories of income not covered.
397 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC §§ 861(a)(1). However, it will not include interest of a 
resident alien individual or domestic corporation that meets the 80 percent foreign business test (in 
Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC §§ 861(c)) or interest on deposits with a foreign branch of a 
domestic corporation or a domestic partnership is engaged in the commercial banking business.
398 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC §§ 861(a)(2).
399 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC §§ 861(a)(4).
400 Some of these purposes are contradictory -  see Isenbergh (2003), above n 380, P10.3 and Graetz 
(2003), above n 338, 51.
401 Vogel, above n 378, 225.
402 Isenbergh (2003), above n 380, P I0.5 explores the fine line between services given by (writers, 
artists, inventors, etc) and the transfer of their intangible property.
403 See, eg, John K Sweet, ‘Formulating international tax laws in the age of electronic commerce: The 
possible ascendancy of residence-based taxation in an era of eroding traditional income tax 
principles’ (1998) 146 University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 1949 and Arthur Cockfield, ‘Tax 
compliance issues for US companies with international electronic commerce transactions’ (2000) 
20 Tax Notes International 223, 228.
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The allocation of interest rules have been problematic,404 allowing companies to 
manipulate the structure of loans to increase the level of tax credits by shifting the 
source of more of the interest off shore.406 The avoidance opportunities are increased by 
the ability to alter the characterisation of income through the so-called “check-the-box” 
regime (which provides for an interposed entity to be disregarded for United States tax 
purposes). Thus, what is debt in Norway may become equity in the United States.406
However, it must be noted that much of the manipulation and complexity arises from 
the domestic source rules, not in association with the rules applicable to non­
residents.40 7 Therefore, on balance, the United States source rules do better meet the 
evaluative criteria of simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance than the Australian 
approach. In being more comprehensive than New Zealand they have become more 
complex and in some cases facilitate tax manipulation (particularly in the context of 
domestic source rules).
D. Summary
The statutory source rules adopted in New Zealand and the United States present two 
very different models. The New Zealand model is solely focused on source rules for 
non-residents, while the United States’ regime focuses on domestic and non-resident 
source rules. Despite the width of the source regimes (in particular the United States 
model) neither of the source regimes covered all classes of income.
In respect of non-residents both statutory schemes do improve clarity by setting out the 
criteria needed to make a determination of source, but, as discussed above, the United 
States model is inherently complex. Further, the New Zealand model still relies on some 
fact and circumstance determinations under the common law, which in some cases gives 
rise to complexity. Thus, despite setting out the source rules in a more coherent manner, 
both models so not fully satisfy the simplicity criterion.
404 Internal Revenue Code o f 1986, IRC §§ 864(e).
405 Doemberg, above n 384, 94-9 and Isenbergh (2000), above n 381, 29-33.
406 See, eg, H David Rosenbloom, ‘The David R Tillinghast Lecture: International tax arbitrage and 
the “international tax system’” (2000) 53 Tax Law Review 137.
407 McIntyre, above n 343, 3-66-7. The complex rules for non-residents are those relating to royalties 
(as they require a determination of use in respect of intangible property) and the sale of personal
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Although some manipulation is reduced, both source regimes were still vulnerable to 
avoidance. In the case of New Zealand this arose from reliance of legal form, while the 
manipulation under the United States model arises from conflicting policies, poorly 
implemented.
On balance, despite these shortcomings, generally these statutory models do seem to 
better meet the evaluative criterion of simplicity than the current Australian regime.
V. Reform options for source
A. Overview
In Part III it was established that Australia’s current law of source failed the evaluative 
criteria of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention tax avoidance. In order to 
explore the sub-thesis (that the law can be modified within the jurisdictional framework 
to more closely meet the evaluative criteria) a review of source models adopted in other 
jurisdiction was conducted in Part IV, focusing on the domestic statutory source rules 
adopted in the United States and New Zealand. Although it was established that neither 
country’s source rule model satisfied all the evaluative criteria, it is clear that clarity 
(simplicity) can be enhanced through a clear articulation of source.
Therefore, the purpose of this Part is to explore whether the modification, through 
codification, of Australia’s current existing source “rules” can result in the law that 
better meets the evaluative criteria. The approach to be adopted in Part V is the same as 
adopted in Chapters 3 and 4. It involves changing some of the existing tests from the 
facts and circumstance model to specific criteria models (ie trading-off equity for 
simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance).408
property in association with the office source rule (due to the passage of title test that determines 
place of sale).
408 This is consistent with the approach set out in Chapter 2, ie where the tax policy objectives are in 
conflict, the reform option that provides a balance between the equity tax policy objective and the 
simplicity and anti-avoidance tax policy objectives will prevail, where equity objective leads to 
negative outcome in terms of complexity (simplicity) and tax avoidance.
369
B. Reform options
In order to determine whether the current determination of source can be modified 
within the jurisdictional framework to better meet the evaluative criteria, the process 
will be to consider the various reform options under the following three headings: 
income from personal exertion, income from business (including the taxation of capital 
gains), and income from property.
1 Income from personal exertion
As discussed above (Part III C) there is no statutory or common law rule that determines 
the source of personal service income.409 However, it does appear that under the 
common law different weighting is applied in determining the source of income for 
persons earning income as employees (or even between categories or employees, eg 
artisans and office holders) versus those persons earning income from independent 
personal services. The place of service often gives weight to the determination of the 
source of employment income, while the place of business often gives weight to the 
determination of the source of income from personal services.
(a) Evaluating options for reform
In 1975 the Asprey Committee stated that the place of performance of service should be 
adopted as the test of source where the services are performed as an employee.410 The 
Committee recognised, but did not endorse, a recommendation by the Commissioner of 
Taxation that place of performance should also be the test for services preformed 
independently.411
Similarly, in A Tax System Redesigned,412 the Review of Business Taxation 
recommended the introduction a general source principle which provides that personal 
service income is to be sourced in Australia to the extent such income derives from
409 See, eg. Federal Commissioner o f Taxation v Mitchum (1965) 113 CLR 401, 408; 13 ATD 497, 
502; 9 AITR 559, 568 (Taylor J).
410 Asprey Report, above n 10, 275.
411 Asprey Report, ibid.
412 A Tax System Redesigned, above n 194.
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functions performed in Australia or risks assumed in Australia.413 Under the proposed 
rules, the place where a contract is concluded is to be disregarded for source purposes. 
This “place of service” approach is also used under both the United States and New 
Zealand source rules.
If all personal service income was sourced at the place of service, then horizontal 
inequity will be reduced as the source of personal service income will be determined for 
all taxpayers under the same criteria.
The adoption of a “place of service” rule should also improve simplicity. By specifying 
that the place of service is the source of personal service income, the rule is clearer, the 
outcome is more predictable and as a result, compliance costs should reduce.
Finally, the removal of any reliance on legal form (ie the place of contract) should 
reduce tax avoidance. Non-resident providers of independent services would be unable 
to argue that as the place of contract and the place of payment are offshore, that income 
arising from services provided in Australia did not have an Australian source.
(b) Finding the balance
Given the strong line of cases that continue to confirm that the place of service is the 
dominant fact in determining the source of employment income, the adoption of such a 
source rule would accord with the jurisdictional claim. This change would ensure that 
the test more closely meets the tax policy objectives, in particular simplicity and the 
prevention of avoidance.
However, the adoption of such a “place of service” test for independent service income 
and specific categories or employees (eg artisans and office holders) would be a major 
variation to the jurisdictional claim, as the place of business (including place of 
contract) is often the factor that determines the source of income from independent 
personal services. As this codification narrows the range of possible sources of 
independent service income that could be determined from the weighting of facts under
413 Ibid, Recommendation 23.2(c).
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the common law, the currently “unrestricted'’ jurisdictional claim is altered. Therefore, 
this change cannot be recommended in the context of the sub-thesis.
2 Income from business (including the taxation of capital gains)
As discussed above (Part III D) the source of business income is determined by:
• two specific statutory source rules (rules related to shipping and insurance 
income);
• two specific income allocation rules (rules where business is carried on partly in 
and partly out of Australia and specific deeming rules where a business is 
controlled off shore); and
• a CGT “sufficient connection” rule that prescribes the assets, owned by non­
residents for which Australia retains taxing rights;
and, outside these statutory criteria, is determined under the common law. The 
determination of source of business income at common law consists of weighing of all 
the facts.414
(a) Evaluating options for reform
The options for reform, if any, will be considered in the statutory rules and the common 
law.
(i) Business income statutory rules
The shipping and insurance rules (contained Division 12 and 15 of the 1936 Act) clearly 
deem an Australian source in respect of income that derives from functions performed 
in Australia, assets located or used in Australia, or risks assumed in Australia.41'̂ The 
rules are clear and the outcome is generally predictable. Thus, they are simple and are 
not open to blatant manipulation.
414 As noted above, the key factors in determining the source of business income include the location 
of economic activity, importance of contracts and the location of real property.
415 They are consistent with Recommendation 23.2(c) of A Tax System Redesigned, above n 194, 684.
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The other key statutory rule (which assigns an Australian source to income derived 
where goods are manufactured offshore by a non-resident, or goods are purchased off­
shore, imported into Australia and sold) was found by the Asprey Committee to be 
simple and resistant to tax avoidance.416 Finally, although there are concerns that non­
residents can easily avoid capital gains tax by disposing of non-resident interposed 
entities with underlying Australian assets, this manipulation will not be resolved by 
source codification as it is an enforcement and collection issue arising from legal form, 
not related to source.
(ii) Common law
The determination of the source of business income at common law is far from simple 
and, being based upon legal jurisdictional concepts (such as the place of contract), it 
fails to satisfy the anti-avoidance criterion. The Asprey Committee and the Review of 
Business Taxation both recommended the abandonment these legal jurisdictional 
concepts (including the use of the place of contract as the basis for source 
determination) .417 The Asprey Committee recommended the adoption of rules that seek 
to identify source of income arising where it is a product of economic activity in 
Australia. 418
Similarly, the Review of Business Taxation recommended the introduction of a general 
source principle that provides that “income is to be sourced in Australia to the extent 
such income derives from functions performed in Australia, assets located or used in 
Australia, or risks assumed in Australia.” 419
416 Asprey Report, above n 10, 273. However the committee wish to limit its scope “. . . to stop profit 
from a casual sale having a source in Australia.”
417 Asprey Report, above n 10, 265 and A Tax System Redesigned, above n 194, 684, 
Recommendation 23.2(c)(ii).
418 Asprey Report, ibid. The Committee produced a list of possible source rules in Ch 17 A.
419 A Tax System Redesigned, above n 194, Recommendation 23.2(c)(i). This approach is not new. In 
the 1930s the Second Royal Commission on Taxation noted in applying the principle of taxing 
based upon economic allegiance (obligation) that the rules need to look at “where the income is 
physically or economically produced” and where “the final results of the process, as a complete 
production of wealth,” is actually to be found -  see Commonwealth, Royal Commission on 
Taxation, Reports (1933-34), 65. There is also strong academic support for source rules linked to 
the location of real economic activity, the location of customers, workers or assets -  see, eg, Graetz 
(2001), above n 324, 1419.
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An alternate approach is to adopt the permanent establishment test in lieu of the current 
determination of source of business income. Thus, an Australian source will only arise if 
the non-resident has sufficient presence in Australia.420 As the domestic source rules 
would be consistent with DTAs the horizontal inequity between non-residents covered 
by DTAs and those not would be resolved. Consistency with the DTAs would simplify 
the law by broadly having one set of rules. However, casual sales caught under ss 38 to 
43 of the 1936 Act would no longer be within Australia’s tax net.
(b) Finding the balance
While the statutory rules appear to broadly meet the evaluative criteria, providing little 
scope for reform, the determination of the source of business income under the common 
law cannot meet the evaluative criteria without significant reform. This reform requires 
codification of the common law principles (if possible) and modification in accordance 
with the suggested models, such that the new statutory rules link source to the location 
of real economic activity (ie the location of customers, workers or assets).
As codification narrows range of possible sources of business income that could be 
determined from the weighting of facts under the common law, the currently 
“unrestricted” jurisdictional claim is altered. Therefore, as this change would 
significantly vary the current jurisdictional claim, in the context of the sub-thesis the 
suggestions cannot be adopted. Thus, it is not possible to vary the source of business 
income “rules” to better meet the evaluative criteria.
3 Income from property
The determination of the source of income from property is based upon a combination 
of statutory tests and the common law depending upon the characterisation of the
421income.
420 See Magney (1994b), above n 293, 47-8 and Cannon (2004), above n 6, 9-11. This approach is 
broadly consistent with a number of the recommendations of the Asprey Committee - see Asprey 
Report, above n 10, 273.
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Thus, where the amount is dividend or royalty income the source is determined 
principally under statute. The source of a dividend paid to a non-resident is determined 
under the 1936 Act s 44(1) to be the source of the profits from which the dividend has 
been paid. The process for determining “source of profits” is determined under the 
common law. Similarly, there are two statutory source rules applicable to royalties; a 
general provision and a specific rule for certain “natural resource” royalties. Broadly, 
under these rules a royalty will have an Australian source where it is paid or credited by 
a resident to a non-resident. As the statutory rules apply for limited purposes (ie they do 
not deal with inbound royalties and in respect of foreign tax credits), the source of 
royalty income is also determined under the common law.
Where the amount is interest or income from real property, the common law tends to 
have precedence. Although interest is deemed to have an Australian source where the 
monies are secured by mortgage on an Australian property, outside this narrow statutory 
source rule the process for determining source is set out in the common law. Similarly, 
the source of income from real property is determined at common law. Generally, as the 
real property income derives from immovable property, its source is where the 
underlying property is located.
(a) Evaluating options for reform
One approach to simplifying the determination of the source of property income is to 
codify the existing source rules such that a determined source could occur without 
reference to the common law. This codification would minimise avoidance through 
manipulation of the place of contract. By using the debit/equity rules characterisation 
issues and manipulation, as experienced in the United States, could be minimised.
The Asprey Committee went further suggesting that the test of origin for purposes of 
withholding tax should in general be adopted as the tests of source for purposes of tax 
by assessment.422 The Committee argued that the tests would improve simplicity, being
421 The crucial factors in determining source of property income at common law are the legal 
jurisdictional factors (such as the location of the property) and the contract under which the rights 
give rise to the income.
422 Asprey Report, above n 10, 278. Also see Magney (1994b), above n 293, 48-68.
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easy to administer, simple to comply with (ie determine a fixed percentage of the gross 
income amount) and providing certainty.423
(b) Finding the balance
Despite the advantages of removing impact of arbitrary legal jurisdictional tests (such as 
the place of contract), particularly in respect of interest, through the adoption of origin 
rules, that very removal represents a jurisdictional change.
However, it would be possible to codify the source of income from real property in 
Australia as having a source in Australia. As this position is reflected in the common 
law it would be within jurisdiction.424 This minor change would clarify the law resulting 
in some increased certainty (simplicity).
C. Summary
As source of income in Australia is generally determined by weighing facts in 
accordance with legal jurisdiction principles embodied in the common law, it is difficult 
to modify the rules within the jurisdictional framework to better meet the evaluative 
criteria. Only limited codification, in respect of income from employment and income 
from real property, can be undertaken without changes to the jurisdictional claim. Thus, 
despite the merits of statutory source rules, the determination of source cannot be 
broadly modified to better meet the essential criteria.
VI. Conclusion
A. The main thesis
The purpose of the analysis in Parts II and III of this Chapter was to establish the main 
thesis in respect of the determination of the source of income, that is:
423 Asprey Report, ibid and McIntyre, above n 343, 3-66.
424 Asprey Report, above n 10, 276.
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The law, as applying in the 1997 Act, is inadequate as the law fails in its practical 
application to satisfy the "essential objectives” o f equity, efficiency, simplicity and the 
prevention o f tax avoidance.
In Part III of the Chapter, the scope of the determination of the source of income was 
explored, and it was found that the existing law for determining source is inadequate. 
Overall the approach for determining source fails in identified ways to satisfy the equity, 
efficiency, simplicity and prevention of tax avoidance evaluative criteria. The major 
weakness is the factual element of the determination at common law, which in certain 
situations:
• results in horizontal inequity;
• gives rise the lack of simplicity; and
• leaves the rules open to manipulation.
Thus, it has been established that the determination of the source of income in the 1997 
Act is inadequate as the law fails in its practical application to satisfy the "essential 
objectives’' of equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance.
B. The sub-thesis
The purpose of the analysis in Parts IV and V of this Chapter was to establish the sub­
thesis in respect of the determination of the source of income, that is:
The domestic law can be modified within the jurisdictional framework to more closely 
meet the "essential objectives” o f equity, efficiency, simplicity and the prevention o f tax 
avoidance.
The comparative study in Part IV indicated that codified source rules do better meet the 
evaluative criteria of simplicity and prevention of tax avoidance. However, despite the 
merits of statutory source rules, the analysis in Part V found that there was limited scope 
to modify the process for determining source, within the jurisdictional framework to 
better meet the "essential objectives”. The minor changes identified were limited to
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codifying source rules in respect of income from employment and income from real 
property.
In summary, given the factual nature of the determination of source at common law, 
there is little scope to introduce statutory source rules without altering the jurisdictional 
frame work.
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Chapter 6
Summation, revelations and the way ahead 
I. Summation
This thesis has argued that the law of residency and determination of source under 
Australia’s income tax law (the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)) is inadequate in 
its practical application when judged against the four tax policy objectives; equity, 
efficiency, simplicity and the prevention of tax avoidance. It establishes that the 
residency rules (applicable to individuals, companies and trusts) and the determination 
of the source of income do not meet those objectives (particularly in respect of 
simplicity and the prevention of avoidance).
This finding is significant as it provides a contemporary, comprehensive evaluation of 
residency and source (including the impact of related rules under Australia’s system of 
DTAs) against a robust tax policy framework. Although there have been recent 
Australian governmental reviews, such as the 1999 broad inquiry into Australia’s 
business tax regime by the Review of Business Taxation1 2and the 2002 Treasury Review 
of International Taxation Arrangements, they have not been focused on a 
comprehensive review of the key jurisdictional boundaries of the Australian tax system, 
residency and source. Further, both governmental and academic criticisms of the rules in 
the past have tended to be focused upon identifying isolated circumstances where the 
law in operation fails and then to make recommendations for reform. This analysis has 
not been based upon a comprehensive review of residency and source against specified 
objective tax policy criteria.
The thesis also highlights the lack of coherent tax policy development in respect of 
defining these jurisdictional taxing boundaries. Although there was governmental debate 
from the late 1880’s until the 1930s on whether Australia should tax on a residency
1 Review of Business Taxation, Commonwealth, A Tax System Redesigned (1999).
2 Treasury, Commonwealth, Review o f International Taxation Arrangements: Consultation Paper 
(2002) (the Consultation Paper).
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basis, this analysis did not involve a systematic analysis of what particular transactions 
should be in Australia's tax net, except to generally exclude foreign source dividends 
and other income taxed in other jurisdictions.
The thesis also argues that there is scope to modify the law, within the jurisdictional 
framework, so that it more closely meets the tax policy objectives. The thesis identifies 
very limited areas where change, consistent with the tax policy objectives and within the 
jurisdictional boundaries is achievable. It concludes, after an exhaustive review and 
analysis of the operation of residency and source, that any significant change is not 
possible without reconsidering Australia’s jurisdictional claim.
This finding is significant as it reinforces calls made by the ATO in 1997 in its Report 
on Taxation and the Internet for the current source, residency, and permanent 
establishment rules to be substantially revised,3 4 and the more limited reform 
recommendations of the two more recent governmental reviews (ie a generic 
recommendation for reform of the source “rules”5 and options for reforming elements of 
the company residency test6). It illustrates the need for a contemporary comprehensive 
review of residency and source, particularly in light of globalization, the development 
and explosion of the trade in services and the communications revolution.
II. Findings and revelations
As there are a myriad of possible tax policy objectives against which the effectiveness of 
the law can be measured, the initial analysis undertaken (in Chapter 2) was to identify 
the most appropriate tests for evaluating the law. This involved setting out a range of 
possible tax policy objectives, which could be used to evaluate the adequacy of the law 
of residency and source, drawn from major and minor Australian inquiries and reviews, 
major tax reform reviews conducted in other jurisdictions, independently commissioned 
studies and academic writing.
3  •
3 See generally Peter Harris, Metamorphosis o f the Australasian Income Tax: 1866 to 1922 
Research Study No 37, Australian Tax Research Foundation (2002).
4 Australian Taxation Office, Commonwealth, Tax and the Internet: Discussion Report (1997), vii.
5 A Tax System Redesigned (1999), above n 1, 684, Recommendation 23.2(c)(ii).
6 Board of Taxation, Commonwealth, International Taxation: A Report to the Treasurer (2003) 109 
(Recommendation 3.12).
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A series of common tax policy objectives emerges from that analysis. First, there is wide 
spread use in evaluating the effectiveness of existing laws and the proposed tax reforms 
of the three tax policy objectives of equity, simplicity and efficiency. Second, underlying 
a number of most recent reform reviews, the policy objective of reducing tax avoidance 
is also commonly used. The scope of these four tax policy objectives was examined in 
detail in order to define each term and set out the process for measuring the extent to 
which the law of residency and source complies with the objectives. This was important 
given the legal focus of this study as the evaluative process is qualitative in nature rather 
than quantitative or empirical.
In Chapters 3 to 5 the residency rules applicable to individuals, companies and trusts 
and the determinations of source income were evaluated against these tax policy 
objectives. There were three key findings.
First, in the examination of the residency and source rules it was found that overall they 
mostly failed in some way to satisfy the equity, efficiency, simplicity and prevention of 
tax avoidance evaluative criteria. The major weakness in most of the tests is the 
“individual fact and circumstances” element, which in certain situations:
• results in horizontal inequity;
• gives rise to the lack of simplicity; and
• leaves the rules open to manipulation.
Although the facts and circumstances element of the tests does cater for a taxpayer’s or 
a transaction’s particular circumstances, a determination in accordance with the 
“individual facts and circumstances” of a matter will not, in most cases, ensure that the 
law has delivered horizontal equity.
Second, another cause of the complexity is the tendency to attempt to limit the 
application of particular corporate tax policy rules (for example, those rules applying in 
respect of deemed companies and those that operate for specific tax policy purposes)7 
by modifying the company residency definitions in s 6(1) of the 1936 Act. The result is 
a myriad of definitions with many of the failings identified above. In designing the
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limitations in terms of current jurisdictional constraints, the policy makers have 
imported the weakness of the company residency definitions as well as imbedding 
common law concepts (such as central management and control). A similar process has 
occurred in respect of specialised trust residency definitions.
Finally, that the law of residency and source is archaic. The statutory residency rules 
were introduced in 1930, while some of the statutory source rules have their genesis in 
the 1936 Act, for others it is found in the 1915 Act and others in the 1890s’ State and
• oNew Zealand income tax acts. Similarly the common law principles in respect of 
residency and source were established in the United Kingdom in the late 1890’s. The 
fact the law has ancient origins in itself is not the issue, rather it is the ability of that law 
to engage in a 21st century world where trade in services outstrips trade in goods and the 
communications revolution has removed the need for traditional physical linkages to 
jurisdiction. It has been clearly shown that to respond to these environmental changes 
will involve recasting the jurisdictional claim and it is imperative that this process is 
transparent.
In the context of residency rules for individuals, the comparative study of individual 
residency rules found that whether a jurisdiction adopts a facts and circumstance 
criterion or a more objective criterion to determine residency is not dependent on the 
basis of the legal system (civil or common law) nor the structure of the tax codes (single 
code or schedular code). Although this study was not repeated in respect of company 
residency and source, similar trends seem evident. It appears nations set their residency 
rules based upon each jurisdiction’s own economic and social value judgments.
The broader comparative studies in respect of residency and source also revealed that 
the models adopted in other jurisdictions often struggled to satisfy the tax policy 
objectives. However, individually, the rules operating in other jurisdictions do offer 
alternatives that could be adopted in any future recasting of the Australian rules. The 
foreign individual residency rules offer the greatest number of options, while the models 
of corporate residency operating in other jurisdictions are merely variants of the tests
7 Specific purpose residency rules apply in the FSI rules, the dividend imputation system, and thin 
capitalization.
8 For example, as mentioned above in Chapter 4, the ship charterer source rules were introduced into 
New South Wales in 1895 and in Victoria in 1896. The rules in NSW were adopted from the The
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adopted in Australia. The source options are similarly limited: codification or the status 
quo. However, despite limitations on reform options the study did illustrate how 
improvements in simplicity, equity and efficiency can be achieved in both the residency 
and source context by merely changing the structure of some of the tests to counter the 
problems identified.
Finally, the thesis examined the extent to which the law could be modified, within the 
existing jurisdictional claim, to better meet the evaluative criteria. Outside some 
recommendations about gender specific language and other minor technical 
improvement the major recommendations were:
• in respect of individual residency tests, that the superannuation test should be 
repealed and the ordinary resident test removed and some minor amendments to 
the domicile, 183 day and resides tests;* 9
• in respect of the company residency rules, that the “voting power” test be 
repealed and the “central management and control” test amended to restore the 
“carries on business” element of the test;
• in respect of trusts, there were no recommendations, rather an observation that 
given the rules rely heavily on the residency rules relating to individuals and 
companies, it is only through the improvement in these underlying concepts that 
the residency rules for trusts can be improved: and
• in respect of source of income, given that the determination is generally 
conducted by weighing facts in accordance with legal jurisdiction principles 
embodied in the common law, it is difficult to modify the rules within the 
jurisdictional framework to better meet the evaluative criteria, except for limited 
codification in respect of income from employment and income from real 
property.
In the main, the changes recommended are minor changes. Although they result in rules 
that better meet the evaluative criteria, the improvement is not dramatic.
Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1891 (NZ) Schedule C (1) -  FH Salusbury and W
Newberry, Salusbury and Newberry’s Land and Income Tax Assessment Act o f 1895 (1896), 86.
9 These recommendations were that the “permanent place of abode” gloss of the domicile test should 
be amended to restore the original intent of the test, and the 183 day test amended to clarify how
383
There are also two observations that can be made from the reform evaluation process. 
First, the less abstract the circumstance the easier it is for nations to apply legally based 
geographic jurisdictional rules. For example, it is generally simple to determine where a 
real person is physically present, but to determine where a company physically “lives” is 
conceptually difficult. Similarly, given that profit is merely the difference between 
income and expenditure, finding its existence in a physical space (ie applying fictional 
physical source) is conceptually difficult and artificial.10 Therefore, it is not surprising 
that geographically based rules of attachment, developed in the late 19th and early 20th 
century struggle to deliver law that is equitable, efficient, simple and prevents tax 
avoidance.
The second observation is that although these changes, combined with some technical 
alternations, will result in the rules better meeting the evaluative criteria, greater 
improvements can only be achieved through variations to the jurisdictional claim.
In summary, the thesis provides an exhaustive, contemporary evaluation of Australian 
residency and source against the evaluative criteria of equity, efficiency, simplicity and 
the prevention of tax avoidance. It establishes that there is little scope for dramatic 
improvement without a rearticulation of Australia’s jurisdictional claim (ie the “rules of 
engagement” with which Australia seeks to enforce its rights to tax).
III. The way ahead
As stated in Chapter 2 (Part IV A), from a policy perspective, it is preferable to 
undertake a fundamental evaluation of Australia’s taxation jurisdictional claim, than to 
adopt piecemeal solutions that merely fiddle at the edges.* 11 To ensure the success of 
such a fundamental evaluation of Australia's taxation jurisdictional claims, it is
the period is calculated by defining what time period constitutes a day and to specify a 
commencement date for residency.
10 John Prebble, ‘Fictions of Income Tax’ (2002) (Paper Presented at the 14th Australasian Tax 
Teachers Association Conference, Auckland, 18 January 2002) 3. Prebble notes that “[t]o cope 
with companies one must operate as if the fiction of corporate residence were a fact. To cope with 
profits, one must attribute a fictional physical source to income. That is the problem of place in a 
nutshell.”
11 Alice Abreu, ‘The difference between expatriates and Mrs Gregory - Citizenship can matter’ 
(1995) Tax Notes International 1613, 1615. Abreu notes “[i]t would be nice if we could stop 
reacting to problems in the tax system by attempting to design new and improved Band-Aids and 
could turn instead to a comprehensive examination of the structural features of the system that 
cause the problem to arise in the first place.”
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necessary first to clearly articulate what is the scope of that claim, before comparing it 
with the existing claim. It is only with this policy articulation that simple, equitable and 
efficient residency and source rules can be designed. In formulating this reform policy, 
consideration must be given to determine who or what should be a resident and which 
income of non-residents we wish to tax. It is only with this articulation that the absence 
of taxation can be viewed as an intended result rather than the result of avoidance.
Given globalisation, the changes in the world trade and technology revolution, the case 
for reform has never been stronger. Ultimately, the solution lies with a new, clear 
articulation of Australia’s jurisdictional claim (“rules of engagement”) based upon 
robust tax policy objectives.
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